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 In the fall of 2003 Syed Mumtaz Ali, leader of the Islamic Institute of Civil 
Justice located in Toronto Ontario announced in a media interview that his institute was 
in a new position to offer faith based arbitration to Muslims in Ontario in family law 
matters such as divorce, custody, and wills. This announcement precipitated a media 
storm. Participants in the public debate on faith based arbitration, or what came to be 
called the “sharia debate,” worried that vulnerable people such as Muslim women and 
children might not receive fair treatment by faith based arbitrators. Although, these were 
legitimate concerns, I argue that much of the public discourse was deeply Islamophobic, 
and factually wrong in several respects. I argue that the media played an important role in 
advancing what I call imperial secularism and what others have called colonial feminism. 
Furthermore, no one knew what was taking place on the ground in Muslim communities 
with regard to alternative dispute resolution of family law matters generally. My 
fieldwork research revealed two unanticipated results. First, the vast majority of Muslim 
adherents seeking out alternative dispute resolution services related to family law matters 
were Muslim women rather than Muslim men. Second, the vast majority of Muslims 
seeking out these services were looking for a religious divorce in addition to a civil 
divorce so that they could remarry within their religious community. They were not on 
the whole seeking guidance on matters, for example, regarding custody, division of 
family assets, or support payment amounts upon divorce.  
 The Dalton McGuinty government ultimately decided to ban faith based 
arbitration, making its announcement on September 11, 2005. However, I argue that due 
to de facto legal pluralism there are several other avenues for making religious legal 
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traditions legally enforceable, for example, through faith based mediation, if the 
disputants agree to enter the results of a mediation into a separation agreement. I argue 
that this apparent oversight of the resulting policy is in part due to a public discourse that 
treated vulnerable people generally and Muslim women in particular paternalistically as 
“children” in need of rescue. I argue however that given the realities of Canada’s Family 
Law Act, it is crucial to develop policy that recognizes vulnerable people as agents, 
facilitating agency rather than essentially denying it. Furthermore, my fieldwork suggests 
that many of the practices of Muslim faith mediation are much more reasonable than 
several participants in the public debate assumed, questioning the Islamophobic tone of 
the public debate. However, there are still risks in faith based mediation and the like, and 
for that reason I make several policy recommendations designed to facilitate the agency 
of vulnerable people to protect themselves.  
 Notably, Orthodox Jewish communities have been using faith based arbitration 
for several years. Therefore, I conducted research to see how the McGuinty government’s 
decision affected them. The unanticipated result was that very little had changed in 
practice for Jewish communities precisely because of de facto legal pluralism.  
I argue that the Islamophobic discourse of the public “sharia debate” and the limited 
policy formed following the debate are the result in part of imperial secularism and 
colonial feminism. Therefore, I argue that anti-imperial secularism and post-secular 
feminism should be developed within Canada’s larger multicultural framework in order 
to promote improved public discourse and public policy that treats vulnerable people 
generally and Muslim women specifically as agents rather than as “children” in need of 
paternalistic rescue.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 In this dissertation I examine how a secular Canada, in the context of the policy 
goals of its laws on multiculturalism, accommodates the Canadian Charter guarantee of 
religious freedom of people who wish to practice faith based arbitration in Ontario, as 
well as what the limits of this accommodation are.1 This project also explores the public 
policy implications with regard to the recent public debate, legislative outcome, and 
ongoing practical issues of faith-based (formal) arbitration and (informal) mediation with 
particular, though not exclusive, focus on Muslim communities, in Ontario.  
Consequently, this study will examine negotiations between the dominant society and the 
minority or minoritized2 community; religious intolerance and discrimination; and 
diversity within the Muslim community itself. The primary research will include 
interviews and surveys of Muslim men and women, as well as interviews of various 
arbitration and mediation providers. In order to make a point of comparison, I also 
interview a number of Jewish providers of faith based arbitration. I attempt to position 
myself appropriately with regard to interviewing members of minoritized communities, 
because as an academic researcher I crossed boundaries of gender, race, religion, and 
class; however, the main thrust of the project remains a theoretical and practical 
exploration of the multicultural public policy and practice surrounding faith-based 
arbitration and mediation.  
                                                 
1 This project was funded by a Canada Graduate Scholarship from the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). 
2 The word “minoritized” points to the question of who creates the boundaries and knowledge of what 
constitutes “minority communities.”  Rather than simply being objectively given or produced internally by 
minorities themselves, communities are “minoritized”, that is they are constituted through knowledge that 
is produced about them mainly by the dominant majority community. See Zine 2012; Cobb 2010; and 
Robinson 2003. 
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 In my theoretical analysis I attempt to theorize the modern concept of religion as a 
located concept in order to theorize secularism in such a way that what I have called 
“imperial secularism” may be recognized and countered with anti-imperial secularism. 
Adding onto forms of critical multiculturalism that aim to resist dominance and establish 
genuine equality for minoritized groups, and in addition to anti-racist, feminist, and anti-
colonial forms of multiculturalism, I add the requirement of an anti-imperialist secularism 
and post-secular feminism. In my analysis of the history and discourse of the so called 
“sharia debate” I argue that the prevalence of the stereotypical figure of the “imperiled 
Muslim woman,” as coined by Sherene Razack, has led to policy that is designed to 
protect  people who are imagined to be devoid of agency. I argue that this is a major 
shortcoming of policy resulting from the debate as vulnerable people generally and 
Muslim women specifically would benefit much more from policy that promotes and 
facilitates agency particularly given the realities of Ontario’s family law. I criticize the 
stereotypes prevalent in the media debate on faith based arbitration as outlined by 
Razack, including what one might call, “uncivilized sharia,” to signify the stereotypical 
assumption that sharia is inherently barbaric, unchangeable, and intrinsically 
misogynistic. I argue along with Razack that these stereotypes do not in fact effectively 
dismantle patriarchal inequity or violence either in Islamic or Western culture, but rather 
reinforce it in both. Therefore I argue for dismantling such stereotypes in the interests of 
dismantling patriarchal inequity and violence and opening up a new social discourse and 
practice in which Muslim women’s agency can be more effectively acknowledged and 
respected in the context of either or both religious and secular spaces in Canada.  
 2
 In my fieldwork I find that in practice the most pressing issue of the sharia debate 
for Muslim leaders and adherents in Ontario was not faith-based arbitration, but rather 
religious divorce. Furthermore, women are by far the most common seekers of these 
kinds of services. In other words, the government`s paternalistic decision to protect the 
vulnerable Muslim woman from uncivilized sharia ended up robbing many Muslim 
women of their agency, that is, the control over their ability to divorce and enter into new 
religiously sanctioned marriages. I make several policy suggestions based on these 
unanticipated findings. In conclusion, I argue that certain kinds of secularism can create 
real barriers to the free exercise of agency by vulnerable and religiously minoritized 
women, especially those who either may want to use faith based alternative dispute 
resolution services, or who stand to gain the most from the new protections the 
Arbitration Act now affords, but cannot.3 Beginning with Ayelet Shachar’s proposal for 
transformative accommodation with regard to the potential for and limits of plural 
(religious) legal accommodation in Canada, as well as Anver Emon’s proposal to 
facilitate multicultural jurisprudence, I suggest that Shachar’s proposal is ironically both 
closer to being realized and further from being achieved as a result of the “sharia debate” 
and policy decisions following. I argue that the proposals for institutional and legal 
pluralism resonate with Veit Bader’s call for institutional pluralism and Lori Beaman’s 
commitment to “deep equality.” I point out that two substantial changes in policy are 
necessary in order to fully realize her vision of transformative accommodation. Taking up 
Emon’s suggestion, I argue that publicly funding religious family-service civil society 
institutions at the price of government oversight, while it risks paternalism and 
                                                 
3 See chapters 4 and 5 for further exploration of why this is the case.  
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imperialism, could at least be potentially facilitated immediately despite the fact that faith 
based arbitration may not be allowable in Ontario for some time (Emon 2007; 2011).  
 
1.1 Faith Based Arbitration and the “Sharia Debate”4 
 In 2003, the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice announced that it was in a new 
position to offer legally binding faith based arbitration to Muslim adherents in family-
law-related disputes such as divorce, separation agreements, and wills. This 
announcement precipitated nothing short of a media storm over “sharia” courts in 
Ontario. After much public debate, including a government commissioned inquiry into 
the issue led by Marion Boyd, on September 11, 2005 the government led by Dalton 
McGuinty announced their decision decided to end enforcement of arbitration agreements 
based on law coming from non-Canadian jurisdictions, effectively ending the practice of 
producing enforceable arbitration agreements based on religious laws as well.5 My 
doctoral project explores how a secular Canada, in the context of the goals of its 
multicultural policies, accommodates the Canadian Charter guarantee of religious 
freedom for Canadians who wish to practice faith based arbitration in Ontario, and what 
the limits of this accommodation are. In this section I will trace a brief history of the so-
                                                 
4 I will discuss Sharia in more detail in chapter 5. At this point I will offer a definition of Sharia provided 
by Frederick M. Denny. “Literally, it means ‘the way to the water hole’ but also includes the meaning of 
‘the right path’ to follow, and thus came to mean ‘law.’ Although it is correct to translate the word as 
simply ‘law,’ it is better to regard law in the strict, codified sense as only one dimension of Shari’a… it is 
also the right teaching, the right way to go in life, and the power that stands behind what is right… The 
Shari’a, as divine legislation, is not the same as fiqh, although it includes it. Fiqh means ‘understanding’ 
and fairly early came to be the main term for the ‘science of jurisprudence’” (2011, 187-188). 
5 Dalton McGuinty at the time of the “sharia debate” was the premier of the Province of Ontario and leader 
of the Ontario Provincial Liberal Party. Ontario is the largest of Canada’s ten provinces and three territories 
demographically and the second largest geographically. McGuinty’s liberals enjoyed a majority 
government at this time, and the Liberal Party of Canada is generally situated in the centre of Canada’s 
political spectrum.  
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called “sharia debate,” and provide some background in order to understand the logistics 
of arbitration and family law in Canada generally.  
 The first media event of the “sharia debate” took place in the fall of 2003 when 
Judy Van Rhijn published an article in the Law Times based on an interview with Syed 
Mumtaz Ali, president of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ), about his plans to 
offer civil arbitrations rooted in sharia law. Mumtaz Ali’s own statements suggested that 
there had been a recent change in Ontario’s Arbitration Act to allow for Muslims to 
arbitrate civil disputes according to sharia. Several media articles uncritically assumed 
this to be true, suggesting incorrectly that this was a new development for Ontario law.6 
This was not the case. In fact, the legal option of arbitration, including faith based 
arbitration, has existed explicitly in Ontario’s Arbitration Act since 1991. The Ontario 
Arbitration Act allows two disputants to chose any third party they mutually agree on to 
arbitrate a civil dispute. The arbitrator chosen then could conceivably be a religious 
arbitrator. Religious arbitrators could be asked to arbitrate family disputes involving 
divorce matters concerning spousal and child support, division of family assets, and 
custody of children, as well as business, employee, or consumer disputes. Jewish 
communities most notably, though not alone, have been utilizing this option for many 
years (Syrtash 1992, 98-108). Moreover, even outside of the Arbitration Act, all 
                                                 
6 “Sharia law in Canada? Yes. The province of Ontario has authorized the use of sharia law in civil 
arbitrations.” In Margaret Wente. 2004. “Life under sharia, in Canada?” GlobeandMail.com. Accessed 
Saturday, May 29, 2004. “Sharia tribunals are reported to be operating informally, but their decisions are 
not recognized under Ontario’s Arbitration Act.” In Michael Valpy and Karen Howlett. 2005.  “Female 
MPP’s concerns delay sharia decision.” GlobalandMail.com. Accessed Thursday September 8, 2005. “. . . 
makes it impossible to understand what former Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd was thinking when 
she recommended Jan. 17 that the province allow sharia tribunals to settle family disputes for Muslims.” In 
Mona Eltahawy. 2005. “Ontario must say ‘no’ to Islamic law.” The Christian Science Monitor. Accessed 
February 2, 2005. “A Canadian Islamic group is trying to prevent the word shariah from being included in 
Ontario’s Arbitration Act.” In Canadian Press. 2004. “Islamic group against Ontario use of Sharia law.” 
CTV.ca. Accessed Sunday August 22, 2004. “The advent of traditional Islamic law, or sharia, to settle 
family disputes has set off an impassioned debate in Canada.” In Ingrid Peritz. 2005. “Ebadi decries idea of 
Islamic law in Canada.” GlobeandMail.com. Accessed Tuesday June 14, 2005.  
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Canadians were free to enter into various legally binding private agreements based on 
any legal system, religious or otherwise, they mutually agreed upon as long as they do 
not contravene criminal law or the Charter (Bunting 2009; Bakht 2006). Therefore, not 
only has faith based arbitration been practiced under the aegis of the Arbitration Act for 
several years, this openness to private resolution of civil disputes has been a feature of 
Ontario’s Family Law Act for many more years than the current Arbitration Act has been 
in existence. Although the debate surrounding faith based arbitration raised legitimate 
concerns about contracting out legally enforceable decision making powers to a third 
person who may not produce equitable decisions, the widespread notion that religious 
tradition could not already play a part in Ontario family law generally or arbitration 
specifically was inaccurate. Contrary to popular perception, the IICJ was not asking for 
new concessions or accommodations. Rather, it was simply voicing its intention to 
participate in a legal option that had been open to all faith communities for several years.  
 As I mention above, this misconception likely has its genesis, at least in part, in 
Mumtaz Ali’s own words. What Mumtaz Ali meant by ‘new’ was that the IICJ was 
newly organized to provide this service, and thus for the first time there was an 
organization with the necessary training and knowledge to produce legally enforceable 
arbitrations in line with the already existing requirements of the Arbitration Act.7 
Whereas Mumtaz Ali wanted to draw the attention of Ontario Muslims to this possibility 
of practicing faith based arbitration with government enforcement, to publicly celebrate 
Muslim institutional integration and participation in Canada, and perhaps to take credit 
for more than was his doing, much of the media reaction interpreted the ‘newness’ of this 
development as something quite different—and much more pernicious.  
                                                 
7 Personal interview with a prominent representative of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice. 
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 Marion Boyd dedicates an entire section of her report to an explanation of the 
Arbitration Act. She strongly emphasizes the role of agency in both arbitration and 
mediation (Boyd 2004, 9-17). Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) generally refers to 
alternatives to the state court system. Boyd cites several alternative dispute resolution 
methods on a continuum of formal to informal stating,  
They may ignore [civil disputes] or walk away from them. They may resolve 
them directly between parties, by informal discussion or by formal negotiation or 
by arbitrary measures, like flipping a coin. They may involve other people not 
personally involved in their dispute, such as professional advisors for each 
disputant. The parties may get independent help in resolving the dispute, by 
asking advice of a neutral third party. They may ask a third party to be more or 
less actively and more or less formally involved in helping them come to an 
agreement, a process known as mediation. The disputants may also give up on the 
quest for an agreed resolution to the dispute, and choose instead to have a neutral 
third party decide the dispute. When this is done by agreement of the parties to the 
dispute, it is known as arbitration. (2004, 9) 
Furthermore, she reminds Ontarians that none of these dispute resolution mechanisms are 
policed by the state, as “civil society functions independently of government” (2004, 
10).8 Only arbitrations properly performed, or any legal contracts such as a separation 
agreement signed following the informal resolution of a dispute, are enforceable by the 
courts. The Civil Justice Review process which took place in the mid-1990s established 
that most civil disputes are required to go to mandatory mediation before appearing in a 
                                                 
8 Boyd includes an extensive discussion of the workings as well as the legal limits to arbitration in her 
report. See Boyd 2004, 13-17. 
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provincial court (Boyd 2004, 10). However, in the realm of family law, disputants can 
choose not to go to mediation if they wish.  
 However, arbitration differs from mediation, even mandatory mediation, in two 
important respects. The first concerns decision making power and the second concerns 
advisory versus non-advisory decisions. Generally speaking, mediation allows two 
disputants to retain their decision making powers. The mediator in this case works 
towards mutually agreeable solutions between the two disputants, and has no decision 
making power per se. An arbitration on the other hand is more like a court, with the 
arbitrator acting as judge. The arbitrator is given decision making power by the two 
disputants, usually because they cannot agree on a mutually acceptable solution. The 
arbitrator in this case makes a binding decision on behalf of both disputants. This would 
be a “non-advisory” arbitration, because the point is to make a final and binding decision 
rather than to further advise the disputants. However, it is important to understand that 
two disputants might ask an arbitrator to perform an “advisory” arbitration. The couple 
might be interested to see what the arbitrator’s decision would be if he or she were given 
the power to decide on their behalf, without the decision being a binding one just yet. 
One imam I interviewed has performed such advisory arbitrations. In one such case after 
arbitrating a divorce case, the couple still could not agree to accept the advisory result 
and finally went to an Ontario court to have the matter settled in a binding manner (Imam 
Interview #14). Alternatively, the couple might have decided to enter the results of the 
advisory arbitration decision into a separation agreement, at which point the outcomes of 
the arbitration decision would become enforceable by the state. The same could be done 
with the outcomes of a mediation as well.  
 8
 There are several costs and benefits to using private forms of dispute resolution 
rather than the court system to resolve matters relating to family law. Privately crafted 
solutions to disputes generally appear to be more acceptable to disputants as they are 
frequently more enduring than court decisions have been (Boyd 2004, 10). There is much 
more flexibility privately for parties to creatively resolve their issues, whereas a court of 
law makes standard decisions based primarily on established statutes and court 
precedents. People indeed appear to more consistently honour privately resolved 
agreements because they have been able to shape the agreements to their particular 
situation, rather than having the judgment handed down from above (Boyd 2004, 10). 
Parties frequently also prefer the privacy of the process to the potential discomfort of 
having private details made public in the court system. Several people have found the 
very processes and schedule of private dispute resolution preferable because the courts 
can be rigid and inflexible, whereas private ordering leaves more room for flexibility in 
“time, procedure, and possible outcomes” (Boyd 2004, 10). The court system is often an 
adversarial, winner-takes-all environment, whereas private dispute resolution is often 
experienced as being more amenable to compromise and win-win solutions. Finally, 
several submissions to the Boyd commission stated that the speed and substantially lower 
expense of private ordering is often preferable to the highly expensive and at times 
excessively long court process (Boyd 2004, 10).9  
                                                 
9 Although the Attorney General’s Office website makes the point that if an arbitration comes to court for 
overturning or enforcement, sometimes in the end the process is just as lengthy and expensive as it would 
have been if the parties had gone to court in the first place, if not more so. See 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/arbitration/cost.asp  
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 There are important limitations to the pubic court system as well, particularly 
when dealing with racialized10, minoritized11, and marginalized communities. Several 
critics have pointed out that the court system is not always necessarily the best 
environment for defending the equity and rights of women (Syed 2012; Macklin 2012; 
Razack 2002; 1998). This is particularly so for racialized women, and perhaps even more 
so for religionized12 women of marginalized traditions such as Islam (Razack 2008). For 
these reasons even many feminists have found the assumption that the courts are 
unquestionably preferable to private dispute resolution, and faith based arbitration in 
particular, troubling at best. Furthermore, private ordering generally is flexible enough to 
be more accommodating to cultural, linguistic, and religious differences than the courts.  
This is not to say however that there are not limitations to private ordering 
generally and faith based arbitration specifically. These are examined comprehensively 
by scholars who critique what they view as the increasing “privatization of justice” in 
Canadian legal culture (Goundry et al. 1998; Bakht 2005). These analysts fear the loss of 
important gains in gender equity made recently over the last thirty years in procedural 
and substantive default norms13 through the Family Law Act. Screening for abuse and 
inequity in spousal relationships, acting in the best interests of children, guaranteeing 
reasonable support amounts for children and spouses, and requiring equal division of 
                                                 
10 The term racialization brings to light the essentialized and socially constructed characteristics of the 
notion of “race”. See also Murji & Solomos 2005; Das Gupta et al 2007; Webster 1992. 
11 Minoritization suggests that “minorities” are often constructed and characterized by dominant 
populations rather than by the communities themselves. See also Zine 2012; Cobb 2010; and Robinson 
2003. 
12 I explain my use of this term in the theoretical section of the dissertation, chapter 2. I intend with this 
term to highlight for interrogation and analysis the specific constructed nature of the modern category of 
religion and the particular flows of power deployed through it, in much the same way that racialization 
does for race.  
13 Procedural law is the rules for hearing and determining the outcome of a matter before the courts 
designed to ensure consistent and just application of due process. Substantive law on the other hand is the 
written law that delineates specific rights and duties. The former establishes the procedures for applying the 
latter.  
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family resources are important examples of the recently gained benefits the public system 
affords that might be compromised in the context of private ordering of family matters.  
 To its credit, the McGuinty government has thoroughly addressed these issues by 
revising the Arbitration Act. The original Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 has been 
amended by two pieces of legislation: the Family Statute Law Amendment Act and a new 
Regulation under the Arbitration Act, 1991, which both came into effect April 30, 2007.14 
A number of changes have been made with the intent of better protecting vulnerable 
people generally and of limiting the state enforcement of faith based arbitrations 
specifically.  
 Arbitrators are now required to complete training specified on the website for the 
Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario.15 Furthermore, they are now required to 
provide a record of her or his arbitrations regularly to the Ministry of the Attorney 
General. The Ministry provides a standard form to be used for reporting arbitrations to 
the government.16 The arbitrator is required to declare that he or she has treated the 
parties to the dispute fairly, and that she or he has acquired the requisite training 
approved by the Ministry. If the arbitrator is trained in screening for domestic abuse then 
she or he is required to screen separately for power imbalances and domestic violence. If 
not, the arbitrator is required to have someone other than herself or himself with the 
appropriate training perform the screening separately for power imbalances or domestic 
                                                 
14 An Act to amend the Arbitration Act, 1991, the Child and Family Services Act and the Family Law Act 
in connection with family arbitration and related matters, and to amend the Children’s Law Reform Act in 
connection with the matters to be considered by the court in dealing with applications for custody and 
access. http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/statutes/english/2006/elaws_src_s06001_e.htm accessed 
December 9, 2008; Arbitration Act, 1991 ONTARIO REGULATION 134/07 FAMILY ARBITRATION. 
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws_regs_070134_e.htm accessed December 9, 2008; 
Website of the Ministry of the Attorney General Ontario, Family Arbitration. 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/arbitration/ accessed December 9, 2008. 
15 http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/arbitration/  
16 http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/arbitration/arbitrator-form.asp  
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violence.17 Arbitrators are now also required to keep careful written records of an 
arbitration including,  
1. the evidence presented and considered,  
2. the arbitrator’s notes taken during the hearing, if any, and 
3. copies of  
i. the signed arbitration agreement,  
ii. the certificates of independent legal advice,  
iii. if the screening for power imbalances and domestic violence was 
conducted by someone other than the arbitrator, the report on the 
results of the screening, and  
iv. the award and the arbitrator’s written reasons for it. O. Reg. 134/07, 
s. 4 (1). 
Finally, one can no longer contract out of one’s right to appeal an arbitration, and one 
cannot sign an agreement in advance binding that person to mandatory arbitration of a 
family dispute before the dispute has arisen.18 
 It is also important to point out another very significant change made to the 
Arbitration Act. The Arbitration Act appears to have been originally intended for 
commercial law use, leaving the matter of family law application unclear.19 This 
ambiguity is now clarified through a newly established relationship between the 
                                                 
17 See subsection 2 of the “Ontario Regulation 134/07 Family Arbitration” of the Arbitration Act, 1991. 
18 See section 3 of An Act to amend the Arbitration Act, 1991, the Child and Family Services Act and the 
Family Law Act in connection with family arbitration and related matters, and to amend the Children’s 
Law Reform Act in connection with the matters to be considered by the court in dealing with applications 
for custody and access. http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/statutes/english/2006/elaws_src_s06001_e.htm  
19 However, although several commentators make this point, Marion Boyd argues that both the 1991 
Arbitration Act as well as Ontario’s old nineteenth century Arbitrations Act did apply equally to family law 
(Boyd 2004, 11). 
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Arbitration Act, the Family Law Act, and even the Child and Family Services Act. 
Arbitrations that deal with family law are now subject to the Family Law Act in that these 
are newly regarded as “family arbitrations” which are subject to the Family Law Act, 
which means that they are governed by all the rules outlined in the Family Law Act.20 It 
appears that this alone would have been enough to address the potential for undermining 
the hard won equality enshrined in the Family Law Act. This means that even if 
arbitrators were asked to make a decision based on religious or other non-Canadian laws 
or principles, these could only be used insofar as they did not conflict with the Family 
Law Act.21 This is an extremely important move in that previously there was no oversight 
or restrictions as to what legal system could be used to arbitrate a dispute. Therefore, 
laws and principles regarded as unfair and unequal by Canadian standards could be 
applied as easily as laws that might be quite acceptable according to Canadian family 
law. Furthermore, the Child and Family Services Act now includes the provision that an 
arbitrator is legally required to report suspected child abuse.22 
 In addition to these new protections for vulnerable people generally, a very 
specific change has been made affecting the status of non-Canadian legal traditions in 
arbitrations. The new legislation states that “family arbitrations based on non-Canadian 
                                                 
20 See section 1 of An Act to amend the Arbitration Act, 1991, the Child and Family Services Act and the 
Family Law Act in connection with family arbitration and related matters, and to amend the Children’s 
Law Reform Act in connection with the matters to be considered by the court in dealing with applications 
for custody and access. http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/statutes/english/2006/elaws_src_s06001_e.htm 
21 Natasha Bakht notes that “religious arbitrators can simply conform to the regulations regarding training 
and record keeping and then perform religious arbitrations that are consistent with Canadian Family Law . 
. . the Family Law Amendment Act permits religious arbitrations that conform to Canadian Family Law” 
(Bakht 2007, 141-142). (My italics).  
22 See section point 2 under “Child and Family Services Act” of An Act to amend the Arbitration Act, 
1991, the Child and Family Services Act and the Family Law Act in connection with family arbitration and 
related matters, and to amend the Children’s Law Reform Act in connection with the matters to be 
considered by the court in dealing with applications for custody and access. http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/statutes/english/2006/elaws_src_s06001_e.htm 
 13
law and principles—including religious principles—will have no legal effect and will not 
be enforceable by the courts.”23 However, the Attorney General’s Office website itself is 
clear that this does not mean that faith based mediation or advisory arbitration is 
restricted. The Attorney General’s Office statement regarding faith based arbitration and 
mediation posted on its website is worth quoting in full, 
Nothing in Ontario law prevents people from turning to a religious official or someone 
knowledgeable in the principles of their religion to help them resolve their family dispute. 
. . A religious official can conduct a family arbitration under Ontario law if that person is 
properly qualified to do so. To be qualified one has to have completed the required 
training and otherwise conduct the arbitration under the statutes and regulations. An 
award from such an arbitration would then be enforceable like any other arbitration 
(Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General). (Italics mine) 
Although there were considerable changes to the Act, I will show that there are several 
forms of faith based arbitration and potentially enforceable mediation that remain 
available to Ontarians. I argue it is vitally important to understand these complexities and 
nuances of the law in order to offer the best possible assistance and protection to 
vulnerable persons as autonomous agents. 
 In a sense, it is moot to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of private 
justice because the government has clearly opted for the continued use, even favoring, of 
private dispute resolution in family legal matters generally (Boyd 2004, 10). However, 
there is a great irony in the amendments to the Arbitration Act. Essentially all the issues 
raised regarding the limitations of the Arbitration Act have been rigorously addressed in 
the 2006 revisions, but at the same moment religious dispute resolution has been 
                                                 
23 http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/arbitration/ accessed December 9, 2008. 
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substantively excluded (through continued denial of public funding for independent legal 
advice in arbitrations) and symbolically excluded (through public and governmental 
legislation and discourse). At the same time that dramatic new protections for vulnerable 
people are afforded under the Arbitration Act, those who might have benefited most from 
them remain essentially excluded. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 By the time of the writing of this chapter in 2013 there has been a substantial 
amount of academic literature published on the faith based arbitration issue in Canada. 
The central observation I make of this body of literature is that surprisingly little of it is 
based on fieldwork research within Muslim communities themselves, lacuna that this 
dissertation seeks to address. Much of the existing literature is theoretical, based 
primarily on the media debate and the literature addressing, for example, women’s 
studies, post-colonialism, racialization, Islam and Islamophobia generally. Furthermore, 
although there are a number of publications on faith based arbitration in Jewish 
communities previous to the “sharia debate” – mainly in the United States, but also in 
Canada – almost none of the research focused on the “sharia debate” focuses on Jewish 
communities in the context of the revised Arbitration Act, which has arguably influenced 
these communities most, because they have perhaps the most developed religious courts 
and made the most regular use of faith based arbitration of any community in Ontario.  
 
1.2.1 Documenting The Faith Based Arbitration Debate 
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 In one of the first and most thorough books on religion in Canadian family law 
before the Ontario sharia debate of 2004-2005, John Syrtash (1992) explores three main 
legal issues as they are addressed by diverse religious minority communities: child 
custody and access; alternative dispute resolution; and removing religious barriers to 
remarriage. He concludes that there has been an erosion of the rights of the custodial 
parent with regard to custody and access issues involving religion as a result of the new 
emphasis on the religious rights of the access parent gained under the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. Second, with regard to arbitration, Syrtash argues that recent 
case law suggests that the decisions of religious courts may well be enforceable in 
Canada, especially if the arbitration proceedings employed recognized practices such as 
independent legal advice. Finally, Syrtash argues that the progress achieved through 
remedial legislation on behalf of Jewish women (and potentially Muslim and other 
women in religious traditions in which men possess unequal power in granting the 
religious divorce) seeking to remarry within their tradition is a substantial encouraging 
development that suggests, along with the other developments cited in his work, that 
Canada is beginning to respect and accommodate “its own multicultural legal principles 
and minority religions and cultures when legislating or judicially determining disputes 
over marriage, divorce, custody and access to children, or child protection” (Syrtash 
1992, 180). Syrtash presents research on the overlap between family law and religious 
communities in mainly Jewish, Catholic, Muslim and Aboriginal contexts.  
 A former Attorney General and women’s rights advocate herself, Marion Boyd 
does an excellent job of summarizing the legal complexities of arbitration and mediation 
with an eye to women’s equity issues. Boyd (2004, 2007) argues that the 1991 version of 
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the Arbitration Act does not adequately protect vulnerable people, including those who 
might elect faith based arbitration. She concludes her report on faith based arbitration 
with forty-six recommendations for changes to the Arbitration Act designed to better 
protect the interests of vulnerable people in the context of family law.24 Boyd’s report has 
been criticized by some for not taking seriously enough the issues of community 
pressures, coercion, and women’s rights at risk in faith based arbitration. However, Boyd 
maintains that she attempted to further the protection of vulnerable people in faith based 
arbitration without crossing the line into paternalism and the infantilization of the 
vulnerable members of marginalized communities. Boyd’s report deserves early mention 
because she was the one commissioned by the McGuinty government to investigate the 
issue once it erupted in the media. Boyd’s is one of the few publications based on 
research gathered from religious communities who have or may use faith based 
arbitration in practice. Although she did not engage in fieldwork in the communities 
themselves, she solicited and received several submissions from stakeholders in 
numerous religious communities, as well as from other concerned citizens and 
organizations such as women’s groups and legal organizations.  
 In response to Boyd’s work, Alexandra Brown (2012) argues that even though the 
Boyd report failed to have its recommendations realized in policy, it ultimately succeeded 
in its latent functions of legitimizing the multicultural state in several ways. The 
construction and reception of the report also served to further the perception of state 
neutrality hiding any potential state complicity in the formation of, or failure to address, 
inequity. Nicholas Pengelley (2005) also assesses Boyd’s recommendations arguing that 
based on international precedent, faith based arbitrations in conflict with civil litigation 
                                                 
24 Though she has been criticized for not recommending mandatory independent legal advice (ILA). 
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are very likely to be overturned, and courts tend to favour those who are able to 
demonstrate undue duress or coercion to arbitrate. However, even though he applauds 
Boyd’s recommendation that if independent legal advice is not requested that it must be 
explicitly rejected in writing, he is critical of Boyd for not making independent legal 
advice mandatory. 
 John D. Gregory, Anne Marie Predko, and Juliette Nicolet (2005) argue that the 
1991 Arbitration Act, and perhaps even the Family Law Act should be amended to better 
protect women and vulnerable people generally. Also Earle Waugh and Humera Ibrahim 
(2002) argue that alternative Islamic dispute resolution of some manner will likely 
continue to be practiced and spread, and that therefore as the process matures, safeguards 
to protect equality rights of individuals need to be better built into alternative dispute 
resolution processes.  
 
1.2.2 Legal and Equity Issues 
 The above publications document the debate and legal issues raised in the debate 
over faith based arbitration in a general way. Other authors have explored the legalities 
and equity issues raised by faith based arbitration and alternative dispute resolution in a 
much more thorough manner. In her early articles on faith based arbitration, Natasha 
Bakht (2004) focuses particularly on explaining the risks to vulnerable persons in the 
context of Ontario’s Arbitration Act, recommending significant changes to the 1991Act. 
Bakht’s early articles during the debate detail the legal intricacies of faith based 
arbitration specifically, and the dynamics of private and public justice generally, and as a 
legal scholar she is well qualified to explore these issues. Her later articles after the 
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debate take quite a different tack (Bakht 2006). In tandem with Sherene Razack and 
others, these articles criticize the othering of minoritized communities in the sharia 
debate, and although the amendments to the arbitration act are praised, she criticizes the 
McGuinty government for prohibiting faith based arbitration altogether, questioning the 
effectiveness of this policy decision for genuinely protecting vulnerable people given the 
realities of family law in Ontario. Another legal scholar, Anne Bunting (Bunting & 
Mokhtari 2009) relies on some limited fieldwork with Muslim women in order to offer a 
representation of Muslim women as complex agents, challenging the stereotypical media 
representation of Muslim woman as nearly helpless. At the same time, Bunting attempts 
to represent some of the pressures that Muslim women have experienced in their families 
and communities. Importantly, Bunting details the realities of de-facto legal pluralism in 
Canadian family law. It is also noteworthy that a number of Bunting’s interviews were 
conducted prior to the public “sharia debate” as part of her ongoing research interests. 
 Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens (2005), writing before the McGuinty 
Government decision of September 2005, argues that private justice that allows any law 
code to be used in arbitration unnecessarily leaves open room for injustice. Careful not to 
say all religions promote illiberal ends, he argues that leaving the door open for even a 
few fundamentalist arbitrators to potentially arbitrate unfair agreements is 
unconscionable. Following the McGuinty Government decision, Miriam S. Pal (2006) 
maintains that although arbitration is now prohibited, through mediation the potential 
remains for bringing religious tradition to bear on civil disputes. Pal also holds that the 
central issues of the sharia debate should not be thought of as limited to religious 
arbitration, but rather extended to the entire issue of the privatization of justice. Finally, 
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along with other authors, Pal expects this issue is not over. As the exponential growth of 
Canadian Muslim communities continues faith based arbitration specifically and religious 
private ordering generally will likely come to be an issue that Canadian legislators and 
legal professionals will need to address again in future.  
 The Canadian debate has had an impact on American thought regarding 
alternative dispute resolution as well. In contrast to those who argue that it is a good way 
to protect and facilitate religious freedom, Nicholas Walter (2012) argues that in both 
Canada and the United States, faith based arbitration inhibits religious freedom because 
one of the litigants may choose to change her or his religion after signing an agreement to 
arbitrate a matter religiously, or between the conclusion of an arbitration and its 
enforcement, but would still be legally bound to arbitrate religiously or abide by the 
decision of a religious tribunal that she or he no longer shared the religious beliefs of. 
Nicholas argues that courts should only enforce those faith based arbitration agreements 
that deal exclusively with religious matters that cannot otherwise be addressed in secular 
courts. On the other hand, Caryn Litt Wolfe (2006) uses the Canadian sharia debate to 
critique American practices of faith based arbitration. After providing a history of faith 
based arbitration in the United States and weighing the advantages and disadvantages, 
Wolfe concludes that although she agrees faith based arbitration should not be banned in 
America as it was in Ontario, it requires better oversight to protect the vulnerable, 
especially in the case of family law arbitrations.  
 
1.2.3 Multiculturalism, Secularism, and Constitutional Democracy 
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 In addition to publications that explore the history and detailed legal issues raised 
by the debate over faith based arbitration, several other authors address faith based 
arbitration through the theoretical lenses of multiculturalism, secularism, and 
constitutional democracy more generally. Avigail Eisenberg (2007) offers an analysis of 
multiculturalism in the context of faith based arbitration and the “sharia debate.” She 
offers a program for genuinely assessing issues such as the “sharia debate” without, on 
the one hand dismissing the issue outright and therefore not taking diversity seriously, or 
on the other hand simply allowing minority communities to do as they please regardless 
of the consequences to vulnerable people. Taking a different approach, Naser 
Ghobadzadeh (2010) uses the “sharia debate” to argue that multiculturalism facilitates the 
development of Muslim women’s agency. Through a comparison of the sharia debates in 
Canada and Australia, Ghobadzadeh argues that the sharia debate in Canada featured 
much more public participation of Muslim women than in Australia, and that the more 
developed policy and practice of multiculturalism in Canada explains this difference. 
Making a more negative evaluation of Ontario’s actions in light of multiculturalism, 
Patricia Goff (2010) reminds us that people’s identities are at stake in negotiations over 
diverse social imaginaries, as was the case in the sharia debate. Even though the final 
decision of the McGuinty government may have been the best for Ontario at the time, 
Goff suspects Canada did not in fact travel very far down the multicultural road, as she 
puts it, given the tenor of this debate.  
 Turning to the issues faith based arbitration raises for constitutional democracies, 
Lorraine Weinrib (2008) focuses on the importance and relevance of Canada’s adoption 
of rights based democracy through the Canadian Charter for shaping public discourse in 
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the sharia debate. She argues that the process of adopting the Charter set the stage for the 
sharia debate in two ways: by providing a model for debate of constitutional principles, 
and second by establishing the principles of a rights based democracy within which the 
sharia debate took place, namely between the rights of religious minorities and the rights 
of women. Despite its limitations, Weinrib holds the sharia debate up as an example of 
the triumph of rights based democracy, highlighting the adoption of the direct and 
primary relationship of the individual to the state. 
 Finally, exploring notions of the secular, Jennifer Selby (2012) argues that the 
sharia debate highlights at least three developments in Canadian secularism.25 First, 
Canadian secularism is Christo-centric rather than being neutral; second, the permeation 
of private and public spheres present in the debate illustrates “de-privatization” as argued 
by Jose Casanova (1994); and finally secularism as it manifested in the debate tended in 
practice to privilege a feminist politics that marginalizes women who operate from a 
position of embeddedness in religious communities.  
 
1.2.4 Fieldwork Publications 
 Julie Macfarlane (2012) is the only researcher to date to embark on a major 
research endeavor to explore through fieldwork what in fact is being practiced regarding 
faith based arbitration and religious divorce in Ontario Muslim communities. With 
substantial funding, she has been able to interview some two hundred stakeholders in 
Muslim communities. Her findings parallel my own.26 The majority of Muslims seeking 
                                                 
25 Selby also describes some fieldwork she has conducted on the “Sharia Debate.” 
26 However, this does not make my research redundant. First, Macfarlane agrees that this issue is so under-
researched that there ought to be several studies done in order to establish representativeness and accuracy 
(personal communication). Second, my project is different from Macfarlane’s in a number of ways. As a 
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out services from imams and other service providers are looking for religious divorces in 
addition to secular divorces, rather than advice regarding the kinds of issues that can be 
decided in faith based arbitration. Furthermore, in large part those people who do search 
out advice on issues such as division of assets and support payments receive advice from 
imams and other service providers that many secular Canadian service providers would 
likely deem fair in the context of Canadian legal norms. Therefore, although there are 
certainly concerns regarding inequity that may be better addressed, the voices of the 
“sharia debate” that represented anything that might transpire under faith based dispute 
resolution in Muslim communities as inherently unfair have widely missed the mark.  
 Pascale Fournier has written several articles of indirect relevance to the “sharia 
debate.” Fournier has investigated practices of talaq or Muslim divorce in Toronto, 
Ottawa, and Montreal for their unequal practices as well as what Muslim women are 
doing to address those inequities (Fournier 2011). Fournier argues that the mahr (the 
dowry given to the Muslim wife by her husband upon marriage, and which under certain 
circumstances must be returned to him if she wishes to initiate a divorce) in practice can 
be used as a substantial tool of power and discipline for Muslim women (Fournier 2006). 
This image of Muslim husbands and wives in negotiated relations of power is 
considerably different from the image of couples negotiating family legal disputes 
represented in Marion Boyd’s report which she argues presents “unchanging and 
predictable subjects and outcomes” (Fournier 2006, 677). Fournier further argues based 
on judicial cases deciding mahr and muta (temporary marriage practiced in some Shia 
                                                                                                                                                 
legal studies scholar her theoretical tools issue mainly from that field. As a sociologist of religion and 
religious studies scholar I bring an analysis of secularism, multiculturalism, and Islamophobia to my 
material that she does not. Furthermore, I engaged in fieldwork among Jewish community members 
whereas Macfarlane focused exclusively on Muslim communities.  
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contexts but not allowable in Sunni communities) that Canadian and American judges 
deploy Orientalist stereotypes as they employ putatively universal norms which in fact 
are culturally located (Fournier 2001). Fournier calls for judges to interrogate these 
assumptions of normativity when adjudicating matters that involve cultural difference.  
 
1.2.5 Media Representation: Islamophobia, Racism, and the Other 
 Several authors interrogate the stereotypes proliferated by media representation of 
the so called “sharia debate” critiquing it for uncritically facilitating Islamophobia and 
racism.  In an extensive and systematic study of the mass media publications on the 
sharia debate, Anna Korteweg (2012) found two major types of representation of Muslim 
women’s agency in the debate, each with particular consequences for how the larger 
issues were framed. First, the majority of media representations conceptualized Muslim 
women’s agency as real only if women resisted Islamic tradition and opted for secular 
institutions. This approach was most often associated with stereotypically homogenized, 
racialized, and othering representations of Muslim communities generally. The second 
and less common approach represented Muslim women’s agency as embedded within 
Muslim communities. This approach according to Korteweg was much better able to 
represent Muslim women as genuine agents negotiating complex intersecting fields of 
inequity, freedom, and marginalization. 
 Sherene Razack (2008) offers a thorough analysis of the discourse of the “sharia 
debate.” She highlights the racialization, latent imperialism, and othering that permeated 
much of the discourse of the “sharia debate.” She explores how the “modernity/ 
premodernity” distinction was used in the discourse as a kind of racializing colour line 
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between the (white) civilized secular western citizen and the (dark) barbaric religious and 
premodern other.27 Ultimately Razack is not sure what could have been done differently 
policy-wise, as Muslim women seem to be caught between a rock and a hard place. On 
one side stands what seems to be a racist, Islamophobic, white-supremacist state and 
majority population and on the other a patriarchal religious community. Her main issue is 
with how the debate proceeded, suggesting that a much different discourse should have 
been used to achieve the same policy ends without the imperialist baggage. Jasmin Zine 
(2009) agrees with Razack’s analysis and further argues that the Canadian approach to 
the “sharia debate” constitutes a kind of disciplining of Muslim communities. In the name 
or protecting the Muslim woman, Zine argues that the public discourse and policy arising 
out of the debate functioned more effectively to reinforce the paternalism of the state 
(Zine 2009, 152). In her most recent article, Zine furthers her analysis of the 
essentializing representations of gender employed by both forms of religious extremism 
and imperialism in the “sharia tribunal affair” (Zine 2012). Ironically, she sees several 
similarities in the way these opposed discourses both represented Muslim women as 
being in need of rescue and lacking agency. In other words, religious extremists and 
secular imperialists, though opposed to each other, both ultimately represented Muslim 
women as lacking agency and needing rescue. Zine shares with others the critique of the 
polarization of the debate that characterized religion as anti-woman and the secular state 
as feminist. Zine concludes with a call for a much more diverse discourse that allows for 
deeper discursive engagement with the issues raised in the sharia tribunal affair, 
critiquing the gendered and racializing discourses on either side of the dominant polarity. 
                                                 
27 Razack sees Islamphobia as a substitute for racism, an alternative way to espress what is essentially 
racially motivated hostility. Zine sees racism as having a role in Islamophobia, but she does not reduce 
Islamophobia to racism.  
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In a similar vein, Itrath Syed (2012) criticizes three main tracks of the “sharia debate” 
discourse: the denationalizing of Muslims, the representation of Muslim women as 
infantilized, and the representation of sharia as fossilized.  
 Meena Sharify-Funk (2009) examines how the media both represented and also 
shaped Muslim communities by privileging the voices of two particular Muslim 
institutions, one conservative, and the other very liberal. Sharify-Funk argues that this 
controversy driven approach of the media represented Muslim communities as deeply 
polarized at the same time the media was reinforcing and deepening this polarization in 
the community. Katherine Bullock (2012) argues similarly that the mass media deeply 
influenced how the debate was represented publicly through the structural elements 
affecting the gathering of information for mass media dissemination, and other elements 
such as framing, labeling, and the construction of “balance” and “choice.” Bullock argues 
that through these measures Muslims against faith based arbitration were over-
represented and Muslims in favour of faith based arbitration, regardless of how qualified 
and thoughtful their support was, were misrepresented and marginalized.28  
 Trevor Farrow (2006) aims to clarify what he argues are three crucial 
misunderstandings spread through the media debate on faith based arbitration. He argues 
first that the central issue of the “sharia debate” was not simply about whether to allow or 
prohibit religious tribunals, rather it was about state enforcement of their agreements; 
second, this issue does not affect Ontario alone, and third, the issue should not be 
represented as exclusively or even primarily as a Muslim or even religious issue, but as 
the much larger issue of the privatization of the Canadian public civil justice system. 
                                                 
28 Griefenhagen joins those who critique the discourse used to engage the issues during the “sharia debate”. 
In particular he engages how the term “sharia” was used and represented in the debate, as well as how 
agency was represented in the debate (Griefenhagen 2005).  
 26
Cathy Huth (2008) also takes the media to task for misrepresenting the issue of faith 
based arbitration, in three key ways. She holds that the media incorrectly represented 
faith based arbitration as pushing outside the boundaries of multicultural policy, as 
undermining the Canadian state, and as destabilizing the principle of one law for all. 
Following an analysis of the media representation of Islam, the sharia debate, and 
arbitration generally, and an analysis of the relevant public policy issues, Catherine 
Morris also exhorts policy makers to consider carefully how to protect both religious 
freedom and vulnerable persons in public and private justice, especially in the context of 
polarized and inflammatory media coverage (Morris 2006).  
 Audrey Macklin (2012) challenges the assumed cultural neutrality and 
unencumbered agency of the “secular liberal subject” in the sharia debate, and how it is 
counterposed to the “encultured subject” who is imagined to be much more encumbered 
and even inhibited by his or her culture. While other authors focus on the construction of 
the encultured subject in the discourse of the sharia debate, Macklin takes a different 
approach by exploring the illusory aspects of the construction of the unencumbered 
liberal subject. First, she points out that the issues of risk to vulnerable people highlighted 
in the sharia debate are not unique to faith based arbitration but in fact are intrinsic to 
arbitration and private ordering generally. Second, using examples, Macklin illustrates 
that even secular agreements issuing from private ordering procedures that raise serious 
gender equality rights concerns can not only arise, but these agreements have even been 
enforced under judicial review. Therefore, to suggest that gender inequity in private 
ordering is primarily a religious issue and that secularism is the solution is misleading. 
James Thornback provides another similar analysis based on the media discourse of the 
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Sharia debate. Thornback observes that the majority of journalists still conceive of Islam 
as monolithic and opposed to the West, and that this conception leads to polarizing the 
issue around religion, either rejecting or defending Sharia, but largely ignoring the deeper 
issues raised about domestic law in Canada. Thornback argues that only those journalists 
who did not represent Islam as the other were able to address in a sober and reasoned 
manner the crucial concerns at stake in Ontario legal structures (Thornback 2005).  
 
1.2.6 Legal Pluralism 
 In her well-known book Multicultural Jurisdictions, Ayelet Shachar (2001) is 
mainly concerned, with the possibilities for accommodating genuine legal diversity in 
multicultural countries such as Canada without compromising the rights of vulnerable 
people. Specifically on the sharia debate, Shachar uses the case study of faith based 
arbitration to argue that, because group pressure to use alternative dispute resolution in 
Muslim communities will be strong, added procedures should be included in faith based 
arbitration such as independent legal advice in order to protect individual equality rights 
(Shachar 2005). In later articles, Shachar argues that vulnerable minority group members 
should not be put in the position of choosing between a potentially patriarchal and 
inequitable religious community on the one hand, or a secular legal system that takes 
little or no account of cultural diversity on the other (Shachar 2008). Shachar proposes a 
system in which religious communities are encouraged to more deeply commit to 
operating in line with the norms of the (gender) equity of the secular system, and in 
which the secular courts are encouraged to more genuinely meet the needs of culturally 
diverse minorities in the context of the secular courts. Sheema Khan (2007) argues that 
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the sharia debate already illustrates the development of transformative accommodation at 
least in the sense of increased participation in public debate of Canadian Muslim 
communities who employed broad accessible discourses to persuade the larger society 
rather than parochial language designed only to convince community insiders. Even 
though faith based arbitration was prohibited, Canadian Muslims became better 
integrated into the discourses and activities of public engagement, and for Khan this 
represents an important sign of growth and maturation of Muslim Canadian communities.  
 Other authors offer ways to fine tune Shachar’s proposal for transformative 
accommodation. Jehan Aslam (2006) argues that it was a mistake to prohibit faith based 
arbitration entirely. He argues rather that stronger forms of judicial oversight of 
arbitration be instituted to replace the “rubber-stamp procedural review that seems to be 
the current norm under the Arbitration Act” (Aslam 2006, 845). Assuming that anyone 
challenging an arbitral agreement did not have informed consent could be an effective 
way to easily overturn unequal agreements according to Aslam.29 Similarly, Veit Bader 
(2009) argues for a midway solution between absolute secularism and absolute 
accommodation. He recommends what he calls “associational governance,” which is 
intended to be an institutionally plural approach to addressing legal diversity similar to 
Shachar’s joint governance model. Ultimately, Bader argues that what he calls the zero 
accommodation approach of the McGuinty government missed the opportunity to more 
effectively protect vulnerable people in the context of family law disputes.  
                                                 
29 Critics might charge that this would make arbitration useless. However, in his defence I believe Aslam 
means that if a secular court finds the agreement to be unfair according to Canadian legal standards, it 
should be overturned, not simply overturned automatically if someone brings the agreement to court for 
judicial review.  
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 In contrast, Laureve Blackstone (2005) argues that the McGuinty government was 
right to prohibit court enforceable religious arbitrations. She even goes a step beyond the 
McGuinty government arguing that family law should be prohibited from being 
adjudicated under the Arbitration Act altogether. However, she also recommends that the 
conversation regarding the recognition and limited accommodation of cultural and 
religious diversity in law not be preempted, but rather developed and engaged. 
Blackstone looks to England, Australia, and the United States for examples of 
alternatives to court enforceable faith based arbitration that still effect genuine 
engagement with legal diversity in the context of cultural and religious minorities.  
 
1.2.7 Sharia Law 
 One of Anver Emon’s greatest contributions to the debate is a rigorous history of 
Islamic law, its contextual and adaptive nature, and especially its transformation in the 
context of western colonialism and the modern nation state (Emon 2012; Emon 2007; 
Emon 2006). Emon points out that a good deal of the characteristics of what is now 
called “sharia law” that western commentators disapprove of, are ironically largely the 
result of western colonial changes to its practice that “froze” it in time, taking away its 
more flexible, contextual, and adaptive nature in the process. Furthermore, Emon offers 
suggestions for how a multicultural state might facilitate the development of diverse 
forms of sharia practice again, with an eye to protecting the rights of vulnerable people in 
the process.  
 In the same vein, Lynda Clarke (2012) outlines the complexity of “sharia law.” 
However, while Emon documents the historical development and diversity of these 
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traditions, Clarke explores the meanings of “sharia law” employed and negotiated by 
Muslim minority communities in the West in more recent history. Clarke documents the 
politics and diversity of this discourse, as well as the ongoing struggle for authority in 
these debates within diverse Muslim communities.  
 
1.2.8 Impact on Muslim Communities 
 A number of articles attempt to document the impact of the sharia debate on 
Muslim communities as stakeholders in the debate. Alia Hogben (2006), a prominent 
leader in the Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW), describes her 
organization’s involvement in the sharia debate, and its reasons for opposing faith based 
arbitration. The CCMW felt that the risk to vulnerable people presented by the then 
current form of the Arbitration Act was too high. Hogben however laments the way the 
discourse opposed multiculturalism and religious freedom over against women’s equality 
rights, arguing that women’s equality rights are embedded in both multiculturalism and 
religious freedom. The article concludes by documenting publications produced by the 
CCMW that provide practical information guides for Muslim women regarding Canadian 
and Muslim family law.  
 Faisal Kutty (2012) on the other hand notes what he regards as a missed 
opportunity for Muslim communities in Ontario. He argues, in light of the observation 
made by many scholars that the prohibition of faith based arbitration has not in fact 
prohibited the formation of state-enforceable family law contracts, that the McGuinty 
government’s decision to prohibit faith based arbitration has missed the opportunity to 
facilitate the “organic bottom-up consensus-building approach to Islamic reform” that 
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could have taken place in the context of faith based arbitration service provision among 
Canadian Muslim communities.  
 Nevin Reda (2012) provides an analysis of the sharia debate as it progressed 
among Muslims rather than more generally in the public discourse. Although the “good 
Muslim/bad Muslim” dichotomy takes on a very different meaning in dominant western 
discourse on Islam, this dichotomy within the sharia debate among Muslims was made by 
the IICJ to mean good Muslims support faith based arbitration while bad Muslims oppose 
it. Reda challenges this polarization of the Muslim community in the sharia debate, 
offering several religious arguments for her position as a Muslim who opposes faith 
based arbitration. She maintains that a different, more diverse, conception of Muslim 
communities in Canada must be facilitated in order to improve the process and quality of 
future debates.  
 In conclusion, my literature review illustrates the importance of my dissertation 
research. Most of the work on the issue of the debate on faith based arbitration and the 
government’s policy changes that followed is speculative and ideologically based. My 
project is one of very few that has attempted to find what Muslim communities are 
practicing on the ground, and what their responses to the debate on faith based arbitration 
were. Furthermore, no one has looked at the impact of the government’s policy changes 
following the debate on faith based arbitration on Jewish communities of Ontario. My 
project will show that much of the discourse on the so-called “sharia debate” is 
misguided, not only in terms of how Muslim communities and practices were represented 
and framed, but also because it does not capture the real situation of vulnerable people. It 
was a debate rooted in ideological conceptualizations of freedom and justice as well as 
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cosmological ideas of good and evil rather than reality. Futhermore, policy that arose 
following the “sharia debate” too was framed in terms of “rescuing” vulnerable people 
rather than engaging them as people with agency. My research attempts to take into 
account the voices of Muslim and Jewish community members in a way that will inform 
policy in order to make it better suited to facilitating the agency of vulnerable people 
rather than in spite of their alleged absence of agency.  
 
 
1.3 Chapter Overview 
 In chapter two I draw together several theoretical sources that I use to interpret 
my research, and I make a number of theoretical contributions. Building on the work of 
other postcolonial scholars (Asad 1993, 2003; Razack 2009), specifically their criticisms 
of the secular, I argue that a new notion of secularism is necessary to address the issue of 
what I have called “Imperial secularism,” which I argue is a form of secularism that 
works to create a hierarchy in society along a continuum of secular and modern or 
dominant forms of religion to minoritized, marginalized, “unmodern,” racialized, 
orientalized, and othered forms of religion. I argue that this kind of secularism must be 
countered with anti-imperialist forms of secularism that work toward non-othering forms 
of secularity that treat all religions equally.  
In this chapter I coin the terms “religionization” and the “subnatural” rather than 
“religion” and the “supernatural” to define what it is social scientists of religion are 
studying. In other words I argue that religion be conceptualized and studied as a located 
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concept bound up with local power relations and cultural norms.30 Rather than 
reaffirming the dominant status quo by accepting “the modern concept of religion” as a 
workable frame for analysis I suggest that the conceptual frame “religion” itself should 
be made the object of scholarly analysis in the spirit of the work of Talal Asad and others. 
Part of the aim of my contribution here is to effect a more descriptive and critical 
conceptualization of religion that will aid in forming an anti-imperial secularism that does 
not other religion normatively, but rather treats religions equally as cultural groups 
among other communities and groups contained and managed by the modern state. 
Finally, in the context of several theoretical and practical developments around 
multiculturalism, I make a modest contribution. Adding onto forms of critical 
multiculturalism that aim to resist dominance and establish genuine equality for 
minoritized groups, and in addition to anti-racist, feminist, and anti-colonial forms of 
multiculturalism, I add the requirement of an anti-imperialist secularism if genuine 
equality is to be fostered by multicultural policy and practice. Regarding the more 
specific multicultural issue of the limits of accommodating (religious) legal pluralism, 
after describing Ayelet Shachar’s proposed “transformative accommodation” in this 
chapter I state that I will return to evaluate Shachar’s proposed “transformative 
accommodation” in the conclusion of the dissertation.  
 Chapter three outlines the methodological approaches and challenges of this 
project. I begin by attempting to position this project in the context of western 
scholarship on others, which has too often been orientalist and served western economic 
and imperial interests. I attempt also to situate myself as a western researcher. I then 
document my research strategies and activities. I outline the challenges of this project 
                                                 
30 See also McCutcheon 2003.  
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methodologically. I outline my sampling procedures as well as my research instruments 
and details of the data collection process for this project. And finally I outline my 
strategies for analyzing the data gathered in this project.  
 In chapter four I provide a brief history of the sharia debate in Ontario while also 
offering an analysis of the events based on Sherene Razack’s insights. My central 
argument in this chapter is that because of the realities of Canada’s modern legal system, 
which is fundamentally dependent on the exercise of human agency to be effective, the 
stereotypical figure of the “imperiled Muslim woman” (Razack 2009), devoid of agency 
as she is imagined in public discourse, cannot be protected by Canadian law. I do not 
make this point in order to make a moral argument. I make this as a technical legal 
argument in order to show that the policy arising from this discourse has been largely 
ineffectual on the ground. Therefore I argue that because of the influence of the 
stereotypical figure of the imperiled Muslim woman as outlined by Razack, and despite 
the laudable but limited protection that has been afforded through the revised Arbitration 
Act, ironically the deployment of the “imperiled Muslim woman” has produced more 
harm than protection for vulnerable Muslims.  
 An individual without agency cannot be protected, or rather cannot protect 
himself or herself, under the current family law regime of Canada generally and Ontario 
specifically.31 Therefore I argue further, because the figure of the imperiled Muslim 
woman is imagined for several reasons to be virtually devoid of human agency, that she 
cannot be protected by the Ontarian family law regime. Policy and law based on the 
figure of the imperiled Muslim woman are designed to protect people who are imagined 
to have no agency. And for vulnerable people, there are at least two damaging results. 
                                                 
31 See also Gill 2001; Chambers 2008; and Christman & Anderson eds. 2005. 
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First, I show that such policies cannot protect vulnerable people because the existing 
legal system is fundamentally designed to protect people largely only when they exercise 
their agency.32 Despite the fact that faith based arbitration is technically no longer 
practicable in Ontario (and I clarify the extent to which that indeed is the case here), de 
facto legal pluralism in practice leaves vulnerable people open to many forms of legally 
enforceable contracts that might be based on religious law. Because the solution of the 
McGuinty government was simply to end all faith based arbitration, in part because 
vulnerable Muslim women were imagined as unable to exercise the agency necessary to 
access the protections of the legal system over against the “dangerous Muslim man,” little 
further policy has been developed to assist vulnerable people that may find themselves 
presented with these other types of legal contracts.33 Second, vulnerable people are much 
better protected I argue with policies and practices that support and facilitate their 
agency, rather than those that are based on the assumption of an absence of agency. For 
the most part agency-affirming policies have not been developed, and in the limited 
extent to which they have been developed they have remained largely hidden. I will 
conclude with a number of recommendations for agency-affirming or agency-facilitating 
                                                 
32 Although generally speaking there are many laws, policies, and regulations designed to protect people 
even when they do not or cannot exercise agency, for example young children or mentally challenged 
persons, in the context of family law specifically several legal studies scholars have noted that the nature of 
family law in Canada, and the realities of de facto legal pluralism in the context of family law, make the 
exercise of agency crucial for enabling the protections that the Family Law Act affords (see Chapter 4). 
Combined with the fact of several remaining avenues for establishing legally enforceable family law 
contracts that can still be deeply shaped by religious law, this contrasts markedly with the public perception 
that the McGuinty Government’s decision to end faith based arbitration fully protects vulnerable people 
from the potential dangers of faith based alternative dispute resolution.  
33 I am not saying that there were not legitimate concerns about family and community pressures to contract 
out of one’s rightful default legal norms in Ontario Family Law in the context of faith based arbitration. 
What I am saying is that in order for the legal changes made to the Arbitration Act to effectively protect 
vulnerable people in the context of the realities of Ontario law, many more agency-affirming policies 
would need to be developed.  Again, I will explore this in more detail below. 
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policies as well as methods for making existing agency-facilitating policies more visible 
to those who may benefit from them most.  
 After having explained in chapter four why the stereotypical figure of the 
“imperiled Muslim woman” cannot be protected by secular law, even under the revised 
Arbitration Act, I explore and critique in chapter five how this stereotype, as proliferated 
by the media during the debate, precludes the possibility of protective justice in the 
context of Muslim family law. One of the primary reasons that the “imperiled Muslim 
woman” cannot be protected is that she cannot, according to the stereotype, receive 
anything like justice at the hands of her community and religious tradition. This is 
because she is imperiled by what is imagined to be irredeemably patriarchal sharia law 
implemented at the hands of misogynistic Muslim men. I argue in this chapter that to the 
stereotypes of the “imperiled Muslim woman,” “dangerous Muslim man” and “civilized 
European” that Razack identifies, we might add the stereotype of “uncivilized sharia” 
(Razack 2008).  
 Chapter 5 explores this latter stereotype for its productive power34 by examining 
the media discourse on the Sharia debate. I also attempt to critique this stereotype such 
that, on the one hand, inequitable interpretations of sharia may be left open to feminist 
critique without, on the other hand, falling back into the disparaging and imperialist 
stereotype of “uncivilized sharia.” Based on Razack’s argument regarding the three 
stereotypes she identifies (see chapter 4), I argue that the stereotype of “uncivilized 
sharia” also does not in fact effectively dismantle patriarchal inequity or violence in any 
case, either in Islamic culture or Western culture, but rather reinforces it (Razack 2008). 
                                                 
34 Razack is referring here to Foucault’s thesis that power is not simply repressive, it is also productive. In 
this instance the stereotypical image of the imperiled Muslim woman has been used to produce assumptions 
and reinforce relations that further western interests.  
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Dismantling the stereotype of “uncivilized sharia” is therefore I argue an important 
strategy for also dismantling patriarchy, gender inequity, and violence in both dominant 
and minoritized cultures.   
 This chapter also aims more generally to document, analyse, and critique the 
othering of Muslims and Islam in the context of the sharia debate as it proceeded in the 
media. I explore the media analyses of the public sharia debate of several authors here. I 
analyze how the interpretations of Islamic legal tradition put forth in the media differ 
dramatically from those of Muslims and academic scholars generally. Finally, I argue that 
the modern media is a fundamental instrument of secularization (as I have defined 
secularization in chapter three). Most importantly for my purposes, the media establish 
and maintain secularization as cultural hierarchy. This means that secularization is as 
much about protecting dominant cultural (secular and religious) interests and racializing 
and marginalizing religious others as it is about regulating religion fairly in an allegedly 
neutral secular public sphere. I use this media case study of the sharia debate to illustrate 
how these things are accomplished in the modern West.  
 I present in chapter 6 the results of my fieldwork. Based on my empirical 
research with faith-based religious groups in southern Ontario from 2007-2009, I find 
that in practice the most pressing issue of the sharia debate for Muslim leaders and 
adherents in Ontario was not faith-based arbitration, but rather religious divorce.35 Much 
of the so-called sharia debate focused on the plight of vulnerable people in the context of 
faith-based arbitration. The media generally and Muslim and non-Muslim feminists 
specifically expressed concern that Muslim women and children might not receive fair 
and equitable treatment in the event of a civil dispute (such as a contested will) or of a 
                                                 
35 Portions of this section as well as chapter 5 have been previously published (Cutting 2012). 
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marriage breakdown (involving disputes over spousal support, child support, custody, or 
division of family resources) (see Boyd 2004). Much of the public “sharia debate” 
assumed that Muslim community leaders were fully aware of the Arbitration Act and 
intended to use it to make third party decisions on behalf of, for example, divorcing 
Muslim couples in ways that would be detrimental to Muslim women. However, my 
fieldwork findings suggest two unanticipated results. First, Muslim couples in the process 
of divorce did not seek out full arbitration agreements on the matter of divorce itself. 
Rather, the majority of Muslims approaching Muslim leaders for assistance with civil 
disputes were looking for a religious divorce in addition to a legal divorce. Second, 
Muslim women constitute the vast majority of those approaching Muslim leaders and 
other Muslim organizations for assistance in securing a religious divorce. I argue that for 
these reasons the 2006 policy change enacted by the McGuinty government has made 
little difference on the ground, and that the most pressing issue impacting Ontarian 
Muslim women’s rights and wellbeing – the granting or withholding of religious divorce 
– has been ignored.  
 To consider the disparity between the prevalent discourse and Muslim religious 
arbitration in practice, the first part of this chapter reports my findings regarding the 
practices of Muslims with regard to private ordering of civil disputes within three 
organizations: the Islamic Institute for Civil Justice, the Darul Iftaa36 and the Islamic 
Social Services and Resources Association. I briefly mention research on other similar 
Muslim dispute resolution service providers in Ontario. Based on my fieldwork research 
findings, I demonstrate that by far the most prevalent practices taking place among 
Muslim communities in Ontario are Muslim divorce and Muslim mediation. Arbitration 
                                                 
36 Darul Iftaa literally translates as House of Advisory Council or Opinion. 
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is not a common practice.37 Muslim women are the overwhelming majority of clients 
seeking this service. These findings challenge the negative representations of Muslim 
dispute resolution proliferated during the public debate. The second part of the chapter 
discusses the relevance and impact of this reality for public policy and practice. 
 My fieldwork research is based on informal semi-structured interviews with 30 
Muslim men and women, including leaders, social workers, and adherents. Two Muslim 
organizations were kind enough to share brief anonymous case summaries of Muslim 
divorce/dispute resolution cases. I have received 21 such case summaries in total to date. 
I examined these fieldwork results for common themes and issues that cut across the 
majority of the interviewees and I construct my argument around representative examples 
from my fieldwork.  
 Chapter 7 is the final concluding chapter of the dissertation. I begin with an 
evaluation of Ayelet Shachar’s proposal for transformative accommodation with regard 
to the potential for and limits of (religious) legal accommodation in Canada (Shachar 
2001). I support some of Shachar’s suggestions, and based on my research offer some 
suggestions of my own. I also evaluate Anver Emon’s proposal to facilitate what he calls 
multicultural jurisprudence. Second, I ask the question “is secularism bad for women?” 
My answer is that certain kinds of secularism, for example “imperial secularism,” have 
been very bad for women, especially racialized and religionized others. I reiterate my 
argument that anti-imperial forms of secularism must be developed in response. Finally, I 
offer several concrete policy recommendations based on my research that I argue may 
                                                 
37 As I document below, this is not simply because faith based arbitration was not available or allowed 
before or now. My research suggests that it is because there is simply no demand for it among Muslims or 
Muslim service providers, and most surprisingly, even by those organizations reported in the media to have 
been pursuing the practice of faith based arbitration.  
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address the policy gaps that persist since the conclusion of the “sharia debate,” and 
continue to potentially place vulnerable people at unnecessary risk. 
 
Conclusion: 
 I will examine in this dissertation how a secular Canada, in the context of the 
policy goals of its multicultural law, accommodates the Canadian Charter guarantee of 
religious freedom of Ontarians who wish to practice faith based arbitration in Ontario, 
and what the limits of this accommodation are. There is only one other major fieldwork 
project I know of, Julie Macfarlane’s, that extensively explores this issue on the ground. 
Because this issue has been so under-researched my project accomplishes, in tandem with 
Macfarlane’s, important groundbreaking research that requires further research to be 
complete and representative. Given the paucity of fieldwork on this issue my work is far 
from redundant, but rather reinforces and confirms other new research in the area, while 
also accomplishing unique fieldwork and analysis. Based on my fieldwork findings that 
there remain several avenues for procuring legally enforceable contracts related directly 
to family law matters, and that the vast majority of people in Muslim communities 
seeking religious alternative dispute resolution services are women, I argue that in large 
part the McGuinty Government has missed the “policy boat.” I argue that policies 
designed to facilitate Muslim women’s agency must replace policies designed to protect 
people imagined to be largely devoid of agency in order to facilitate better protection of 
vulnerable people given the realities of Ontario’s family law. I argue further that the 
sundry and pernicious stereotypes prevalent in the public debate must be dismantled in 
order to effectively oppose patriarchal inequity and violence. I offer several policy 
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recommendations designed to facilitate these aims here. It appears that a secular Canada 
in the context of the policy goals of its multicultural law has attempted in this instance to 
protect vulnerable people by eschewing to some extent accommodations of religious 
freedom as outlined in the Canadian Charter. I have argued that religiously influenced 
legally enforceable contracts are not so easily eschewed under Ontario Family Law. 
Therefore, the issue is rather that agency affirming policies designed to assist vulnerable 
people in activating and benefiting from the protections the family legal system offers is 
what is needed, rather than imagining that the reforms to Ontario’s Arbitration Act, 
which are positive as far as they go, have completely addressed the issues raised in the 
debate on faith based arbitration. Although the so-called “sharia debate” ended in 2005 
and the amendments to the Arbitration Act were finalized in 2006, this research project is 
still pertinent to ongoing issues of faith-based alternative dispute resolution practices in 
Ontario, Canada, and globally. For example, several states in the United States are 
passing laws to prevent the use of foreign laws in state courts as part of a spreading 
reaction to the potential use of Islamic law or sharia in legal matters (Masci and Lawton 






Theory: Religion, Multiculturalism, and the Secular 
 
 My doctoral project explores how a secular Canada, in the context of the goals of 
its multicultural policies, accommodates the Canadian Charter guarantee of religious 
freedom for Canadians who wish to practice faith based arbitration in Ontario, and what 
the limits of this accommodation are. In order to answer this question I must establish the 
theoretical underpinnings of the concepts used in the question. In other words, what do 
we mean by secularism, multiculturalism, religion, and religious freedom, and who 
decides what the limits of accommodation are? How are these social realities related to 
one another? In this chapter I aim to theorize these concepts, and in some cases offer new 
conceptualizations intended to fill what I perceive to be gaps in the existing literature on 
these concepts and theories. I use these concepts and revised theories to express my 
conclusion that the “sharia debate” was an example of how Canadian secularism distorted 
public policy debates by positing abstract caricatures of a Muslim “other”, specifically, 
the vulnerable, uneducated, Muslim woman and the predatory, dominating, irrational pre-
modern Muslim man. Sherene Razack refers to these stereotypical figures as the 
“imperiled Muslim woman” and the “dangerous Muslim man”(2008). This specific form 
of secularism served to promote racism, sexism, anti-immigrant sentiment, Orientalism 
and Islamophobia. Sometimes, this form of secularism was deployed by several figures 
and organizations in the name of “imperial feminism” over against Islam and Muslims in 
Canada generally. This form of secularism operated through a discourse that did not refer 
to real women. Therefore I introduce original empirical evidence to show that these 
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media and public discourses have nothing to do with the real lives of Muslim Canadians 
and therefore are an abstract fabrication of an Orientalist imagination.  
 
 
2.1 The Secular, Secularism, and Secularization 
 The notion of the secular is foundational to modernity generally and modern 
nation states in particular (Casanova 1994; Taylor 1998; Asad 2003). In order to 
understand how a “secular” Canada accommodates religious freedom it is necessary to 
understand the secular and secularization. Jose Casanova makes an important and useful 
distinction between the secular or secularization as a concept, and secularization as a 
sociological theory (Casanova 1994, 12). The notion of the secular began life as a 
concept created by the Western Christian church in the Middle Ages where it came to 
signify priests who worked out in the world as opposed to the religious clergy who had 
withdrawn from the world into the monasteries (Casanova 1994, 13).38 Coming 
historically out of this context, the concept of secularization has two main meanings, one 
spatial and political, the other having to do with levels of adherence. Regarding the 
former, Casanova states, “Secularization as a concept refers to the actual historical 
process whereby this dualist system within “this world” and the sacramental structures of 
mediation between this world and the other world progressively break down until the 
entire medieval system of classification disappears, to be replaced by new systems of 
                                                 
38 The secular also came to signify lands previously owned by the church that had been appropriated by 
non-Church agents -- mainly the state (or aristocracy) -- following the Protestant Reformation (Casanova 
1994, 13). Therefore, it is important to understand that the idea of the secular began as a religious concept. 
When the Catholic Church dominated much of Western Europe during the Middle Ages, the spatial-
political-conceptual world of this region was divided into at least two separate realms: the secular, and the 
religious. 
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spatial structuration of the spheres” (Casanova 1994, 15). Whereas previously one might 
say the secular was a realm within the dominant religious sphere, now the secular 
dominates the spatial-political terrain while religion is made to find its place within it. 
Politically speaking, now there is really only one world, whereas previously there were 
two discrete realms.  
 Secularization theory is a theory of the changing place of religion in modern 
society. According to this theory, secularization is generally thought to be a process 
generated by the changes brought about by modernization that tend to change the place of 
religion in society from one of relative dominance to one greatly reduced in power, scope 
and influence by comparison (Martin 1978: Berger 1990; Bruce 2002). The notion of the 
secular on the other hand is generally understood to be the conceptual opposite of 
religion, keeping in mind that the secular was itself a Christian concept historically. 
Secularism then is generally understood to be a political doctrine that aims to achieve 
varying levels of secularization in a given modern or modernizing society (Seljak 2005, 
179).  
 I require a new understanding of secularization in order to explain what I have 
found in my research. Therefore, I will summarize the dominant understandings of 
secularization theory in the sociology of religion literature in order to identify where my 
nascent understandings of secularization fill in what I believe are gaps in the existing 
theory. One might think that I should define how I use the term religion before I theorize 
the secular or secularization. After all, does not religion come first historically, ruling 
over traditional groupings of people in an absolutist, non-rational, community-oriented, 
and pre-modern way? Does not the secular, modern world come quite late historically, 
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“freeing” the rational individual from traditional religions and restricting the powers of 
religion to a nascent private sphere so that people do not destroy each other because of 
religious bigotry? These discourses on religion and secular modernity are highly 
productive, in the Foucaudian sense, of the economic and political interests of modern 
societies and will be deeply questioned and deconstructed in this analysis. Therefore, the 
reason I theorize the secular before I define how I will use “religion” is that I accept the 
argument that how we define and understand religion today is thoroughly a modern 
construction (McCutcheon 1997, Smith 1982, Asad 1993). One then must first 
understand something about modern secular projects in order to understand how and why 
religion is constructed, defined, and circumscribed in just the way it is. I argue the 
modern category formation of “religion” is a product and tool of secularization. Thus I 
will explore the modern program and project of secularization before I analyse one of its 
key tools. I am not saying that the various cultural traditions such as Christianity, Islam, 
and Judaism that are now understood to be among the world’s “religions” did not exist 
prior to modernity. I am saying that the particular way that these traditions have come to 
be contained by the label “religion” through certain historically specific defining acts, 
and the way these traditions are thought about, circumscribed, managed, regulated and, in 
certain cases, policed in modern societies is thoroughly modern, and did not exist in the 
same way previously.  
 
2.1.1 Differentiation as Religionization 
 Talal Asad has provided a useful conceptualization of modernity over against 
those who would argue that modernity is not a verifiable object when he states that 
 46
“[m]odernity is a project—or rather a series of interlinked projects—that certain people in 
power seek to achieve. The project aims at institutionalizing a number of (sometimes 
conflicting, often evolving) principles: constitutionalism, moral autonomy, democracy, 
human rights, civil equality, industry, consumerism, freedom of the market 
[capitalism]—and secularism (Asad 2003, 13). Rendering modernity this way helps 
frame it in a manner that it can be studied through its particular projects and therefore 
opened to academic interrogation, rather than being dismissed as unverifiable and 
therefore illegitimate as an object of academic inquiry.  
 I argue in this section that the modern project of secularization is not one that 
simply works with the allegedly universal concrete categories “secular” and “religion”. 
Rather, secularization is fundamentally a “religionizing” project. I coin the term 
“religionization” intending to invoke many of the same ideas that racialization was 
intended to convey about “race”. The term racialization was intended to disrupt 
established and reified cultural ideas about “race” as a “real” thing.39. Since race is not a 
biologically supported notion, it is a socially and culturally constructed one, and that is 
what is suggested by replacing the term “race” with racialization. “Religionization” 
serves a parallel function in this paper.40  
 Similarly, by coining the term “religionization” I hope to disrupt some established 
notions about “religion”. Scholars of religion have observed for many years now the 
                                                 
39 Many academics now agree that although skin colour can be passed down genetically, race, which means 
that several other genetically inheritable traits, related to mental ability for example, are generally more 
similar among those with the same skin colour, and less similar among those with different skin colours, is 
a socio-culturally constructed notion, as this has been proven biologically to be false. In other words, 
although racialization is a social reality, race is not a biological reality (Omi and Winant 1993; Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis 1992; Goldberg 1993). 
40 However, the idea that religion is an invented category and that religion is a social construction is not 
new (McCutcheon 1997, Smith 1982, Asad 1993). Therefore “religionization” does not introduce new 
theory in the academic study of religion, but is meant rather to succinctly embody and communicate ideas 
that are not well understood in public consciousness and discourse. 
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problem of essentializing the category “religion” (Asad 1993; McCutcheon 1997; Wiebe 
1999, Masuzawa 2005). Religionization certainly echoes those critiques. However, it 
suggests also that modern projects of conceptualizing, defining, and re-defining religion 
are continually maintaining and/or revising what the term “religion” means and does 
culturally. “Religion” is not simply a pre-existing given that modernity then privatizes, 
creating a neutral non-religious, or even ecumenical space; it is crafted culturally and 
constructed strategically. Modernity actively defines, maintains, and redefines the 
concept of “religion,” deciding who or what is assigned to that category in order not only 
to contain, manage, and control these people and things, but also in order to actively 
“Other” religion in order to define itself as its opposite, the secular. Religion is the Other 
to the secular. Designating something as religious or not religious also becomes bound up 
in particular projects that create a cultural hierarchy between on the one hand secular 
and/or dominant forms of religion and on the other hand marginalized forms of religion. I 
argue below that this hierarchy construction and maintenance components of 
religionization are useful tools for what I call imperial secularism.41  
 Jose Casanova differentiates three elements of secularization: decline, 
privatization, and differentiation (Casanova 1994, 11-39). Decline is fairly self 
explanatory. This facet of secularization theory states that people will cease to think and 
act “religiously;” they will drop religious ideas for secular ones (Casanova 1994, 25). 
Privatization usually means that religion has become an individual private affair rather 
than a collective public issue (Casanova 1994, 35). Individuals now have the freedom and 
                                                 
41 Talal Asad has shown that secularism is not only to be understood the way Charles Taylor does, as a 
benign and progressive project. Secularism in practice can also be used to accomplish the goals of powerful 
and dominant national interests, quite apart from the benign theoretical goals of secularism (Asad 2003). It 
is this latter form of secularism I point to with my term “imperial secularism.”  
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power to choose their religion, or to choose to have none, and the secular state declares 
that one’s religion is no prerequisite for state membership or human rights. Privatization 
is often presented in discourses on modernity as a kind of liberation, rather than also as a 
new kind of requirement enforced by the modern state. Furthermore, Asad points out that 
the notion of the privatization of religion is in fact unclear at several points, not because 
religious people are tying to infiltrate the public sphere, but because the very extent and 
comprehensive powers of the modern state over any and all “private” affairs makes it 
essentially impossible to separate religion from the workings of the state. This insight is 
relevant to this study in particular in that it uncovers several problems with Casanova’s 
suggestion that the deprivatization of religion can be modern if only modern forms of 
religion are allowed to deprivatize. In fact, the state closely regulates the private lives of 
all subjects, regardless of the form of religion they practice (Casanova 1994, 211-234).42 
These are important concepts and critiques, but the notion of differentiation bears deeper 
consideration for my project than the first two parts of secularization theory as outlined 
by Casanova. 
 Differentiation in modern society begins with the increasing specialization of 
labour in increasingly complex modern economies. With the advent of modernity, 
modern factories increasingly demanded specialized workers for very specific and limited 
tasks. The specialization of skilled labour carried over into the construction of specialized 
autonomous spheres of public activity. Differentiation in secularization theory classically 
entails the gradual separation of religion from other increasingly autonomous realms, 
spheres, or institutions of modernity such as the state, economics, arts, medicine, 
education, and virtually every sphere of what is now regarded as “public life” (Casanova 
                                                 
42 Although to be fair, Casanova distances himself from this claim later (Casanova 2008). 
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1994, 20-25). Now that this form of differentiation has become dominant, it is often 
difficult for moderns not to assume that these discrete spheres existed prior to modernity, 
and that now they are only more autonomous. I rather would agree with Talal Asad that 
the normative autonomous institutions and spheres we now know today discretely as the 
state, economy, science, religion, and others are not simply extensions of what came 
before, only liberated from each other. Rather, each of these “spheres” is in many ways a 
radically new construction, representing a revolutionary transformation from what came 
before, even if one can build a genealogy connecting the past to the present. Importantly 
here, “religion” as a modern conceptualization is very different than those meanings 
documented in genealogies of the term “religion” preceding modernity. Therefore, I 
argue that an under-used sense of the term “differentiation” should be reasserted here: 
differentiation as the processes of conceptualizing or defining an object not simply 
liberating an already existing conceptual object from other already existing conceptual 
objects. “The secular” requires an Other, “the religious.” Both are co-created since they 
depend on each other. To question “the secular”, one must immediately question “the 
religious”. The process of continually defining and maintaining or reconceptualizing 
“religion” in modern societies is a primary task and strategy of secular and secularizing 
governments, economies, and cultures. The importance of this under-represented notion 
of differentiation for secularization theory should be asserted: differentiation means 
religionization, and it is intimately tied up with constructing hierarchies.  
 A further point about secularization theory bears making here. The majority of 
theories of secularization focus on how the modern state and economy (in other words 
modernity) impact on the religious subject, but normally only in an indirect way. In many 
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versions of the theory, secularization appears to be a process that is largely an 
unintentional and secondary consequence of modernization generally. For example, it is 
argued by Steve Bruce that a number of factors dislocate persons from the communities, 
social connections, economies, and systems of obligations that support an individual’s 
inclination to be religious: plurality of religions, fragmentation of communities, 
individualization, and many others are all cited as events and realities of the “modern 
world” that indirectly, or at least secondarily erode traditional supports for and 
obligations to be religious, as well as felt needs for religions. What is missing from these 
theories is the notion that secularization is not simply a benign unwitting secondary affect 
of modernization, but rather a primary political project, strategy, practice, and discourse 
actively and consciously deployed to institute “western modernity” (Gorski et al 2008). 
Gorski et al speculate that the reason this most recent of meanings of secularization is 
also the most forgotten may be because, “as James Beckford rightly points out, . . . that 
many early sociologists ‘were involved in political and practical schemes to clarify, 
obstruct or assist the decline of religion’s significance’ (Beckford 2003). By emphasizing 
grand, impersonal forces and processes (“science”, “rationalization,” etc.), the post-
WWII generation of secularization theorists were not just conforming to then dominant 
ideas of science; they were also covering the tracks of their forebears (Swatos 1984, 
Vidich & Lyman 1985)” (Gorski et al. 2008, 15). 
 Modernity does not simply consist in “non-religious practices” that have adverse 
if unintended affects on religion. Rather, modernity creates, defines, and assigns the 
notion of “religion” in specific ways, not least of which involves the construction of 
religion as an Other to and subject of the modern secular state so that it may be managed 
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in certain ways. Therefore, the analysis of the secular and secularization in this project 
will not involve simply the examination of whether religious adherence is rising or falling 
in modern society. It will also not simply look at the actions of the state as attempts to 
shore up differentiation, as if the religious and the secular were assumed givens, and the 
lines between them simply needed to be reinforced. Rather, the analysis of the secular 
and secularization here will examine how religion and the secular are created, maintained 
or recreated and defined with regard to who is privileged and who marginalized through 
these constructions.  
 
2.1.2 Imperial Secularism: Hierarchy Construction and Maintenance 
 There have already been several insights offered about what the “secular” was 
made to mean in the discourse of the Sharia debate (Razack 2008; Zine 2009; Syed 
2012). These insights mostly build on the work of Asad, who has called for an 
anthropology of the secular (Asad 2003). Part of that project, as Asad has imagined it, 
reveals secularization to be a complex and revolutionary cultural shift rather than simply 
a reordering of boundaries between essentialized preexisting objects. Secularization is 
also deeply implicated in the history of western colonialism and imperialism. Political 
projects that deploy the secular often use this notion to other and colonize subject 
populations both at home and abroad. The secular comes to designate the dominant, and 
“religious” comes to designate the Other in need of modernity, despite the fact that much 
of so called secular (dominant) culture is also arguably deeply “religious.” Sherene 
Razack observes in Asad’s work the insight that the notion of the secular is used by 
modern nation states to establish the relations the state wants (Razack 2008; Asad 2003). 
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This notion is very different from that of Charles Taylor who argues that “secularism 
secures the power of the [benign] state as neutral arbiter” between dissenting religious 
and other types of political and cultural factions (Razack 2008, 161). Asad and Razack 
suggest rather that the (secular) state comes to represent the dominant community, and 
that one powerful way to justify certain types of control and othering of minoritized 
populations is to designate them “religious” minorities, and their “problems” “religious” 
in nature. The cultural construction and maintenance of this hierarchy of dominant 
secular (together with privileged forms and types of “religion”) over minoritized forms 
and types of “religion” I argue should be regarded as an important component of 
secularization theory.  
 It is important to explore what the notion of the secular in this sense secures and 
achieves for dominant national populations and several dominant developed countries, 
what Razack would designate the family of white, western nation-states (2008, 160). For 
example, Asad observes that the banning of the headscarf in France achieved much more 
than simply the reassertion of the separation of church and state, and allegedly the 
potential protection of Muslim women’s agency (Asad 2004 as discussed in Razack 
2008). In many ways this public debate and final legal act was much more productive of 
reinforcing who does and does not belong to the nation, further racializing and Othering 
immigrant religious minorities in France, and justifying their political and economic 
marginalization and over-policing. My aim is to theorize these insights regarding this 
Othering and hierarchy work of discourses of the secular and the religious directly into 
secularization theory more generally, because I think they have a much wider 
applicability. I coin here the phrase “imperial secularism” in order to designate 
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theoretically how the “secular” is made to mean and accomplish things that serve 
imperial and dominant national interests in certain (and several) historical contexts. I do 
not argue here that imperial secularism is the only form of secularism, or that hierarchy 
construction and maintenance is its only function. There are different types and 
components of secularism as noted above in Casanova’s work. The concept of imperial 
secularism is meant to add to the theoretical field of secularization theory, not replace all 
that has gone before.  
 I derive the phrase “imperial secularism” from the phrase “colonial feminism” 
used to designate a form of feminism that historically has been used to justify military 
intervention and colonial control of Other’s lands and resources.43 As mentioned before, 
the state uses the project of secularization to establish the relations it wants (Razack 
2008, 148, 161). This does not of course mean simply that benign states always work to 
protect religious minorities against persecution, citizens against religious establishment 
by enforcing religious freedom, and individual (especially women’s) rights over against 
communal rights and actions. It means rather that in the name of aiming at these rather 
benign goals, other more patriarchal and imperialist ends might also be achieved, in the 
same way that several feminists have observed “colonial feminism” was used in the 
service of neo-colonial interests in Afghanistan to far more affect than substantially 
improving the plight of Afghan women (Khan 2008). In the same way that women’s 
                                                 
43 For example, Shahnaz Khan concludes her article on Afghanistan, “I began this discussion with the 
suggestion that the desire for rescue of the Third World woman is a form of colonial feminism through 
which accounts of Afghan women’s de-contextualized lives produce a discourse that suggests that timeless 
tradition, religion and the Taliban are the cause of their oppression. I have pointed out that identifying local 
patriarchies as the sole cause of women’s oppression rationalizes military missions” (Khan 2008, 132. 
Italics mine). See also Leila Ahmed. 1992. Women and Gender in Islam. New Haven Connecticut :Yale 
UP; Frantz Fanon. 1965. A Dying Colonialism. New York: Grove Press (Both cited in Khan 2008); and 
Lamia Ben Youssef Zayzafoon. 2005. The Production of the Muslim Woman: Negotiating Text, History, 
and Ideology. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.  
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rights can be used to justify wars on Others that in fact destroy and disadvantage women 
deeply, secularism can also be used to oppress religious minorities, justify over-policing 
religionized Others, and disregard genuine consideration of Muslim women’s plight and 
agency rather than facilitating Muslim women’s agency and improving their material and 
social conditions (Khan 2008).44  
 This means that promoting secularism is often as much about protecting dominant 
cultural interests and racializing and marginalizing religious Others, as it is about 
regulating religion in an allegedly neutral secular public sphere. In the same way that 
“gender” is not a neutral category, but has historically always referred to a culturally 
enforced hierarchy between masculine and feminine, so too the secular historically has 
not been a neutral category, but has in practice referred to a space that is stratified in 
hierarchies amongst secularism, dominant privileged religions and forms of religion and 
marginalized religions—despite modern claims to neutrality. Therefore, an essential 
component of secularization historically, that I have termed “imperial secularism”, 
consists in installing a cultural hierarchy at odds with the aims of building and ensuring 
an egalitarian public sphere by means of a neutral state. In sum, an important component 
of secularization historically that lingers even today has been hierarchy construction and 
maintenance between dominant and marginalized social groups, a key component and 
strategy of the project of imperial secularism.  
                                                 
44 “There is another option for the First World woman who wishes to express solidarity with Afghan 
women. She can interrogate her own situatedness and examine the ways in which her own elected 
representatives might have contributed to the condition of Afghan women’s lives. Foreign forces, as I have 
underlined, have had a major role in creating the Afghan tragedy, and many of these forces answer to First-
World elected representatives. Only a self-critical analysis which examines the complexities of local 
arrangements and their interaction with transnational forces can take us away from military rescue missions 
supported by sometimes well-meaning but myopic feminists.” (Khan 2008, 132). I make here a similar 
argument regarding the Sharia debate.  
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 Building on the analogy of feminism will help to explain further what I mean by 
the construction and maintenance of hierarchies. There is an important parallel between  
constructing hierarchies and the insights of third-wave feminism (Gillis et al. 2007; 
Jushka 2001). The Othering process in gender hierarchy, according to third wave 
feminism, is understood as not being limited to that between men and women; the 
concept is extended to processes of racialization, imperialism, class differences, that is, 
Othering that creates a hierarchy among women between white, colonial, economically 
privileged women and Other women. I argue that there also exists, in part as a result of 
imperial secularism, a hierarchy of religions in the “secular” modern state along a 
continuum of privileged to Othered generated through racialization, histories of 
colonialism, class differences and other factors.  
 Furthermore, my argument has been that secularism as hierarchy construction and 
maintenance that serves dominant interests is not simply an occasional unfortunate 
accretion onto an otherwise benign and neutral secularism proper, but rather has been 
intrinsic and essential to modernity generally and secularism specifically from its 
inception, bound up as it was and is with colonialism and imperialism. This argument 
parallels post-colonial anti-racist arguments that understand racism to be not simply an 
unfortunate blemish on or aberration of western modernity but, in fact, absolutely central 
to modernity and modernization from its historical inception to the present day (Miles & 
Brown 2003; Eke 1997; Said 1978). The beginnings of a solution is to work towards anti-
racist, anti-Orientalist, and anti-imperial forms of secularization against imperial 
secularism, in the same way that anti-racist, anti-colonial feminism is suggested to be the 
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way to at least begin correcting the damage and blind spots of colonial feminism45 (Khan 
2008). I will have more to say about how to aim at this in the concluding chapter.  
 The construction and maintenance of hierarchies does not simply mean that 
modern religion or religion that is deemed to be appropriate to modernity is now the only 
acceptable form of religion in the modern nation state: privatized, individualized, 
disestablished, and the like (Casanova 1994), although the privileging of certain forms of 
religion such as these, and the marginalization of other forms of religion is a very 
important part of it. Constructing hierarchies also means that on the one hand some 
religions mainly belonging to dominant populations in a given context are privileged 
either by being taken for granted as culturally normative, thus largely invisible, and 
therefore even “secular” or simply belonging to the nation, and on the other hand 
religionized others designated as not belonging to the nation or dominant culture are 
marginalized, sometimes strategically, in various ways. Some religions (read Islam in the 
West) are deemed in this discourse to be more “religious” than others, while some 
religions (read modern, liberal Christianity in the West) are regarded as more “western”, 
secular, or culturally appropriate than others.  
 Orientalism therefore is an important element of imperial secularism (Said 1978). 
The racialization of religion is also an important component of constructing hierarchies of 
religion in secular states (Joshi 2006). Furthermore, the culturalization of problems of 
patriarchy, inequity, and violence in immigrant communities, while the same problems 
are individualized in the majority community, also plays an important role in fashioning 
hierarchies of religion (Zine 2009; Narayan 2006; Grewal 2009). There are more than 
likely other strategies used by imperial secularism to achieve hierarchies; I have only 
                                                 
45 I will add to this what I call post-secular feminism, to be discussed below.  
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mentioned four (non-exclusive) strategies thus far here: colonial feminism, Orientalism, 
racialization of religion, and culturalization of deviance/inequity. Secularization therefore 
is not always just about the separation of religion from the state and the privileging of 
“modern” privatized, individualized, and disestablished forms of religion. It has also 
involved the installation of some religions as more modern and therefore privileged and 
more representative of the nation than “Others.” However, in conclusion, the construction 
and maintenance of hierarchies is not necessarily intrinsically and unavoidably a part of 
all possible or actual secularization projects, though I argue that unfortunately it is 
remarkably widespread in practice. For example, Tariq Modood’s (2005) call for a 
moderate secularism in place of what he calls radical secularism would appear to foster a 
form of secularism much less susceptible to hierarchy formation than historic western 
state formations have produced.  
 Secularization as (in part) hierarchy construction and maintenance also in part 
helps to explain the continued widespread existence of dominant religions, and the fact of 
their religious dominance even in public life, in highly modern nation states. Almost 
without exception, even in the most “secular” of nation-states, even though formal legal 
limits and relative disestablishment has occurred, there remain extensive and marked 
instances of the dominant religion(s) of “the nation” enjoying widespread cultural 
privilege in both private and public spaces (Blumenfield et al 2008; Clark 2006; 
Casanova 2008). Perhaps part of the reason secularization has not more fully 
marginalized the presence of religion generally, and dominant religions in particular, out 
of the public sphere is because imperial secularism functions to privilege the dominant 
national community.  
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 An important caveat bears making here. I do not want to reinforce the same 
division that I am in fact critiquing between the notions of “secularism” and 
“secularization”. I have been arguing that on the one hand much secularization theory 
presents secularization as nearly an inadvertent result of modernization generally. 
Secularism on the other hand has come to mean an ideology and intent to secularize in a 
specific way: that is to exclude as much as possible all religion from public life (Seljak 
2005, 179). In other words, secularization just happens, but secularism is an intentional 
project. I am arguing that an important aspect of secularization theory that needs to be 
recovered and reexamined is the notion of secularization as the result of an intentional 
project sought by those who “aim at modernity” (Asad 2003, 13). Therefore, I would 
extend the notion of secularism to include all those who aim at modernity by pursuing the 
secularization of societies, and more importantly claim that secularism is an important 
component of secularization theory and therefore an essential explanation of 
secularization. In conclusion, I affirm that “imperial secularism” achieved primarily 
through constructing and maintaining hierarchies is an important component of 
secularization and discourses of the secular. Furthermore, intentional projects and human 
agency, imperial or otherwise, are central to secularization.  
 
2.2 Definition of Religion 
 In order to proceed upon a project that studies religions, one must define what one 
is studying. This is particularly important theoretically to me for this project because, as I 
have argued above in concert with scholars such as Talal Asad, “religion” itself is a 
culturally located concept with a genealogy, rather than an observable universal category. 
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All “essentialist” definitions of religion are bound to fail. Therefore, the definition I offer 
below attempts to outline how the modern concept of religion has been constructed, 
rather than affirming that there is indeed an object out there that can be called “religion.” 
The usefulness of this working definition is that it helps to locate the data of “religion” in 
the context of modern constructions of that category while at the same time being 
critically aware of and questioning how the modern category of “religion” is constructed. 
Furthermore, I am arguing that the particular crafting and assigning of the concept of 
religion in modernity is not only unique in the history of the term “religion,” but also its 
meaning and productive power are at times strategically constructed and reconstructed to 
achieve particular interests.  
As I have already stated, the productive power of “religion” (and secularizing 
projects that employ this modern tool) may be aimed at benign goals: equality, freedom 
of religion, and protection of individual agency, though even these things are a part of a 
completely new way of being in the world that modern projects have constructed. 
However, the discourse on “religion” (how and to whom it is assigned) can also be 
deployed in ways that are more effective at benefiting the dominant and marginalizing 
the minoritized. I have included a new definition of religion in this chapter because I 
believe it begins to locate some of the hierarchy construction and maintenance of the 
secular, which of course defines itself in opposition to the religious. This is an important 
component of what I have here called religionization.  
 Is religion definable? No, and yes. Bill Arnal concludes his opening chapter on 
the definition of religion published in the Guide to the Study of Religion stating the 
impossibility of defining religion, and yet affirming the need to theorize the modern 
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concept of religion as a located historical project (Arnal 2000). The latter is what I 
attempt to work toward here.  
 Talal Asad, and Bill Arnal who builds on him, are correct to argue that religion as 
transhistorical essence is not definable (Asad 1993, Arnal 2000). There is no kernel 
cultural characteristic, or family of characteristics, that can justify by definition, across 
times and cultures, the grouping together of what we think of in modernity as religious 
traditions and groups and the exclusion of other cultural traditions and groups. However, 
I do believe we can better define and describe how modernity has created and defined the 
modern category of religion.46 This will not help us to consolidate the category, but 
rather understand in part how the category is produced and what it produces. Here I am 
taking “religion” to be a manufactured category (McCutcheon, 2003) that has been made 
to play an important part in the modern project of “secularization.” This modern cons
I argue is definable, and that is what I will attempt to move towards in part here. 
truct 
 
                                                
 Asad notes that the modern concept of religion began to take the shape that is 
recognizable to us today in the seventeenth century in opposition to “a new kind of state, 
a new kind of science, and a new kind of legal and moral subject” (Asad 1993, 43). I am 
especially interested in the modern conceptualizing of religion over against the new 
modern kind of science specifically here. An assessment of several recent publications on 
the definition of religion reveals that the vast majority of substantive and exclusive 
definitions of religion depend on a characteristic termed the “supernatural”, or the 
superempirical, unverifiable, or unfalsifiable (Idinopulos & Wilson Eds. 1998; Arnal 
2000). Although there are other strategies for defining religion, the underlying modern 
 
46 I do this in the same way that anti-racist scholars no longer attempt to define race as if it is a real thing, 
but rather define it in part as a social contruction, and explore how the category “race” is constructed as a 
social reality rather than reifying it.  
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concept of religion is generally more dependant for its rationale on some notion of the 
supernatural than on more recent scholarly and notoriously broad functional and family 
resemblance definitions that too easily include many cultural things that are not thought 
of normally as being religious.  
 Definitions of religion as a type of culture that involves some kind of relationship 
to the supernatural, unverifiable, or unfalsifiable are definitions that depend upon an 
allegedly cross-cultural (universal) epistemological division of the world into knowable 
and unknowable realms, and that not only is this division normative, culturally located 
and therefore ultimately untenable as a definition of culture, it also reveals something 
about the modern concept of religion that needs to be better theorized and studied.  
 
2.2.1 The Sociology of Science: An “Objective” View of Science and Religion as 
Culture 
Even if the notion of the “supernatural” was coherent, supernatural definitions of 
religion are simply not objective. I am not advocating a naïve positivist objectivism, but 
the notion of the supernatural does not even, or perhaps especially, satisfy the basic 
requirements of even a historicized, critical, and located objectivism. Taking an objective 
view of religions that does not take a position on the truth claims of religious groups is 
not new (Platvoet 1990, 186). However, studies of the implications of objectivity for 
definitions and theorizations of the modern concept of religion are in need of further 
exploration. In other words, definitions of religion that depend on the notion of the 
supernatural already judge the truth claims of religious groups, by definition.  
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Definitions of religion that rely on the notion of the supernatural rely on a 
culturally located and normative position on what counts as knowledge, or rather what is 
knowable, that is then deployed as if it were culturally universal. In opposition to this 
practice I argue that what is deemed knowable and unknowable to modern scientific 
knowledge projects is not in fact culturally universal, and therefore when used as a basis 
for defining an entire and diverse category of culture, “religion” amounts to a normative 
deployment of a single cultural set of (modern) epistemological assumptions across time 
and space rather than being a category that is based on “objective” description of cultural 
traditions that may be in complex epistemic relation (and perhaps tension) with each 
other. In other words, I understand “religion” as intended to designate a type of culture 
among other types of culture, not a type of knowledge among other types of knowledge. 
The modern concept of religion, through the notion of the supernatural, has 
attempted to lump together a family of traditions that refer to things that modern science 
has declared unknowable or even untrue by modern means of knowing. This is hardly an 
objective stance. Culturally, it is very explicitly the deployment of one culture’s 
epistemic norm across all cultures as definitive of modern and not modern, of scientific 
and religious.  
 I argue further that because the modern concept of religion takes modern science 
to be normative; in many cases the notion of the supernatural simply dismisses some 
important aspects of so called “religious phenomena” by definition. What can an 
objective science of culture mean by saying religions refer to the unverifiable when a 
number of Christians, for example, continue to invoke the argument from design as 
verifiable proof of God’s existence, or invite us to test the empirical effectiveness of God 
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in our lives through personal transformation and even healing of our bodies. And 
incidentally, I should also point out that defining religion as referring to the unverifiable 
cannot make sense of atheists either, like Richard Dawkin’s for example, who essentially 
claim that God is verifiably non-existent. I’m sure he would be happy to find out that he 
is wrong by definition, because the supernatural declares both the existence and non-
existence of such things to be unverifiable. I am not unaware that modern scientists are 
unimpressed by religious proofs for God. I argue rather that an objective study of culture 
should first describe these cultural phenomena simply as productions that authorize 
different cultural knowledges and second, to explain any epistemic tensions between 
them as socially located struggles over cultural resources and power. This does not mean 
that the methodology of scientists of culture must include theology; it simply means our 
modern scientific methodology does not require us to define culture normatively (as I am 
saying the “supernatural” has done in the past) any more than it requires us to judge the 
truth claims of the people we study. Scholars of religion should take a critical point of 
view that doesn’t take a position on what counts as knowledge for the cultural 
phenomena we study, and that critically aware objectivity must be reflected in our 
definitions of cultural phenomena, which I argue is blatantly missing if the notion of the 
supernatural is employed.47 
 
2.2.2 The Subnatural 
                                                 
47 I am not advocating a naïve positivist objectivism, but rather that the notion of the supernatural does not 
even, or perhaps especially, satisfy the basic requirements of even a historicized, critical, and located 
objectivism. I am not arguing to replace one naïve objecitivism with another (i.e. the supernatural with the 
subnatural). I am saying that the supernatural is so culturally located it cannot even be employed as a 
historicized, critical, and located objective description. What I offer to replace it is I argue more “objective” 
(that is in a limited, historicized, critical, and located way) precisely because by its very definition it 
explicitly points to socio-cultural constructions (i.e. cultural epistemic hierarchies) rather than a supposedly 
universally and cross-culturally observable distinction between “natural” and “supernatural.” 
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 I propose that a useful definition of the modern concept of religion is not that 
“religion” is culture that refers to phenomena that are epistemologically unverifiable but 
rather that religions are cultures that refer to phenomena that are epistemologically 
marginalized in relation to “modern knowledge”. Religion does not refer to unverifiable 
knowledge, but to marginalized knowledge. Religion is not defined by its relation to 
unverifiable phenomena, but to epistemologically marginalized phenomena in the context 
of modernity.  
 To signal this change I am coining the neologism, the subnatural. The modern 
concept of religion is one that defines religions as cultures that refer not to supernatural 
things but rather to subnatural things. Whereas the supernatural is a term that assumes the 
universal cultural normativity of modern science, the term subnatural suggests that 
science is a located, though admittedly powerful, even hegemonic, cultural force that 
marginalizes other cultural groups in terms of their power to produce socially legitimized 
knowledge in modern societies. These marginal cultural groups then take up positions of 
epistemic tension relative to modern science, not least of which include a family of 
cultural groups lumped together by most modern concepts of religion. The notion of the 
subnatural suggests the cultural locatedness of both dominant and marginalized 
knowledges. I believe this is a major advantage over the notion of the supernatural, which 
suggests that what modern scientists and secular people believe is unverifiable or 
unfalsifiable is culturally universal. It is also superior because the notion of the 
supernatural suggests that religion enjoys a kind of privilege in modern society by being 
“above” the natural (super-natural), when in fact it is precisely the notion of 
epistemological unverifiability and unfalsifiability conveyed in assigning “supernatural” 
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to a phenomenon that marginalizes it epistemically. Those things designated as 
“religious” do enjoy certain privileges in modern societies such as tax exemptions, 
constitutional rights to freedom of practice, and even social and cultural legitimation of 
various sorts. However, the cost of these benefits is epistemological marginalization, 
which then serves as the state’s justification for privatization and even degrees of 
exclusion of “religion” from the public spheres because of the use of non-universal 
reasoning (Cooke 2007). The subnatural on the other hand suggests what is more 
properly the case, many of the political and cultural privileges religions enjoy in modern 
societies come at the cost of acquiescing to the modern assumption that religious 
knowledge is local, as compared to the superior, universal, and far more culturally 
privileged knowledge that can present itself as directly accessing the “natural”.  
 There are other relevant aspects of culture that have been definitive of religion. 
Asad, as I noted, mentions not just a new kind of science, but a new kind of state, and a 
new kind of legal and moral subject. Furthermore, it is also clear that not all marginal 
knowledges in modernity are thought of as religious. Perhaps the modern concept of 
religion is better defined as one that deploys a specific configuration of marginalization 
(epistemically) and privilege: politically and otherwise culturally. There are of course 
other forms of culture that are marginalized epistemically, but religious culture is 
uniquely marginalized (epistemically) and privileged (socially and politically) in the 
modern nation state.48 However, again my point is not to offer a more coherent definition 
of religion in place of previous ones in order to bolster the concept. My aim is to more 
                                                 
48 For example, traditional medical cures such as bloodletting may now be marginalized epistemically, but 
religions generally receive a higher social status, respect, and honour (especially “legitimate” ones) in 
addition to political benefits such as tax exemption and constitutionally protected rights (i.e. to religious 
freedom), which anyone attempting to employ bloodletting today will not.  
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accurately theorize and label how and what it is that modernity is accomplishing through 
the concept of “religion” in order to position it and study its effects. Therefore, I study 
Islam and Judaism as religions in this dissertation because that is how dominant society 
has categorized members of these communities. Members of certain groups who can be 
categorized in a variety of ways (by gender, race, class, profession, etc.) are seen as 
Muslims and Jews first and foremost, i.e., they  have been religionized.  
 
2.2.3 What Does the Subnatural Do? 
 The concept of the subnatural is intended first and foremost to explicitly divulge, 
locate, and theorize the underlying epistemological assumptions of the modern concept of 
religion. The traditional notion of the supernatural suggests that science can ascertain 
what is empirically verifiable or unverifiable for all cultures. In opposition to this, the 
subnatural suggests that no such transparent universally consistent claim about what is 
and is not empirical exists seamlessly across all cultures. Rather, the subnatural suggests 
that the modern concept of religion is produced partly through cultural dominance of 
knowledge production, rather than being an innocent, observable, and unbiased category 
of culture that is useful for the social sciences. The “subnatural” suggests that the notion 
and productive power of the modern concept of religion itself requires explanation, rather 
than simply that particular traditions (religions) require explanation simply because they 
embrace “alternative” knowledges than those produced by “secular” modernity. There are 
parallels to my approach here in other disciplines. Charles S. Maier argues that the 
economist “interrogates economic doctrines to disclose their sociological and political 
premises....in sum, [he or she] regards economic ideas and behavior not as frameworks 
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for analysis, but as beliefs and actions that must themselves be explained” (Mayer 1987,  
6). This is an excellent example from another discipline of the defining concepts in a field 
becoming objects of analysis rather than the invisible and unquestioned frames of 
analysis. 
 Secondly, the subnatural is meant to highlight the unworkability of the modern 
concept of religion. My analysis furthers arguments that precede it that state that 
“religion” is indefinable, that is unsupportable by definitions that attempt to justify it 
observably and rationally. However, the subnatural is also an attempt that invites further 
attempts to define the modern concept of religion, that is, as a located, cultural project of 
modernity, rather than a workable cross-cultural conceptual category for humanists and 
social scientists. This is not meant to make the concept universally workable across time 
and space. It is meant to unveil its chronological and spatial limits as well as its 
(invisible) inner workings and assumptions in order to render this in fact very limited 
(and ultimately incoherent) concept more open to analysis and study.  
 Thirdly, the subnatural suggests that located analysis of epistemological positions 
and tensions within and between cultural phenomena, religious or otherwise, are worthy 
of investigation, description, and locative analysis. What counts as knowledge, or what 
counts even is knowable, is not uniform across and within cultures, and therefore merits 
academic attention. 
 Finally, as any good definition should, the subnatural has implications for theories 
and explanations of “religions”. I argue that the subnatural suggests first that so called 
“religions” are in part created (i.e. construed as “religious”) by the epistemic 
marginalization accomplished in part by the modern concept of religion, rather than 
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simply being “essentially” religious by embracing “unverifiable phenomena”, as if 
dominant knowledge productions are the stick by which social scientists should measure 
all other cultural knowledges, when in fact dominant knowledge production itself must be 
explained by social scientists. In other words, “religion” continues to exist in the modern 
world in part because of modern religionization. Moreover, the subnatural suggests that 
the epistemic tensions and negotiations between so-called religions and modernity persist 
because religions are responding to their relatively recent repositioning as epistemically 
marginal by modern projects and institutions through a process of negotiating the 
appropriation or rejection of epistemic cultural capital. In other words they are not simply 
resisting or embracing “reality”; they are resisting or appropriating a particular 
(dominant) way of “living in the world”.49  
 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
 The supernatural to date, I argue, has been largely an emic (insider) category of 
(scientific) modernity based on normative cultural assumptions about modern science. In 
response, I have endeavored here to construct an etic category outside of the normative 
assumptions of modernity (or at least critically aware of them) that more accurately 
apprehends the social struggles over epistemic cultural legitimacy that are going on in 
and through the modern concept of religion, and as they are played out in the culture of 
modern projects. 
 As Arnal has argued, even though the many definitions of religion to date are 
ultimately incoherent and fail, it is still left to social scientists and humanists of religion 
to unpack the modern concept of religion, not least because it remains very powerful, 
                                                 
49 “Modernity is not primarily a matter of cognizing the real but of living-in-the-world” (Asad 2003, 14). 
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widespread, and apparently central to modern, that is in part secularizing, projects. 
Therefore, building on Asad (and Arnal’s) project of continuing to theorize the modern 
concept of religion, I submit the subnatural as a definition and re-theorization of 
assumptions behind the modern concept of religion. Religion in part is a modern concept 
that is defined by cultural ideas and practices that establish a relationship with what is 
regarded in modern scientific society as the subnatural.  
 In this subsection on the definition of religion I have attempted to accomplish two 
things. First, I am trying to define the phenomena I study in order to justify studying the 
particular groups I explore as religious groups. Second, the way I have defined religion as 
a particular socially constructed hierarchy mirrors the way that Islam was located 
(marginalized) in a cultural hierarchy through the so-called sharia debate. In other words, 
religionization, based in part on what I have termed the subnatural, is a crucial tool of 
imperial secularism. I will be locating and criticizing imperial secularism (and the tools it 




 Now that a theoretical position on the secular and secularization has been 
established, and now that the modern concept of religion has been theorized for the 
purposes of this project, in this context I will turn to the theoretical issues of what 
multicultural public policy towards religion(s) can mean in a secular state such as Canada 
generally, and for the “Sharia debate” specifically. My contributions regarding 
multicultural theory build on important forbears that I will document here before 
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forwarding my own contribution to multicultural theory. My basic argument in this 
section is that in order for multiculturalism to be effective in Canada, it must address the 
issue of what I have called imperial secularism. Imperial secularism must be countered 
with anti-imperial secularism, and this will help achieve the policy goals of Canadian 
multiculturalism in the arena of combating religious discrimination, accommodating 
religious diversity, and protecting religious freedom without compromising individual 
rights.  
 
2.3.1 Multiculturalism in Canada 
 In many modern liberal and secular states the primary political arguments 
available for debates on faith based arbitration would likely centre, as they did in Ontario, 
mainly around freedom of religion in favor of faith based arbitration on the one hand and 
constitutionally protected individual equality rights against faith based arbitration on the 
other (Canadian Diversity 2010).50 Multicultural arguments might be deployed in favour 
of faith based arbitration in the United States as a political discourse, but it would have 
no weight as an official policy (Goldberg 1994). Moreover multicultural arguments 
would likely be counterproductive in a state such as France. However, in Canada 
multiculturalism is not only an official policy, it is also law, and therefore it played a role 
in the “Sharia debate” in Ontario that it may not have in other modern states.  
 There are several ways to conceive of multiculturalism, therefore clarifying the 
term here will be helpful. Augie Fleras and Jean Lock Kunz (2001) distinguish at least 
five ways to understand multiculturalism. First, multiculturalism might simply refer to 
the demographic fact of diversity in a given state. Thus, France might be characterized as 
                                                 
50 See also Canadian Diversity: Balancing Competing Human Rights (2010). 
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multicultural in the sense of being culturally diverse, but it is decidedly not multicultural 
in terms of its national policy, though arguably accommodating at the local level is 
common. Second, multiculturalism may be thought of as an ideology or as a general 
prescription of the way things should be. This can be distinguished from official or 
governmental implementation of multiculturalism. Perhaps the United States provides 
one of the best examples of this, because multiculturalism developed there as an ideology 
of equality issuing from race relations discourse as a general political demand for racial 
and ethnic equality, though it has never been an official policy or law (Goldberg 1994). 
Third, multiculturalism may also be a policy. Governments may outline and assent to 
policies or establish laws that aim to facilitate social and cultural equality and diversity. 
Fourth, multiculturalism as practice may be discernible from other forms of 
multiculturalism as well. It is conceivable that a state may embrace multiculturalism as 
official policy, but only in word and not in deed. Moreover, governments and citizens 
may engage in multicultural practices on their own initiative without having been 
prompted by an official policy. Fifth, multiculturalism acts as a critical discourse. An 
important critique of multiculturalism as ideology, policy, or practice is that it only 
accommodates very shallow and “visible” signs of diversity without effectively 
challenging underlying racial, ethnic, gender, or economic inequities. Critical 
multiculturalism seeks to resist the status quo on all of these levels and to affect genuine 
political, economic, and social equality and respect.  
 Pierre Elliott Trudeau famously introduced the policy of multiculturalism in 
Canada in 1971 (Biles and Ibrahim 2005). However, multiculturalism was made law only 
in 1988 (Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1988). Therefore, multiculturalism as a 
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discursive political resource in the debate over faith based arbitration  is not simply a fact 
of cultural diversity or a discourse of recognition; it has both the force of official 
government policy and law behind it. However, whether the policy and law of 
multiculturalism in Canada has been put into practice adequately in order to genuinely 
achieve socio-economic equity remains an open question.  
 Multicultural policy in Canada brings religions into the political and legal spheres 
in a way that both complements and goes beyond Charter guarantees to freedom of 
religion. Whereas the constitutional guarantees enshrined in Canada’s Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms are expressed largely in liberal, individualist terms,51 the Multiculturalism 
Act strongly suggests the political and legal recognition of group rights, including 
religious groups.52 However, John Biles and Humera Ibrahim argue that despite the 
importance of religion to Canadian society and policy, religion has been largely 
marginalized in multicultural discourse in Canada (Biles and Ibrahim 2005, 164). 
Furthermore, the debate over faith based arbitration was characterized by many 
participants as a conflict between multicultural group rights for religious communities on 
the one hand (in favour of faith based arbitration), and individual rights to equality 
(especially gender equality) against faith based arbitration  on the other. Multiculturalism 
was once again lambasted in the public debate as at best having failed to successfully 
integrate immigrant communities, and at worst sacrificing women’s rights to the group 
rights of allegedly illiberal communities.  
                                                 
51 However, Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is meant to guide interpretation of 
the Charter in light of Canada’s multicultural policy, although Section 27 is not explicitly a right to 
multiculturalism per se.  
52 “AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada recognizes the diversity of Canadians as regards race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and is 
committed to a policy of multiculturalism ... [emphasis added]” (as quoted in Biles and Ibrahim 2005). 
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 I will examine and critique in more detail the way that multiculturalism was used 
discursively in the public debate on faith based arbitration in chapter five. However, for 
the theoretical purposes of answering my thesis question, I am not using multiculturalism 
here to argue either in favour of or against faith based arbitration . Rather I am exploring 
how a multicultural and secular Canada addresses the issue of faith based arbitration  and 
religious freedom. Secularism is an important factor related to multiculturalism here as 
well. Secularism is especially interesting in Canada because there is no formal 
constitutional separation of Church and State as in the United States, although many 
Canadians imagine that there is. A dramatic example illustrating just how different 
Canada is from America is the fact that our constitution enshrines constitutional 
guarantees to public funding for Roman Catholic schools in several provinces that 
remains in effect to this day (Seljak 2005). Therefore, even though Canada understands 
itself to be a secular state, it is very different from the United States, where such an 
arrangement would be impossible.  
 
2.3.2 Multicultural Theory and Practice 
 The theoretical justifications for multiculturalism are varied and contested. 
Although I make a very specific argument regarding how multicultural policy and 
practice needs to be modified toward a more critical multiculturalism that explicitly 
includes anti-imperial secularism in its aims, it is also important to briefly explore a 
number of the recent theoretical supports and critiques of multiculturalism in modern 
societies, because I make my argument in the context of several theoretical arguments in 
favour of multiculturalism generally. 
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 Not only is Canada known internationally as a model multicultural state, but a 
number of important international scholars of multicultural theory have been Canadian as 
well, namely Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1994). Charles 
Taylor is well known for his arguments in “The Politics of Recognition” (1994). Taylor 
argues that recognition is not simply a privilege but also a right because mis-recognition 
can do real damage to persons and communities. Taylor argues further that in order for 
recognition to be genuine it must be intentional and strategic. To that end, Taylor 
recommends among other things (non-confessional) education about historic religious 
traditions (Taylor 1994, 72). Taylor’s argument however has been powerfully critiqued 
because the recognition he advocates amounts to a one-way recognition of a minoritized 
“them” by the majority “us” which simply consolidates the position of the dominant 
culture and marks out Others as being in need of the gift of “our” recognition (Day 2000). 
Therefore, although Taylor’s approach justifies recognition, and therefore multicultural 
engagement with diversity ethically and morally, his recommendation for engaging 
diversity reaffirms dominance and does very little to achieve the aims of critical 
multiculturalism.  
 Talal Asad makes a similar argument, though it is much extended, but his 
suggestion of a direction is more productive than Day’s. After critiquing Taylor, Richard 
Day simply falls back on procedural liberalism to address issues of diversity more fairly, 
he believes, without collectively as the majority culture looking down on minorities 
(2000, 209-228). However this completely ignores the arguments of Taylor and 
Kymlicka among others who have extensively critiqued the myth of liberal neutrality. It 
is the inevitable dominance of the majority that liberalism always authorizes through 
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individualism and democracy that Taylor was attempting to address in the first place. 
Asad on the other hand suggests rather that instead of relying on dominant recognition of 
minoritized populations, which appears destined to fail for several reasons, that modern 
states rather consider the problem of how to facilitate a decentered political reality 
through what John Milbank has called overlapping and heterogeneous complex space and 
complex time “in which everyone may live as a minority among minorities” (Asad 2003, 
178; Milbank 1993). This is similar to William Connolly’s (1996) call for decentered 
pluralism, but Asad thinks that Milbank’s conception is amenable to facilitating more 
genuinely diverse spaces and times than approaching the issue by facilitating genuine 
diversity across states. How to achieve such a state remains an open question, but I 
believe the decentering impulse points in the right direction. Anything less seems only to 
reaffirm majority dominance in one form or another.  
 Whereas Taylor has made a moral and ethical argument for the recognition of 
diversity in liberal states, Kymlicka’s contribution is to attempt to argue for multicultural 
citizenship squarely in the context of liberal political theory. This is a substantial 
achievement given that the best liberalism has been able to do previous is offer minimal 
recognition and accommodation to minoritized peoples based on democratic majority will 
or individual initiatives, which arguably have not been very successful on the whole 
(Modood 2007; Seljak 2005). Kymlicka recognizes and critiques the myth of liberal 
neutrality, and argues therefore that liberal states must recognize group rights. However, 
his arguments are directed mainly towards recognizing group rights for national 
minorities and indigenous peoples rather than immigrant minorities. Furthermore, even 
with the help of Kymlicka’s arguments, critics such as Ashwani Peetush (2002) have 
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argued that liberalism is not very open to even dialoguing about diversity generally 
because there is no reason – in principle – for liberalism to do so. Peetush even shows 
how Kymlicka’s discourse in his political theory is latently Orientalist and othering as 
well. Indeed, the problem of justifying the recognition of (minority) group rights and 
needs in the context of liberalism, which normally only authorizes sovereign individuals, 
seems to be one of the major challenges to theorizing multicultural policy in the context 
of liberalism.  
 Given the difficulty of recognizing multicultural group rights in the context of 
liberalism, some theorists have tended to focus on facilitating friendliness to diversity 
more informally, through deliberative democracy in the context of the civil sphere 
(Bouchard & Taylor 2008). Regarding religion specifically in the context of the civil 
sphere, Jurgen Habermas has declared that we are now in a post-secular age (Habermas et 
al 2010). This means that the experiences of secular modernity have convinced Habermas 
and others that religion can no longer be completely separated from political life as was 
imagined in earlier versions of secularism. Rather, political philosophers must find room 
for religion to be included in the civil sphere in a way that does not again lead back to 
forms of religious oppression.  
 Habermas thinks religion can be incorporated into political life informally in the 
civil sphere through dialogue, conversation, and discourse (Habermas et al 2010). Maeve 
Cooke points out that Habermas is unlike Rawls in that he believes that truth at some 
level is at stake in “political legitimation” (Cooke 2007, 224). For this reason, Habermas 
advises that any reasoning offered in the civil sphere must be post-metaphysical. One 
does not have to judge another’s conception of the good according to Habermas, but one 
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does have to offer reasons not based on otherworldly transcendence. Cooke critiques 
Habermas in an interesting way here, arguing that his requirements of the public sphere 
are too restrictive.53 Habermas’ position “leads to a model of law and politics that impairs 
the conditions of political legitimacy for citizens who understand political validity in 
‘otherworldly’ terms (be these religious or non-religious), thus weakening their 
motivation to live together peacefully with others in a democratic political order” (Cooke 
2007, 226-227). In order to avoid the pitfalls of potential religious oppression, Cooke 
recommends rather the requirement of what she calls “non-authoritarian thinking”. 
Carefully laying out in detail what she means by this, it is potentially a way of limiting 
the harms that may be done in the name of otherworldly referents without excluding 
otherworldly referents altogether. Appealing to otherworldly referents may then be 
persuasive to those who share in the epistemic assumptions of such referents, but thus 
limited they might not then easily lead to authoritarian thinking that shuts down 
deliberative public debate.  
 Taylor too, in the interests of accommodating the voices of diverse groups in 
modern liberal democracies, advocates for an expanded conception of dialogue that 
includes religious groups in the secular civil sphere. To this end, he reconceives 
secularism in terms of an “overlapping consensus”, building on Rawls’ conception. This 
means that although there will have to be core foreground political principles that 
everyone in a state must assent to, there may be any number of “background 
justifications” that citizens subscribe to that justify support for those common principles, 
including “religious background justifications” (Taylor 1998). However, this still leaves 
                                                 
53 Habermas (2008) changed his position recently to be more in line with Cooke’s thinking. However, this 
debate illustrates current issues being negotiated in the Academy which have by no means yet achieved 
consensus. 
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the problem of coming to agreement on the core political principles from so many 
background positions. Taylor believes that core political principles can emerge through 
persuasion and negotiation of an overlapping consensus (Taylor 1998). Although they are 
theorizing somewhat differently, both Habermas and Taylor are arguing that the way 
forward to including cultural and religious diversity in political life is through open 
dialogue, persuasion, and negotiation at the level of civil society. However, as Asad 
argues, the state is not simply a benign and neutral entity. In several and sundry 
circumstances the state will intervene in the lives of citizens through dialogue-ending 
legal judgments (Asad 2003, 6). Moreover, where civil society dialogue meets power, 
matters are more difficult and complex than mere negotiation. On the one hand, as Lori 
Beaman (2012) has argued, people belonging to minoritized groups may not have the 
power to be heard or to withstand the potentially unjust pressures of majority civil 
society. In some of these circumstances even “non-authoritarian” dialogue and persuasion 
may fall short of justice, and legal discourse and judgment may be required to protect the 
legitimate interests and rights of minoritized populations (Beaman 2012). On the other 
hand, and more problematically I think, quite aside from authoritarian thinking, not only 
might civil discourse be deeply unjust, intolerant, and othering toward certain minoritized 
populations, but also the state legal apparatus may become deeply unjust toward them as 
well. Sherene Razack for example has documented that even basic citizen rights are put 
in peril by such government policies as “extraordinary rendition, security certificates and 
secret evidence and trials” (Zine 2009, 151; Razack 2008). Therefore, although opening 
up dialogue at the civil society level seems a productive idea as far as it goes, it leaves 
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untouched perhaps some of the most important issues facing minoritized communities in 
modern and especially western liberal democracies currently.  
 Finally, British scholars too have made important contributions to multicultural 
theory. Bhikhu Parekh (2002) attempts to extend liberal justifications for 
multiculturalism, while Tariq Modood (2007) approaches multiculturalism more as a 
sociological reality that must be addressed than a theoretical argument to be revised. 
Parekh (2002) argues not by working with the existing logic of liberalism to justify 
multiculturalism, but rather by reconceiving the liberal conception of human nature and 
culture. Through a brief history of liberal ideas regarding diversity, Parekh argues that 
liberals tend to begin either from an assumption about human nature or about culture. He 
argues that the way both have been framed is limited and limiting for liberal approaches 
to diversity. He attempts to bridge these two beginning points by theorizing human nature 
in a way that takes culture into account. Therefore, although a universal notion of human 
nature is here in part constituted by a minimal understanding of what humans share as a 
species, it also includes how they are formed socially and what resources they gain from 
the cultural communities that form them, in addition thirdly to the ability of self-
transformation and cultural transformation enabled by the human capacity for reflection. 
Parekh argues that conceiving of human nature as inextricably formed and contextualized 
by culture puts into action different notions of understanding and accommodating 
difference than, for example, what the myth of liberal neutrality would authorize on the 
basis of universal individual human nature. From this revised liberal point of view Parekh 
is able to make a number of new claims about the value of cultural diversity in liberal 
multicultural society, and is able to justify a number of recommendations for how to 
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accommodate and engage cultural diversity in a multicultural state. These 
recommendations include not only open dialogue at the level of civil society, but also 
more formal actions through various apparatuses and institutions of the state and political 
society (Parekh 2002). 
 Tariq Modood on the other hand approaches multiculturalism less from a 
theoretical view point and more from a practical sociological angle (Modood 2007). He 
argues rather that multiculturalism should be built from the bottom up, from the 
conditions and realities of plurality in modern societies, rather than theoretically from the 
top down. Modood substitutes notions of difference and identity in place of “culture” 
which he feels too easily essentializes groups. Identity, according to Modood, allows for 
the notion of plural individuals, rather than suggesting that all individuals that belong to a 
culture, especially a minoritized one, exclusively identify with and fit that culture. 
Modood agrees with Taylor that misrecognition of one’s identity is a form of oppression, 
and therefore should be considered a matter of national belonging and citizenship. He 
argues that in order for equality to be effected, justice must be meted out in variable 
ways, because diverse peoples are in diverse situations, and applying the same law across 
the board without taking those differences into account will simply reinforce dominance 
rather than challenge it. Furthermore, Modood is against what he calls ideological or 
radical secularism which tends to ban religious groups but not other identity groups from 
the public sphere unfairly. He advocates then for what he calls institutional or moderate 
secularism which maintains a certain necessary separation between church and state 
without unfairly limiting religious groups in the civil sphere (Modood 2007). Although 
Modood is doubtful about the potential for liberalism alone to deeply address diversity, 
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he acknowledges that multiculturalism cannot get off the ground without liberalism, and 
ultimately the recommendations he makes seem to remain dependent on and couched 
within a liberal context. Therefore, although he makes some valuable contributions to a 
program of multicultural national identity and citizenship that is more genuinely diverse 
without trying to defend liberalism theoretically, his ideas ultimately rest on the realities 
of a liberal-democratic state.  
 Regardless of this limitation, Modood has made a number of substantial 
contributions. He has argued for the acknowledgment of the existence of cultural racism 
generally, and Islamophobia in particular (Modood 2005). Modood has argued that 
religious identity has become a field of identity in which struggles for equity have arisen. 
This multicultural sociological reality has operated from the ground up, and parallels 
other previously “privatized” forms of identity that have sought political recognition for 
the purposes of striving for social equality such as feminism and sexual diversity. Given 
the growing political recognition of these forms of idenity, Modood argues that a form of 
state secularism that enforces the privatization of religion is unjustifiably unequal 
(Modood 2005). Consequently, moderate secularism must conceive of “separation” not as 
absolute separation, but rather as discreet distinctions between entities that inevitably 
connect at sundry points. Given the sociological realities of these multicultural practices, 
Modood then advocates for the conscious development of a plural national identity that 
takes religions seriously, rather than understanding multiculturalism and nationalism to 
be inherently mutually antagonistic (Modood 2005).  
 One of the most prominent and important critiques of multiculturalism is that it is 
too shallow to address the real underlying problems of diversity that issue from social 
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inequity and the oppression of minoritized groups. I have already referred to critical 
multiculturalism above, and there are several important strains of critical multiculturalism 
that have been developed. Racial inequality causes serious problems for the aims of 
multiculturalism not always addressed in the context of multicultural theory or practice 
(Bannerji 2000; Razack 2002, 1998). Issues of gender have been central to critiques of 
multiculturalism as well, especially where group rights are understood to be potentially 
undermining the individual rights of women in minoritized communities (Bannerji 2000; 
Okin 1999). Therefore, feminism and anti-racism are essential components of a critical 
multiculturalism that aims to affect equality rather than simply surface accommodation 
that reaffirms dominance and keeps the minoritized marginalized in crucial ways. There 
are other important forms of oppression as well, for example relating to class and just 
distribution of wealth as well as sexual identity and orientation. Addressing religious 
discrimination is an emerging body of scholarship that critical multiculturalism must 
appropriate in addition to these other forms of oppression and discrimination (Mooney 
Cotter 2009; Ghanea 2003; Addison 2007). Addressing religious discrimination is central 
to this dissertation project as well.  
 Making the connection between multiculturalism and secularism is crucial to 
answering how a secular Canada, in the context of the goals of its multicultural policies, 
accommodates religious freedom for Canadians who wish to practice faith based 
arbitration in Ontario and what the limits of this accommodation are. I believe the 
distinction between imperial secularism and anti-imperial secularism is particularly 
useful for distinguishing between types of secularism, because even those who 
distinguish between secularism of different types, such as ideological and institutional 
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secularism as Modood suggests, leave out that secularism itself can be imperialist or 
colonial. Even an institutional secularism as delimited by Modood, which arguably 
already exists in Canada, can be imperial in practice, and I argue that anti-imperial 
secularism must be developed and aimed at in order to address the issues of inequity and 
marginalization explored in this exploration of faith based arbitration. I argue that the 
different typologies of secularism that have been fashioned to date on the whole only 
differentiate between those that are friendly to religion in the public sphere, and those 
that are (unnecessarily) exclusive of religious subjectivity. Most still understand 
secularism itself to be a good at core, and only potentially in need of adjusting to the 
political aims of increasingly diverse modern states. I argue however that forms of 
secularism themselves can be carriers of oppression such as racism, colonialism, 
hierarchy construction and maintenance, and sundry forms of Othering.54 For this reason 
I argue it is essential to understand “imperial secularism” as a potential for oppression 
that must be challenged and resisted. It is for similar reasons that the notion of “colonial 
feminism” was developed to challenge assumptions that anything done in the name of 
feminism is necessarily a good, and to reveal that deeply oppressive ends may be 
accomplished through certain forms of feminism that must be challenged and resisted. In 
opposition to colonial feminism, which almost always assumes that secularism is good 
                                                 
54 I am not saying anything that Modood would fundamentally disagree with or that dramatically adds to 
his work. However, I believe that thinking about these problems in terms of imperial and anti-imperial 
secularism helps to further extend the aim of achieving equality into issues such as the sharia debate in a 
way that is not yet widespread in the academy. 
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for women, I posit what I call “post-secular feminism.”55 Only a multicultural approach 
that takes into account these realities can produce a genuinely equitable society.56 
 
Conclusion  
 My doctoral project explores how a secular Canada, in the context of the goals of 
its multicultural policies, accommodates the Canadian Charter guarantee of religious 
freedom for Canadians who wish to practice faith based arbitration in Ontario, and what 
the limits of this accommodation are. I have argued that a new notion of secularism must 
be understood in order to answer this question. “Imperial secularism” is a form of 
secularism that works to establish and maintain hierarchies in society along a continuum 
of secular and modern or dominant forms of religion to minoritized, marginalized, 
“unmodern”, racialized, Orientalized, and Othered forms of religion. This kind of 
secularism must be countered with anti-imperialist forms of secularism that work toward 
non-othering forms of secularity that treat all religions equally. Part of the marginalizing 
work of imperial secularism is accomplished through an aspect of differentiation, that is 
the very definition of religion that I argue generally assumes the normative and culturally 
located notion of the supernatural to be adequate to deploy across all cultures to justify a 
universal and trans-temporal modern concept of “religion.” I have suggested using the 
terms religionization and the subnatural rather than religion and the supernatural to define 
what it is social scientists are studying, that is, religion as a located concept bound up 
with local power relations and cultural norms. Rather than reaffirming the dominant 
                                                 
55 Both anti-imperial secularism and post-secular feminism will be discussed in more detail in the 
concluding chapter.  
56 In the conclusion I will discuss more in depth the theoretical and practical implications of my findings for 
multiculturalism and law in Canada.  
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status quo by accepting the modern concept as a workable frame for analysis I suggest 
that the conceptual frame “religion” itself should be made the object of scholarly analysis 
in the spirit of the work of Talal Asad and others. A further implication is that a more 
descriptive and critical conceptualization of religion will aid in forming an anti-imperial 
secularism that does not Other religion normatively, but rather treats religions equally as 
cultural groups among other communities and groups contained and managed by the 
modern state. Finally, in the context of several theoretical and practical developments 
around multiculturalism, I make a modest contribution. Adding onto forms of critical 
multiculturalism that aim to resist dominance and establish genuine equality for 
minoritized groups, and in addition to anti-racist, feminist, and anti-colonial forms of 
multiculturalism, I add the requirement for an anti-imperialist secularism if genuine 
equality is to be fostered by multicultural policy and practice. Regarding the more 
specific multicultural proposal to accommodate legal pluralism, I will engage in an 
evaluation of Ayelet Shachar’s proposed “transformative accommodation” along with a 
fuller discussion of the implications of anti-imperial secularism for Canadian 









 This chapter will outline the methodological approaches and challenges of this 
project. The thesis question this dissertation seeks to answer is: how does a secular 
Canada, in the context of the goals of its multicultural policies, accommodate the 
Canadian Charter guarantee of religious freedom for Canadians who wish to practice 
faith-based arbitration in Ontario, and what are the limits of this accommodation? I begin 
this chapter by attempting to position this project in the context of western scholarship on 
others, which has too often been Orientalist and served imperial interests. I attempt also 
to situate myself as a western researcher. I then document my research strategies and 
activities. I outline the challenges of this project methodologically. I outline my sampling 
procedures as well as my research instruments and details of the data collection process 
for this project. I outline my strategies for analysing the data gathered in this project.  
 
3.1 Crossing Boundaries and Positionality 
 From the outset my dissertation committee and I have been very aware of the fact 
that this dissertation involves myself, the researcher, in a project that crosses many 
boundaries. I am a male, academic, middle class, white, Christian, whose first language is 
English, one of Canada’s official languages. Also, I belong historically, nationally and 
ethnically to a group of western colonizers, or family of white nations, as Sherene Razack 
refers to them (Razack 2008). Of my proposed research participants most are non-
Christian, racialized, non-academic, women and men; for many English is not their first 
language. Many of these people belong to or descend from populations that have been 
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colonized by western nations. This presents a number of issues regarding power relations 
between researcher and research participants that must be addressed theoretically and 
practically. There is a long history of research of this kind undertaken by a privileged 
researcher like myself on “Others.” Uncritically carried out, this research has often been 
framed by the interests of dominant and colonizing populations, and therefore it 
ultimately serves to consolidate the power of the rulers over historically marginalized, 
racialized, and colonized peoples.57 Along with my dissertation committee, I have tried 
very hard to be aware of and address the inequalities and hazards of research across these 
boundaries and to structure the research and writing of this project in such a way as to 
mitigate them.  
 An important clarification on the focus of my research project came early in the 
process. One of the central issues in the public debate on faith based arbitration was the 
risks it presented to vulnerable Muslim women. However, early on the thesis committee 
and I decided that this project was not to be a fieldwork exploration or representation of 
Muslim women. Rather, this project is an investigation of multicultural practices in 
Canada in the context of the legal regime that protects religious freedom and diversity 
(which includes the Charter of Rights) with regard to the issue of faith based arbitration. 
Although this project certainly addresses issues that have an impact on Muslim women, 
                                                 
57 Peter Pels and Oscar Salemink. 1999. Colonial Subjects: Essays on the Practical History of 
Anthropology. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press; Chandra Talpade Mohanty. 1991. “Under 
Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.” In Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russ, 
and Lourdes Torres eds. Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism. Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana UP; Elizabeth Hallam and Brian V. Street. 2000. Cultural Encounters: Representing ‘Otherness’. 
London and New York: Routledge; Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1993. “I and Thou: Method, Voice, and Roles in 
Research with the Silenced.” In Daniel McLaughlin and William G. Tierney eds. Naming Silenced Lives: 
Personal Narratives and Processes of Educational Change. New York and London: Routledge; Kagendo 
Mutua and Beth Blue Swadener, eds. 2004. Decolonizing Research in Cross-Cultural Contexts: Critical 
Personal Narratives. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press; Edward W. Said. 1978. 
Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books; Ziauddin Sardar. 1999. Orientalism. Buckhingham, Philadelphia: 
Open University Press.  
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and to some extent researches the opinions and perceptions of Muslim women, this is not 
the central focus of the project.  
Instead, the fieldwork focuses heavily on community leaders, social workers, and 
academics investigating the actual community practices of faith based arbitration. 
Second, where I have sought the experiences and opinions of adherents I have sought this 
from both men and women. For example, the web survey was aimed at Muslim 
communities generally, not only women. Third, my fieldwork focused on Jewish 
communities as well as Muslim communities. Fourth, to the extent that I did engage with 
Muslim women regarding their experiences and opinions regarding faith based arbitration 
we used fieldwork strategies that minimized direct contact and carefully theorized my 
position as a researcher with regard to how I represent their voices in this project as 
outlined below.  
3.1.1 Framing the research.  
 From the outset I framed the project generally with the goals of critical 
ethnography in mind. I attempted to incorporate the voices of diverse Muslim and Jewish 
positions not previously represented in the existing research or public discourse on the 
subject from the outset. One of the aims of this project has been to counter the 
Islamophobic, racist, and colonial discourses that dominated the public debate on faith 
based arbitration with a more balanced, reasoned, and open approach to the diverse 
experiences and positions Muslims and Jewish people occupy on the issue. For example, 
this project was not designed to support those who claim that Muslim women really are 
oppressed, that Muslim men really are domineering and unmodern, and that the practice 
of Sharia domestically is indeed inequitable and gender discriminatory. On the other 
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hand, this project was also not designed to prove that Sharia was an ideal legal or moral 
system or that Muslim women and men were the model of gender equity. This project has 
attempted to be forthcoming about inequities between the dominant population towards 
Jewish and particularly Muslim minorities as well as inequities within the respective 
communities. However, in the current context, it is very difficult to discuss inequities 
within the religious communities I set out to study without having that research used to 
confirm Islamophobic and racist stereotypes (Razack 2008, Zine 2009).  
3.1.2 Embodied researcher  
 My social and political position is signaled also by my body. I am male, white, 
speak English as my first language, and am a Christian. My body signals my membership 
in the family of white western nations that has historically been engaged in colonial and 
imperial projects for more than five centuries, and remains dominant globally (Razack 
2008). In order to mitigate some of the effects of my embodiment as a researcher, I have 
made a number of strategic research design decisions. Regarding the fieldwork, I focused 
mainly on imams, sheikhs and rabbis, social workers, as well as other leaders in the 
respective religious communities that were educated and more experienced in dealing 
with researchers and the public generally than laypeople might be. Many of these 
interviews were done over the phone as well to mitigate the effect of my embodiment on 
the responses of research participants. The parts of my fieldwork that did cross further 
boundaries were designed to virtually remove my body altogether. The email 
survey/interview and web survey using Survey Monkey was designed to reach out to a 
broader sample of lay Muslims for their experiences and perceptions. This method for the 
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most part did not involve me in any direct contact with the research participants, who 
interacted mainly with web based technologies.  
3.1.3 Critical Sociological Fieldwork 
 This project is not a critical ethnography per se, because it is not an ethnography 
proper, but it employs several principles and approaches that are used in critical 
ethnography. Critical ethnography seeks to give voice to multiple alternative discourses 
in the interests of uncovering, questioning, and resisting dominant discourses.58 
Challenging dominant discourses creates opportunities for resistance to dominant power 
structures in society. Not only does the knowledge generated in this project suggest 
avenues for liberating minoritized, racialized, and othered communities in the context of 
a majority white, Christian nation, but also means for protecting vulnerable people within 
minoritized communities. In this sense, I designed the project with the insights of critical 
ethnography in mind. For this reason I call the method used in this project critical 
sociological fieldwork, as this is not an ethnography proper. 
 This project addresses dominance and marginality on a number of levels. First, 
this project is relevant to the dominance of the mainly white and Christian or secular 
national population over Muslim racialized minorities in Canada specifically and the 
West generally, as well as global western European and American dominance over 
Muslim majority countries generally. In this project I will analyse the dominant public 
discourse in Canada on faith based arbitration that read Muslims in Orientalist ways 
especially in the post 9/11 context as non-modern (even anti-modern), unjust, barbaric 
                                                 
58 Joe L. Kincheloe and Peter L. McLaren. 1994. “Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research.” In 
Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln eds. Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, 
London, New Delhi: Sage Publications; Jasmin Zine. 2008. Canadian Islamic Schools: Unraveling the 
Politics of Faith, Gender, Knowledge, and Identity. Toronto: Toronto UP.  
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and un-Canadian. I subject this stereotypical image to anti-racist and anti-Orientalist 
theoretical analysis, as well as my own critical analysis, and I also place these stereotypes 
alongside the responses of those whom I encountered during my fieldwork research for 
critical comparison. In this way multiple voices on this issue will be represented in this 
project. 
 The second level of dominance that I address consists of the diverse relations of 
power within Muslim and Jewish communities in Ontario. There are a number of issues 
to consider here. First there are issues that arise between majority and minority ethnic 
communities within Muslim communities. In Ontario the South Asian immigrant 
population, for example, far outnumbers other Muslim communities such as the Bosnian, 
Arab, or African Muslim communities. Second, the majority Sunni Muslims in Ontario 
far outnumber the various Shia and Sufi communities. Third, there are in a number of 
cases inequities between men, women, and children that will be addressed. Fourth there 
are inequities in power within the religious tradition between religious specialists, 
leaders, and scholars, and other community members. This project will attempt to analyze 
these numerous voices and positions of power.  
 The issue of gender inequity is difficult to address, because although there 
certainly are issues of gender inequity in Muslim and Jewish families and communities, 
as in all communities and societies, it is very difficult to discuss the words, criticisms, 
and complaints of marginalized women in Muslim communities without having them  
appropriated to support the dominant western stereotypes of Islam that claim Muslims are 
“traditional”, non-modern, inassimilable, hopelessly patriarchal and violent. My aim here 
will be to produce analysis and incorporate participant narratives that challenge both 
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patriarchy within Muslim communities as well as Orientalist narratives and religious 
discrimination against Muslim communities generally. I would not like to see my 
analysis of the inequities a number of vulnerable Muslim people face used for the 
purposes of reinforcing religious discrimination by the majority Canadian community 
against Canadian Muslims. 
 Critical ethnography is concerned with how fieldwork is accomplished, but it is 
also concerned with the power the author has to write and represent the words of her or 
his participants. This project will aim to disclose that power and incorporate a reflexive 
analysis of it. As the author of this project I have the power to frame the questions and in 
part influence the environment in which the questions are answered. As the author I 
possess the power to select which participant narratives to include or exclude; I choose to 
emphasize certain comments and minimize others (Brown 2001). I frame how a 
participant’s narrative will appear within this written project, and what parts of that 
narrative will appear. I will endeavor to exercise this power in a reflexive and analytical 
way, offering justifications for my choices, highlighting other choices that may have been 
made, and most importantly critically divulging the discourses that will be supported by 
my choices and those that may be marginalized. 
 
3.2 Research Strategies and Activities 
3.2.1 Gaining Access to Research Participants: 
 Although I had done some research previously among Muslims in Kitchener-
Waterloo, the vast majority of people I interviewed for this project were new to me. Dr. 
Jasmin Zine, a member of my dissertation committee, was instrumental in aiding me in 
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the beginning to gain access to the communities. She also provided me with a contact in 
the Jewish community to get me started. Dr. Zine’s position is that academics and various 
leaders in the field are “fair game” for seeking out interviews. The point at which we 
begin to seek out interviews of adherents generally who might not be as well educated or 
have the same resources or experience working with the public and researchers is the 
point where one adopts more careful strategies of fieldwork. As regards one-on-one 
interviews, I have interviewed mainly leaders, social workers, religious specialists, and 
scholars of Muslim and Jewish communities.  
 Although Dr. Zine gave me a very good start with interview contacts in Muslim 
and Jewish communities in Southern Ontario, I very quickly expanded my prospects by 
asking research participants for other participants they might suggest. More importantly, 
the internet provided an invaluable source of information regarding local Muslim and 
Jewish institutions, which I then contacted by phone and email to request interviews. I 
found members of the Muslim communities on the whole very forthcoming. The vast 
majority of Muslim leaders were very willing to spend in many cases significant amounts 
of time with me for the purposes of interviewing. Only a very few were hesitant and did 
not wish to be interviewed.  
 I was surprised to find, however, that it was much more difficult to find willing 
participants and subsequent contacts in the Jewish community. The Orthodox community 
is the most organized with regard to faith based arbitration and mediation among Jewish 
communities in Ontario. The Orthodox Jewish community had formed the Beth Din or 
Jewish court in order to handle civil disputes of both family and business related matters. 
Informal mediation and counseling of course takes place in Conservative, Reform, and 
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Reconstructionist Jewish communities, but formal faith based arbitration is much more 
common in Orthodox communities. I was able to get in contact with the administrators of 
the Beth Din and eventually interview them, but generally speaking it was very difficult 
to get in contact with the six to eight rabbis who sit on the Beth Din in turns. I had to 
painstakingly search out these rabbis through the internet and by calling numerous 
Orthodox Synagogues. In the end I was able to get a good representation of interviews 
from those most involved in the Beth Din. I was able also to interview a few Jewish 
representatives of the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) and the Conservative Jewish 
Community, which does have some informal mediation services. Because the number of 
rabbis involved in the Beth Din is modest, and because the information I received was 
quite consistent between interviewees, I reached sufficient saturation in my interviews in 
the Jewish community with twenty interviews.  
 Beyond one-on-one interviews, I attempted a number of electronic survey 
methods for gathering fieldwork information from Muslim communities. This method 
was especially helpful in mitigating some of the boundary crossing nature of my research 
as it involved participants in contact only with online technologies rather than in person 
or telephone conversations with an interviewer potentially of a different religion, gender, 
race, ethnicity, educational level, and class. First, Dr. Jasmin Zine was instrumental in 
assisting my email survey/interview of a number of Muslim women through a Muslim 
women’s reading group that she and another academics at Wilfrid Laurier University 
belonged to. This was a fairly short and informally structured survey/interview with six 
open ended questions (See Appendix F). Unfortunately, although the submissions I did 
receive were very rich I only received four responses to this survey/interview, and 
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therefore the much more developed web survey using Survey Monkey was very useful 
for gathering a much more representative sample of respondents. The email survey 
response is clearly too small to stand on its own, so I have I combined these with my in-
person interviews with women leaders and lay-people for a total of twelve interviews 
with Muslim women. 
 The survey constructed using Survey Monkey was edited and commented on by 
my supervisory committee as well as two researchers in the University of Waterloo 
Survey Research Centre. This survey was very much geared to getting Muslims’ 
perception of the issues of faith based arbitration and mediation, and especially if and 
why Muslims had, or may, or may not use such services (see appendix D).59 For the most 
part, I asked Muslim community leaders and workers for permission to send them the 
link to the web-survey, asking them to forward the survey on to other community 
members as they felt appropriate. The web-survey participants then snowballed from that 
point, as the survey itself asks participants to pass the survey on to others they feel might 
be interested in participating. 
3.2.2 Chronology of Research Activities: 
• September 2007-April 2009: General Fieldwork 
 The bulk of my fieldwork was carried out over a two-year period from September 
of 2007 through April of 2009, though I have added the occasional interview as the 
opportunity arose even after this point. I spent the fall of 2007 mainly writing and passing 
through the ethics review process at the University of Waterloo. I began slowly with a 
small number of interviews both in-person and over the phone once my ethics review 
                                                 
59 Although I employed qualitative interviews with both Muslim and Jewish individuals, the web-survey 
was designed only for Muslim communities.  
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application had been passed. My most productive section of interviewing took place 
during the winter and spring terms 2008. I held several interviews over the phone with 
social workers, Imams, and other leaders in the Muslim community, as well as with 
spokespersons for Jewish organizations and a number of rabbis and administrative staff 
of the Jewish Orthodox Beth Din. I continued to have a few occasional interviews even 
after this main period of fieldwork productivity right up until April of 2009 as more ideas 
for people I thought I should interview arose. There were two main periods of 
transcription work for these interviews. In the fall of 2008 I transcribed significant 
portions of the interviews I had completed to that point (near thirty) in preparation for my 
conference paper presentation to the Association of Muslim Social Scientists in October 
of 2008. In April of 2009 I completed the remainder of the transcriptions of key sections 
of my interviews for the purposes of completing my dissertation.  
• April to June 2008: Muslim women’s reading group email survey 
 During a short few months in the spring of 2008 I completed the email survey of 
the Muslim women’s reading group to which Dr. Jasmin Zine belonged and assisted in 
gaining access to for the purposes of the survey. As mentioned above, I only received 
four responses, though very rich and valuable responses indeed. All responses for the 
email survey of the Muslim women’s reading group were received by June of 2008, after 
having initially sent out the survey in April of 2008. 
• (September 2008) March 2009 – April 2013: Web Survey. 
 I initially purchased my account with Survey Monkey in September of 2008. The 
extensive process of creating the survey and then having it reviewed by both members of 
my committees as well as two members of the University of Waterloo’s Survey Research 
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Centre took approximately six months to complete. The two reviewers from the 
University of Waterloo Survey Research Centre were much more experienced in written 
online survey research, and their advice was invaluable for fine tuning this research 
instrument. I was finally able to administer this survey to the Muslim communities of 
Southern Ontario in March of 2009. When I accomplished my interviews previously I 
asked many participants if they would be interested in passing on an online survey to 
other members of their community, and many offered enthusiastically and generously to 
do so. It is mainly through these contacts and through Dr. Zine that this survey was 
spread to the community. From there the participants passed on the survey by email to 
other people they knew, and so the web survey spread in snowball sampling fashion.  
3.2.3 Challenges 
 As stated above, this is not a project focusing on Muslim women. However, given 
the focus on Muslim women in the media discourse on faith based arbitration, it is 
important to include the voices of the people on whose behalf the media discourse and 
certain spokespersons allegedly spoke on. As one-on-one interviews would involve me as 
a researcher in crossing too many boundaries, we had to find other ways to listen to the 
voices of Muslim women. First, the Muslim women I interviewed  were mainly leaders 
and educated social service workers in the community. Second, I employed a variety of 
other research methods such as email surveys and web surveys to gather voices of 
Muslim women without direct contact and boundary crossing. 
 With regard to the web survey, I would have liked to have been able to conduct at 
least a portion of the survey as a technically random sampling, which would make it more 
statistically representative. Although I judged this in the end to be not feasible, the 
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sampling I did manage to acquire through the web survey is still representative of a large 
number of Muslims mainly in Ontario. 
3.2.4 Sampling Procedures 
 For the purposes of exploring the actual practices of faith based arbitration and 
mediation, I chose to focus mainly on Muslim and Jewish leaders who offered such 
services. In Muslim communities, I interviewed mainly imams who were leaders in their 
local masjids. While some of these leaders were full time paid imams, others were part 
time volunteers depending on the resources available to the respective communities. 
Many of these imams simply incorporated faith based mediation and arbitration into their 
weekly masjid activities and responsibilities. A number of imams however 
simultaneously belonged to organizations independent of their masjids that were 
specifically designed to address faith based mediation and arbitration. Some leaders I 
spoke with only worked through organizations that offered mediation and arbitration 
services, and were not imams as such in their local masjids. I also interviewed Muslim 
community social workers and other prominent active members who serve their 
community. 
 My personal interviews surveyed a wide sample of ethnic diversity, not only 
among interviewees themselves, but also given the fact that these interviewees were often 
leaders and workers representing the very diverse communities they serve. I interviewed 
leaders of diverse South Asian, Middle Eastern, Balkan, and African backgrounds. 
Therefore, in my one-on-one interviews ethnic diversity is represented first by the ethnic 
diversity of the leaders and workers themselves, as well as by the diversity of 
communities they interact with and serve. 
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 In both personal interviews as well as electronic survey methods I used a process 
of snowball sampling rather than a sample structured according to specific criteria or a 
properly statistically random sample. The sample included: fifteen imams, one dedicated 
Muslim arbitrator/mediator, one leader from a prominent Muslim women’s organization, 
one Muslim lawyer, and one Muslim lay person recommended to me by a woman social 
worker. Also included in the sample were seven social service workers including six 
women and 1 man. Four Muslim women also filled out the email interviews. Altogether 
these total thirty interviews with Muslim participants. The Jewish sample included two 
administrators in the Jewish Orthodox Beth Din, and five rabbis that regularly sit on the 
Beth Din. I interviewed eight other Orthodox rabbis that do not regularly sit on the Beth 
Din but send adherents in need of its services regularly, and may attempt to mediate a 
situation if possible before it is taken before the Beth Din. I interviewed two other 
members of the CJC, one Jewish woman lay leader, and two conservative Jewish rabbis 
involved in mediation activities. The total number of Jewish interview participants was 
twenty.  
 There were seventy respondents to the web survey. The web survey did not take 
any personal information that might identify participants. However, demographic 
information was gathered including age, income, gender, employment, ethnicity, place of 
birth, etc. I used Survey Monkey software, available online, to generate a thirty-item 
survey. The survey was emailed to potential participants in the form of a web-link which 
would connect him or her to the survey. Of the seventy respondents fifty completed the 
survey; however, even those that did not complete the survey answered a number of 
questions. The question with the most responses recorded sixty-six answers. Fifty-six 
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participants responded to approximately one quarter of the questions regarding faith 
based arbitration (i.e. not including questions related to the identity of the respondent). 
And 53 participants answered the majority of the questions in the survey.  
3.2.5 Research Instruments and Data Collection 
 I gathered data for this project mainly in the form of informal semi-structured 
one-on-one interviews both in person and over the telephone. I supplemented this 
information with field notes, an email survey, and a web survey.60  I interviewed fifty 
people in total. In each case I provided interview survey participants with a form that 
served as both an information letter explaining the project and an ethics consent form that 
explained the rights and protections regarding confidentiality of participants and asked 
for their conscious and informed consent or refusal to participate in the project (see 
Appendix A).61 Some participants explicitly stated they did not mind, and even preferred 
that their voices be represented with their proper names. In this case they amended the 
consent form to reflect their wishes. In some cases I explained that if I referred to a leader 
of a specific organization, even using a pseudonym, their narratives may not be as 
anonymous as they might prefer, particularly for people inside the communities familiar 
with the organizations in question. Therefore, although most were comfortable with this, 
in a number of cases interviewees requested that I send them a transcription of the 
sections of the interview I planned to use in the written dissertation prior to submission or 
publication.  
                                                 
60 Following are works I consulted on the methods mentioned here. Rubin and Rubin 2008, Arksey and 
Knight 1999, Spradley 1979.  
61 The information regarding the project included in the letter explained the background, rationale, shape, 
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potential participants that the information collected from them would be kept in a secure and private 
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 Beginning with a basic question set for one-on-one interviews, I then tailored 
each question set to the particular individual I spoke to depending on the organization and 
responsibilities each participant had (see Appendices B and C). Although I had fashioned 
a semi-structured set of questions, these were also intended to be open ended. I attempted 
to structure the flow of questions in a natural progression from general opinions about the 
issues related to faith based arbitration to more specific experiences and positions on the 
details of faith based arbitration and mediation. Furthermore, I allowed for significant 
“play” in the conversation allowing participants to take the conversation in directions of 
their choosing, or I created new questions based on what was being shared and followed 
that direction for a time, latter circling back to all questions I intended to cover by the 
conclusion of the interview.  
 The average length of interviews was about 60 – 90 minutes. My longest 
interviews were four hours and my shortest less than half an hour. A number of 
participants expressed gratitude that their voices were being heard in ways that were not 
well represented in the media debate on faith based arbitration. However, many continued 
to be leery of the final products of the project, worrying that their views might be 
misrepresented again as had happened many times in the media. While direct quotations 
were kept faithful to the original words of participants, I made some occasional minor 
editing for grammatical reasons. I digitally recorded most interviews using a Sony ICD-P 
series digital recorder. I used this recorder for both in-person interviews and telephone 
interviews. I logged the content of each interview, and I transcribed significant portions 
of each interview. I did not transcribe all interviews in their entirety. A few interview 
participants did not wish to be digitally recorded, in which case I took notes during the 
 102
interview, and immediately following the interview I digitally recorded myself in private 
recounting everything I could about the interview verbally using the question set and 
written notes to jog my memory. I then logged these verbal notes and transcribed 
significant portions, though of course I did not use these as direct quotations from 
participants in the written dissertation, but rather paraphrased the participants’ statements, 
and where necessary explained that I was doing so. Most of the interviews took place 
either over the phone, or in an interview participants’ home, or in the interview 
participants’ religious institution. I held several interviews at masjids in Toronto, as well 
as the homes of imams in Southern Ontario generally.  
 I designed the question set for the email survey/interview specifically for the 
members of the Muslim women’s reading group. I designed this survey/interview with 
six brief and very open ended questions, not including demographic questions (see 
Appendix F). I was concerned that it had to be short enough that people would participate 
in the project, but the questions had to be rich enough to elicit useful responses. The 
length of responses varied considerably, but in many cases they were very rich and useful 
indeed. My only regret is that not more people participated in this survey/interview 
instrument. However, the web survey garnered a much greater response rate. 
 As per the nature of web surveys, the questions are very structured and responses 
are quite limited. Although I am not happy about that aspect of the survey method, the 
much larger response rate and therefore representation is a very welcome benefit. 
Moreover, although the survey questions and possible responses were highly structured, I 
gave participants the option to write any additional responses they wished at the end of 
every question (see Appendix D). The web survey also concluded with a request for 
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feedback on the survey overall, offering a large text box in which participants could 
express their own opinions. The statistical information gathered from the survey was 
analysed with the help of the University of Waterloo Survey Research Centre. And I 
included the written responses gathered from the survey’s numerous “other” sections and 
final feedback section selectively as they had been written, editing only occasionally and 
lightly for grammatical reasons. 
3.2.6 Data Analysis 
 Even though this is not a full blown ethnography, employing a critical 
ethnographic approach, I have attempted to include the diverse discursive positions of 
research participants’ narratives and responses in order to challenge and revise existing 
sociological theories of modernity, rather than simply fitting these into a previously 
constructed theory. Admittedly, I do employ pre-existing theories such as conflict theory 
and post-colonial anti-racist theory in this work to make sense of my findings, but I 
attempt to give the fieldwork findings precedence, and fit the theory to the empirical 
findings, revising the theory when necessary, rather than fitting the fieldwork findings to 
the theories. With regard to theory, I include the multiple discursive positions of 
participants in this project narrative in a way that informs and challenges theories of 
modernity, secularization, privatization, and religion. Multiple and diverse participant 
voices also challenge prominent biases, and misunderstandings proliferated in the public 
debate on faith based arbitration. And finally, I include multiple voices that challenge 
gender inequity and other kinds of inequity within respective religious communities. I 
have not used the voices of participants to produce a new grounded theory, but rather to 
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question and revise existing theories and conceptions, as well as prominent biases and 
prejudices.  
 I analysed the results of the web-survey using simple forms of univirate analysis. 
These include “eyeballing” the data for obvious patterns, calculating central tendencies, 
measures of dispersion, and charting distributions (Bernard 2002). The small sample size 
of the survey does not justify more complex forms of analysis such as bi-virate and multi-
virate analysis. I provided a text box for feedback on every page of the survey. I have 
collated and analyzed the textual responses of participants much the same way I did for 
the interviews as stated below.  
 I analyzed in-person and phone interviews, as well as the email surveys in an 
informal “qualitative analysis of qualitative data” method (Bernard 2002, 428). Based on 
the questions I asked, as well as the questions that arose during the interviews in response 
to participants’ narratives, I identified and collated patterns among the responses and 
narratives of participants by “eyeballing” the data (Willis 2007, 298). In this sense, 
although the interviews were not formally coded, I coded the results informally according 
first to the categories of questions asked in interviews, and second according to varieties 
of answers to question categories. The patterns identified illustrate the attitudes and 
practices of Muslim and Jewish leaders and adherents regarding faith based mediation 
and arbitration in Ontario. This is a substantial though not representative sample. 
Although this is not properly a representative sample, my interviews altogether show a 
substantial amount of saturation (Jackson & Verberg 2007, 153). I then compared these 
patterns of responses and actual practice of Muslim and Jewish communities to the public 
discourse on faith based arbitration that took place in the media. I found several 
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disjunctures between the issues and meanings that proliferated in the media compared to 
those articulated by the actual religious community members and leaders who use or 
offer these kinds of services. Based on these findings I argue that the public policy that 
followed the “sharia debate”, although positive in some respects, missed the mark in a 
number of ways based on what Muslims and Jewish people were experiencing on the 
ground. I present the results of the analysis of my fieldwork in chapter 6. In my 
conclusion, I summarize my findings and make policy recommendations.  
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Chapter 4 Truncated Agency:  Reading the History of the 
“Sharia Debate” Through a Postcolonial Lens 
4.1 Can the Imperiled Muslim Woman be Protected?  
 It is understandable that the McGuinty government and those commentators on 
the so-called sharia debate committed to democracy, procedural liberalism, and the rule 
of law could find the prospect of Muslim faith based arbitration potentially threatening. 
Many Muslims themselves, both in the media and among my own interviewees, 
expressed serious concern about the real potential for vulnerable people to be 
disadvantaged by particular Muslim faith based arbitrators holding particular 
interpretations of Islamic legal tradition. However, quite aside from this legitimate 
concern, upon further analysis of the history and discourse of the so-called sharia debate I 
find more pernicious assumptions, interpretations, stereotypes, and actions taken that 
work much more to fulfill the interests of dominant populations than the protection of 
vulnerable people. Building on the theoretical frame outlined in chapter two, the 
particular way the so-called sharia debate religionized the issue of faith based arbitration 
rendered religion generally and Islam in particular as nearly intrinsically oppressive and 
inherently premodern—or even antimodern. Uncritical forms of multiculturalism and 
imperial secularism abound in the history of this debate. I conclude that a critical 
multiculturalism that incorporates anti-imperial secularism would be far more effective 
for addressing the issues affecting vulnerable people in the context of faith based civil 
dispute resolution. 
 107
 Much of the public discourse that surrounds and articulates the issue of faith 
based arbitration in Ontario has used what Sherene Razack has called the productive 
discursive figures of the “imperiled Muslim woman” and the “dangerous Muslim man,” 
often in contrast to the figure of the “civilized European” (Razack 2008). These three 
figures are not real women and men but discursive tools that I will track and interrogate 
through their appearance in the debates on faith based arbitration. However, although 
these are discursive figures, when deployed they very much affect the lives of Muslims 
living in Canada and around the world.62 The figures of the imperiled Muslim woman 
and the dangerous Muslim man are shaped and utilized in a way that primarily serves 
western interests. In other words, these stereotypical figures are utilized to defend several 
excessive policies of control, surveillance, and policing of Muslim populations in several 
western countries currently as well as justifying western foreign policies and economic 
exploitation of resources in so-called Muslim countries. “Being tough on Muslims, as 
many European scholars have observed, is one significant way in which contemporary 
Western governments secure both their own domestic base (through appealing to the right 
and consolidating the idea that there is one white national culture) and their international 
stature (through appearing to be active participants of the ‘war on terror’)” (Razack 2008, 
160). The media discourse and public debate over the issue of faith based arbitration are 
saturated with these discursive figures. I will examine the construction, logic, and 
productive power of these figures throughout my analysis of the history and debate of 
faith based arbitration in Ontario in this and the following chapter.  
                                                 
62 For a further discussion of the appearance of these figures in the media representation of the so-called 
sharia debate see chapter 5 below.  
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 My central argument in this chapter is that because of the realities of Canada’s 
modern legal system, which is fundamentally dependent on the exercise of human agency 
to be effective, the figure of the imperiled Muslim woman, devoid of agency as she is 
imagined in public discourse, cannot be protected by Canadian law, except in a partial, 
distorted and paternalistic manner. Therefore I argue that because of the productive 
power63 of the stereotypical image of the imperiled Muslim woman as outlined by 
Razack, and despite the laudable but limited protection that has been afforded through the 
revised Arbitration Act, ironically the deployment of the “imperiled Muslim woman” has 
been productive of more harm than protection for vulnerable Muslims.  
 An individual without agency cannot be fully human in the liberal model. 
Therefore I argue that, because the figure of the imperiled Muslim woman is imagined 
for several reasons to be virtually devoid of human agency, in the context of liberalism 
her humanity is denied. Policies and laws based on this paternalistic conceptualization of 
the Muslim woman as a “sub-human” figure are designed to protect people who are 
imagined to have no agency. For vulnerable people on the ground, there are at least two 
harmful consequences. First, such policies cannot protect vulnerable peoples because the 
existing legal system is fundamentally designed to protect people largely only when they 
exercise their agency. Despite the fact that faith based arbitration is technically no longer 
allowed in Ontario (and I will clarify the extent to which this is the case below), I argue 
in this chapter that de facto legal pluralism on the ground leaves vulnerable people open 
to many forms of legally enforceable contracts that might be based on religious law. 
Furthermore, because the solution of the McGuinty government was simply to end all 
                                                 
63 Razack is referring here to Foucault’s thesis that power is not simply repressive, it is also productive. In 
this instance the stereotypical image of the imperilled Muslim woman has been used to produce 
assumptions and reinforce relations that further western interests.  
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faith based arbitration, in part because vulnerable Muslim women were imagined as 
unable to exercise the agency necessary to access the protections of the legal system over 
against the dangerous Muslim man, little further policy has been developed to assist 
vulnerable people that may find themselves presented with these other types of legal 
contracts.64 Second, vulnerable people are much better protected I argue with policies 
and practices that support and facilitate their agency, rather than those that are based on 
the assumption of an absence of agency. For the most part agency-affirming policies have 
not been developed, and in the limited extent to which they have been developed they 
have remained largely hidden.65  
                                                
4.2 Dangerous Muslim Men, Imperiled Muslim Women and Civilized 
Europeans 
 Sherene Razack names three tropes that have been highly productive for western 
interests: the dangerous Muslim man,66 the imperiled Muslim woman, and the civilized 
European (Razack 2008).67 These tropes justify the surveillance and control of the lands, 
resources, rights, and actions of Others (Muslims in this case) in the name of, for 
example, rescuing imperiled Muslim women from dangerous Muslim men. Many have 
noted the public political justification of the war in Afghanistan in part as an operation 
 
64 I am not saying that there were not legitimate concerns about family and community pressures to contract 
out of one’s rightful default legal norms in Ontario Family Law in the context of faith based arbitration. 
What I am saying is that in order for the legal changes made to the Arbitration Act to effectively protect 
vulnerable peoples in the context of the realities of Ontario law, many more agency-affirming policies 
would need to be developed.  Again, I will explore this in more detail below. 
65 In my concluding chapter I will offer a number of recommendations for agency-affirming or agency-
enabling policies as well as methods for making existing agency-affirming policies more visible to those 
who may benefit from them most. 
66 See also Guenif-Souilamas 2004 and Spivak 1988. 
67 Razack intends here those more generally of European descent that have become dominant globally, 
mainly in Western Europe, North America, and Australia.  
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intended to rescue Afghan women from barbaric Afghan men.68 Ironically, Afghan 
women have benefited little as a result of the war in Afghanistan,69 although western 
control of the region has arguably been achieved.70 Razack warns that “we are in a 
historical moment in which feminism can be easily annexed to the project of empire. As I 
and others have shown, it is often through the language of human rights and gender 
equality that empire is accomplished today” (Razack 2008, 148). As illustrated in the 
case of Afghanistan, rarely do these western projects of rescue actually benefit Muslim 
women, a number of whom do indeed suffer due to inequity. More often these projects 
only consolidate western power abroad, and tighten control over racialized and 
religionized domestic Others at home in order to consolidate the (white and secular) 
“Canadian nation.”  
 Each of the three stereotypes identified by Razack justifies different things and 
operates in different ways. The imperiled Muslim woman is represented as nearly 
helpless, and therefore dependant on benevolent (paternalistic) non-Muslims for rescue. 
The dangerous Muslim man is represented as too patriarchal and unreasonable to be 
properly modern, and therefore is in need of surveillance, inordinate legal constraints, 
and policing (Razack 2008, 146). These stereotypes are used to further suggest that Islam 
itself is inherently too patriarchal and unmodern to be tolerated equally with other more 
                                                 
68 “When the occupation of Afghanistan by American forces can be justified as necessary in order to save 
Afghan women from the Taliban, feminists must necessarily pay attention to how their demands serve the 
interests of imperialism and white supremacy” (Razack 2008, 149). 
69 Cf. Khan, S. 2008. From Rescue to Recognition: Rethinking the Afghan Conflict. Topia 19: 115-136. 
Laxer, J. 2008. “Chapter 7: This War is not About Human Rights.” In Mission of Folly: Canada and 
Afghanistan. Toronto: Between the Lines Press. Pgs. 69-79. The Échec à la Guerre Steering Committee. 
2006. “Canada’s Role in the Occupation of Afghanistan.” In Échec à la guerre (Stop the War!). 
http://www.echecalaguerre.org/index.php?id=186 . Accessed June 23, 2010. 
70 I do not of course mean that western control is not regularly resisted by insurgents, but western control of 
the region is undeniably established in Afghanistan, and if and when western countries pull out they will 
leave a government friendly to their interests. 
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“modernized religions,” further justifying various forms of surveillance, policing, and 
exclusion of Muslim bodies. Finally, the civilized European is represented as the only 
legitimate savior of Muslim women, as he or she is the only one with the agency and 
interest in human rights necessary to liberate Muslim women and usher them into 
modernity (Razack 2008, 146, 148). Furthermore, as Saba Mahmood argues, in western 
feminist discourse agency for the Muslim woman can only be expressed as resistance to 
Islam and Muslim men (and religious adherence only as oppression and denial of her 
agency) so that a woman cannot be conceived of as both a practicing Muslim and 
liberated at the same time (Mahmood 2005). As Razack observes, these tropes, 
stereotypes, and fantasies were central to the debate over faith based arbitration in 
Ontario, and I argue were ultimately productive more of the control and marginalization 
of Muslims generally than significant protection of vulnerable people in the context of 
faith based arbitration specifically, or religiously influenced civil contracts generally, 
which are equally enforceable.  
 In this chapter I want to build on Razack’s insights in a number of ways. I will 
argue that the cost of the Sharia debate goes beyond simply a recurrence of Islamophobia 
and re-affirming some terrible binaries. Razack states, “at the end of the day, something 
positive may have been achieved in that the plans of a small conservative religious 
faction may have been upset, but it has been achieved through reinforcing some rather 
terrible dualisms (women’s rights versus multiculturalism; West versus Muslims; 
enlightened Western feminists versus imperiled Muslim women) that, in a post-9/11 era, 
has tremendous utility for states seeking to regulate Muslim populations” (Razack 2008, 
171). My object here is to extend Razack’s analysis of the “multiplicity of factors that 
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have produced and sustained” the marginalization of vulnerable peoples in the context of 
faith based arbitration. I will search for these multiple factors in my analysis of western 
legal structures, public policies, and western discourses on Muslims, as well as patriarchy 
in Muslim communities. First, I argue the discourse on the sharia debate is one that has 
represented Muslim women as essentially lacking agency. This paternalism is akin to 
dehumanization, especially in the context of a liberal democracy. A defining component 
of a full human person in liberalism is her or his autonomy and agency.71 To represent a 
fully mentally functioning adult person, particularly in the context of a liberal democracy, 
as absent of agency is thus to dehumanize them to some degree. I do not mean that 
Muslim women are dehumanized in the same way that Jews were dehumanized by the 
Nazis in order to exterminate them. I also acknowledge that in certain contexts the law 
protects those understood to have limited agency such as children, the developmentally 
challenged, the mentally ill, people suffering from dementia, etc. However, my point is 
that placing Muslim women in the same category as though they possessed limited 
agency in the same way is paternalistic and infantilizes Muslim women, and thus 
dehumanizes them. Second, in part as a result of this dehumanizing discourse, the 
policies that have been adopted to rescue and protect vulnerable people have essentially 
been designed for people without agency, and therefore, for reasons I will explain below, 
I argue that these are largely ineffective or even counterproductive in practice.  
 Many now imagine that faith based arbitration has been prohibited, and therefore 
that vulnerable people are effectively protected. However, even now as Marion Boyd 
                                                 
71 Cf. Gill, Emily. 2001. Becoming free: autonomy and diversity in the liberal polity. Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas. Chambers, Clare. 2008. Sex, culture, and justice: the limits of choice. University Park, 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. Christman, John Philip and Anderson, Joel eds. 2005. 
Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism new essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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repeatedly pointed out in her report, the only way for a vulnerable person to activate the 
protections that the Canadian legal system offers she or he must exercise her or his 
agency.72 Although the figure of the vulnerable Muslim woman was central to the public 
debate on so-called sharia courts in Ontario, I argue the striking irony is that if this figure 
were a real person she could not possibly be protected in the current legal regime. 
Therefore I argue that basing governing decisions on the logic of this figure is not a good 
way to make policy. In response to this state of affairs, I argue that only policies and 
practices that affirm the exercise of agency of vulnerable peoples can protect them given 
the realities of Canada’s current liberal society and legal system.73  
 I want to be careful here not to reaffirm Islamophobia and the stereotypical 
figures Sherene Razack critiques. I am not arguing that agency affirming policies of 
protection for vulnerable people are needed because Muslim alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) is in fact egregious. I argue below based on my fieldwork research that 
there is much being practiced in Muslim communities with regard to divorce, custody, 
and inheritance, for example, that is quite acceptable with regard to Canadian legal 
norms. Furthermore, the number of people who might suffer as a result of coerced legally 
enforceable contracts based on religious tradition is very likely quite small, in fact no 
greater than those who suffer as a result of other forms of contracts. We should not 
                                                 
72 “Arbitration disputes are like all legal disputes, in that arbitration is triggered only by the parties who 
wish to use the law to resolve a dispute. Similarly, if the arbitration process has contravened the Act or has 
infringed on the rights of the parties, the person who has the problem must go to the court to seek a remedy. 
People with complaints about other people’s behavior generally must bring a claim to the courts (or 
tribunals) and ask for help. The state does not have agents going throughout society looking for wrongs to 
set right, except in the case of crimes and health and safety inspections and, arguably, in child welfare 
matters. People are expected to look out for themselves, and at the same time are allowed to resolve 
disputes privately if they so choose” (Boyd 2004, 9). Italics Mine. 
73 I am aware that the amendments to the Arbitration Act were intended to protect people who may have 
had their autonomy threatened or compromised by others in their family or community, but I argue that 
these policies designed to limit this threat to the autonomy of vulnerable peoples are not enough to protect 
these people. They must be accompanied simultaneously by policies that enable the autonomy of 
vulnerable peoples in order to be effective. 
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ignore, as was often done during the Sharia debate, the fact of potential mistreatment, 
unfairness, and coercion that can occur in any Canadian community, religious or 
otherwise. A number of Muslim women themselves have expressed concern about the 
risks inherent in faith based arbitration, though many I spoke with were also offended by 
the atmosphere of moral panic in which the issue was addressed and by the negative 
representation of the community in the public debate. I do not here want to trivialize the 
very real threat to women’s equality posed by some Muslims who may want to use faith 
based arbitration, or religiously influenced civil contract formation generally, to coerce 
women into unfair agreements. Rather, I want to complicate and contextualize the much 
starker and overwhelmingly negative representations of Muslim communities that arose 
in the public discourse. I wish to further show that the tropes employed in the public 
debate, and to some degree the result they engendered, in fact exacerbated the inequity 
suffered by vulnerable people more than they helped. It is in this carefully limited sense 
that I argue for agency affirming tools and policies for the protection of vulnerable people 
in civil dispute resolution.  
 I aim to accomplish three tasks in this chapter in the course of pushing 
assumptions about the imperiled Muslim woman to their logical conclusion in order to 
show their contradictions and incoherence. First, I will argue that the arguments based on 
the alleged extreme vulnerabilities of the imperiled Muslim woman cannot justify the 
dissolution of faith based arbitration without also justifying very radical change to the 
Family Law Act. The reason I argue this is that Canada’s liberal legal system depends on 
the autonomy and agency of the individual. In order to actually protect the imperiled 
Muslim woman one would have to enact an entire legal system for all Canadians 
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designed to protect people without agency.74 Such a system would be perceived to be 
oppressive, because it would negate the liberal individual’s autonomy to contract 
agreements appropriate to unique family situations. Second, I will trace the logic of the 
imperiled Muslim woman through the issues of faith based arbitration to show that she 
cannot possibly be protected in the current legal system (even outside of faith based 
arbitration), and that she therefore cannot be the basis of effective policy to protect 
vulnerable people. Finally, I will examine the resulting policy decision made by the 
McGuinty government to forbid all faith based arbitration, arguing that this result in 
practice makes very little difference in protecting the rights of vulnerable Muslim 
peoples. In my analysis of the McGuinty government’s actions, I will make suggestions 
as to which policies could be further developed and extended in order to better protect 
vulnerable people as autonomous agents. 
4.3 A History of the Faith Based Arbitration Debate in Ontario 
 The purpose of this section is to provide a historical overview and description of 
the issues relevant to the faith based arbitration debate. The analysis following this 
chapter will focus on the productive power of the imperiled Muslim woman and the 
inadequacy of policy based on the logic of this figure. In this section I will explore how 
the figure of the imperiled Muslim woman in some cases led to and in other cases 
reinforced several misunderstandings and oversimplifications of the issues related to faith 
based arbitration.  
4.3.1 What is the Difference Between Arbitration and Mediation? 
                                                 
74 I argue this in the context of family law. This is not the case in other legal jurisdictions, for example 
criminal law.  
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 Since there are now several publications that explain the legal context of family 
mediation and arbitration in Ontario (Bunting 2009; Bakht 2006; Boyd 2004), this 
dissertation will not reproduce a thorough exploration of the history and workings of the 
legal regimes in question. However, there appears indeed to have been much 
misunderstanding about what exactly family arbitration and mediation are, evidenced in 
the public debate, noticed by other scholars, and present among my own interview 
respondents (Bunting 2009). I have therefore attempted to briefly clarify these in my 
introductory chapter, and I will summarize those points here, my main point again being 
to contrast how the figure of the imperiled Muslim woman was represented as being at 
risk in faith based arbitration with the actual logic of how this stereotype would function 
in these institutions.  
 As stated in the introductory chapter, arbitration involves giving decision making 
powers to a third party in order to break a deadlock that two disputants are not able to 
resolve themselves. Mediation on the other hand does not lock the disputants into the 
decisions a mediator might suggest; disputants are free to take the advice of a mediator 
and enter the results into enforceable contracts such as separation agreements and wills. 
My fieldwork research reveals that some Muslim mediators in fact recommend women to 
enter the results of the mediation or advisory arbitration into an enforceable agreement in 
order to protect vulnerable women who will benefit from the power of the state to force 
ex-husbands to pay child and spousal support. Therefore, my research suggests it is 
women most often who may benefit from enforceable contracts, rather than men who will 
try to enforce an unfair contract of some kind. In the realm of family law, disputants can 
choose not to go to mediation if they wish. This is notably in contrast to Quebec, which 
 117
in fact requires all family law disputes to go to mandatory mediation before going to 
court (Boyd 2004, 32). This is ironic, given that many opposed to faith based arbitration 
pointed to Quebec as a model in that Quebec forbids arbitration of disputes relating to 
family law. This is puzzling, as those concerned with the privatization of family law 
critique mediation for the same reasons they critique arbitration: mediation might not lead 
to just outcomes because there may be substantial power imbalances between the 
disputants (Bakht 2006, 4-7). Forbidding family law arbitration, but requiring family law 
mediation then seems to be counterproductive. Furthermore, I argue that given the 
flexibility of the Civil Code of Quebec to allow, for example, divorcing couples to opt out 
of their statutory default norms much like Ontario’s FLA, renders Quebec’s prohibition 
of the arbitration of family law issues nearly meaningless.  
 There are several costs and benefits to using private forms of dispute resolution 
discussed in the introductory chapter. Lower costs, privacy, flexibility, and relative speed 
of alternative dispute resolution are cited as clear benefits over the adversarial and top-
down nature of the public court system. Furthermore, the public court system is less well 
equipped to take into account the concerns of racialized, religionized, and culturally 
minoritized communities. Even many feminists who opposed faith based arbitration do 
not hail the public court system as necessarily superior for upholding the rights of 
women, especially minoritized and racialized women, relative to alternative dispute 
resolution services with the proper safeguards in place. The potential costs of alternative 
dispute resolution are examined in detail by scholars who criticize what they understand 
to be the increasing privatization of justice. These scholars express fear that important 
legal advances in gender equity in family law may be opted out of in the context of 
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certain alternative dispute resolution services. The McGuinty government has made 
excellent changes to the Arbitration Act to mitigate these issues. However, I also argue 
that ironically, at the same moment, those who would have stood to benefit most from 
these excellent new protections are now essentially excluded from them.  
4.3.2 A New Development in Ontario Law?  
 Many of the misunderstandings I deal with in this chapter are not simply innocent 
errors. Misconceptions often betray underlying assumptions that lead to and support these 
misunderstandings. These misconceptions in turn confirm and support the assumptions 
that helped to create them in the first place. In clarifying here the misunderstandings 
regarding faith based arbitration I seek not simply to provide correct information in place 
of misinformation. I seek also to expose and question the underlying body of assumptions 
that helped produce them. Many assumed for instance that the so-called proposal for 
Muslim arbitration called for a radically new development in Canadian law.75 The facts 
are however that the Arbitration Act had made room for faith based arbitration by any 
religious community since 1991 (Arbitration Act 1991). Furthermore, Canadian courts 
have been reluctant to interfere with religious legal customs generally (Syrtash 1992, 98). 
Historically, religious communities have been given substantial jurisdiction in family law 
matters (Syrtash 1992; Kirsch 1971). I do not simply want to correct this 
misunderstanding however. I argue rather that this misconception was supported by and 
in turn reinforced underlying assumptions of a single (post-Christian) “white national 
culture” (Razack 2009, 160) that needs to be questioned in a country that aims to be 
                                                 
75 “For many weeks there was a prevalent misunderstanding, which continues to be repeated by both the 
media and opponents of arbitration, that the government of Ontario surreptitiously colluded with a Muslim 
organization known as the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice to create a [new] parallel legal system for 
Muslims, thereby depriving them of their legal rights under Ontario and Canadian law” (Bakht 2006, 1). 
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multicultural and anti-racist. As Razack has argued, the secular/religious distinction stood 
in for a religious colour line in the so-called sharia debate (Razack 2009, 148). As I have 
argued above in chapter 2, this particular invocation of the secular deploys a modern 
hierarchy that polarizes the so-called civilized secular over against alleged barbaric 
religion that further facilitates the marginalization of racialized and what I have termed 
“religionized” Others.76  
 I document the beginnings of the so-called sharia debate in the introductory 
chapter, where I point out that most assumed that what the Muslim arbitration that the 
Islamic Institute of Civil Justice was proposing was a radically new development in 
Ontario law. However, contrary to popular perception, the IICJ was not asking for new 
concessions or accommodations. Rather, they were simply voicing their intention to 
participate in a legal option that had been open to all faith communities for several years. 
Importantly, these Muslims were in this sense seeking to join in, integrate with, engage, 
and participate in existing Canadian institutions rather than to isolate themselves from or 
dramatically change them as many charged (Syed 2012). Although this misperception 
likely had its beginning with Mumtaz Ali’s own words, the way his words were read 
confirms rather than questions the presence of Islamophobia in the media. It is ironic that 
while there is much public discourse accusing Muslims of not integrating into existing 
Canadian institutions and culture, that when they attempt to do so they are still accused of 
attempting to violate Canadian norms, or transform and take over Canadian society.77 
                                                 
76 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of modern conceptualizations of religion, and processes of 
“religionization” in secular states. 
77 David Warren, “Multiculturalism -from Britannia to Sharia,” National Post, 8 December 2003, A14. Ken 
Elgert, “Islamic Law a Step toward Legal Apartheid,” Edmonton Journal, 4 December 2003, A19.  Sara 
Harkirpal Singh, “Religious Law Undermines Loyalty to Canada,” Vancouver Sun, 10 December 2003, 
A23. Ghammim Harris, “Sharia Is Not a Law by Canadian Standards,” Vancouver Sun, 15 December 2003, 
A15. As referenced in Razack 2009, p.207.  
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The assumption that Islamic law could not possibly have already been allowed to oper
within the parameters of enforceable Canadian law suggests a further more pernicious 
assumption that Muslims are Others in Canada (Razack 2009). This assumption was 
expressed in numerous calls to protect the Canadian nation against infiltration by a non-
Canadian pre-modern, misogynistic, and Other religious community. Islamic law could 
not be imagined as a part of the Canadian nation without also being represented as a 
fundamental betrayal of what Canada “stands for” (Syed 2012). The media discourse 
(discussed more fully in chapter 5) revealed assumptions that Islamic law is inherently 
unjust, premodern, patriarchal, barbaric, utterly Other and anything but Canadian. This 
discourse flourished despite a much more complex historic and present reality in which 
several Muslim jurisdictions attempt to be flexible in local situations, effect equity, and 
more recently attempt to install practices that are similar to western norms of equality and 
justice generally. 
ate 
 To uncritically assume that the participation of Muslims in faith based arbitration 
was radically new already suggests assumptions about the nature of Islamic legal 
practices and the “proper” place of Muslim culture in the Canadian state. Syed Mumtaz 
Ali’s attempt to garner praise and generate awareness albeit dramatically, was quickly 
(mis-)interpreted in the media and public discourse as true without question, and read as 
violation, breech, and contamination of the Canadian nation. This was not a discourse of 
reasoned assessment of substantive and procedural threats to legal equality. This was the 
reading and representation of an Other to be contained.  
4.3.3 Legitimate Concerns of Feminists Regarding Arbitration  
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 I do not want my critique of the public debate on faith based arbitration to suggest 
that there were no legitimate feminist concerns. The challenge, eloquently expressed by 
Razack, is to address feminist concerns without falling into stereotypical and 
Islamophobic reaction (Razack 2009). Aside from the media discourse, several feminists, 
both Muslim and non-Muslim, raised concerns about women’s rights in the context of 
faith based arbitration of family disputes. Much has changed for the better in the 
Arbitration Act as a result of the amendments that took effect in 2006. I will outline here 
the concerns of some feminists about the practice of arbitration that precipitated the 
amendments. It was indeed a group of Muslim women who first raised concerns 
regarding the potential risks of religious arbitration to vulnerable persons. In response to 
these concerns the National Association of Women and the Law commissioned Natasha 
Bakht to examine the legal facets of faith based arbitration under Ontario’s 1991 
Arbitration Act. Several pertinent issues affecting women were uncovered in this earlier 
version of the Act, were it to be used in family arbitrations (Bakht 2006, 5). Feminists 
have argued against alternative dispute resolution generally for some time (Bakht 2006, 
6). Their concern is the privatization of family law, and these feminists have argued that 
the Canadian state must take responsibility for ensuring that women’s interests are 
protected. Given that separation and divorce regularly result in the “feminization of 
poverty” (Bakht 2006, 6), family law is of particular concern to women. Feminists feared 
given that any legal tradition or principles could be used in arbitration, this could lead to 
any pre-Rathwell-ian78 legal standard being applied in family law arbitrations that could 
                                                 
78 Rathwell v. Rathwell [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436 [Rathwell] this is the case that set the precedent for a 
fifty/fifty division of resources upon divorce in Canadian family law. 
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result in “unfair division of property, spousal support, child support, custody, or access 
awards” (Bakht 2005, 27).  
 There have been substantial improvements to the position of women in family law 
disputes in the previous thirty years; however, there continue to be significant challenges. 
In particular, private dispute resolution in family legal matters has led to substandard 
outcomes for many women (Gordon 2001). Several feminist scholars worry that 
privatized forms of justice easily fall prey to reinforcing gender biases in society, where 
public oversight is not permitted to aid in protecting women’s interests (Bakht 2005, 28). 
Women might experience pressure from their family members, community, or religious 
leaders to engage in private judicial practices that are inequitable (Stopler 2003). 
Furthermore, if arbitrators are not trained and required to screen for domestic abuse, then 
a person who does suffer from family violence by definition cannot be genuinely free to 
choose private dispute resolution mechanisms (Hart 1990). Recent immigrant women 
may also be particularly vulnerable as they may not be familiar with their Canadian rights 
in family law, or she may be in an unequal power relationship if her husband has 
sponsored her to come to Canada, and there may also be substantial linguistic barriers to 
accessing justice (Bakht 2005, 28-29). Finally, inequity tends to impact on justice across 
intersecting lines of gender, “class, (dis)ability, race, and cultur[e]” (Bakht 2005, 29; 
Razack 2009; Goundry et. al. 1998).  
 Feminists also pointed to several shortcomings in the 1991 version of the 
Arbitration Act specifically for protecting the interests of women in family law disputes. 
Under the old Act, arbitrators had no requirements for or standards of legal training or 
training in screening for domestic abuse. The previous Act allowed for disputants to 
 123
contract out of their right to appeal an arbitral decision, which could effectively destroy a 
crucial tool for judicial oversight. One could sign ahead of time a contract committing 
oneself to arbitrate a family law dispute that might arise in future. This could become a 
problem if a party to the dispute for any number of reasons changed their mind once a 
dispute had arisen, perhaps years later, and wanted to go to the courts instead. This would 
ultimately mean that genuine consent to arbitration could be absent. There was no 
requirement for independent legal advice under the previous Arbitration Act. There were 
no requirements for keeping records, so that not only might an award not be honoured 
perhaps because it was verbal? only, but also there are little or no records of arbitrations 
to examine the impact of this form of private dispute resolution on women (Bakht 2006, 
6-7). In the second half of the chapter I will explore how these feminist concerns have 
been addressed in part by the revised Arbitration Act, and how they might be better 
addressed by further policy development. However, in the interests of addressing feminist 
concerns without being reactionary, I continue here my critique of the public discourse on 
faith based arbitration and the misunderstandings it produced. 
4.3.4 One law for all? 
 Several participants in the public debate on faith based arbitration made a plea for 
“one law for all” for the sake of protecting the imperiled Muslim woman.79 These people 
assumed that one law for all would clearly benefit vulnerable peoples more than diversity 
or flexibility in the law. These spokespersons further assumed that legal pluralism, if not 
used by biased persons toward inequitable ends, would at least be used to affect uneven 
degrees of justice between people, rather than applying equally legitimate forms of 
                                                 
79 “One country, one legal code, one court –for everybody.” In Ingrid Peritz. 2005. “Ebadi decries idea of 
Islamic law in Canada.” GlobeandMail.com. Accessed Tuesday June 14, 2005. 
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justice to diverse situations and contexts.80 However, not only is the assumption that one 
law for all is superior misplaced, but also one law for all is not possible under Ontario’s 
current family law regime.  
 First, legal rigidity, inevitably based on dominant cultural norms, has been shown 
repeatedly in legal history to disadvantage vulnerable people, particularly women 
(Bartlett 1990; Bartlett and Kennedy 1991). There is a long history of establishing 
equality through legal flexibility, and sustaining inequity through legal rigidity. For 
example, before reforms to the Divorce Act that set default norms in the event of divorce 
to an equal share of family resources between spouses, the law essentially stated that in 
the event of divorce all individuals would simply retain their own property and resources 
registered in their name.81 The law assumed that this legally uniform treatment between 
all peoples regardless of class or gender was fair and equitable. However, given that at 
the time most women did not have jobs outside the home and did not take legal 
ownership in name of family assets, what appeared to be a fair one law for all was 
actually deeply biased in favor of men over against women. Furthermore, the only 
context in which the original law could even appear to be fair, given the gross gender 
inequity regarding economic privilege, would be in a patriarchal society where women 
are essentially expected to be the wards of men. This law, which had been perfectly 
consistent between all individuals, was changed in order to be more equitable. In other 
words, because individuals were diverse as to economic privilege, the law had to forsake 
                                                 
80 My research demonstrates, for example, that some imams will go “madhab shopping” beyond their usual 
schools of jurisprudence in order to find a school of Islamic law that benefits Muslim women best in the 
Canadian context. See the section on the Darul Iftaa in Chapter 6 below. (A madhab is a school of Islamic 
jurisprudence). 
81 Cf. Rathwell v. Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436; Louise Dulude. 1982. Outline of matrimonial property 
laws in Canada: from east to west. Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women; James G. 
McLeod, Alfred A. Mamo eds. 1988. Matrimonial Property Law in Canada. Toronto: Carswell.  
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legal uniformity to take account of that diversity in order to ensure fairness and equity 
between peoples.  
 Revising the Family Law Act accomplished fairness in at least two ways. First, 
statutes were established in the Family Law Act to ensure that certain broadly fair default 
norms for the division of family assets and spousal and child support could be ordered by 
a judge in the event of a spousal dispute on these matters in divorce. These are likely 
what those calling for one law for all are referring to, although it has apparently been lost 
that this was at its inception a move toward legal accommodation of diversity and away 
from legal uniformity (because it disadvantaged women) for the purposes of establishing 
economic equity. Second, the autonomy of disputants to make choices in divorce was 
preserved in the Family Law Act as parties retain the right to opt out of their statutory 
default entitlements. Once again, this is in order to avoid the difficulties and inequities 
often caused by one law for all legal regimes. Perhaps a woman will need more than the 
statutory division of resources or default levels of support to take care of the children in 
the way she or both parents would prefer. Or perhaps a woman might prefer to pursue her 
career while having the father look after their children, in which case she might opt to 
give more support and resources to the father to take care of their children, freeing her to 
pursue her career. If the couple were not allowed the legal flexibility to contract out of 
the statutory default norms of the Family Law Act, these types of arrangements would 
not be possible. Natasha Bakht further argues that section 15 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms explicitly recognizes that treating all people as if they were the 
same is not always an effective way to be equitable. She points out that “the many legal 
distinctions in the law based on, for example, sex and race are not considered measures 
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that are discriminatory but, on the contrary, that promote substantive equality by 
emphasizing a consideration of the impact of laws on members of groups subject to 
stereotyping and historic disadvantage. This vision of equality is significant because it 
accounts for the cumulative effects of past discrimination” (Bakht 2007, 137).82 It is 
understandable in the context of liberal democratic society with its assumption that 
justice, equality, freedom and liberty are best achieved through procedural liberalism that 
many would assume one law for all is the best way to affect egalitarian justice.83 
However, given the history of effecting injustice for minorities by treating everyone the 
same, it is puzzling that one law for all would be the cry of those seeking to protect 
disadvantaged people.  
 My second related point is that because the Family Law Act allows such great 
flexibility in contracting out of default norms, this equals de-facto legal pluralism in 
family law. As Annie Bunting has stated, the “scope permitted by the act for private 
contracting out of statutory rights puts the lie to the myth, propagated repeatedly during 
the Sharia tribunal debates, that there is one family law for all Ontarians. The law permits 
privatized legal pluralism” (Bunting 2009, 237). It is for this reason that there can never 
be one law for all in the context of family law, unless the law is drastically changed to 
disallow persons to contract out of their statutory entitlements. Annie Bunting makes the 
point forcefully when she states that if the:  
                                                 
82 Bakht provides the example of the sentencing provision in section 718.2(e) of Canada’s Criminal Code 
that instructs judges to avoid incarcerating Canadian Aboriginal peoples as far as possible in order to 
counter the gross over-representation of Aboriginal peoples in the prison system. This “discrimination” in 
the Criminal Code is meant to affect justice and equity, not constitute a parallel and disadvantaging legal 
system. (Bakht 2007, 137). 
83 See Taylor (1994) for an explanation and critique of procedural liberalism.  
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Government were truly interested in creating “one family law for all Ontarians,” 
as its rhetoric suggests, then it would have had to take a very different course. It 
would have had to ban the contracting out of statutory entitlements altogether. 
However, the creation of a one-size-fits-all regime would encounter significant 
political resistance. The recent amendments leave untouched the Family Law 
Act’s balance between private contractual autonomy and statutory entitlements. 
(Bunting 2009, 240)  
Again, one reason autonomy is retained is to protect vulnerable people from the inequity 
that can result form rigid legal codes that cannot take account of diverse family 
situations. I argue that the goal of those concerned with protecting vulnerable people 
should not be one law for all, because this historically benefits the dominant and 
disadvantages the vulnerable, but rather equity and fairness for all, which admittedly can 
be more complex and difficult to achieve, but is no less valuable for that (Bartlett 1990 
Bartlett and Kennedy 1991). Ironically, detractors from faith based arbitration themselves 
argued in other contexts that rigid forms of law counter equality, where Islamic law was 
repeatedly condemned for being an ancient and inflexible legal regime frozen in time. It 
seems inconsistent then to posit that the solution to an allegedly unbendable legal form is 
a modern inflexible and “frozen” version of “one family law for all.”84  
4.3.5 Domestic Violence and Abuse? 
 Several commentators feared that faith based arbitration might facilitate domestic 
violence. However, the potential connection between faith based arbitration and domestic 
                                                 
84 My point is not that inflexible laws can’t be beneficial, human rights charters being a modern case in 
point. The point is that rigidity is praised in one area, while it is condemned in another, uncritically. For a 




violence must be carefully clarified. Furthermore, it is important to ask how domestic 
violence in Muslim communities might be addressed without reaffirming Islamophobia, 
or the stereotypes of the imperiled Muslim woman and dangerous Muslim man. The issue 
of domestic violence is certainly a real and serious issue. I will attempt to carefully 
delineate how the issue of domestic violence might be connected to the issue of faith 
based arbitration specifically and civil disputes under the Family Law Act generally. I 
will also attempt to outline how they are not connected, so as to be clear about the risks 
without uncritically assuming that allowing faith based arbitration equals unbridled 
domestic abuse, as seems to have been the implication in the public discourse.85 
 Domestic abuse can present a major obstacle to equity in the settling of civil 
disputes. Several scholars have documented the affects of domestic abuse in rendering 
the settling of family legal issues drastically unequal (Goundry et al. 1998, 38-41). If, for 
example, a partner to a divorce is suffering domestic abuse from the spouse, then they 
can hardly be regarded as being able to negotiate that divorce on equal terms. This is a 
crucial issue in the private resolution of civil disputes. I will consider how this might be 
addressed after I have shown how domestic abuse is not, in fact, related to civil dispute 
resolution. 
 It is important to point out that domestic abuse cannot be the subject of 
arbitration, mediation, or any court proceeding under the Family Law Act. Domestic 
abuse is a criminal legal issue and can only be the subject of a criminal law prosecution. 
This might seem to be a mundane point, but apparently it is not, given the public 
discourse on the so-called sharia debate. For example, several media articles expressed 
fears that imams would recommend that husbands beat their women, or that women 
                                                 
85 For a further discussion of the media discourse on the “Sharia debate” please see chapter 5 below. 
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would be sentenced to stoning for adultery.86 A personal conversation illustrates the point 
here. My interlocutor, a non-Muslim, felt that it was important to forbid faith based 
arbitration in order to send the message to Muslim men that they “cannot beat their wives 
with a stone.” This statement is a sad corruption of two widespread misperceptions: first 
that most Muslim men beat their wives regularly and second that stoning is a widespread 
Muslim punishment for adultery.87 Neither is true, although domestic abuse generally is 
certainly a real and important issue to address among Canadian Muslim communities—
just as it is among non-Muslim Canadians. But as concerns the law, domestic abuse is a 
criminal act and cannot legally be the subject of an arbitration or mediation of any sort.  
 Therefore, how might domestic violence in Muslim communities in the context of 
alternative dispute resolution be addressed without reaffirming Islamophobia, or the 
stereotypes of the imperiled Muslim woman and dangerous Muslim man? First, it is 
important to realize that the alleged exclusion of faith based arbitration has not ended the 
potential for power imbalances and domestic abuse in faith based alternative dispute 
resolution. Some imams clearly are not trained well, and/or do not take seriously enough 
the issue of domestic abuse. Though I interviewed several that did take it seriously who 
had immediately advised Muslim women to call the police, Julie Macfarlane and I both 
found some Muslim leaders who did not act effectively or appropriately to address this 
                                                 
86 “Sharia-approved but illegal activities already occur in Toronto, and she fears this will give strength to 
them. Muslim women are battered but don’t dare report it (Hurst 2004). In the course of documenting an 
alleged example of Muslim alternative dispute resolution, Jimenez states “One day they had a physical 
altercation that resulted in the police coming. No charges were laid, but police gave her ex-husband a 
warning after Shinaz said he tried to strangle her” (Jimenez 2005). “Opponents of the new tribunals argue 
that the government’s imprimatur will give sharia law even greater legitimacy. Sharia law is based on the 
Koran, which, according to Muslim belief, provides the divine rules for behavior. What is called sharia 
varies widely (in Nigeria, for example, it has been invoked to justify death by stoning)” (Wente 2004).  
87 For a further discussion of these issues please see chapter 5 below. 
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issue (Macfarlane 2012).88 Macfarlane suggests that 1 in 3 of her Muslim female 
respondents seeking divorce experienced violence and/or abuse in their marriage 
(2012).89 It is therefore important to see that religious leaders and private dispute 
resolution providers might in fact play an important role in reporting domestic abuse. 
This is more the case now because the Arbitration Act has been changed to require 
arbitrators to receive training in order to perform the mandatory screening for domestic 
abuse, or to require someone qualified to do it if they are not. Furthermore, a modest 
number of mosques and Muslim organizations are holding their own community 
education workshops on domestic violence.90 These are certainly in the minority; 
however, it is important to note that it is already taking place. Government, and other 
non-Muslim or Muslim community organizations and NGO’s might further offer or be 
invited to help in these endeavors. Government and Muslim and non-Muslim community 
organizations and NGO’s might be able to assist in organizing and carrying out 
educational workshops designed to educate imams and other religious leaders in 
particular regarding how to deal appropriately with domestic violence in Ontario as 
well.91 Since, the supposed ban on faith based arbitration has not removed the potential 
for all religiously based alternative dispute resolution, religious communities and leaders 
should be regarded as partners working against domestic violence, rather than assuming 
                                                 
88 For example, one Imam stated “Well, this kind of anger that you see in a relationship; it is hard to get out 
of it. I get this most of the time because they [Muslim women] have been denied the religious divorce [by 
other Imams who do not recognize the physical or emotional abuse]. That’s when I say look, you go get the 
legal divorce, and I will give you the Islamic divorce. So if you are certain you have the abuse physically or 
emotionally . . . I help them. It happens many times.” (Personal Interview August 30, 2008). 
89 For broader Canadian data on intimate partner violence see Beaman 2013.  
90 I note three institutions that undertook such workshops recently, even in my limited research. 
91 I do not want to mention these issues in a way that simply confirms the stereotypes proliferated in the 
press during the so-called sharia debate. Just like non-Muslim communities in Ontario, there are several 
people living and acting justly, and there are a number of people and institutions that continue to struggle 
with patriarchy and other forms of inequity. 
 131
incorrectly that the issue of domestic violence in alternative dispute resolution is best 
dealt with (and has in fact been accomplished by) excluding religion from impacting 
enforceable domestic contracts altogether.  
 Domestic abuse is addressed nominally in the amendments to the Arbitration Act 
in that parties to a dispute must be screened for domestic abuse. But outside the context 
of arbitration, domestic abuse remains an issue that might be better addressed through 
community development and educational initiatives as I have outlined above. Once again, 
the revised Act seems to exclude the very people it was meant to protect: vulnerable 
people, who have now been told that faith based arbitration is forbidden and therefore 
will likely not benefit from the amendments regarding screening for unequal power 
relations and domestic violence, and for whom arbitration is now very likely 
prohibitively costly because although ILA and screening for inequity and abuse is 
required, Legal Aid is not provided. 
4.4 An Analysis of Faith Based Arbitration and the Imperiled Muslim 
Woman Post-Revised Act 
4.4.1 The Revised Arbitration Act 
 The original Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 has been amended by two pieces of 
legislation: the Family Statute Law Amendment Act and a new Regulation under the 
Arbitration Act, 1991, which both came into effect April 30, 2007 (An Act to amend the 
Arbitration Act, 1991; Arbitration Act, 1991 Ontario Regulation 134/07 Family 
Arbitration). A number of changes have been made with the intent of better protecting 
vulnerable people generally and of limiting the state enforcement of faith based 
arbitrations specifically. I have already mentioned in the introductory chapter that there 
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are excellent new protections for vulnerable people provided for in the revised Act, 
including new procedural requirements designed to increase accountability and 
transparency. Furthermore, I discussed there that the revised Act also accomplishes a 
very important new move, namely the subjection of the Arbitration Act to the Family 
Law Act. Finally, I note in the introductory chapter that in addition to these important and 
very valuable amendments to the Arbitration Act, the new Act also states that no law 
other than Canadian law may be used in Arbitration. This is the amendment meant in part 
to exclude the use of religious law from arbitration in Ontario.  
 Although there are now valuable changes to the Act, there are several forms of 
faith based arbitration and potentially enforceable mediation that remain available to 
Canadians. First, one can still go for faith based mediation, and this can be entered into 
binding private contracts. Second, one can still participate in faith based arbitration in the 
sense that a religious person or leader can arbitrate a dispute, but they have to sign an 
agreement saying they have used Canadian law exclusively to make their decision. Third, 
one can still have an advisory arbitration, and it remains up to the disputants whether they 
accept it and enter it into a binding and enforceable private agreement such as a 
prenuptial agreement or separation agreement, or will. Faith based arbitration has not 
been banned, and to suggest otherwise is very misleading. As Annie Bunting has argued, 
“the government’s denial of legally binding force to family arbitration based on religious 
principles is, it turns out, a matter of legal form rather than normative substance. The 
formal obstacle to binding religious arbitration of family matters is easily evaded, if the 
parties so desire, by embodying the results of advisory religious arbitration decisions in 
negotiated separation agreements” (Bunting 2009, 6). Faith based arbitration has certainly 
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been substantially limited; however, faith based civil dispute resolution generally, and 
certain types of faith based arbitration specifically have not been banned. Furthermore, 
those who choose from these remaining forms of legitimate faith based dispute resolution 
continue to be open to the potential for pressure and inequity. I argue it is vitally 
important to understand these complexities and nuances of the law in order to offer the 
best possible assistance and protection to vulnerable peoples as autonomous agents, 
rather than as stereotypical non-agents. 
 In one interview, I debated with a representative of a Muslim women’s 
organization about whether it is appropriate to state that faith based arbitration is still 
available. Her position was given that religious laws can no longer be used in enforceable 
arbitrations one should no longer say that faith based arbitration is available. However, 
my concern is that if advisory faith based arbitrations are still enforceable if they are 
entered into domestic contracts, and de facto legal pluralism in the Family Law Act 
allows great flexibility for the inclusion of religious principles in settling disputes in an 
enforceable way, that these points will be lost if one simply states that faith based 
arbitration is no longer available. The public currently assumes that because McGuinty 
has announced that “there will be no Sharia in Ontario” that there are no avenues for 
religious laws and principles to be enforced through civil contracts. Although it is 
important to signal the valuable changes that have been made to the Arbitration Act, I 
argue that to say simply that faith based arbitration is no longer enforceable in Ontario 
leads to significant misunderstandings. This both hides further potential sources of 
inequity, and occludes highlighting potential inclusion of religious communities while 
offering the protections of the Family Law Act. Finally, the opportunity for the public to 
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perceive overlaps and complementary principles that Muslim law and Canadian law 
might share is missed, further reinforcing rather than challenging western stereotypes of 
Islam that fuel moral panic and Islamophobia. 
 A subtle but suggestive point deserves mentioning here. In fact, adding the 
pronouncement that no other law than Canadian law can be used is somewhat redundant 
after having already stated that family arbitrations are subject to the Family Law Act, and 
that in the event of a discrepancy, the Family Law Act will take precedence. In addition to 
signing a document that states that an arbitrator followed the revised Arbitration Act in 
the arbitration (which already places the arbitration entirely under the jurisdiction of 
Canadian family law), she or he must also sign a declaration stating they did not use a 
law other than Canadian law to arbitrate the dispute. This is at best redundant and at 
worst unnecessarily exclusionary (Bakht 2007, 142). A civil dispute mechanism 
(arbitration) that is formally and explicitly subject to a law code (FLA) already cannot be 
overruled by another law code. Therefore, what does the added legislation produce? I 
argue it needlessly suggests that Other (and especially Islamic given the impetus for the 
legislative changes) cultural or legal traditions cannot not share affinities with Canadian 
law, and perhaps suggests as Sherene Razack has argued that the government is taking a 
“strong stance on Muslims” in order to be seen to be participating in the war on terror 
(Razack 2004, 160). If the government had simply subjected family arbitrations to the 
FLA, then the government could have rather emphasized that cultural and religious 
diversity can be practiced in the context of Family Law but only in-so-far as these do not 
conflict with the Family Law Act. Furthermore, forbidding all legal codes other than 
Canadian law might suggest that an arbitrator would not deviate from the Family Law 
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Act for any reason other than adhering to another legal regime, which is simply false. 
Despite the changes to the Arbitration Act, it is still possible to make contextually 
sensitive (positive) or inequitable (negative) arbitral decisions that diverge substantially 
from the default norms of the Family Law Act (given the flexibility afforded in the Act) 
without actually using a law other than Canadian law. The decision might then be 
overturned by the courts because the reasons given are not acceptable, or it might indeed 
be accepted as reasonable, but it would not be overturned because of the use of another 
legal code.  
4.4.2 Can the Imperiled Muslim Woman be Protected? 
 I argue that the stereotypical figure of the imperiled Muslim woman could not be 
protected if she were a real person. Vulnerable people must exercise their agency in order 
to benefit from the protections afforded by the legal system. The logic of the figure of the 
imperiled Muslim woman, conceived of as having little or no agency, means that such a 
person would never show up in arbitration, mediation, or even a state court, because the 
figure of the dangerous Muslim man would never need to, much less allow it. Such a man 
would never need to have an arbitration enforced by the state, because there would be no 
question of his will, combined with the supposedly irresistible pressure of family, 
community, and religion on the imperiled Muslim woman. If the dangerous Muslim man 
is, as he is imagined, so extremely patriarchal as to, for example, absolutely demand 
certain terms in a divorce without question, and if the imperiled Muslim woman is, as she 
is imagined, so extremely pressured by husband, family, community, and religion as to be 
nearly devoid of agency and therefore to acquiesce unquestionably, then there is no 
dispute. What many failed to understand (and this is why Boyd tried to emphasize the 
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point repeatedly) is that the issue is not only that a vulnerable person may end up in 
forms of dispute resolution that may be unfair because there has to be a dispute in the 
first place. Indeed, if the a matter between husband and wife winds up in some form of 
civil dispute resolution at all, then the woman is already manifesting more autonomy than 
the imperiled Muslim woman is imagined to have. The greater problem rather would be 
that in order for a civil dispute to be brought to public or private dispute resolution 
mechanisms, one has to in fact dispute a matter. One must exercise one’s agency, voice 
one’s concerns, or launch a dispute whether it be in the context of mediation, arbitration, 
or the courts. If a Muslim woman, for example, does not dispute a separation agreement, 
the contract does not end up in arbitration, or mediation, or even the state court system. 
Otherwise, separation agreements are more or less rubber stamped by the courts who 
assume that if no one is disputing the agreement the resolution is amicable among all 
agents to the contract.92 I cannot over-emphasize this point. If the imperiled Muslim 
woman is as devoid of autonomy and agency as she is imagined, then she would not end 
up in arbitration of any kind (despite the excellent new protections the Act affords), 
because she would not dispute her husband. She would not even end up in private 
mediation or the court system if she did not exercise her right to dispute. Therefore, if the 
imperiled Muslim woman were a real person she could not be protected by Canada’s 
current family law system, regardless of whether one is speaking of private or public 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  
                                                 
92 “Other than in matters involving children, such as custody and child support, where the courts will 
invoke their parens patriae jurisdiction to approve agreements that are in the best interests of the children, 
and in separation agreements that must meet the broad objectives of the Divorce Act couples’ decisions to 
settle their family law affairs are generally left un-reviewed by the courts.” (Bakht 2007, 138) 
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 The sharia debate was treated in the press and represented in the public 
governmental discourse as though the question of faith based arbitration required a 
simple “yes” or “no” answer. That is, the options appeared to be either the imperiled 
Muslim woman could be allowed (to be coerced against her will) into faith based 
arbitration, or she could be protected (despite her lack of agency) once and for all by 
forbidding faith based arbitration. McGuinty’s discourse also suggests finality to the 
solution. McGuinty declared that he “would not let his province become the first Western 
government to allow the use of Islamic law to settle family disputes and that the 
boundaries between church and state would become clearer by banning religious 
arbitration completely;” therefore, McGuinty announced “there will be no Sharia in 
Ontario” (CTV.ca News Staff, “McGuinty Rules Out Use of Sharia Law in Ontario”). 
This strongly suggests that there is no more danger to the imperiled Muslim woman 
because the opportunity for autonomous choice has been legislated away. The discourse 
proceeds as if what matters most is not the autonomy and agency of the vulnerable person 
to access the legal protections available, rather it is allegedly the legislation which will 
supposedly protect vulnerable people quite apart from the exercise of their autonomy. 
Ironically, the only way a vulnerable person can really be protected is through the 
exercise of her or his agency, regardless of the amendments to the Arbitration Act. The 
only way for a vulnerable person to access the protections the new Act affords is if she or 
he exercises her or his agency by raising the dispute and having the matter brought before 
a formal arbitration tribunal that meets the new requirements enshrined in the Act.  
4.4.3 Dehumanization of Muslims 
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 Once again, one can understand that stakeholders with an interest in justice and 
fairness could be deeply concerned about the prospect of Muslim faith based arbitration. 
Many Muslims themselves were concerned, as evidenced in the media debate and among 
my own interviewees. However, quite apart from this legitimate concern I have 
discovered through my analysis a much more insidious series of suppositions, 
stereotypes, and interpretations in the history and discourses of the so-called sharia 
debate, and these things are less effective for protecting vulnerable people than they are 
for protecting the interests of dominant populations.  
 Colonialism and imperialism have historically dehumanized the Other in several 
ways in order to justify forms of governance of Others that minoritize, subjugate, and 
“liberate” their lands, labour and resources for imperial exploitation (Loomba 1998; Said 
1978). In the sharia debate and resulting policy, I also see subtle forms of dehumanization 
employed in rendering Muslim bodies subject to inordinate policing, control, rescue, and 
forcible ushering into modernity (Razack 2009, 148). The imperiled Muslim woman 
suggests that Muslim women are not fully human in that they do not possess sufficient 
autonomy and agency to be full liberal individuals. This justifies their forcible ushering 
into modernity through “liberating” them from the bounds of their communities and 
cultural (religious) traditions (Razack 2008; Bakht 2007).93 The dangerous Muslim man 
is also not fully human because he is too patriarchal, barbaric and pre-modern. These 
figures justify the desire for inordinate policing and control of his (religious) culture in 
the context of practices of private ordering in civil disputes. Only the westerner is human 
because fully modern, and burdened with responsibility to control, police, and by 
                                                 
93 There are close parallels to be drawn to the paternalism inherent in The Indian Act and other Canadian 
legislation aimed at aboriginal peoples as well. Cf. Dean 2005; Razack 2002; Razack 1998. 
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whatever other means necessary to usher these figures into modernity for everyone’s 
good.94 This constitutes a form of secularism that is deeply imperialist. 
 There is a deep irony in the discourse used in the sharia debate that accuses the 
dangerous Muslim man of dehumanizing (denying the full humanity of) the imperiled 
Muslim woman through patriarchal compromise of her legal rights to equality. Here, 
Muslim communities are accused of dehumanizing their potentially marginalized 
members, but as I have argued, the discourse used and actions taken by the dominant 
communities is deeply dehumanizing as well. I argue that these dehumanizing stereotypes 
have further led to inadequate policy where exclusion rather than inclusion is emphasized 
to the detriment of vulnerable people in Muslim communities, and therefore those who 
might benefit most from the protections the revised Act affords, likely cannot afford 
them. Ironically, on the one hand the discourse on the Sharia debate suggests that 
vulnerable Muslim people are in need of inordinate paternalistic oversight and protection, 
while on the other hand the fact that current policy in many ways leaves them in the lurch 
suggests that these people are not worthy of genuine protection. The result is that Muslim 
communities have been more effectively excluded than vulnerable peoples have been 
effectively protected. The important question this raises is: how might the issues of 
gender inequity and human rights with regard to the privatization of family law be 
addressed while avoiding the dehumanization of Muslims and the consolidation of 
empire and oppression that such dehumanization is too often used to justify? I make some 
                                                 
94 “This colour line is an especially pernicious one in a post-9/11 world when, in the name of anti-terrorism, 
Western states have won support for a variety of punitive and stigmatizing measures against Muslims and 
other groups of colour. Such measures are often defended as civilizing measures, necessary in order to 
bring democracy, human rights, and Women’s rights to Muslim countries. . . I explore below how ideas 
about women’s rights and secularism are part of the neo-liberal management of racial-minority populations 
who are scripted as pre-modern and requiring considerable regulation and surveillance. . . presumed to be 
trapped in the pre-modern by virtue of their particularist tendencies” (Razack 2008, 148). 
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practical, discursive, and policy recommendations as to how to accomplish these goals in 
a humanizing way in the concluding section below.  
 Several forms of marginalization or forcible assimilation through dehumanization 
have been used in the history of colonialism (Loomba 1998; Said 1978). Many of these 
forms surface subtly and not-so-subtly in the sharia debate as well. First, we see in the 
sharia debate and policy outcomes discourse and activity that dehumanizes in order to 
control, exclude and ghettoize Others. Several headlines suggested, or outright declared, 
that Sharia was not Canadian.95 Even Muslims who opposed faith based arbitration were 
appalled at the discourse and Islamophobia proliferated in the debate, as I found in many 
of my interviews for this project. McGuinty’s pronouncement that “there will be no 
Sharia in Ontario” on September 11, 2005 without any attendant qualifications that faith 
based mediation and advisory arbitration was still acceptable, and that Islamic law could 
be practiced as long as it did not contradict Canadian law, were noticeably absent. The 
discourse of the debate, and the policy actions that followed have left Muslim 
communities feeling deeply excluded. As the announcement of amendments to the 
Arbitration Act was couched in a discourse of absolute forbiddance of faith based 
arbitration, this has left any people who may have wanted to engage in some form of faith 
based alternative civil dispute resolution feeling ghettoized, as they likely perceive that 
only “back alley arbitrations” (Emon 2005) are available at this point.  
 Inordinate control and surveillance of Muslim communities are also suggested by 
the policy actions following the debate. In addition to keeping careful written records of 
                                                 
95 David Warren, “Multiculturalism -from Britannia to Sharia,” National Post, 8 December 2003, A14. Ken 
Elgert, “Islamic Law a Step toward Legal Apartheid,” Edmonton Journal, 4 December 2003, A19.  Sara 
Harkirpal Singh, “Religious Law Undermines Loyalty to Canada,” Vancouver Sun, 10 December 2003, 
A23. Ghammim Harris, “Sharia Is Not a Law by Canadian Standards,” Vancouver Sun, 15 December 2003, 
A15. 
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proceedings on file, now arbitrators are required to submit annual reports of all their 
cases to the Attorney General’s office for review. All participants are required to have 
documentation of independent legal advice. Furthermore, in addition to the requirement 
of arbitrators to screen parties separately for domestic abuse, even the Child and Family 
Services Act has been changed to legally require arbitrators to report child abuse if they 
suspect it. Most if not all of these measures are laudable for the protection of vulnerable 
peoples in the context of family arbitration generally. However, their strong association 
with Muslim communities as a result of the discourse and history of the sharia debate 
suggests that Muslim communities are marked for extraordinary levels of surveillance 
and control. Razack, I think, rightly fears that although more explicit and extreme laws 
deploying forms of surveillance and controls found in Europe are arguably not yet 
present to the same degree in Canada, the discourse and policies enacted as a result of the 
sharia debate have prepared the ground for such laws to be developed potentially in 
future.96 
 Second, the discourse on the Sharia debate and aspects of the policy following 
also function to forcibly assimilate. The dehumanization of the imperiled Muslim woman 
as virtually absent of autonomous agency justifies her rescue by the civilized European. 
The announcement of the amendments to the Arbitration Act suggested that the way her 
rescue would be accomplished would be through the utter exclusion of the practice of 
faith based arbitration, allegedly leaving imperiled Muslim women and dangerous 
Muslim men no choice but to abide by Canadian legal traditions. The message therefore 
                                                 
96 “[M]y guess is that the way is paved, if it was not before; for the kinds of laws we are seeing in Europe, 
which are enacted in the name of protecting Muslim women but are thinly disguised methods of putting 
Muslim populations under heavy surveillance while relieving the state of scrutiny about its practices 
towards both Muslims and all women” (Razack 2008, 171). 
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suggested here that religious communities generally, and Muslim communities in 
particular, must assimilate themselves to Canadian cultural norms and practices. This 
message further suggests that Muslims in Canada did not already possess cultural norms 
and practices compatible with Canadian legal norms. Although instilling legal protections 
for universal human rights is essential, the message of the sharia debate and the policy 
changes that followed was that in order to remain in Canada, and to be fully Canadian, 
one must assimilate unconditionally to certain national cultural (legal) norms. 
Furthermore, although this dual strategy of both exclusion and assimilation appears to be 
contradictory, it is not. There is a long history of colonial strategies that combine both 
assimilation and exclusion to accomplish imperial goals. Excluding racialized others at 
the same time (limited) integration is offered at the cost of assimilation is a well 
established colonial strategy. Assimilation requires filtering out one’s religious, cultural, 
and social otherness, ushering that person into a specific and uncompromising, though no 
less culturally located, form of modernity. Perhaps a better term for this form of 
colonialism taking place within the Canadian state might be internal colonialism, which 
refers to dominant populations marginalizing disadvantaged minority groups in the 
context of a single country, rather than between countries as has been more often the case 
(Hechter 1975, Benjamin & Hall 2010). In place of this assimilationist approach, I 
suggest a critical multiculturalism that includes anti-imperial secularism as outlined in 
chapter two. I will return to this issue in my concluding chapter. 
 Third and finally, the dehumanizing discourse and limited policy following the 
sharia debate functions tacitly to consolidate and justify foreign policies of war and 
economic imperialism designed to exploit fossil fuel rich countries. Discourses of rescue 
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of imperiled Muslim women from dangerous Muslim men have been used repeatedly to 
justify war and economic exploitation (Razack 2008; Bunting 2006, 2007). Furthermore, 
as Razack has pointed out, being seen to be participating in the “war on terror” in the 
current post 9/11 geo-political climate by being “tough on Muslims” also benefits Canada 
by consolidating its membership in the family of white western nations (Razack 2008, 
160). The desire of Canada to secure its place among the family of white western nations 
surfaces in more subtle ways as well. Canada desires to maintain an international 
reputation as “respectable,” and being dubbed by other nations as accommodating 
Muslims, especially in regard to anything suggesting sharia law, would be interpreted by 
many nations as meaning that Canada is becoming less white, rational, just, and 
egalitarian. This would suggest that Canada is “surrendering to Islam” in the eyes of 
many white western nations, and would not be regarded as “respectable” among those 
nations.  
 Religionization in the context of the so-called sharia debate placed Islam much 
further down a cultural hierarchy that places more highly other religions regarded as 
more modern and civilized. The forms of secularism invoked in the name of protecting 
the imperiled Muslim woman were deeply imperialist. I suggest that anti-imperial forms 
of secularism that address both inequities between marginalized and dominant 
populations, as well as inequities within marginalized communities, would be much 
better suited for addressing issues facing vulnerable people in the context of faith based 
arbitration specifically, and faith based private forms of ordering civil contracts more 
generally. I explore further policy recommendations in this regard in the concluding 
chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Western and Media discourses on the  
“Sharia Debate” 
 
 I have explained above in chapter four why the “imperiled Muslim woman” 
cannot be protected by secular law, even under the revised Arbitration Act. Now I will 
explore and critique how this stereotype, as proliferated by the Ontario and Canadian 
newsprint media during the debate, precludes the possibility of protective justice in the 
context of Muslim family law. One of the primary reasons that the “imperiled Muslim 
woman” cannot be protected is that she cannot, according to the stereotype, receive 
anything like justice at the hands of her community and religious tradition. This is 
because she is imperiled by what is imagined to be irredeemably patriarchal sharia law 
implemented at the hands of misogynistic Muslim men. To the stereotypes of the 
“imperiled Muslim woman,” “dangerous Muslim man” and “civilized European” that 
Razack identifies, we might add the stereotype of “uncivilized sharia” (Razack 2008).  
 This chapter will explore this latter stereotype for its productive power. I will also 
attempt to critique this stereotype such that, on the one hand, inequitable interpretations 
of sharia may be left open to feminist critique without, on the other hand, falling back 
into the disparaging and imperialist stereotype of “uncivilized sharia”. Based on Razack’s 
argument regarding the three stereotypes she identifies (see chapter 4), I argue that the 
stereotype of “uncivilized sharia” also does not in fact effectively dismantle patriarchal 
inequity or violence in any case, either in Islamic culture or Western culture, but rather 
reinforces it (Razack 2008). Dismantling the stereotype of “uncivilized sharia” is 
therefore I argue an important strategy for also dismantling patriarchy, gender inequity, 
and violence in both dominant and minoritized cultures.   
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 I have already argued, on the one hand, why the “imperiled Muslim woman” 
cannot be protected by secular law. If on the other hand, as much of the media discourse 
insists, the “imperiled Muslim woman” cannot access justice in her community either, 
then she is caught between a proverbial rock and a hard place. Dismantling the stereotype 
of “uncivilized sharia,” in addition to dismantling the other stereotypes Razack has 
identified, I argue is an important contribution to opening up a public and political space 
where Muslim women’s agency can be more effectively facilitated to protect Muslim 
women in the context of both religious and secular spaces in Canada.  
 This chapter also aims more generally to document, analyse, and critique the 
othering of Muslims and Islam in the context of the “sharia debate” as it proceeded in the 
media. I will explore the media analyses of the public sharia debate of several authors 
here. I will clarify some of the misunderstandings of Islamic legal tradition that the media 
discourse proliferated. And, finally, I argue that the modern media is a fundamental 
instrument and institution of secularization (as I have defined secularization in chapter 
three). Most importantly for my purposes, the media establish and maintain secularization 
as cultural hierarchy. This means that secularization is as much about protecting 
dominant cultural (secular and religious) interests and racializing and marginalizing 
religious others, as it is about regulating religion fairly in an allegedly neutral, secular 
public sphere. I use this media case study of the so-called “sharia debate” to illustrate 
how these things are accomplished in contemporary Canada.  
 
5.1 The “Sharia Debate” in the Media 
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 On the whole, the tone of much of the media debate on faith based arbitration in 
Ontario was very negative, and negatively represented Islam and Muslims. Confusion 
was fostered in the media with statements suggesting that “sharia courts” were being 
proposed rather than that Muslims were intending to use already existing processes of 
faith based arbitration. Ken Elgert (2003) writing for the Edmonton Journal entitled his 
article “Islamic Law a Step toward Legal Apartheid.” Writing for the Edmonton Journal, 
Allyson Jeffs (2005) entitles her article “Iranian activist warns against the hammer of 
Sharia law.” Globe and Mail Montreal correspondent Ingrid Peritz (2005) said that “[t]he 
advent of traditional Islamic law, or sharia, to settle family disputes has set off an 
impassioned debate in Canada ever since a Muslim group proposed setting up an 
arbitration panel in Ontario.” There is no mention of existing arbitration law or the fact 
that Jewish communities have been arbitrating civil disputes for years. Another pattern 
was to place the more inflammatory discourse very early in an article, and bury the more 
balanced information deep within the text. Globe and Mail columnist Margaret Wente 
(2004) dramatically asserts very early in her piece, “Sharia law in Canada? Yes. The 
province of Ontario has authorized the use of sharia law in civil arbitrations, if both 
parties consent”. Not until much later in the article does she mention that faith-based 
arbitration has already been practiced for several years by other religious communities in 
Ontario under the arbitration act. Toronto Sun columnist and founding editor, Peter 
Worthington (2004) introduces his article with a similarly alarmist first line before later 
clarifying his point: stating “Outrageous as it is, former NDP attorney-general Marion 
Boyd wants sharia law introduced into Ontario to resolve Muslim domestic disputes.” 
Writing for the National Post, David Warren (2003) further suggests multiculturalism is 
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folly in his article entitled “Multiculturalism – from Britannia to Sharia.” Finally, writing 
for the Vancouver Sun, Ghammim Harris (2003) further suggests the exclusion of Islam 
from the Canadian nation in his article title “Sharia Is Not a Law by Canadian 
Standards.” 
 Islam was singled out as much more dangerous and premodern than other 
religious communities in Canada. Worthington (2004) writes “Catholics and Jews can 
arbitrate domestic disputes within their faiths, and Ms Boyd apparently sees no 
fundamental difference between them and sharia law for Muslims. In fact, there is a hell 
of a lot of difference. Catholics and Jews don’t discriminate against women the way 
sharia law does by violating fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution for equal 
treatment.” Much of the media descriptions of sharia associated it strongly with extreme 
criminal laws such those that prescribed hands being cut off for theft, death by stoning for 
adultery, or beheadings, and allowed for polygamous marriages. Worthington (2004) 
states,  
Under some interpretations of sharia, a woman who is raped is guilty of tempting 
the man. Showing an ankle is tantamount to enticement. A Muslim husband has 
the right – duty even – to beat his wife if she’s disobedient. A Muslim who 
converts to Christianity technically could face the death sentence . . . In its 
extreme form, as with the Taliban of Afghanistan, on select Fridays in Kabul 
women who were deemed guilty of violating sharia law – like leaving their 
houses, or showing their faces – were taken to the football stadium to be 
humiliated. Some were beaten, some were shot. That won’t happen here, but it’s 
sharia law and the pressure on women will be acute. 
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Wente (2004) said “What is called sharia varies widely (in Nigeria, for example, it has 
been invoked to justify death by stoning”. The one common denominator is that it is 
strongly patriarchal.” Worthington (2004) admitted, “In Ontario it may not be used to 
order women stoned to death for behavior it tolerates in men, but it is a matter of degree.” 
Feature writer for the Toronto Star Lynda Hurst (2004) states of Homa Arjomand, 
Iranian-Canadian political activist and coordinator of the International Campaign Against 
Sharia Court in Canada, that “All – all – of the women’s activists she worked with in 
Tehran have been executed, victims of a reactionary regime that rules, and continues to 
rule, by strict adherence to Islam’s sharia law.” Kevin Dougherty (2005) quotes Ms. 
Houda-Pepin pondering which version of sharia would be used in Canada saying “In 
Pakistan, a woman who is raped can be flogged unless she can produce four male 
witnesses to prove she was raped, she said, while in Nigeria a woman can be stoned to 
death for sexual relations outside marriage.” Hurst (2004) relates information provided by 
Arjomand “Sharia-approved but illegal activities already occur in Toronto, and she fears 
this will give strength to them. Muslim women are battered but don’t dare report it. 
Bigamous marriages occur.”  
 Several media articles suggested that many if not all Muslim women would have 
their agency compromised if faith based arbitration were allowed. Worthington (2004) 
asserted “Ms Boyd says Muslim women will have a choice – be adjudicated by sharia 
law, or Ontario law, and have a choice of adjudicators. In theory, maybe, but in practice – 
look at how many abused women haven’t the strength to defy their abusers.” After a long 
criticism of the dangers of sharia law Wente (2004) states “Immigrant women are among 
the most vulnerable people in Canada. Many don’t speak English, are poorly educated, 
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and are isolated from the broader culture. They may live here for decades without 
learning the language, and they stay utterly dependent on their families. They have no 
idea of their rights under Canadian law.” New York based columnist for Asharq al-
Awsat, Mona Eltahawy (2005) said “with sharia tribunals in place in Ontario, it isn’t 
difficult to imagine the pressure that would be exerted on Muslim women to choose them 
over civil courts.” Dougherty (2005) quotes Tarek Fatah in his article saying “‘To have 
choice you have to have the ability to make the choice. To suggest that Muslim 
immigrants, Muslim women, who are among the lowest income group in the country 
have the ability to make the choice is absolute nonsense.’” Wente (2004) states “These 
decisions can be appealed to the regular courts. But for Muslim women, the pressures to 
abide by the precepts of sharia are overwhelming. To reject sharia is, quite simply, to be a 
bad Muslim.” Hurst (2004) quotes Arjomand saying “‘In a straight disagreement between 
a husband and a wife, the husband’s testimony will prevail. That is sharia. Even those 
women who know they can appeal will not challenge an arbitration decision for fear of 
the consequences.’ Despite what the attorney-general’s office blithely assumes, she says, 
it’s unlikely decisions contrary to Canadian law will ever show up before the courts.”   
 Ironically, the media coverage of the so-called “sharia debate” suggested that 
sharia law was a disadvantage both because it was ancient, and therefore rigid and 
inflexible, but also because it was diverse. Worthington (2004) asserted “Sharia law has 
no place in civilized society, no matter how benignly it is depicted. It dates back to the 
14th century and does not treat the sexes equally. Period.” Hurst (2004) states “The 1,300-
year-old body of laws and rules for living was inspired by the Qur’an, Islam’s holy 
book.” Speaking of a Muslim women’s council of over 900 members from a diversity of 
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Islamic backgrounds Hurst (2004) said “But they feel they must (oppose faith based 
arbitration), she says, because the equality of the sexes espoused by the Qur’an is not 
reflected in the sharia – the laws that evolved over 200 years following the death of 
Mohammad in 632.” Freelance writer, J. D. Sturtridge (2004) states “I do miss them, 
those loud, demanding, politically adept second wave feminists, and not because I am 
feeling particularly nostalgic. I miss them because we need them, and we need them 
because a 1400 year-old malignant presence is stirring in the peaceable kingdom, a 
presence called Shari’a.” However, on the other hand sharia is criticized for being 
diverse. Hurst (2004) asserts “Many in the Muslim community, men included, don’t see 
how the arbitration tribunals can possibly work. Sharia differs among various sects and 
countries of origin. An interpretation in one country is unacceptable in another.” As noted 
above, Wente also states “What is called sharia varies widely (in Nigeria, for example, it 
has been invoked to justify death by stoning)” (Wente 2004 italics mine). Eltahawy 
(2005) said “Even more problematic, there is no consensus on sharia, which is derived 
from the Koran and the life and sayings of the prophet Muhammad.”  
 Several media articles after suggesting the othering of Islam as illustrated above, 
privilege the secular by suggesting secular law is the answer to the inequality and 
oppression experienced Muslim women. Writing for the Vancouver Sun, Sara Harkirpal 
Singh (2003) entitles her article “Religious Law Undermines Loyalty to Canada.” 
Worthington (2004) states that “In Ontario it may not be used to order women stoned to 
death for behavior it tolerates in men, but it is a matter of degree. There is no need for 
(faith based arbitration) in Canada. It is not religious freedom, it is religious oppression.” 
Eltahawy 2005 said “But what is wrong with Canadian civil law that religious Canadians 
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must look elsewhere?” Ingrid Peritz (2005) quotes Shirin Ebadi stating “One country, one 
legal code, one court – for everybody.” Columnist for the Globe and Mail, Marina 
Jimenez (2005) states “The Ontario government is currently considering whether to 
accept the recommendations of a recent report that found the existing system does not 
discriminate against women. Critics say otherwise, and today, demonstrations against the 
act are planned in 12 cities in Canada and Europe including Amsterdam, London, Paris 
and Dusseldorf, in what activists say is part of a global battle between secular societies 
and ‘political Islam.’”  
 Not all media coverage was as negative or confused. A number of media articles 
took a more balanced and less alarmist approach such as Judy Van Rhijn’s early article 
“First Steps Taken Towards Sharia Law in Canada” (2003); Michelle Mann’s article 
“Only Fair to Treat All Religions the Same” (2006); and Mirko Petricevic’s “Faith-Based 
Arbitration Comes Under Spotlight” (2005). These articles are more sober about what 
exactly was proposed in the context of existing law under the Arbitration Act. They are 
more balanced with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of Muslim faith based 
arbitration and mediation. Finally, these articles do not imagine Muslim women to be 
completely devoid of agency. Following is an analysis of the negative kind of discourse 
found in the media debate, in concert with a number of other media analyses that make 
similar observations.  
 
 
5.2 Western Perceptions of Islam, Sharia, and Muslim Women circulated in 
the “Sharia Debate” 
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 Although several legitimate concerns were raised in the public “sharia debate”, on 
many occasions they were married to Islamophobic, racist, and imperialist conceptions 
that were proliferated widely in the media. I argue generally that these latter elements in 
fact increase rather than decrease patriarchy, inequity, and violence. Therefore, anti-
racism, anti-Islamophobia, and anti-imperialism are important strategies for facilitating 
liberation and protection of Muslim women. Furthermore, media representations of 
Muslim women’s agency were often confused, contradictory, and ultimately detracted 
from Muslim women’s agency. This is a crucial matter to explore, because as I have been 
arguing, Muslim women’s agency is crucial for protecting Muslim women given the 
realities of Canada’s legal system.  
5.2.1 National Identity and Orientalist Othering 
 I use Sherene Razack and Jasmin Zine in order to outline the general 
configurations of the othering of Islam in the West before proceeding to an analysis of 
how this was achieved more specifically through the mass media “sharia Debate.” Zine 
highlights the disconnection for Muslims in the West who, on the one hand, have rights 
and obligations as citizens or legitimate immigrants of western nation states, and on the 
other receive multiple signals that they yet do not in fact belong to the national imaginary 
(Zine 2009). Overwhelmingly negative representations of Muslims in the media as well 
as several state policies in western countries including the banning of ostensibly Muslim 
headscarves in France, citizenship tests in Germany, and immigration videos in the 
Netherlands suggest that Muslim identities are not welcome in western nations (Zine 
2009, 149-150). However, more than exclusion from national identity, even basic citizen 
rights are put in peril by such government policies as “extraordinary rendition, security 
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certificates and secret evidence and trials” (Zine 2009, 151; Razack 2008). Borrowing 
Agamben’s (2005) analysis of the “state of exception”, Razack points out that Canadian 
immigration and anti-terrorism policies directed at Muslims are characteristic of war 
measures (Razack 2008). These kinds of policies are used domestically to reinforce “the 
logic of empire in a world increasingly governed by the state of exception, one in which 
Muslims are cast out of the national and political community” (Zine 2009, 151).97  
 The western media has often become the purveyor of Orientalist fears and 
fantasies: fears of violent premodern Muslims bent on harming western bodies, and 
fantasies of the West as the benevolent and peaceful harbinger of (only the benefits of) 
enlightened modernity (Zine 2009, 148-149). Furthermore Orientalist fantasies of 
western rescue of imperiled Muslim women from dangerous Muslim men have been 
widespread in the media as well (Razack 2008). Several scholars note that these fears and 
fantasies have functioned to justify western military aggression against Muslim lands 
abroad in pursuit of imperial interests as well as western xenophobic over-policing of 
Muslim bodies domestically, ostensibly in the interests of national security, but also in 
the interests of preserving and protecting the dominant (racialized and religionized) 
national identity (Zine 2009; Razack 2008; Asad 2003).  
 These more general patterns of Muslim marginalization observable in western 
media and policy are noticeable in the media-orchestrated “sharia debate” in particular 
ways. To illustrate an important contrast, although Jasmine Zine, a Muslim, scholar and 
                                                 
97 This is Zine’s deft summary of Razack’s argument in Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from 
Western Law and Politics. 2008.  
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activist,98 for example took a position against the proposal for sharia based tribunals, she 
did not regard sharia as intrinsically and unchangeably patriarchal and unfair to women. 
Although noting recent Muslim scholarship and national legal reforms in countries like 
Morocco that are increasingly fair with regard to gender equality, Zine still took this 
position on the Ontario debate because these more gender equitable interpretations of 
Islamic tradition require time to become more widespread in Muslim communities in 
Canada (Zine 2009). However, notably she did not take the position of many in the media 
that imagined Islam as frozen in time and irredeemably hostile to women’s rights and 
equality. Furthermore, Zine did not represent the liberal modern West as the only 
legitimate and unproblematic protector of women’s rights generally and Muslim women 
specifically. However, several media articles did take this Orientalist position,99 calling 
for the paternalistic state to rescue racialized and religionized Muslim women’s bodies 
(Zine 2009; Razack 2008; Syed 2012). Zine notes the double bind of Muslim feminists 
attempting to address issues of gender inequity within communities, at the same time they 
face an Orientalist majority society quick to take such action as confirmation of 
Orientalist interpretations of Islam (Zine 2009, 153). Although the direction of the 
McGuinty government’s decision on the sharia debate was generally in line with her 
position on the issue, Zine critiques the overwhelmingly Orientalist media renderings of 
Islam as premodern others to be disciplined culturally by a “superior” and paternalistic 
western state.  
                                                 
98 Jasmin Zine. “Creating a Critical Faith-Centred Space for Antiracist Feminism: Reflections of a Muslim 
Scholar Activist.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion. Vol. 20, No. 2, Fall, 2004. Indiana University 
Press.  
99 That the Orientalist position of assuming secular liberal western civilization is the answer to the problems 
experienced by non-western societies.  
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 Itrath Syed, a Muslim  political and feminist activist, on the other hand at first 
took a position against faith based arbitration, but then revised her stance because she 
was far more disturbed by the overwhelmingly Orientalist discourse of the media’s 
coverage of the so-called sharia debate than at faith based arbitration itself. However, she 
remains critical of gender inequity in Muslim communities. Syed noticed that the 
discourse of the media debate was not simply about the advantages and disadvantages of 
the proposal, but rather what amounted to an overt denationalizing (i.e. defining Islam as 
explicitly outside Canada’s national imaginary) of Muslim culture (Syed 2012, 2-3).  
These conclusions were reached after careful study of several newspaper articles mainly 
from the Toronto Star, Globe and Mail, and National Post between September 2004 and 
September 2005 (Syed 2012, 3). Syed laments that “according to the parameters of the 
discourse there were only two, very polarized, sides to the debate. One side was civilized, 
Canadian and feminist, and the other was barbaric, medieval, foreign and misogynist. 
These dichotomies were erected by invoking familiar tropes in which Muslim women 
were infantilized, the Muslim community of Canada was denationalized and Islamic law 
was fossilized” (Syed 2012, 1). 
 The othering of Muslims in this debate took on a tone of denationalizing Muslim 
culture and Muslim people over against an overwhelmingly white civilized Euro-
Canadian national identity (Razack 2008). Syed calls attention to the irony of portraying 
Muslims as foreigners and invaders in the debate given that these Muslims were in fact 
proposing access to already existing legal provision of the Arbitration Act rather than, as 
they were represented in many media articles, attempting to completely transform 
Canadian law “as part of a larger plan to destroy Canadian society, constituting a full 
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frontal attack on all that is good and decent in the Nation” (Syed 2012, 4). Syed notes that 
the largely irrelevant gestures to dramatically oppressive practices in some countries with 
a Muslim majority often functioned to shut down debate on the real issues at stake in the 
“sharia debate” (Syed 2012, 5). Much discourse in the debate rendered Muslims a 
“cunning” and “silent threat” to Canadian society, in line with the general characteristic 
of anti-immigrant discourse in Canada historically (Syed 2012, 6).100 Such accusations 
state that Muslims are using multiculturalism and human rights regimes against 
modernity in order to infiltrate modern society with traditional (and oppressive) Islamic 
culture. Even though a number of these statements were made by Muslims or people 
whose origins could be traced to “Muslim countries” Syed notes sadly that they too are 
structured by the racialized imagination they deployed (Syed 2012, 6).  
 I am arguing that the othering critiqued above more than fails to facilitate Muslim 
women’s agency and equality; it also in fact reinforces patriarchy, inequity, and violence 
domestically and abroad (Razack 2008). This is because of several reasons mentioned 
above. First, military aggression on the part of western imperial interests in Muslim lands 
and resources is justified by such othering and colonialist rescue narratives, whereas the 
military action justified has rarely resulted in substantial benefit to Muslim women, for 
example in Afghanistan (Khan 2008). This imperial aggression is itself deeply reflective 
of western patriarchy, inequality, and violence globally (Razack 2008). Second, the 
othering that occurred in the sharia debate shut down reasoned and rational debate (a 
supposed hallmark of liberal western modernity) on the crucial issues at stake. I have 
already argued in chapter four that this contributed to the formation of limited policies of 
                                                 
100 For example,  these stereotypes echo “yellow peril” stereotypes in Canada in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century directed toward Asian immigrant communities.  
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protection because policy makers did not fully understand and therefore better facilitate 
the central role of Muslim women’s agency in protecting Muslim women. Finally, 
Orientalist voices reinforced the very fears they in large part created of a dangerous other 
over against a civilized “us.” Reinforcing this discourse further alienates those who 
already feel excluded, increasing the chances for aggression against western nations. Co-
opting Muslim feminist voices for Orientalist and imperialist ends undermines the goals 
for which they struggle. Too often the discourse on sharia in the West regards sharia as 
too much of a threat to even talk about or consider rationally. It is important to note the 
productive power of placing an issue beyond the pale of reasoned consideration because 
it is putatively beyond “rationality” and “civility”.  
5.2.2 Re-presenting Muslim Communities 
 Several scholars have highlighted the various ways that Muslim communities 
have been disparaged generally, how sharia has been vilified specifically, and Muslim 
women’s agency denied summarily in the media’s so-called “sharia debate”. Many have 
observed that this kind of approach severely limited the public debate (Korteweg 2008, 
448). James Thornback found that to the degree that Islam was represented as a 
monolithic other to the West, journalists were reduced to taking over-simplified positions 
for or against the alleged proposal, unable to genuinely understand or address the more 
complex problems of family law and mediation/arbitration. Thornback found in his 
analysis of the media that only those who did not embrace such Orientalist tropes were 
able to debate the real issues at stake in Ontario law and offer reasoned criticisms and 
suggestions for change (Thornback 2005). 
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 Meena Sharify-Funk has pointed out how the media participated in over-
simplifying the debate by privileging the voices of two opposing and increasingly hostile 
voices in the dispute, namely the secular Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC) and the 
more traditional Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) (Sharify-Funk 2009). Although 
Sharify-Funk acknowledges that the primary responsibility for the nature of the 
increasingly adverse exchange between these two organizations belongs first and 
foremost to the two organizations, she nonetheless holds the media responsible for 
emphasizing these voices in particular and virtually excluding more nuanced and 
balanced voices issuing from other Muslim groups. This media emphasis also reflected 
back to Muslim communities a restricted sense of communal diversity, therefore also 
perhaps having an impact on how Muslim communities viewed themselves and the 
available options within their communities. Finally, possibly as a result of the apparent 
increasing hostility within Muslim communities, McGuinty’s own ultimate decision 
regarding faith based arbitration may have been unduly influenced. Although as Sharify-
Funk observes, journalists do not see their job primarily as “facilitating dialogue or 
probing for common ground . . . an understandable position, perhaps, but [this is] also a 
constraint that contributed directly to the incivility that manifested in full public view 
during the Shari’ah debate” (Sharify-Funk 2009, 85). In the process of her analysis 
Sharify-Funk found that “the media have been complicit in the rancorous outcome of the 
Shari’ah debate, having played a role in defining the scope and parameters of discussion 
and amplified more divisive rather than conciliatory voices” (Sharify-Funk 2009, 85).  
5.2.3 Muslim Women’s Agency 
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 Itrath Syed decries what she calls the “Construction of the Iconic Infantilized 
Muslim Woman” in the sharia debate (Syed 2012, 9). Syed notes the overwhelming 
otherness with which Muslim women’s oppression is represented in the media compared 
to any sexism western women might experience (Syed 2012, 10). Syed too notes “the 
marked difference in the ways that the Jewish community and the Muslim community 
have been racialized in Canada. Jewish women are not racialized in Canada as being 
infantile, unable to look out for themselves or unable to know their own best interests. In 
contrast, Muslim women are racialized to be entirely unable to have any agency over 
their lives. Similarly Jewish men are not racialized to be hyper–oppressive, whereas 
Muslim men are racialized in this way” (Syed 2012, 11), despite the fact that it took 
Jewish women several years to lobby for changes to the law to protect divorced Jewish 
women (see chapter 6). Yet even though clearly they were struggling against patriarchal 
forms of religious legal tradition there was no media outcry whatsoever. This drastically 
unequal representation of sexism functioned to close down reasoned debate, validating 
policies that attempted to protect Muslim women despite their alleged utter lack of 
agency instead of developing policy that would facilitate Muslim women’s agency.  
 Anna Korteweg has conducted perhaps the most extensive and thorough media 
analysis of the sharia debate to date, documenting 108 relevant newspaper articles 
published in the Globe and Mail, National Post, and Toronto Star (Korteweg 2008, 439-
441). Korteweg’s main argument is regarding the representation of Muslim women’s 
agency in these media articles along two main tracks. First, the dominant representation 
by far came from articles that conceived of agency in a very culturally limited and 
historically specific sense: agency as resistance to dominance. This conception, though it 
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is often represented by pundits of modernity as universal, in fact proceeds from a highly 
specific historical occasion: liberal modernity’s “free will” and “free choice” 
understandings of human subjectivity (Mahmood 2005). This conception of agency can 
only understand people who embrace cultural norms that appear to be oppressive as 
either lacking agency or doing so for the sake of other material interests (Korteweg 2008, 
438).101 This conception cannot perceive anything but a resistive response to oppression 
as a form of agency. Second, a minority of media articles conceived of agency more 
broadly as contingent and embedded in wider cultural, communal, historical, economic 
and social contexts (Korteweg 2008, 438-439).102 This notion of agency acknowledges 
that all actions by agents issue inextricably from social contexts and contingencies, rather 
than feigning an individual that experiences relatively little encumbrance to freely 
choosing either to embrace or oppose potentially oppressive practices.  
 First, Korteweg found that these different conceptions of agency led to different 
types of policy suggestions accordingly. Second, holding one or the other conception of 
agency also had an impact on how minority communities were conceived of as different 
from the majority community ethnically and racially. The majority of articles that 
suggested a reductive notion of Muslim women’s agency as resistance were also 
associated with suggestions for state intervention that called for the proposal to be 
quashed. Korteweg argues that these opponents positioned the state as the secular and 
only legitimate protector of women’s equality. On the other hand, those who appeared 
                                                 
101 Korteweg is referring here to Mahmood 2001.  
102 It is important to note that although the majority of media representations of Islam generally and sharia 
specifically were deeply negative, not all were. There was a minority of reasonable fair and well-reasoned 
journalism on the “sharia debate”. For example Judy Van Rhijn’s early article First Steps Taken Towards 
Sharia Law in Canada (2003); Michelle Mann’s article Only Fair to Treat All Religions the Same (2006); 
and Mirko Petricevic’s Faith-Based Arbitration Comes Under Spotlight (2005). I spend the balance of this 
chapter critiquing Islamophobic renderings, but I acknowledge a minority of more balanced media 
treatments of the issue.  
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generally to subscribe to an embedded conception of Muslim women’s agency rather 
more frequently, “led to calls for state oversight of sharia-based tribunals to reduce the 
potential for abuse and strengthen the aspects of Islamic jurisprudence that support 
women’s capacity to act in their own interests. In these representations, the state [rather] 
facilitated the agency of devout Muslim women” (Korteweg 2008, 447. Italics mine). 
This coincides with what I have been arguing about the “imperiled Muslim woman” in 
chapter 4.  
 It is important to note that the notion of agency one took in the media articles was 
not necessarily correlated to one’s position on the debate. One might assume that those 
who reduced agency to resistance were against the proposed sharia tribunals, and those 
with a more robust notion of agency were in favor. Rather, some like the Canadian 
Council of Muslim Women appeared to conceive of agency as embedded in wider 
contexts even though they were against the apparent proposal. However, even though the 
CCMW was against faith based arbitration, I show in Chapter 6 that they still view the 
state as a facilitator of Muslim women’s agency rather than simply the only legitimate 
paternal protector of Muslim women.  
 Racialization and othering of Muslim communities were also correlated with 
narrow estimations of Muslim women’s agency in the media articles (Korteweg 2008). 
Those who could not conceive of Muslim women as possessing agency in relation to 
inequity unless they were resisting often held more general views of Muslim 
communities as homogenized and racialized others. Racialization here refers “to the 
process of imputing innate group differences that distinguish subordinate groups from 
majority society” (Korteweg 2008, 448). Much of the discourse in the debate suggested 
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that social pressure to accept unjust outcomes was far more generally characteristic of 
Muslim communities than the majority society, whereas in fact this pressure is felt across 
all communities. Equitable gender relations then were almost exclusively associated with 
the majority society over against minoritized Muslim communities. And once again, this 
racialization coincided mainly with those articles that held narrow views on what counted 
as agency.  
 Several feminists claimed that even though patriarchy and inequity remain 
significant problems in Canadian courts, they are preferable to the level of patriarchy they 
imagined Muslim women would suffer in the context of faith based arbitration. The issue 
of the privatization of family law through alternative dispute resolution, which feminists 
have been sounding alarms about for several years, does not get much press in any case 
(Goundry et al. 1998). That is why it is so surprising that when the opportunity arose to 
highlight the problems of gender inequity in the privatization of family law in ADR 
generally and arbitration specifically, rather than highlighting the dangers common to all 
women under such legal regimes, sharia was represented as an incomprehensible threat 
while the Canadian courts were represented as the modern and virtuous savior of 
“imperiled Muslim women”.103 Therefore, it is not clear why sharia required such a 
degree of moral panic. Itrath Syed fears “if the issue is that privatization and 
ghettoization are against women’s interests, then surely the largely undocumented, 
unaccountable systems of community mediations are worse for women than the 
                                                 
103 “Not surprisingly, through this process of the demonization of Islamic law, the corresponding result was 
that Canadian law became stabilized in the debate as being egalitarian, accessible, and ideal. Despite there 
being decades of feminist criticism of Canadian Family Law, within the ‘shariah’ debate many feminists 
became impassioned champions of the law. Much like the way in which real citizens are ennobled when 
juxtaposed to the ‘anti-citizens’, and western women and men are ennobled when juxtaposed to the 
racialized constructions of Muslim women and men, so too, Canadian Family Law began to take on a 
nobility when juxtaposed to the spectre of ‘shariah’. The result in all cases is the same; the boundaries of 
‘here’ were policed against the intrusions of ‘there’” (Syed 2012). 
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arbitration process which would have a [comparably] greater means of transparency and 
intervention. I would argue that the compromise suggested by many opponents [that 
those interested in Islamic law continue to use it privately, i.e. away from the gaze of the 
Nation] reveals the real issue at hand. It was not just the concern for women’s rights that 
were at the core of this opposition, but rather the maintenance of the distinctions between 
what is and is not acceptable as the public face of Canada” (Syed 2012, 16). 
 
5.3 What is “Sharia Law”? 
 The media repeatedly stated that “sharia Courts” had been “proposed” in Ontario 
(Boyd 2004, 3-4). This statement led to much confusion. First, many wondered if the 
proposal was for a fully functioning separate court independent from the secular system, 
and whether this would receive operational funding from the state. Lebanon for example 
runs numerous parallel courts with their own bodies of law all operating independently of 
a unified secular legal system with full state funding and sanction (Mallat 1990). 
However, this was not what was being proposed in Ontario. No separate “court” was 
proposed as such. And the IICJ would not have received any state funding to operate. 
Moreover, the IICJ would not have had the freedom to operate independently of 
Canadian law as its own separate legal system.104 Rather, the 1991 Ontario Arbitration 
Act stated well prior to 2006 that any two parties may choose any third party (arbitrator) 
they wish to arbitrate a civil dispute, including family disputes. Moreover, the two 
disputing parties could choose whatever law they wanted to have applied to their dispute 
(Boyd 2004). For example, one could have New York state law applied to a civil dispute 
                                                 
104 Although the notion of “de facto legal pluralism” in Canada discussed in chapter 4 mitigates this idea 
somewhat. 
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being arbitrated in Ontario if both parties freely chose to do so. The Arbitration Act then 
left open the possibility of choosing various religious legal traditions, and therefore 
religious arbitrators, to resolve a dispute as well. The Arbitration Act stipulated that the 
two disputants must choose their arbitrator and legal tradition freely and mutually in 
order for the final decision to be enforceable by the state. Therefore rather than asking for 
an independent “sharia court,” the IICJ was announcing the organization of a Muslim or 
Islamic Tribunal or arbitration board based on Islam in the context of already existing 
legal structures. Once again, nothing new was proposed. Rather, the IICJ was seeking to 
participate in existing Canadian legal institutions rather than striving to isolate 
themselves or dramatically change them as many charged. 
 Anver Emon points out that both opponents and supporters of Muslim faith based 
arbitration used a notion of sharia that is in fact a very recent construction and does not 
reflect the diversity of what sharia has been or might be (Emon 2006, 2-3). He notes that 
“the conception of sharia that prevailed in the Ontario debates was one that viewed the 
tradition as an inflexible and immutable code of religious rules, based on the Qur’an and 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. Various media outlets described the sharia as a 
‘code’ of law that deterministically governs every aspect of a Muslim’s life” (Emon 
2006, 3). Opponents critiqued sharia as being ancient, frozen and unable to offer anything 
but findings detrimental to the well-being of women in family law contexts (Syed 
2012).105 However, there is ample evidence that shows sharia is not a code that was 
delivered immutably at the outset. There are a number of sources for sharia including the 
                                                 
105 Most participants in Marion Boyd’s consultation including supporters suggested using the alternative 
phrases Islamic personal/family law or Muslim personal/family law (Boyd 45, 2004). But what is meant by 
this is not always clear either. 
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Qur’an and various sources for the Sunnah.106 However, there is a long tradition of 
diverse juristic interpretation of these original sources stretching over hundreds of years 
using several methods of juristic interpretation (Emon 2006, 4-5). Furthermore, there 
arose several competing interpretive communities so that now there are at least four 
established madhabs or bodies of law107 for Sunni communities and at least one 
established body of law (Jafari) for Shia communities. Therefore, during centuries of 
development of Islamic tradition sharia was not simply “found” by looking into the 
authoritative religious sources for a ready-made ruling, but rather it was created and 
composed of a very complex and involved body of interpretation. Moreover, these 
distinct interpretive communities arose in response to the differing contexts in which they 
were applied, rather than simply being applied regardless of context as sharia was 
represented in the media debate.  
 In addition to the influence of cultural context on the development of sharia, new 
institutional contexts developed over time “that transformed what might have been moral 
norms into enforced legal rules” (Emon 2006, 7). These new institutional contexts are an 
important further and very different kind of constructive framework that changed sharia 
as it developed. This new procedural institutional context became so important “that 
resolving a particular controversy may not be dependent upon some doctrinal, substantive 
determination of the law” (Emon 2006, 8). Several matters not clearly dealt with in 
religious sources have been submitted to Muslim judges to be adjudicated by the analysis 
and determination of the human justice (Emon 2006, 8). Therefore even the history of the 
                                                 
106 Sunnah refers to the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad such as the hadith (recorded narrations of the 
words and deed of the Prophet Muhammad) and sira (biographies of the Prophet Muhammad) 
107 The schools of law are Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi, and Shafi’i.  
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legal institution of sharia is one of continual negotiation and adjudication by a diverse 
judiciary.  
 Emon points out however that one of the most important transformations of 
“sharia” in Islamic history was precipitated, and in many ways caused, by western 
colonization of Muslim lands. During this period of colonialism beginning in the 
eighteenth century “the institutional structure that gave real-world significance to Islamic 
law began to be dismantled or modified” (Emon 2006, 8). Emon provides a very detailed 
analytical history documenting many of the cunning tactics used by colonial rulers to 
dismantle, restructure, and even themselves administer Islamic law as a tool for ruling the 
colonized (2006, 9-19). Once these lively and context based institutions were dismantled, 
all that remained were abstract doctrines left over from previously living, flexible, and 
interpretive institutional structures. No longer did institutions exist that could continue 
the work of contextual interpretation that “can mediated between text and context” 
(Emon 2006, 8). Therefore, what is referred to as Islamic law currently is in fact only the 
records of a very lively and diverse past set of juristic institutions (Emon 2006, 9).  
 To complicate matters further, the products of this very recent formation 
facilitated and forced by colonial interference are now jealously guarded by those 
Muslims who strive to protect what is left of Muslim legal traditions. According to Emon 
this has transformed the products of colonial attempts to codify (or freeze) Islamic legal 
tradition (in order to make it easier to administer), which Emon calls reductive Anglo-
Muhammadan law, into ideologies of identity (2006, 9). Therefore attempts to change 
these laws in order to adapt them once again to current contexts is frequently interpreted 
as an attack on Muslim political identity, reminiscent of past colonial, and suggestive of 
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ongoing imperial interests (Emon 2006, 9). Therefore the West is deeply implicated in 
both the freezing and the politicization of Islamic law. In this way, the policing of 
Muslim women’s bodies becomes symbolic on the one hand of modernization relative to 
western interests at the same time they are on the other hand symbolic of retaining 
Muslim identity for Muslims (Kassam 2000).  
 There is some irony therefore in the fact that many in the media disparaged sharia 
for on the one hand being ancient and frozen, in other words not only outdated but also 
inflexible to new contexts, and on the other hand for being too diverse.108 The fact that 
there are several schools of Islamic law raised the question of which law would be used, 
and the assumption was made that the fact that this variable was unknown would 
somehow disadvantage vulnerable people.109 This is ironic as the fact of several schools 
of Islamic law suggests on the one hand that sharia might have a history of development, 
rather than being frozen in time from its inception as suggested by the media, and on the 
other hand may have been, at least at some point, amenable to diverse local contexts, 
rather than inflexible despite context as the media suggested. The critiques are not 
entirely inappropriate of course, because for the reasons Anver Emon mentions even 
though sharia has a history of diversity and context sensitivity suggested by the multiple 
schools of sharia tradition, these have in recent times been largely codified into 
established legal norms, while the institutions that gave sharia its judicial contextual 
flexibility have been largely dismantled (Emon 2006). However, the analysis present in 
                                                 
108 Griefenhagen. 2005. ‘Sharia’ and ‘Multiculturalism’ Discourses: Exclusions and Equities in the 
Controversy over the issue of Muslim Personal Law in Ontario. Unpublished. On file with the author. 
109 “Sharia differs among sects and countries of origin.” Lynda Hurst. Toronto Star. May 22, 2004. “What 
is called sharia varies widely.” Margaret Wente. Globe and Mail. May 29, 2004. “There are four main 
schools of Sunni Muslim law. Different countries have different interpretations and applications of Muslim 
laws. Proponents say sharia-inspired arbitration can successfully be adapted to the contemporary Canadian 
context. Opponents question which set of Muslim laws will be applied by arbitrators in Canada.” Mirko 
Petricevic. “Faith-based arbitration comes under spotlight.” The Record. July 30, 2005.  
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the media debate does not go this far. Rather, it appears sharia is uncritically and 
contradictorily lambasted for being both too flexible and too rigid. This is in line with an 
approach to sharia that appears to simply seek to render it so other and uncivilized that 
even apparently contradictory critiques of it are presented and accepted as legitimate 
without qualification or question.110  
 One might reply that the relevance of this history of sharia is limited because, as 
Emon notes himself, both supporters and opponents in the sharia debate were operating 
as if sharia did not have this history, therefore Emon’s is a moot point for the sharia 
debate. Sharia may have been very different things in the past, and there may be great 
potential for the future; however, as Zine has pointed out, this history and potential is not 
yet realized in the community to the extent that more recent and patriarchal 
interpretations have been substantially decentred (Zine 2009). What relevance does the 
history of diversity within and colonial influence upon sharia have on the current debate? 
I would argue this history does offer many important insights into and critiques of the 
“sharia debate”.  
 First, Orientalist representations of sharia are in part dismantled by this history. 
Not only is the notion of sharia being frozen in time from its inception deeply 
complicated here, but also the entire Orientalist notion of a closing of the gates of ijtihad 
is put into question. Indeed, Anver Emon notes several authors who argue that the gates 
of ijtihad111 were never “closed” until perhaps western colonialism closed them (Emon 
                                                 
110 Itrath Syed suggests that “The limited willingness to engage with the possibilities of the proposal was 
very telling. Any substantive interrogation of the proposal would have rendered the discussion plausible 
and rational. I would argue that the opponents preferred the debate to remain in the realm of the implausible 
and the entirely unintelligible. That was the only way to completely demonize the proposal and all those 
who were willing to engage with it” (Syed 2012). 
111 Ijtihad is defined by Frederick M. Denny as “independent legal reasoning in search of an opinion” 
(2011, 190).  
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2006, 19; Halaq 1984; Ali-Karamali and Dunne 1994). This realization of western 
responsibility may have changed in part the tone of the sharia debate from one of 
unconditional othering to one of partial responsibility for current Muslim cultural 
configurations. The West is deeply implicated in the process of creating the arguably 
“frozen” notion of sharia still held to varying degrees by many post-colonial Muslim 
states today. This places a moral responsibility for this development on the West, 
therefore deeply challenging western disparaging of an allegedly “uncivilized sharia”. It 
is rather the uncivilized history of western colonialism that has played a decisive role in 
fashioning what today is taken to be sharia. Western condemnation of “uncivilized 
sharia” is therefore in a very real sense an unwitting self-condemnation.  
 Second, the West’s implication in the “freezing” of sharia globally suggests 
ethically, I would argue, that this partial responsibility calls for Western states to do their 
part in dismantling the Orientalist constructions and representations they helped to create. 
Anti-colonialism and anti-Orientalism is not an option; it is an ethical requirement for the 
West.  
 Third, western states might open themselves to facilitating Muslim feminist, anti-
racist and anti-colonial initiatives. This will of course not mean a second colonial 
restructuring of Muslim states under European domination, but rather perhaps openness 
to “dialectical interaction” (Stone 2000) or “transformative accommodation” (Shachar 
2001) in which western countries might genuinely engage the legal diversity represented 
by their diverse populations. It is essential that western organizations not attempt to “fix” 
patriarchy in the other but rather only facilitate such indigenous Muslim transformative 
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projects.112 Importantly, western stakeholders must realize feminist transformation does 
not necessarily mean the erasure of Islamic religious tradition (Mahmood 2005).  
 Fourth, western nations must be attuned to what colonial constructions and 
Orientalist images of Islam generally and sharia specifically continue to produce that 
benefit the West (despite the post-colonial era), in order to dismantle lingering 
motivations for Orientalist representations of the other. As I have been arguing, even if 
the post-colonial era has arguably arrived, these lingering constructions continue to 
justify western domination of Muslim lands and resources, and the policing of Muslim 
bodies domestically in part to protect the cultural identity of the nation at home. 
Unmasking these hidden benefits is an important step in dismantling the unethical use of 
these tools of domination to achieve those reprehensible ends.  
 Fifth and finally, Emon makes his own suggestions as to how multicultural 
accommodation of cultural diversity might proceed, specifically in the legal sphere, in the 
West (Emon 2006, 24-28). Although faith based arbitration has been arguably 
circumscribed, mediation has certainly not been affected. Therefore, Emon suggests that 
“in liberal democratic states where Muslims wish to observe sharia values in the area of 
family relations, the government can create a legal regime that facilitates and regulates 
the development of non-profit Muslim family service organizations. By utilizing various 
legislative regimes such as corporations law and tax law, and by using the power of 
judicial review, the government can create venues for Muslims to create their own civil 
society institutions through which they can critically evaluate the historical sharia 
                                                 
112 It is theoretically conceivable that such a project could be initiated by western agencies acceptably if 
Muslim stakeholders were given sufficient consultative power over the project and western initiators 
accepted only a facilitative role. However, given the histories of colonialism and imperialism in the West, 
such a prospect makes this researcher extremely uneasy. 
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doctrine, determine how it fits within the state’s legal system, and arbitrate family 
disputes in light of their de novo analysis of sharia” (Emon 2006, 25). Emon recommends 
several checks and balances in this government supported (and therefore regulated) 
system similar to the changes made to the Arbitration Act to protect vulnerable people 
and to ensure diverse community engagement. A number of Muslims during the sharia 
debate, including women, rejected the suggestion that all arbitrations without exception 
conducted under “Muslim principles” would be inequitable toward women, not least 
because this suggested that any egalitarian rulings could not be regarded as issuing 
authentically from Islamic law. Such people fiercely defended the notion that Islamic law 
is open to reinterpretation (Syed 2012, 14). What Emon suggests then, is that if the 
government partially funds Muslim non-profit centres that would assist in their 
developing a “Canadian sharia”, then the government could facilitate and regulate this 
process from the bottom up, given that mediation and advisory arbitration are still 
available to Muslims, even under the revised Arbitration Act, and therefore that Muslim 
legal principles can still be enshrined in legally enforceable contracts in various ways at 
any rate. .  
 
5.4 Criminal law and Illegal practices? 
 Much of the public discourse provoked by the “sharia debate” fed on media 
images of hands being cut off for theft, of adultery punished by stoning, of beheadings, 
and of polygamous marriages. As I have argued above, this imagery was central to the 
construction of moral panic regarding the “sharia debate” in Ontario. However, none of 
these practices had any relevance to faith based arbitration. First, criminal law cannot be 
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the subject of arbitration. The Arbitration Act can only apply to commercial or family 
law issues. Furthermore, nothing that is against criminal law in Canada can be prescribed 
by an arbitrator. And of course, adultery is not a criminal offence in Canada, while 
stoning is a criminal offence. Therefore, none of these media images found in the sharia 
debate had any relevance whatsoever to the issue of faith based arbitration. However, as I 
have mentioned above, these images were absolutely central to the western discourse on 
sharia, and the imperial and racist national interests they serve. One of the important 
functions of these extreme images of “sharia” is to reinforce the notion that Muslim 
women are absolute victims of Muslim community and traditions, and therefore once 
again they are striped of agency. The only expression of Muslim women’s agency in the 
context of religious community recognizable to most western eyes is resistance to Islam. 
All else is seen as subjugation (Mahmood 2005).  
 Accusations of polygamy bear special consideration here for several reasons. The 
allegation of “polygamy” was used uncritically as a blanket accusation of gender inequity 
(Boyd 2004, 24), and this contrasts ironically with the actual practice of increasing “poly-
spousal” legal recognition in Canada, precipitated by the liberalization of divorce laws. 
Therefore I suggest a more nuanced approach to the issue of polygamy that might have 
generated a more rational and less othering debate on the issue of gender inequity in faith 
based arbitration.  
 The first point to be made is that polygamous marriage cannot legally be 
performed in Canada. Therefore, as this is a criminal practice it cannot be the subject of 
arbitration under the Arbitration Act nor can it be prescribed by an arbitrator. 
Furthermore, even if polygamy were legal in Canada, it could not become the subject of 
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arbitration. One cannot ask a third party to take on decision making powers regarding 
whether one will marry or not in either Muslim or Canadian legal traditions. The only 
issue that might arise would be that raised by a divorcing polygamous family, in which 
case matters of support, division of assets, and custody could become matters of 
arbitration. In this case, one might argue that a woman in a polygamous marriage might 
be awarded less in the event of divorce because the resources of the household would be 
divided between more than two spouses. This is a legitimate concern, but it is also a 
concern that a woman divorcing from a polygamous marriage might get far less than she 
would have in a legitimate marriage in support or division of property because such 
marriages are not recognized in Canada (Boyd 2004, 23). Marion Boyd points out that if 
a polygamous marriage was performed in a foreign jurisdiction that recognizes such 
marriages as legal, then the marriage will also be recognized in Canada. And one 
important rationale for this is that women will be able to legally claim support and a 
portion of the family property (Boyd 2004, 23). Certainly patriarchal forms of polygamy 
have been shown generally to be potentially detrimental to women’s rights and interests 
(Campbell 2005) and are therefore a legitimate concern. However, recognition of foreign 
polygamous marriages has been an important avenue for upholding gender equality in 
Canada for these families in the event of divorce, and this recognition of a claim to 
support and property division is the only aspect of polygamy that faith based arbitration 
could have touched. However, this was not dealt with reasonably in the debate, but rather 
polygamy was used simply as an example of the gender inequity allegedly endemic to 
Muslim culture and community. 
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 The second point is that statistics suggest the actual practice of polygamy is 
extremely rare as, for example, less than two percent of Middle Eastern populations are 
involved in polygamous marriages (Rebhun 2008, 11). Moreover, as already stated 
above, patriarchal polygamous practices increasingly are banned in “Muslim” countries 
(Emon 2006). 
 Third and finally, the degree of concern over polygamy is somewhat disingenuous 
given the current state of Canadian legal practice. Research suggests that polygamy in 
non-Muslim contexts in Canada although frowned upon is not regarded with the same 
kind of moral panic or level of government interest as that expressed in the sharia 
debate.113 More importantly, because “poly-spousal” relationships are increasingly a 
legal option and norm in Canada, I argue that ultimately the only legal approach to 
addressing gender inequities in polygamous relationships that will be available to 
Canadians will not be continued attempts to eliminate polygamy, but rather will only be 
taking steps to make it more equitable. There are numerous legal definitions of “spouse” 
in Canadian law. This point challenges those who would use polygamy uncritically as
generic example of gender inequity among Muslims. Not only are people who are legally 
married considered spouses, but also common law relationships between people who 
together in the same dwelling for an extended period of time, or couples who share a 
child and have a relationship of some permanence, whether or not they are married or 





). Boyd writes:  
                                                 
113 Campbell, Angela. 2005. Polygamy in Canada: legal and social implications for women and children : 
a collection of policy research reports. Ottawa, Ontario: Status of Women Canada. The reasoned 
arguments and rational research accomplished in these policy reports suggests a reasoned engagement with 
the issue not present in the sharia debate.  
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Consider the hypothetical case of Tim, who married Jane when he was 22, and 
separated from her at 24 when he went to live with Mika. He and Mika lived 
together for 4 years, during which time he had an affair with Laura. Laura became 
pregnant, and since the child’s birth 8 months ago, he has been living with Laura 
and the child. If Tim and Jane have never divorced, Tim has three spouses for the 
purpose of spousal support obligations. Ironically, permitting polygamy would 
provide additional protection to Mika and Laura in this example, because they 
would also be able to claim a division of property, in addition to support rights. 
Boyd 24, 2004 
It is important to understand the dynamics of effecting gender equity in the context of 
marriage and divorce law. The liberalization of divorce laws has of course helped to 
make divorce much more common. This has had a positive effect on women’s equity as 
women are freer to leave a relationship with support and equal division of property if 
they wish. However, this has increased the incidence of women in relationships that are 
not marital. Given that men still hold more wealth generally in Canada, if women could 
not claim support in the context of a common law or co-parenting relationship, either 
because the divorce from their former spouse was not complete, and/or they were not 
legally married to their common-law or co-parenting “spouse”, this would increase the 
feminization of poverty if these subsequent relationships ended. Therefore, although this 
is not the same as supporting polygamy, the recognition of “poly-spousal” relationships 
in these ways is an important strategy for effecting gender equity.  
 Canadians are free to engage in all manner of sexual or co-habitational 
relationships enjoying various forms of legal recognition of those “spousal” relationships 
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for the purposes of spousal support in the event that the relationship ends.114 Canadians 
are free to engage in multiple “poly-spousal relationships”, but they are still not allowed 
to legally marry polygamously. Put differently, Canadians are allowed to engage in all 
the practices that compose polygamy without legally being able to marry polygamously 
(Boyd 2004, 23-24). The main difference therefore between Canadian law and 
interpretations of Islamic law that allow for polygamy is not that one allows it and the 
other does not, but rather that in Islam only men can engage in multiple-spousal 
relationships, while in Canada both men and women can engage in multiple-spousal 
relationships. Therefore the important distinction to make rather is between patriarchal 
polygamy and gender equal polygamy. Ironically, recognition of polygamous marriage 
gives women the opportunity to claim a division of property as well as support, whereas 
the various forms of poly-spousal legal recognition in Canada only give women the right 
to claim child or spousal support. Only marriage gives women the right to claim equal 
property division in Canadian law, and therefore current common law disadvantages 
women and continues to feminize poverty in this way. I anticipate the increasing 
recognition of “poly-spousal” relationships in Canadian law, precipitated by liberalized 
divorce laws, together with the increasing non-monogamous diversity of polyamorous 
relationships Canadians engage in,115 will eventually undermine attempts to police 
                                                 
114 It is important to note as well that marriage is still legally privileged over other forms of spousal 
recognition as it is the only legal relationship in which partners may claim a division of property (in 
addition to support). Even a legally recognized common law relationship does not give partners the right to 
claim a division of property. 
115 See Anapol, Deborah M 2010. Polyamory in the twenty-first century: love and intimacy with multiple 
partners. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Barker, Meg.; Langdridge, Darren. 2009. 
Understanding non-monogamies. New York: Routledge 2009; Loue, Sana. 2006. Sexual partnering, sexual 
practices, and health. New York : Springer c2006; Walker, Rebecca. 2009. One big happy family : 18 
writers talk about open adoption, mixed marriage, polyamory, househusbandry, single motherhood, and 
other realities of truly modern love. New York: Riverhead Books 2009; Klesse, Christian. 2007. The 
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polygamy, and in the interests of equality and fairness, necessitate rather the development 
of legally recognized gender-equal polygamy. Efforts to ensure such relationships are 
equitable in practice will have to take the tack of facilitating agency within the context of 
such relationships, rather than attempting to criminalize these relational forms.  
 I am not defending polygamy or even the legal recognition of polygamy here. I 
am pointing out the contradictions between the way polygamy was discussed during the 
“sharia debate”, essentially used to other Muslim communities generally and faith based 
arbitration specifically, and the way polygamy and multiple-spouse relationships in fact 
are dealt with in Canadian legal practice. To represent polygamy as uncompromisingly 
anti-woman, when recognizing multiple-spousal relationships legally is increasingly the 
norm in Canada, a result of the express interest of protecting gender equity, is 
disingenuous at the very least. Using polygamy in this way without considering Canadian 
legal practice honestly and rationally reflects the tendency in the debate to simply other 
sharia at all costs, and to represent it as so far beyond civilized rational consideration that 
it cannot even be entertained in a reasoned fashion. However, a reasoned understanding 
of polygamy reveals that ever since the liberalization of divorce laws, increasing 
recognition of multiple-spouse relationships is absolutely central to protecting gender 
equity for women. Furthermore, Canada recognizes polygamous marriages that were 
performed in a jurisdiction that recognizes them, for the express purpose of protecting 
gender equity in the event of a marriage breakdown. If Canada did not recognize 
polygamy or multiple-spouse relationships for these purposes, this would disadvantage 
women who would not be able to claim support or division of property. Surprisingly, this 
                                                                                                                                                 
spectre of promiscuity: gay male and bisexual non-monogamies and polyamories. Aldershot, Hampshire, 
England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
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is the only role that faith based arbitration could have played relative to polygamous 
relationships. Arbitration does not involve sanctioning or performing polygamous 
marriages. It could only be used to assign support or division of property in the event of a 
divorce. Therefore, the othering role polygamy was made to play in the sharia debate is 
problematic at best.  
 
 5.5 “There will be no Sharia in Ontario”  
 I will here unpack the discourse that Ontario premier Dalton McGuinty used in 
his pronouncement on September 11, 2006 facing an upcoming election in 2007. 
McGuinty was widely reported in the media to have stated “[t]here will be no shariah law 
in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all 
Ontarians”116 What might these words have been taken to mean by the public, and why 
was this approach taken rather than another? Aside from the obvious intent to 
communicate that enforceable arbitration according to any non-Canadian legal regime 
had been eliminated in Ontario, several other things are suggested given the tenor of the 
“sharia debate.” Given the context and content of the debate, I will pay careful attention 
to what was not said by McGuinty as much as what was said. 
 Although McGuinty’s comments are most likely intended only to refer to legally 
enforceable forms of faith based arbitration, the over-simplified nature of the statements 
further suggest that a central practice of Islam, sharia, will also play no part in the cultural 
life of Ontario’s citizens generally. More than simply referring to legally enforceable 
forms of faith based arbitration, McGuinty suggests that even the private life and culture 
                                                 
116 CTV.ca News Staff. Monday September 12, 2005. “McGuinty rules out use of sharia law in Ontario.” 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1126472943217_26/?hub=TopStories Accessed 
Friday July 2, 2010.  
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of observant Muslims is excluded as well, because in addition to understanding sharia as 
informing family law, many Muslims regard sharia as a guide to the way a Muslim 
should conduct herself or himself in order to follow the “straight path” of Islam. This is 
not literally what was intended by McGuinty, but to express what he did mean in the way 
he did is a careless, damaging and perhaps strategic overgeneralization.117 To be fair, on 
the one hand McGuinty was attempting to address the legitimate concerns of several 
Canadians, Muslim or otherwise. On the other hand, turning a blind eye to the 
racialization, Orientalism, and othering of the sharia debate is a deeply damaging 
incidence of political and public neglect.118  
 For McGuinty to apparently leave aside in his announcement the issue of 
Islamophobia and blatant stereotyping and misunderstanding of sharia and Muslim 
communities that proliferated in the press was a gross oversight. McGuinty’s statements 
simply suggest that the discourse was correct in its moral panic, and that for this reason 
sharia will be excluded from arbitration. The wording of the announcement targets sharia 
specifically first, before it expands to religious arbitration generally. Therefore, the 
rationale and target of the announcement is made clear at the outset. To leave these issues 
unclarified invites interpretations of McGuinty’s comments that connote a much deeper 
cultural exclusion than restrictions on enforceable faith based arbitration alone.  
 Furthermore, McGuinty’s comments completely ignore the realities of de facto 
legal pluralism in Ontario, including several enforceable (and non-enforceable but legally 
practicable) avenues for the practice of Muslim family law still available as discussed in 
                                                 
117 Razack (2008) suggests that one of the motivations for countries to demonstrate their participation in the 
American led “War on Terror” it to gain admission to what she calls the fraternity of white nations (160). 
118 Perhaps this is more a reflection of the media representation of McGuinty’s announcement rather than a 
full representation of what he actually said. To the degree that this is true, I am critiquing the media 
representation of McGuinty rather than government representatives or policies.  
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chapter 4. Finally, in order for Muslim women to be protected, agency affirming policy 
must be developed, because the only way for women to be protected in the existing legal 
system is for women to exercise their agency.119 McGuinty’s comments suggest that the 
problem of protection has been solved apart from Muslim women’s agency, when in fact 
that is not entirely the case. McGuinty’s announcement does not suggest that Muslim 
women must be educated and better enabled to exercise their agency for fuller protections 
to be achieved, leaving readers to assume there is no cause for concern. In conclusion, I 
argue that 1. McGuinty’s comments promise more than they deliver, 2. they affirm 
Islamophobia and misunderstanding more than they dismantle it, and 3. they deny the 
importance of Muslim women’s agency and ultimately protection, given the realities of 
Ontario’s legal system, more than they affirm or offer it.  
 In fact, religious arbitration was not explicitly banned. Only non-Canadian laws, 
religious or otherwise, were banned, so to mention religious laws generally, and sharia 
specifically, without pointing out that the legislation will explicitly target neither, perhaps 
clouds the issues more than it clarifies. McGuinty could have taken the opportunity to 
affirm that the intent is not to exclude Islam, Muslims, and religious people generally as 
being particularly pre-modern and inequitable, but rather that vulnerable people 
regardless of culture or religion will benefit from the new protections. This message was 
not communicated at this press release, and to my knowledge it has not been 
communicated publicly in any substantial way since.  
 Finally, why was exclusion of sharia, and religious laws generally, the focus of 
the pronouncement rather than the equitable inclusion of religious laws in the context of 
adding extra protections for the rights of vulnerable peoples? Now that family arbitrations 
                                                 
119 See chapter 4. 
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are explicitly governed by the Family Law Act, excellent new protections are afforded 
those seeking family arbitration. Religious people of all sorts may engage in formal 
arbitration based on their traditions in so far as their decisions do not contradict Ontario’s 
Family Law Act. McGuinty could have recognized that there are similarities between 
several religious legal traditions and Canada’s legal traditions that could be embraced as 
mutually similar and affirming.120 Rather than suggesting the possibility, as did several 
Muslim leaders I spoke to, that Ontario’s justice system generally, and its family law 
specifically, is deeply Islamic because of its pursuit of justice, the assumption that Islam 
is inherently other was re-affirmed. Overall, I characterize this announcement as a sadly 
missed opportunity at best, and at worst an uncritical affirmation of the damaging 
racialized Islamophobia and misunderstandings circulated in the media debate.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 My overall argument in this chapter is that dismantling the stereotype of 
“uncivilized sharia” is an important part of dismantling patriarchy and facilitating 
Muslim women’s agency. Therefore, anti-racism, anti-Islamophobia, and anti-
imperialism are important strategies for facilitating liberation and protection of Muslim 
women. Western discourses and assumptions about “sharia law” often represent it as 
barbarically violent, frozen in time and therefore hopelessly premodern and deeply 
patriarchal. There are few western voices that represent sharia Law as flexible, open to 
interpretation, or able to constitute anything approximating justice as envisioned by 
                                                 
120 See chapter 4. For example, several imams I interviewed viewed Canadian law as “Islamic” because 
they recognized it as a system that genuinely seeks out justice. Therefore, several imams embrace Canadian 
norms of spousal and child support, as well as equal distribution of resources upon divorce and equal 
distributions of inheritance in wills because they recognize these as just, and therefore in line with sharia.  
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“modern” human rights and legal regimes. This assumption then forms the basis for the 
position that the only possible protection for Muslim women’s rights must be found 
outside their religious communities and traditions within the protective arms of the 
supposedly benign secular state. However, once again, the question is how to address the 
patriarchalism that Muslim women do face in the context of sharia and family law, 
without falling into disparaging over-generalizing about a hegemonic and monolithic 
Islam. Therefore, I have here critiqued this over-generalization not only to show that 
there may be avenues of protection of Muslim women’s rights in the context of sharia 
family law, but also to show that given Canada’s current legal regime, the best possible 
mode of protection for Muslim women who want to practice faith based mediation and 
family legal practices is one that works in concert between Muslim communities, the 
secular state, and civil society generally, and more importantly one that facilitates 
Muslim women’s agency rather than assuming it to be inconsequential. The final 
argument I am making in this chapter is that, as argued in chapter 2, an essential 
component of secularism is installing a cultural hierarchy at odds with the aims of 
building an equal and neutral public sphere, and that the sharia debate illustrates how the 
mass media have played an important role as a secularizing institution in this regard of 
hierarchy construction and maintenance. 
5.6.1 The Media as Secularizing Institution 
 The state uses secularism to guarantee the relations it wants (Razack 2008, 148; 
161; Asad 2003). This does not of course mean simply that benign states always work to 
protect religious minorities against persecution, work to protect citizens against religious 
establishment by enforcing religious freedom, and strive to protect individual (especially 
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women’s) rights over against communal rights and actions. It means rather that in the 
name of aiming at these higher ideals, other more patriarchal and imperialist ends might 
be achieved, in the same way that several feminists have observed imperial feminism was 
used in the service of neo-colonial interests in Afghanistan to far more affect than 
substantially improving the plight of Afghan women (Khan 2008). Secularism in the 
sharia debate was not simply employed benignly to protect Muslim women from 
oppression and Canadian society from forms of Islamism that militate against human 
rights. Rather, imperial feminism was again used to justify over-policing of a community, 
single them out as national others for cultural exclusion, and further justify the control of 
Muslim lands abroad and Muslim bodies domestically in Canada. In the same way that 
women’s rights can be used to justify wars on others that in fact destroy and deprivilege 
women deeply, secularism can also be used to oppress religious minorities, police 
religionized others, and disregard genuine consideration of Muslim women’s agency 
rather than facilitating Muslim women’s agency (Khan 2008).  
 Several media articles merge two notions: privileging of the secular and the 
othering of Islam.121 I argue that the modern media is a fundamental instrument and 
institution of secularization (as I have defined secularization in chapter two). Most 
importantly for my purposes, the media establish and maintain secularization as cultural 
hierarchy. This means that secularization is as much about protecting dominant cultural 
(including religious) interests and racializing and marginalizing religious others, as it is 
                                                 
121 David Warren, 'Multiculturalism -from Britannia to Sharia,' National Post,8 December 2003, A14. 
Margaret Wente, “Life under sharia, in Canada?” Globe and Mail. Saturday May 29, 2004. Ken Elgert, 
'Islamic Law a Step toward Legal Apartheid,' Edmonton Journal, 4 December 2003, A19. Lynda Hurst, 
“Ontario sharia tribunals assailed.” Toronto Star. May 22, 2004. Sara Harkirpal Singh, 'Religious Law 
Undermines Loyalty to Canada,' Vancouver Sun, 10 December 2003, A23. Margaret Wente, “The state 
should not give its blessing to Muslim Courts.” Globe and Mail, December, 23, 2004. Ghammim Harris, 
'Sharia Is Not a Law by Canadian Standards,' Vancouver Sun, 15 December 2003, A15. 
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about regulating religion in an allegedly neutral secular public sphere. In the same way 
that “gender” is not a neutral category, but has historically always referred to hierarchy 
between masculine and feminine, so to the secular historically has not been a neutral 
category, but has in practice referred to a space that is stratified hierarchically between 
dominant privileged religions (and forms of religion) and marginalized religions, despite 
modern claims to a neutral secular sphere. This has been a strategic hierarchalizing 
project as much as it has been a historic coincidence resulting from the mere fact of 
statistically cultural majorities.  
 Furthermore, in the same way that what Shahnaz Khan has called “imperial 
feminism” has achieved imperial interests more than actually furthering women’s rights, I 
will coin the term “imperialist secularism,” which too has been used to marginalize 
religious others more than it has been used to secure the religious neutrality of democratic 
states and human rights. Using the analogy of feminism, there is an important parallel 
with third wave feminism (Gillis et al. 2007). Gender hierarchy in third wave feminism is 
identified as not being limited to that between men and women (i.e. between secular and 
religion in parallel) but also to racialization, imperialism, class differences, and othering 
that creates a hierarchy among women between white, colonial, privileged women and 
other women (i.e. between a hierarchy of religions in the “secular” modern state along a 
continuum of privileged to othered). Furthermore, my argument has been that secularism 
as imperial hierarchy is not simply an occasional unfortunate accretion onto an otherwise 
benign and neutral secularism proper, but rather has been intrinsic and essential to 
western secularism from its inception, bound up as it was and is with colonialism and 
imperialism. This argument parallels anti-colonial anti-racist arguments that understand 
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racism to not simply be an unfortunate aberration of historic western modernity, but in 
fact absolutely central to modernity and modernization from its historical inception to the 
present day. My argument then is an extension of those of other authors on secularism 
and post-colonial anti-racist theory such as Talal Asad, Sherene Razack, and Jasmin Zine. 
I build on this work offering a new conception of secularization that is similar to but I 
argue extends this previous work. I therefore use this case study of the so-called “sharia 
debate” to illustrate how imperial hierarchy is accomplished in the modern West through 
“secularization” as well. 
 McGuinty’s announcement was not simply a further clarification of the division 
between the “church” and the state. This decision was also bound up with and in concert 
with Orientalist, racist, and ultimately othering discourses and policies such as those 
identified above by Razack. This association of othering, racism and Orientalism is not, I 
argue, simply an unfortunate incidental and contextual appendage to an otherwise 
“purely” innocent secularizing action that “only” sought to clarify legal spaces. Quite to 
the contrary: othering, racism, and Orientalism have been absolutely central to modern 
projects generally and secularization specifically in actual practice from the outset of 
modernity. I argue that this is a continuation of a central tool of secularization rather than 
an infrequent coincidental junction. The beginnings of a solution is to work towards anti-
racist, anti-Orientalist, and anti-imperial forms of secularization against what I am calling 
imperialist secularization, in the same way that anti-racist, anti-imperial feminism is 
suggested to be the way to correct the damage and oversight of imperialist feminism 
(Khan 2008). Put differently, rejecting imperial feminism or imperial secularism does not 
entail rejecting feminism or secularism entirely. My point is that one must be aware that 
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there are these different types, and one must be careful what form of feminism or 






6.1 Constraining Sharia 
 Based on my empirical research with faith-based religious groups in southern 
Ontario from 2007-2009, I argue that in practice the most pressing issue of the “Sharia 
debate” for Muslim leaders and adherents in Ontario was not faith-based arbitration per 
se, but rather religious divorce. Much of the so-called “Sharia debate” focused on the 
plight of vulnerable people in the context of faith-based arbitration. The media generally 
as well as Muslim and non-Muslim feminists specifically expressed concern that Muslim 
women and children might not receive fair and equitable treatment in the event of a civil 
dispute (such as a contested will) or of a marriage breakdown (involving disputes over 
spousal support, child support, custody, or division of family resources) (see Boyd 2004). 
Much of the public “Sharia debate” assumed that Muslim community leaders were fully 
aware of the Arbitration Act and intended to use it to make third-party decisions on 
behalf of, for example, divorcing Muslim couples in ways that would be detrimental to 
Muslim women. However, my fieldwork findings suggest that this was not the case. First, 
most Muslim couples in the process of divorce did not seek full arbitration agreements on 
the legal and financial matters of divorce. Rather, the majority of Muslims approaching 
Muslim leaders for assistance with civil disputes were looking for a religious divorce in 
addition to the legal divorce granted by the Canadian courts. Second, Muslim women 
constitute the vast majority of those approaching Muslim leaders and other Muslim 
organizations for assistance in securing a religious divorce. I argue that for these reasons 
the 2006 policy change enacted by the McGuinty government has made little difference 
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on the ground, and that the most pressing issue impacting Ontarian Muslim women’s 
rights and wellbeing – the granting or withholding of religious divorce – has been 
ignored. In fact, it has made obtaining such a divorce more difficult. 
 To consider the disparity between the prevalent discourse and Muslim religious 
arbitration on the ground, the first part of this chapter reports my findings regarding the 
practices of Muslims with regard to private ordering122 of civil disputes within three 
organizations: the Islamic Institute for Civil Justice, the Darul Iftaa123 and the Islamic 
Social Services and Resources Association. I briefly mention research on other similar 
Muslim dispute resolution service providers in Ontario. The second part of the chapter 
discusses the relevance and impact of this reality for public policy and practice. 
My fieldwork research is based on informal semi-structured interviews with 30 Muslims 
in leadership, lay, and Muslim social work positions in the communities. Two Muslim 
organizations were kind enough to share brief, anonymous case summaries of Muslim 
divorce/dispute resolution cases. I have received 21 such case summaries in total to date. 
I also interviewed 20 Jewish community leaders, Rabbi’s, and community members.124 I 
used Survey Monkey software, available online, to generate a thirty-item survey. Seventy 
respondents began the survey and fifty completed the survey. Fifty-three participants 
completed the majority of the web survey. I examined these fieldwork results for 
common themes and issues that cut across the majority of the interviewees, and I 
                                                 
122 Private ordering refers to non-governmental parties entering into voluntary private agreements or 
contracts.  
123 Darul Iftaa literally translates as House of Advisory Council or Opinion. 
124 Ideally I would have liked to have interviewed at least 30 people in the Jewish community (mainly the 
Orthodox Jewish community). However, I found that because the Beth Din is a relatively small 
organization (there are only approximately six Rabbis that serve as judges for the Beth Din) that my 
interviews reached a saturation point (the information I received began to repeat itself) early on.  
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constructed my argument around representative examples from my fieldwork. The survey 
results were used mostly to confirm my findings. 
 
6.2 Research Participant Reactions to the Media Debate 
 In chapter 5 we outlined the major themes of the so-called sharia courts debate in 
Ontario, offering a critique from the perspective of an anti-imperial secularism and post-
secular feminism. We noted that most of this debate and analysis was rooted in 
imagination; few commentators actually understood what faith based arbitration services 
did or why Muslims would seek out those services. In this chapter we will listen to the 
voices of Muslim women and men who provided those services and sought them out. We 
discover that the media representation of the major issues missed the mark while 
engaging in an ideological clash. The real reason that people used these services was to 
overcome the issue of limping marriages by obtaining a religious divorce. The 
participants themselves understood that the media had caricatured the issue. One social 
worker responded to what she perceived to be the overgeneralizations about Muslims in 
the media debate on faith based arbitration stating,  
“I’ve been a social worker for 26 years. One of my areas of specialty has been 
woman abuse and child abuse. Do I hate men? No. You know? Do I hate all 
parents because [some of them] hurt children? No. Do I hate all Muslims because 
some Muslims do hurt people in their own community and others? No.” (Personal 
interview March 5, 2008) 
One Muslim social worker employed by a Muslim social services organization argued 
that the Muslim community does face challenges when it comes to patriarchy, but that it 
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is not unique in this regard. Other religious communities in Canada face the same 
challenges. She said, “My feeling is that the Muslim community would want me to say, 
oh, we are so different with different issues and problems. But my feeling is that many of 
the issues are the same as in other communities” (Personal Interview April 12, 2008).  
Her comments contradict those of commentators, well represented in the Ontario media 
debate on faith based arbitration, who stereotyped Muslim communities negatively as 
uniquely patriarchal.  
 Some of my research participants felt that both sides of the debate over faith 
based arbitration were lacking. One Muslim social worker stated,  
When it came up in the papers it was basic. I thought hey, interesting. And my 
first thought was hmmm, which Muslims is he [Syed Mumtaz Ali] talking about? 
I thought, interesting, but it didn’t click with me. And then all hell breaks loose. I 
was an observer. I was very disgusted with both sides. The reason is, I think, the 
ones who were supporting it, they made themselves sound like they spoke for all 
Muslims. If you are going to propose something like that you start with talking to 
people, but to them it was like God is on our side… It was like we represented 
you. (Personal interview March 5, 2008) 
Commenting on how the media sought out certain voices in order to capitalize on the 
sensationalism of the debate on faith based arbitration, one Muslim lawyer stated,  
Ali Hindi. He’s an engineer… he’s always in the press. He’s always saying 
sensational things. He’s the opposite of Tarek Fatah. The media loves the two of 
them. One gives them one thing and the other gives them the other stuff. So they 
say really outrageous things. For example, polygamy. You know, why say that 
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kind of stuff? He’ll give his opinion but does he have any basis for it? (Personal 
Interview March 11, 2008) 
Several research participants commented on what they felt was a strong Islamophobic 
bias in the media debate on faith based arbitration. One Muslim woman social worker felt 
that Islamophobia played a prominent role in the public debate on faith based arbitration 
stating, “so opposition, the vocal one, they played to people’s fear about Muslims. And I 
think there was a lot of Islamophobia hidden within the opposition… People with other 
political motives or views were utilizing this and using it for their [own] argument. 
Meanwhile it vilified the whole community.” (Personal interview March 5, 2008). One 
research participant wrote to one of the participants, a well-known feminist, in the public 
protest that took place immediately before Dalton McGuinty, then premier of Ontario, 
made his final announcement to the media regarding the faith based arbitration debate on 
September 11, 2005. This participant responded to what she perceived to be prejudicial 
targeting of Muslim communities stating,  
I actually wrote her a letter. I wrote all of them, and I said I have the greatest 
respect for [you], but I think you weren’t answering the right questions. And the 
only one in the picture was Islam... What about Jewish women? Are you saying 
that Jewish Rabbis are not capable of coercing women or marginalizing women? 
Is the idea that the subjugation of women and abuse of women is only rooted in 
Islamic culture and the Muslim tradition? Where were you when this was a non-
issue? Like in New York where a Rabbi declared a woman insane in order for her 
children to be taken away from them, where children are being taken away 
regularly from these women. And they are outside the community, and that 
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traditional community is very close knit, so that people outside the community are 
actually ostracized… where do you go? (Personal interview March 5, 2008) 
This Muslim social worker further stated,  
There are women who are sponsored and don’t speak the language who are 
oppressed. Or there are women who sponsor their husband and continue to stay 
with him even when he’s abusive. All of these things are issues that need to be 
addressed. But you don’t target one community and say everything they do is 
wrong and everything they do is evil, and you need to save their women from 
them. (Personal interview March 5, 2008) 
When asked how she felt the Muslim community was represented in the media debate, 
one Muslim social worker who works in the community stated,  
I didn’t think they were represented. I think they totally responded to the louder 
voices. I think they also responded to what they thought the society wanted to 
hear, which is that Muslims themselves also reject Islam. It became more than 
rejecting the faith based arbitration that was being presented. It became about 
rejecting Islam. That’s how I heard it. (Personal Interview April 12, 2008)  
One imam who regularly engages in faith based mediation felt that when it came to 
Muslims, the faith based arbitration debate was not handled in an even-handed manner 
stating,  
The public debate made me very sad. People got carried away. The former 
attorney general was also a feminist. We cannot be paternalistic when it comes to 
Muslims, one law for them and a different one for non-Muslims. Arbitration will 
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take place whether we like it or not, and the law should be involved to make sure 
that justice prevails. (Personal Interview August 30, 2008) 
One imam at a group interview stated “Just by looking at who was involved, this is not 
something that mainstream Muslims will be concerned about, although they maybe 
should have been. But because the person who was representing the Muslims and those 
that were against them… usually when these kinds of people are out there speaking, 
mainstream Muslims will just turn it off and think okay these aren’t… they’re not going 
to represent us anyway” (Personal Interview July 4, 2008). Another imam present at the 
same interview followed up by saying,  
Most of our information was coming from the Toronto Star. And most of what 
you read in the Toronto Star you read everywhere else. The arguments were the 
same. It was, you know, people’s hands will be cut off eventually and women will 
be stoned. That was their trump card. Women are going to get stoned. Who on 
earth would think that a woman is going to get stoned in Ontario? How is that 
going to happen? How can you even make that kind of argument? But that 
argument was made. And it was believed. And it was all over the place. (Personal 
Interview July 4, 2008) 
Immediately following this comment a Muslim adherent also present during this group 
interview responded, “post 9/11 anything can be said about Muslims and its okay,” To 
which the imam responded “No.” (Personal Interview July 4, 2008).  
 Commenting further on the negative representation of Islam and Muslims during 
the media debate on faith based arbitration, a Muslim lawyer active in the Muslim 
community stated,  
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Being a lawyer, and understanding how the arbitration act worked, and also the 
fact that it had to do with private disputes not, you know, it was being projected 
out there the stoning of women, and cutting of arms, and whipping and all this 
stuff. You know, you can’t arbitrate [these things]! You know, an arbitrator could 
not say, yes you can beat your wife… But unfortunately that wasn’t the 
perception out there. (Personal Interview March 11, 2008)  
Another imam I interviewed stated,  
It is unfortunate that the media and the politicians [played] the Islamophobic 
card… it was Islamophobic, saying sharia is coming to Ontario. The next thing 
that we can hear is actually that people will be stoned… its hate speech really, and 
McGuinty played the cards in order to get the Islamophobic votes you know, and 
this is actually unfortunate. (Personal Interview February 19, 2008). 
Finally, one Muslim adherent stated of those that participated in the public media debate 
on faith based arbitration, “what comes out in the media are the more extreme sides of the 
issue, not the mainstream. You ask the Muslim in the street, and he will never identify 
with any of the people talking in the media. They don’t represent most of Muslims in 
Ontario” (Personal Interview July 4, 2008).  
 Most web-survey respondents also felt negatively about how their community was 
represented in the media during the so-called “sharia debate.” One participant complained 
of, “Too many people with their own agendas leaping in with their strident voices.” 
Another respondent made several observations about the nature of the media debate, 
“media coverage, in my opinion, was superficial, partly because each side representing 
different Muslim community perspectives, did not make correct or complete arguments. 
 195
In particular, the proponents did not make a distinction between Sharia and Fiqh; did not 
indicate that there were several schools of Islamic jurisprudence. The opponents did not 
point out that mediation was the preferred dispute resolution approach in Islam.” One 
participant expressed optimism that in response to media crises such as the so-called 
“sharia debate” the ability of Muslim communities to effectively respond and be heard by 
governments has improved, “we've experienced some serious community scares in the 
past. Since then, our community outreach programs have been well received by the 
various levels of government.” 21 of 52 respondents (40.4%) felt their religious 
community was represented “very unfairly” during the media debate, and 75% felt their 
religious community was represented “unfairly” or “very unfairly.” Only three people 
(5.8%) felt their religious community was represented “very fairly,” and six felt it was 
represented “fairly.”  
 
6.3 Islamic Arbitration vs. Religious Divorce 
 Many Muslims in the Canadian context, and particularly Muslim women, will 
seek out a religious divorce in addition to a civil divorce. Not all Muslims will do so, as 
they may not be observant to that degree or they (or their community) might consider a 
civil divorce to be sufficient. However, my research suggests that many Muslims do seek 
out religious divorce and that their communities and religious leaders reinforce the 
importance of acquiring an Islamic divorce in addition to the civil divorce in order to be 
considered legitimately divorced within their religious community and before their God. 
For example, one Muslim woman I interviewed who had both a civil and Islamic divorce 
stated,  
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Your divorce is not granted by the imam. The courts cannot grant an Islamic 
divorce. It’s like the separation of church and state. If I did not get the religious 
divorce from the imam, then I am not considered a divorced woman.” She added, 
“What happens is that the man has the right to divorce you. So you ask and you 
say, ‘This thing is not working.’ So you ask for the divorce called a talaq. And if 
he gives you problems and says I don’t want to divorce you, then you can go to an 
imam and say, ‘You know, I want a divorce.’ The imam would do some research 
on the situation and try to mediate and such, and when all these resources are 
exhausted then he will grant the divorce. (Personal Interview May 3, 2008) 
I have found that virtually all religious divorces do not typically involve negotiating 
terms addressed in a civil divorce, such as the division of property, support payments, or 
custody, issues that might be subject to arbitration. However, without a religious divorce, 
many women suggest they will experience social barriers to remarriage within their 
community, and they may fear that they are committing adultery if they remarry under 
Canadian law. In extreme cases, ex-husbands will behave as if they are still married, 
leaving some women feeling oppressed and helpless to fully dissolve a relationship. 
Therefore, acquiring a religious divorce is of great importance to many Muslim women in 
the Canadian context (see also Macfarlane 2012). There are at least three types of Muslim 
divorce. First, the talaq is a unilateral divorce performed by the husband.125 Second, the 
khula is a wife initiated divorce that still requires the consent of the husband (generally 
the wife must return her dowry in this case). Third, the faskh is a judicial annulment of 
the marriage, often used when the husband cannot be contacted in order to agree to the 
divorce. (For a further discussion of the different types of Muslim divorce as they relate 
                                                 
125 Talaq is the Islamic term (deriving from Arabic) meaning divorce. 
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to the Canadian context, see Macfarlane 2012.) I conducted research at three 
organizations that are confronted with Muslim women’s requests for aid and guidance in 
obtaining a religious divorce: the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice, the Darul Iftaa of the 
Canadian Council of Muslim Theologians, and the Islamic Social Services and Resources 
Association.   
6.3.1 The Islamic Institute for Civil Justice 
 Perhaps the most instructive examples of the prevalence of religious divorce over 
faith-based arbitration are within the practices of the Islamic Institute for Civil Justice 
(IICJ). It is surprising that although the IICJ is the organization responsible for making 
the 2003 public announcement of faith-based arbitration as available to Muslim 
communities, it has never performed, or apparently even intended to ever practice formal 
arbitration. This continues to be the case, even though the IICJ understands that it is still 
available under certain new guidelines outlined in the revised 2006 Arbitration Act.126  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, fear in the debate likely stemmed from the initial statements 
of the late Syed Mumtaz Ali, the founder and head of the Institute, who pronounced that 
“good” Muslims would be obligated to utilize faith-based arbitration (see Judy Van Rhijn 
2003; see also Reda 2012). I was unable to interview Ali as he was quite aged at the time 
of my fieldwork and had withdrawn from public activities. However, a small number of 
arbitrators and mediators associated with the IICJ now work for an organization called 
Muslim Mediation Services (MMS). It is from the IICJ/MMS that I received my 
information through their kind provision of anonymous case summaries and a lengthy in-
person interview. The IICJ is a part of the Canadian Society of Muslims. The Canadian 
                                                 
126 This is not to say they may not pursue this in future. However, currently I base my conclusion on the 
actual practices of the IICJ combined with what I gathered from my interview with the IICJ all of which is 
documented in this chapter.  
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Society of Muslims is a non-profit Muslim organization based in Toronto. Its mandate is 
to provide information on Islam and “generate tolerance and harmony both among 
Muslims and non-Muslims” (muslimcanada.org). The information they provide is mainly 
from a Sunni-Hannafi perspective. The main activity of the organization appears to be 
providing information through their website. The organization also seems to issue from a 
South Asian context as its major leaders are of South Asian descent. There is no 
indication on the website as to how large the organization is. Based on the website and 
my interview with a member of the organization, since Syed Mumtaz Ali has passed 
away, it appears the IICJ is now just a website that is a subsection of the larger Canadian 
Society of Muslims website. It is not clear that the Canadian Society of Muslims is still 
active either as it appears not to have been updated since 2005. Muslim Mediation 
Services appears to be then made up of Muslim mediators, some of which had previously 
been involved with the IICJ. It is interesting that such a small organization should have 
triggered what became an international debate on so-called sharia courts. 
 The MMS is the only Islamic organization in Ontario I found to be both aware of 
the new regulations under the amended Arbitration Act and in a position to adhere to 
them in order to perform court-enforceable arbitration. The 2006 amendments to the 
Arbitration Act require several protective measures be taken in the context of a formal 
arbitration if the resulting arbitral award is to be enforceable.127 MMS members have the 
appropriate training the new regulations demand: they keep written records, they are 
aware of the requirement to provide Independent Legal Advice (ILA), they work within 
                                                 
127 For example: disputants must have Independent Legal Advice, arbitrators must keep written records of 
proceedings and must be trained as outlined by the Attorney General’s Office of Ontario, and the 
arbitration must adhere to “Canadian law” alone (Attorney General 1991). 
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the bounds of Canadian law, and are familiar with the Family Law Act.128 In addition, 
this organization is aware of the ambiguity of the new regulations. Although the Act n
states one must arbitrate exclusively according to Canadian law, the MMS claims that in 
a sense this sanction only means that they do not “mention God” in the final report 
(Personal Interview July 4, 2008). Therefore, the IICJ/MMS operates on the 
understanding not only that Islamic law may be practiced in the context of mediation and 
the result may be made enforceable in a private contract, but also that Islamic law may be 
practiced in formal arbitration and the arbitral award made enforceable as long as the 
amendments to the Arbitration Act are followed. One of the central reasons they are able 
to proceed accordingly in good conscience is because Canadian family law explicitly 
allows a great deal of flexibility for disputants to come to their own resolution. For 
example any separating couple can agree to any arrangement of custody, maintenance, or 
division of resources that they agree upon (see Macklin 2012).
ow 
                                                
129 There are certain 
default norms in the event of a disagreement, but these can be contracted out within the 
context of the Family Law Act (see Macklin 2012).130 However, although the MMS is in 
 
128 The mediator/arbitrator I spoke to was not a trained lawyer but claimed to possess the appropriate 
background training required by the revised Arbitration Act such as acceptable formal course training as an 
arbitrator/mediator, and training in how to screen for domestic abuse.  
129 This is arguably not the case with regard to custody and child maintenance as in the case of children the 
court reserves the right to determine the best interests of children (See Boyd 2004, 16). However, with 
regard to all other arrangements between a husband and wife, the couple may contract out of the default 
norms provided in the Family Law Act.  
130 Although an arbitrator must sign a document stating that he or she did not use any other legal system 
than Canadian law it may be possible, for example, for an arbitrator to decide a father should have custody 
because it is judged to be in the best interests of the child, or, for example, to decide a certain division of 
resources and support is fair and in the best interests of the children based entirely on the arbitrator’s 
judgment of the situation in the context of Canadian law. It is not clear how such a situation would be dealt 
with as there are few if any relevant test cases that have been brought to the courts to be enforced or 
overturned. Natasha Bakht notes that “religious arbitrators can simply conform to the regulations regarding 
training and record keeping and then perform religious arbitrations that are consistent with Canadian 
Family Law . . . the Family Law Amendment Act permits religious arbitrations that conform to Canadian 
Family Law” (Bakht 2007, 141-142). 
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a position to understand and effectively use the revised Arbitration Act in this way, it has 
never done so.  
 As part of my research with the IICJ, I was provided anonymous case summaries 
of all formal cases handled by the IICJ and MMS that they completed from their 
inception in 1999 up to and including 2008. There have only been sixteen completed 
cases, with an additional six cases initiated in 2008 but not completed at the time of my 
research. The vast majority of cases concern the granting of religious divorces. There is 
also one business dispute, one customer dispute with a business, and a dispute involving 
wages. None of the divorce cases address significant issues that can typically be enforced 
or appealed by a secular court such as custody, support payments, or division of family 
property. The divorce case summaries only state that a religious divorce was granted to 
the applicant, all of whom are women, and they either order the husband to pay the mahr 
or the wife to repay her mahr (Islamic dowry). In some cases the husband is ordered to 
share the costs of the religious court and incidental expenses. The issues of custody, 
maintenance, and division of assets are not matters addressed in these decisions either 
because they have been decided already by the parties themselves or by the courts. In all 
cases a civil divorce was already obtained or was in the process of being obtained. Only 
one case addressed financial issues regarding marriage breakdown, and it consisted of 
mediation leading to the drawing up of a separation agreement. In this case the wife 
received custody of the children, and the husband agreed to support the children as he 
was able; the amount was not specified, presumably because he did not have regular 
work at the time of the agreement. In the case of the car dispute, a Muslim woman paid 
for work done to her car by a Muslim mechanic, and her car later broke down on the 
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highway. She claimed it was due to a shoddy repair job. The arbitrators decided that the 
mechanic in question should give her the extra money she had to pay to do a second 
repair after the highway breakdown. The car repair shop paid her the money, and the case 
was closed. 
 With regard to granting the religious divorce, one member of the MMA stated that 
the McGuinty government’s decision “hasn’t protected vulnerable people, because all the 
women who come to me are vulnerable women. And they only come to me because they 
heard about it from a friend or they were referred by an imam. And we are through a 
process of due diligence trying to make sure women are not being taken advantage of. 
Because these women who come they are abandoned and left with three children on 
welfare” (Personal Interview June 26, 2008).  The MMA regards the unequal access to 
divorce a power imbalance and attempts to address this power imbalance by granting 
religious divorces to women who want them. As one representative of the MMA said:  
These are true cases. So how long do you intend to keep her in nikkah (religious 
marriage)? Oh forever! In the meantime he’s gone on with another woman. You 
have to understand the cultural aspect that the court doesn’t care about. But the 
court does care about the balance of power in the relationship. And this is part of 
what we learn to look for in mediation and arbitration: we look for power 
imbalances. (Personal Interview June 26, 2008)   
 In contrast to the concerns expressed in the media during the “sharia debate,” I found no 
instance in the IICJ/MMS’s comprehensive record of cases that suggested that fears of 
imposing sharia-inspired legal and financial settlements on vulnerable women was 
justified. In fact, while this organization calls what it does “arbitration,” most of what it 
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does, especially regarding divorce, has nothing to do with agreements enforceable in 
Ontario court. Specifically, the Ontario courts do not enforce or appeal religious divorce. 
It is conceivable the courts might enforce the payment of the mahr under contract law, 
but in most cases this amount was a few hundred dollars, with no case of more than a 
$2,000 lump sum payment.131 The separation agreement is the only contract in the MMS 
file enforceable by an Ontario court, but it is enforceable as a contract not as arbitration. 
The contents of the agreement were not decided by a third party; they are the result of 
mutual agreement facilitated by mediation.  
 Given its lack of engagement with formal arbitration services, it is ironic that the 
IICJ was the organization that brought the issue into the media in the first place. 
Although the IICJ/MMS is the only Muslim organization that was fully aware of the new 
Arbitration Act regulations and was equipped to perform arbitration that could be 
enforced by Ontario courts, the organization does not in fact appear to have ever 
undertaken formal arbitration. Despite the fears expressed following Mumtaz Ali’s 
announcement, neither the MMS nor the IICJ has made a binding third party decision on 
any family matter that can be enforced in Ontario courts beyond a few small claims. In 
addition, these organizations have addressed far fewer cases than many of the other 
Muslim organizations I document below. 
6.3.2 Darul Iftaa of the Canadian Council of Muslim Theologians 
 The granting of religious divorces within Muslim communities in Toronto is the 
major civil dispute issue, and the “freeing” of Muslim women from the oppression of so-
called “limping marriages” has been a central aim of Muslim leaders and organizations 
                                                 
131 Although Ontario courts have been reluctant to enforce mahr awards, British Columbia courts have been 
more open to enforcing them (Bunting and Mokhtari 2009, 241). 
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generally, and the Darul Iftaa of the Canadian Council of Muslim Theologians in 
particular. Most of the members of the CCMT and the majority of Darul Iftaa’s clients 
are of South Asian background. South Asians make up 49% of the more than 250 000 
Toronto-area Muslims and 42% of the more than 350 000 Ontario’s Muslims, comprising 
its largest single ethnic group.132 The muftis (certified Muslim judges) most active in the 
Darul Iftaa were trained in the Islamic Family Law system of India for several months. 
The training consisted of studying the practices of daily Indian Islamic Family Law court 
proceedings.133 These muftis continue to consult their mentors in India on jurisprudential 
questions regarding issues not dealt with previously in the Canadian context.134 The 
Darul Iftaa website lists seven council members who are imams in the Toronto Area who 
also work as muftis for the Darul Iftaa (iftaa.jucanada.org). The CCMT was established in 
the 2002 to resolve fiqh issues, the jurisprudencial interpretation and expansion of the 
Shariah having to do with Islamic morals, rituals, and legislation, facing Muslims in the 
Toronto area (ccmt.jucanada.org). The Darul Iftaa was organized shortly after this. The 
Darul Iftaa by its own designation claims to adhere to a very orthodox school of Islam 
(Personal Interview July 4, 2008). The support for women in limping marriages has led 
imams associated with the Darul Iftaa to turn away from its general adherence to an 
orthodox interpretation of the Hanafi School. Because the allowances for granting a faskh 
                                                 
132 The 2001 Canadian Census reports 351 760 Muslims in Ontario of which 148 445 report South Asian 
visible minority status. The Census reports 253 600 Muslims in Toronto of which 124 735 report South 
Asian visible minority status. See Statistics Canada. Selected Demographic and Cultural Characteristics 
(104), Selected Religions (35A), Age Groups (6) and Sex (3) for Population, for Canada, Provinces, 
Territories and Census Metropolitan Areas, 2001 Census – 20% Sample Data (table). “Religion in 
Canada.” “2001 Census: Release Topics.” Census. Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 97F0022XIE2001040. 
Ottawa, Ontario. 25 March 2004. Web. 20 June 2012.  
133 For a discussion of the issues relating to British colonial influence on the formation of Anglo-
Muhammadan law see Emon 2012.  
134 For example, finding religious legal reasons for granting a faskh (an Islamic marriage annulment) to a 
woman requesting a divorce because her husband was not ultimately granted immigrant status to come to 
Canada, and she does not want to move to South Asia because she is from Canada (Anonymous Interview 
July 4, 2008). 
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or annulment of an Islamic marriage in the Hanafi School are limited, the Darul Iftaa has 
borrowed heavily from the Maliki School in order to gain much increased latitude for 
freeing women oppressed by limping religious marriages where the Darul Iftaa regard the 
Maliki School to be more liberal on this matter.135 
 One of the interview participants from the Darul Iftaa stated “many of our women 
will not feel comfortable going and getting remarried without a religious divorce. We 
want their hearts to be at peace. And then they also want this, so for that they come to us. 
They get the divorce from the court and then they come to us” (Personal Interview July 4, 
2008). Islamic law is understood by the majority of Sunni scholars and imams to accord 
husbands a unilateral right to divorce. This legal understanding is why men seldom 
approach imams for a religious divorce. A man may pronounce the “talaq” three times 
and the couple may be considered religiously divorced without witnesses or imams 
involved. However, although most schools of Islamic law allow for wife-initiated 
divorce, even in these circumstances if the husband does not ultimately grant the talaq 
because of recalcitrance or simply because he cannot be found or contacted, the couple 
may not be considered religiously divorced. It is for this reason that the vast majority of 
Muslims approaching religious leaders for a religious divorce are women, as Islamic law 
allows for a Muslim judge to grant a religious divorce on the husband’s behalf (see 
Macfarlane 2012). This unequal access to religious divorce is the result of a patriarchal 
system of law. However, Muslim communities generally, and the Darul Iftaa in 
particular, are attempting to resolve the problems this patriarchal system causes women 
in a pro-women manner.  
                                                 
135 The Hanafi school of Islamic Law is currently prominent in Central and Western Asia, Lower Egypt, 
and the Indian subcontinent. The Maliki school of Islamic Law is currently prominent in North African and 
Upper Egypt (Denny 2011).   
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 The Darul Iftaa also attempts to counter cultural proscriptions against divorce as 
Islam allows divorce.  
The parents sometimes feel the cultural shame if their daughter goes and asks for 
a divorce. And a lot of times the family pressure is to not do something like this. 
And it will take a lot of courage for that woman to come to us and say I want a 
divorce because of these reasons. Because a lot of the time the background comes 
in where they think that the word will get out in the community that their daughter 
went and got a divorce and that’s a shame for the family. It is partly a cultural 
thing. And also a lack of knowledge of the option that they have within the 
religion. (Personal Interview July 4, 2008) 
The Darul Iftaa has even tried to educate Muslims who do not realize the Muslim women 
have a right to initiate divorce.  
There is this idea, obviously it’s a misconception or misunderstanding among 
many Muslim males that they are the sole possessors of the right of divorce, and 
that no matter what may happen the wife has no way to attain a divorce besides 
the husband issuing a divorce. And because of this there was a lot of oppression 
on women. They didn’t realize that even within our Islamic teaching that the wife 
does have the right to divorce. (Personal Interview July 4, 2008) 
The Darul Iftaa has dealt with a far greater number of cases involving civil disputes 
among Muslims as compared to the IICJ/MMS. The Darul Iftaa is a division of the 
Toronto-based Canadian Council of Muslim Theologians (http://iftaa.jucanada.org). Even 
though this division of the CCMT has only been in operation since early 2007, by the 
summer of 2008 it had received between 100 and 150 cases dealing mainly with granting 
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religious divorces (Personal Interview July 4, 2008). When I spoke with representatives 
from the Darul Iftaa in the late spring of 2008, they had already received 47 cases that 
year. Although the Darul Iftaa has a well-designed, organized and maintained website, it 
is otherwise wary of explicitly advertising its services for fear it would be overwhelmed 
with new cases. Currently clients are referred to the Darul Iftaa through imams who are 
aware of the organization or are dues-paying members. The CCMT boasts a membership 
of more than 100 religious leaders mostly in the Toronto area. The rationale for creating 
the Darul Iftaa was overwhelmingly centered upon granting religious divorces to women 
in “limping marriages.”136  
 All of the cases brought to the Darul Iftaa to date have been brought by women. 
They are all marriage annulment cases.137 There is a widespread belief among many 
Muslims in Toronto that only a qualified Islamic judge can pronounce a religious divorce 
on behalf of a husband unable or, more often, unwilling to grant a talaq or accept 
khula138 (a wife-initiated divorce, normally requiring her to return her dowry), and peop
with this qualification are apparently hard to come by.
le 
                                                
139 As one member of Darul Iftaa 
 
136 The phrase “limping marriages” appears to have become widely used in Europe. It refers to couples who 
have been granted a civil divorce but have not been granted a religious divorce. Many women feel that they 
are unable to remarry within their religious community without being granted a religious divorce in 
addition to a secular civil divorce (Kramer 2005).  
137 Julie Macfarlane has made the important point that many so-called khulas are in fact faskhs or marriage 
annulments. I have found that many imams have worked hard to encourage Muslim men to grant the talaq 
as well (Macfarlane 2012).  
138 The reasons the numbers of Muslim women looking for a religious divorce from an Islamic organization 
are not higher is presumably because there are many Muslim men who are willing to grant the religious 
divorce. However, one should not underestimate the number of Muslim women looking for a religious 
divorce. Virtually all Muslim leaders I spoke to provided this service, or referred clients to another 
organization, and it was by far the most common service related to divorce that Muslim leaders offered or 
addressed.  
139 Although I have found a number of organizations and individual imams who do grant religious divorces, 
the Darul Iftaa is by far the most organized and thorough, and handles the greatest number of cases 
specifically to do with granting faskh (Islamic marriage annulment). The charge for the Darul Iftaa’s 
services is $200 for administrative costs. However, if the applicant cannot afford the fee she is not required 
to pay, although most are able to. 
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stated “the issue was not so much the issue of the press and McGuinty’s decision. It is fa
and away the issue of granting religious divorces. Same as the Jewish community, the 
secular divorce may not be recognized by the rabbinate. So she needs a religious divorce 
so that she can remarry within her community” (Personal Interview July 4, 200
r 
8).140 
                                                
The Darul Iftaa generously provided me with five anonymous sample case summaries of 
the types of cases it has dealt with in the previous eighteen months. They all deal with 
wives who have been abandoned or legally divorced by their husbands but have not been 
granted a religiously-valid divorce.141 In four of the five cases the men never appeared 
before the Darul Iftaa even after being repeatedly summoned to defend their case for 
keeping the religious marriage intact. The wife is asked to bring at least two male 
witnesses to support her claims that her husband is not fulfilling his religious duties or 
respecting her religious rights. In cases where a wife was not able to bring the requisite 
number of witnesses, that the husband does not appear counts against him and the divorce 
is granted. The religious reasons for granting the divorce recorded are fairly extensive 
including quotes from the Qur’an and Hadith and a number of jurists, often filling four 
pages of single-spaced text. The reasons for granting the divorce range from husbands not 
providing financially for wives because of abandonment, to verbal abuse by husbands, to 
husbands cheating on their wives, and “irreconcilable differences” (their translation of 
shiqaaq).142  
 
140 The practice parallels the practice of marriage annulment in the Catholic Church as the Catholic Church 
does not allow divorce, but under certain circumstances will grant an annulment which allows members 
previously married to remarry within the tradition.  
141 To the best of my knowledge these cases were randomly selected, although one case appears to have 
been selected intentionally because of its exceptional nature. 
142 According to the representatives of the Darul Iftaa I spoke to, Shiqaaq is a term referring to a marriage 
that has broken down to the point that divorce has become a reasonable option. These representatives 
translate the term Shiqaaq as “irreconcilable differences” – the closest legal equivalent in English Canadian 
divorce law. 
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 In some cases the husband appears at initial divorce hearings, often getting into 
abusive arguments with the Darul Iftaa, and alleging that his wife was coerced by her 
parents to get the divorce. These are the only cases the Darul Iftaa has had where 
coercion was suspected as a factor in a woman’s approaching the organization. However, 
in these cases the Darul Iftaa ultimately decided that the husbands were making the 
accusation in an effort to frustrate the attempts of their wives to get a religious divorce. 
The Darul Iftaa in each case called the wife suing for divorce numerous times and asked 
repeatedly, while she was alone and away from her parents, whether she was being 
coerced to obtain a religious divorce. All wives consistently held that they were not and 
wanted genuinely to be free to move on with their lives. The husbands very often 
ultimately cut off all relations with the Darul Iftaa and refused to appear at any future 
hearings. All of these women were granted the divorce.  
 It appears that a few women were refused a faskh from the Darul Iftaa as they had 
left their marriage partners to have an affair and often were currently living with their 
boyfriends whom they wanted to marry after procuring the religious divorce. The Darul 
Iftaa muftis expressed shock that these women would openly and without shame come to 
a known orthodox Islamic organization making such a request. While one might wonder 
why these women came to this particular organization rather than another more liberal 
imam or Muslim organization, these refusals again illustrate the unequal treatment of 
women in Muslim divorce as men have a unilateral right to divorce independent of any 
religious authority or reasoning (see Macfarlane 2012).  
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The religious divorce documents clearly state on every page that they are strictly the 
rulings of a religious authority and not a legal document.143 The Darul Iftaa informed me 
that it does not attempt to deal in a formal way with any monetary issues regarding 
division of assets or support. The Darul Iftaa muftis state that these elements are simply 
too contentious, and they have enough conflict to deal with from recalcitrant husbands 
who want to keep their wives within limping marriages. If clients request the judge’s 
opinion about religious norms for custody, support, or division of assets they will give it 
informally (orally), but they are clear that these do not constitute any formal religious or 
legal ruling.  
6.3.3 Islamic Social Services and Resources Association 
 The Islamic Social Services and Resources Association (ISSRA) was established 
in Toronto in 1990 in order to help meet the social services needs of the Muslim 
communities of Toronto. ISSRA provides many social services, and coordinates 
numerous social programs and hundreds of volunteer staff (issra.ca). ISSRA serves 
people from very diverse ethnic backgrounds, and thus applies the school of Islamic law 
appropriate to a client’s place of origin upon request. ISSRA sees approximately two new 
cases regarding family issues per week, and therefore addresses approximately one 
hundred new cases every year. Masjids (mosques) all over Toronto refer their members to 
ISSRA if they feel their needs cannot be met at the local level.144 ISSRA estimates that 
approximately 70 percent of these cases have to do with marriage and divorce issues, and 
30 percent have to do with mediating parent-child relationships, i.e., family counselling. 
                                                 
143 Darul Iftaa Documents #1 through #5 on file with the author (see also http://iftaa.jucanada.org/uploads/ 
MCo9V4LBmItlEqMLo58MLQ/ksao_VsL0kFYGrkibMbOrQ/Darul-Iftaa-Application.pdf).  
144 ISSRA serves people from very diverse ethnic backgrounds, and thus applies the school of Islamic law 
appropriate to a client’s place of origin upon request. 
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ISSRA also estimates that about 60 percent of marital issues are reconciled through 
counselling, while roughly 40 percent end in divorce (Personal Interview July 5, 2008). 
Of the people who initially approach ISSRA for assistance approximately 80 percent are 
women. Due to its advocacy of Muslim women’s rights in defense against the sometimes 
unfair demands of husbands, two members of ISSRA report that it has gained the 
reputation of being “pro-women.” 
 ISSRA has not done and does not do formal arbitration of civil disputes. 
However, it has mediated between family members on a wide variety of issues, which in 
many cases has influenced how families have settled divorces in the civil courts 
regarding issues of maintenance, division of resources, and custody. Once again the most 
significant issue by far is that of securing religious divorce for women. ISSRA also 
reports that many men believe it is their right to keep their wives tied to limping 
marriages, and a number of husbands apparently use this situation against their ex-wives 
out of bitterness and as a tool of revenge. One member of ISSRA stated, “The bottom line 
here is the women do have recourse. Lots of guys think they can hold on to wives as long 
as they don’t pronounce divorce, so wives can’t get on with their lives and remarry” 
(Personal Interview July 5, 2008). ISSRA always counsels women that they have the 
right of religious divorce and has granted a number of these despite husbands’ refusal to 
pronounce talaq or agree to khula.  
 Before an Islamic divorce is granted, ISSRA requires a civil divorce be procured, 
and the organization provides a referral list of Muslim lawyers for independent legal 
advice for the purposes of civil divorce. However, ISSRA often suggests mediating 
financial issues rather than going to court because the court process is much more 
 211
expensive, adversarial, and takes a greater emotional toll on couples. Furthermore, 
according to ISSRA, the mediated arrangements are often very similar to what is awarded 
in civil courts. ISSRA’s preferred approach is for the mediator to ask the wife what she 
feels she needs with regards to support, and then attempt to negotiate this request with the 
husband, rather than for the mediator to try to come up with a number on behalf of the 
couple. One member of ISSRA told me, “I don’t really get into the 50/50 part. I ask them 
to come up with their own figures. Most times the wife doesn’t want 50/50 she just wants 
support enough to move on with her life. So I negotiate with the couple about what that 
is” (Personal Interview July 5, 2008). One member of ISSRA reported that many women 
are not interested in an equal division of family assets because either they have not been 
married for long, or the family does not have many resources, or they are only interested 
in enough support to get on with their lives.  
 A number of husbands agree to support their wives and children and honour that 
agreement. A number of other husbands agree to support, but then default on the 
payments. ISSRA tries to contact these men to encourage them to restart the payments, 
which is effective in some cases, but on many occasions ISSRA’s calls are simply not 
returned. Sadly, as in many cases in Ontario, the husband has sometimes disappeared 
either to another country or to an unknown address. On member of ISSRA has noted a 
general reluctance of women to pursue ex-husbands for support either through ISSRA or 
the civil courts because they do not want to undergo the emotional difficulty and time-
consuming work for what they expect will be very little payoff. ISSRA further notes 
reluctance among Muslim women to approach the secular system as many feel it is not 
Islamic. The imam of ISSRA claims to always counsel clients that Canada’s justice 
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system shares with Islam its struggle to effect justice and claims to advise that the 
Canadian justice system is in many ways itself Islamic. He said, “The thing I tell clients 
and people all the time is that the Canadian legal system is not un-Islamic. Many people 
seem to think that Euro-American legal systems are un-Islamic. I tell them no, because 
the primary objective of the legal system is to serve justice. And that is an Islamic 
objective” (Personal Interview July 5, 2008). The imam for ISSRA laments that it does 
not have more power to enforce support payments on women’s behalf.  
The imam for ISSRA usually recommends children stay with the mother until the age of 
majority. However, according to him in many cases the husband has left in any case. The 
imam for ISSRA and other organizations state that given this religious group is largely a 
recent immigrant group, many families experience financial hardship because family 
members cannot get jobs. Therefore the imams, social workers and community workers 
from most of the Muslim organizations I interviewed note that husbands or fathers who 
cannot find work sometimes leave Canada to find work in their home countries or 
elsewhere, leaving their families in Canada putatively because they cannot afford to do 
otherwise.  
 A number of clients have consulted ISSRA about inheritance as well. If people 
want to draw up a will according to Islamic norms, ISSRA will provide the requested 
recommendations. These usually involve the traditional half that girls are given relative 
to boys, with the clear proviso that men are required to support families with these 
resources, and women are the sole owners of their inheritance with no obligation to spend 
a cent on anyone else. However, in many cases ISSRA has advised that sons, for 
instance, who stand to inherit twice what daughters may inherit, are free to give up this 
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right if they are fully informed of their rights and they choose to do so. The imam for 
ISSRA has not heard back from these clients as to their final decision, but his reading of 
the clients has been one of relief at finding that they are free to draw up an inheritance 
that is equally divided among all family members without violating Islamic legal 
tradition. ISSRA has not addressed any disputes with regard to an inheritance. 
ISSRA’s experiences with religious divorce lead to a number of observations. First, even 
this very organized Muslim body has never practiced formal arbitration—or even 
intended to. Second, outside of arbitration there remains great leeway for faith-based 
principles to be drawn up in contracts that are then enforceable by Canadian law, such as 
prenuptial agreements, separation agreements, or wills (see Bakht 2007, 2006, and 
Bunting 2009). ISSRA has mediated many separations and counselled a number of 
people on wills that are then drawn up in legally-enforceable documents. The changes to 
the Arbitration Act do not change the nature or enforceability of these private contracts. 
The power of the state may be used to enforce the private religious decisions of citizens 
who draw up those decisions in legal contracts. Third, there is apparently very little 
difference between what people agree upon in divorce through mediation with ISSRA 
and the arrangements arrived at in court. ISSRA in fact reports one husband who sought 
to dispute a separation agreement in court because he felt he could pay less than what 
ISSRA was asking him to agree to. Finally, religious divorce for women in limping 
marriages is by far the most prevalent of all civil dispute issues ISSRA addresses. 
6.3.4 Imams and Muslim Leaders in the GTA Generally 
 In all of my research to date I have not found a single instance of a formal signed 
arbitration (faith-based or otherwise) agreement taking place in Muslim communities. 
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However, although no one appears to be arbitrating formally in Muslim communities of 
Ontario, a number of imams are assisting Muslims through faith-based mediation in the 
formation of separation agreements, wills, and prenuptial agreements. All of these 
contracts are enforceable by provincial law. This practice is noted above with ISSRA and 
in one instance with the IICJ. It is also practiced among a number of other leaders and 
mediators with whom I spoke. For example, one self-described “moderate” Muslim 
scholar encourages, through mediation, the forming of separation agreements that appear 
very equitable in comparison with Canadian default norms of family law. In view of 
Ontario’s Family Law default norms, equitable divisions of family assets are sought and 
reasonable amounts of child support are recommended. This scholar stated “I have 
advised that the man should be providing support for the children until the children are 
capable of taking care of themselves. According to one’s needs that is the Qur’anic 
concept” (Personal Interview August 30, 2008). The scholar reasons based on Sharia that 
the Canadian context must be taken into account when sorting these issues out between 
couples, and he also suggests that the intent of Sharia – which he believes to be equitable, 
fair, and just – must be translated into the modern Canadian context. In his opinion, older 
rulings would no longer be just in current Canadian society where women are not cared 
for in the same extended-family contexts as they were centuries ago. This scholar 
strongly encourages the couple to get a mediated agreement drawn up in a formal 
separation agreement, precisely because it is then a contract that can be enforced by the 
state. This agreement usually benefits women who are most often in need of the 
enforcing power of the state, usually to make men pay the promised child support. In 
another example, the imam for ISSRA advises that it is Islamic to adhere to the Canadian 
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Family Law default norm of a 50/50 division of family property and resources. ISSRA 
also consults the Federal Child Support Guidelines when asked to recommend reasonable 
child support amounts. See http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/fcy-fea/lib-bib/legis/fcsg-
lfpae/index.html. 
 Another Toronto-based imam, who could be read as more conservative-leaning, 
also appeared to take measures to ensure equity and fairness with regards to women in 
mediating separation agreements. His calculation of support took into account the 
lifestyle the wife was accustomed to during marriage. The value of the mahr had to take 
into account the value of the currency at the time the contract was made relative to its 
value in Canadian dollars at the time, and then inflation had to be taken into account, so 
that the true value of the original mahr is preserved. This imam also strongly encouraged 
the couple to enter the results of the mediation in a separation agreement. Here the imam 
sought to make evident his mediation so that its results would not be lost in a later secular 
court decision. This request raises some concern of coercion. However, in one of the 
cases the imam shared with me the couple did end up taking the matter to civil court after 
all, and ironically, after the couple paid the lawyers tens of thousands of dollars, the wife 
ended up with half the amount of support that she would have received if the couple had 
agreed to the imam’s recommendations. I am aware that my evidence comes from imams 
who might want to create the impression of gender fairness given the tenor of the “Sharia 
debate.” However, my research access to several diverse imams who provide dispute 
resolution services, together with my access to several case files and personal interviews 
with Muslim women in the communities, including some women who have had a Muslim 
divorce themselves, suggest that although there are likely inequitable and patriarchal 
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religious leaders and dispute resolution service providers in Ontario, there are also 
several that are quite equitable by Ontario’s family law standards. 
 The majority of leaders I spoke with agreed that according to Islamic tradition 
women are entitled to child support for as long as she takes care of the children, that she 
is at least entitled to the assets she brought to the marriage, any earnings she has made, 
and any inheritance that she has received. Wives are entitled to support from husbands 
throughout the marriage, and many also stated if that support is not fully rendered during 
the marriage it is payable in some form upon divorce. Not all agreed that a fifty/fifty 
division of the marital home and wealth gained during marriage145 was Islamic, but some 
did, and the vast majority made recommendations for support and division of assets that 
would likely be interpreted as reasonable and fair in Canadian courts. For example, one 
scholar stated “people ask me if it is Islamic to divide things up 50/50, and I say it is the 
custom of this country and you both agree to that there is nothing wrong with that. That is 
how I look at it” (Personal Interview August 30, 2008). However, there is no way to 
know if all imams are as equitable in their mediation of civil matters as those with whom 
I spoke.  
 
6.4 Responses of Muslim Women 
 A consideration of the responses of Muslim women I interviewed illuminates 
some of the reasons they may or may not seek out faith based arbitration and mediation. I 
interviewed eight Muslim women community leaders, social workers, and adherents in 
                                                 
145 When I mention the 50/50 division of family assets in this dissertation, I refer to the Canadian family 
law practice of each spouse having a right to 50% of all assets gained during marriage or any increase in 
value of assets brought to the marriage. This excludes, for example, the original value of assets owned by 
individuals before marriage, as well as gifts, and inheritances (Family Law Act 1990).  
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person or by phone, four women submitted email interview responses, and 20 participants 
identified as women in the web-survey for a total of thirty two Muslim woman research 
participants.146 Although this sample is somewhat limited, what I have gathered helps to 
expand on other similar surveys of Muslim women’s responses to this issue.147  
The women who participated in the web-survey were, by and large, practicing Muslims. 
Twelve of the women said they considered themselves practicing Muslims and seven said 
this was true “to some degree.” Only one woman said she was not practicing. When 
asked “how important is it to you to have an Islamic marriage or nikah (as opposed to 
only having a civil marriage)?” of the 20 participants who identified as women in the web 
survey 17 said it was “very important,” two said it was “somewhat important,” and one 
said it was “very unimportant.” When asked, if divorcing, how important it would be to 
have an Islamic divorce 12 women said it would be “very important,” four said it would 
be “somewhat important,” and three said it would be “very unimportant.”  
 A Muslim woman social worker reflected the thinking of many Muslim women 
from the community she works with stating “I’m not going to city hall, so where am I 
going? In my mind the same person that put us together is the same person that can take 
us apart.” Two other social workers  who work primarily with Muslim women noted that 
some Muslims prefer Muslim marriage and divorce to civil marriage and divorce stating, 
“someone recently ran into a problem when they were filing taxes, and they said well I 
got divorced Islamically. And we said hello! That doesn’t work here. Some of them 
refuse [stating] I’m not going to no court house, I’m not signing a paper.”  
                                                 
146 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of research methods.  
147 See Canadian Council of Muslim Women 2004 Regional General Meetings Report. 
http://www.ccmw.com/documents/CCMWRegionalMeetingsSummaryReport.pdf. See also Bunting 2009; 
Bunting and Mokhtary 2009, and Macfarlane 2012.  
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 When asked “if you were involved in a divorce, how important for you would it 
be to have issues such as the division of family assets, amount and duration of 
maintenance of a dependent wife and children, and child custody decided according to 
Islamic principles?,” one woman stated “as my spouse and I had a nikkah, we have set up 
our financial portfolio with this in mind.” One person expressed confidence in the 
equality of Islamic law as well, “the Islamic way of divorce has been well defined in 
Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammad. There is no ambiguity in such matters. 
Any decisions based on these principles that are amicable to both the parties involved is 
the best course. Islam has never been partial to either gender in any respect.” One wrote, 
“in the case of divorce, I would respect Islamic laws and would want to do what is 
necessary for a good Muslim. However, if I feel that those laws/practices do not sit well 
because of my gender (female) then I will bypass it.” When answering this question only 
10 women who participated in the web-survey said it would be “very important,” three 
said it would be “somewhat important,” and six said it would be “very unimportant.” 
Generally speaking then, among the women who participated in the web-survey, it is 
more important to have an Islamic marriage than it is to make divorce arrangements 
according to Islamic principles, but still the majority of women, 13 of 20, stated the latter 
would be either very important or somewhat important to do so.  
 Illustrating the importance of resolving civil disputes according to Islamic 
tradition, one woman I interviewed stated “if I were involved in a civil dispute I would 
want it to be decided by Sharia because for Muslims, Islam is a way of life that 
encompasses all aspects including any disputes that invariably arise” (Email Interview 
April 14, 2008). When asked “if you were drawing up your will, how important would it 
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be for you to will your assets to your family according to Islamic principles?” Ten 
women participating in the web survey said it would be “very important,” five said it 
would be “somewhat unimportant,” two said it would be “somewhat unimportant,” one 
said it would be “very unimportant,” and one said “I don’t know.” When also asked in the 
web survey “if you were involved in a dispute with your family over an inheritance that 
was willed to you, how important would it be to you to have that dispute resolved 
according to Islamic principles?” nine women reported “very important,” six reported 
“somewhat important,” one reported “somewhat unimportant,” and three reported “very 
unimportant.”  
 When asked how they felt generally about faith based mediation, feelings among 
women participants in the web-survey were generally positive. Sixteen of the 20 women 
reported either “very positive” (10) or “positive” (6). Only three reported “negative,” and 
no one reported “very negative.” These women also generally felt positively about 
recommending faith based mediation to a friend or family member: Sixteen reported 
either “yes certainly” (8) or “yes possibly” (8), while only one said “no possibly,” two 
said “no certainly,” and one said she did not know. However, when asked about their 
general feelings regarding faith based arbitration, one woman stated “I would never use 
faith-based arbitration the way it was proposed; I find our standard Canadian family law 
to be more in keeping with Islamic principles than the proposed medieval Muslim law” 
(Email Interview March 30, 2008). Another women stated “although I would want 
mediation/arbitration based on Islamic teachings and principles, I would be concerned 
about possible culturally-rooted injustices occurring, e.g. attitudes towards women.” 
Another participant stated, “faith-based arbitration may not work for women in general. I 
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would only accept it if I know that the arbitrator is not only well-versed in religious 
matters, he/she also possesses in depth knowledge of cultural context (North American in 
our case) and is very much aware of Canadian laws.” only nine women participating in 
the web-survey reported “very positive” (3) or “positive” (6). Two women reported 
“negative,” four reported “very negative,” three reported “I don’t know,” and two 
skipped the question entirely. Responses were similarly negative when asked whether 
they would recommend faith based arbitration to a friend or family member if, 
hypothetically, it were still available. Only 10 women participating in the web-survey 
said “yes certainly” (2) or “yes possibly” (8). However, two said “no possibly,” three said 
“no certainly,” three said they did not know, and two skipped the question entirely. 
Feelings about faith based arbitration among the women of this survey are much more 
negative or ambivalent than their feelings about faith based mediation.  
 I asked if participants agreed with the Dalton McGuinty government’s decision to 
change the Ontario Arbitration Act so that the state would no longer enforce arbitrations 
decided according to religious laws. One woman expressed a sentiment common among 
the Muslims I interviewed when she said that even though McGuinty said there will be 
no Sharia in Ontario, the practice of Sharia in the daily life of Muslims is widespread and 
unaffected by McGuinty’s decision because it is such an integrated aspect of her 
everyday life. A Muslim woman social worker working in the Muslim community further 
stated, “And we also believe that McGuinty will try as much as he might, but we don’t 
believe he will be successful in terms of trying to stop it. He cannot stop it.” Another 
Muslim woman social worker stated, “McGuinty says there is no religious arbitration in 
Ontario, but there is. And who is going to stop any two people, because it is not illegal. 
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Who is going to stop them from entering into any arbitration, nobody.” These women 
express the sentiment, common among my interview participants, that the McGuinty 
government did not protect vulnerable people because faith based arbitration and 
mediation will simply continue underground where there are no protections or systems of 
accountability. However, a number of interview participants who would choose to 
resolve their civil dispute according to Sharia still felt that McGuinty made the right 
decision, arguing the Ontario Muslim community needs to develop further before it is 
ready to offer proper mediation and arbitration services. These sentiments may in part 
explain the tendency of web-survey participants to strongly support resolving their civil 
disputes according to Islamic principles at the same time they are unsure about the 
effectiveness of the McGuinty government’s decision regarding faith based arbitration.  
Another reason interview participants were unsure if the amendments to the Arbitration 
Act had effectively protected vulnerable people was because, in their opinion, such 
protection is more a matter of education and awareness building than legislative change. 
One Muslim woman social worker stated,  
I know for a fact that it still happens today. And women don’t know how to take 
court action. They don’t have the connections, or they’re afraid. It is the women 
who are isolated and are not connected to anything... So I think they [the 
McGuinty Government] focused on the wrong angle. I think what they should 
have focused on was to say, do women have the resources and the know-how to 
access legal resources? You know, if they got into this. And if not, why? And how 
[can this be changed]… I know for a fact in working with a lot of [Muslim] 
women, when I was working as a counsellor with [Muslim] women, I know a lot 
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of them don’t know about their rights. They don’t know about the legal system. 
They don’t know. They’re not informed…When this issue came up in the press it 
made me want to know more. So if I ever get divorced I [now] know where to go, 
what lawyers to hire to get the most out of my husband (laughing). But that’s the 
thing. I can read these things. Other women don’t. They don’t speak the language. 
Some have a limited education. The ones of most concern are the poor, 
marginalized, and exploited. They are the ones who are more likely than anyone 
to go to an imam rather than going to the legal system. (Personal Interview April 
12, 2008) 
When answering this question in the survey itself, only four women participating in the 
web-survey said they either “strongly agreed” (2), or “agreed” (2). Three women said 
they “disagreed,” five said they “strongly disagreed,” one person skipped the question 
and seven said they did not know. It is unexpected that women would feel so negatively 
or ambivalent about faith based arbitration, while only four agreed with the McGuinty 
government’s decision.   
 I asked my participants how well trained they felt Muslim faith based mediators 
were regarding women’s rights in both Islamic law and Canadian law. One Muslim 
woman social worker stated flatly, “imam’s don’t have the training.” Another Muslim 
woman who has had both a civil and religious divorce stated “the wise men of the 
community are women.” One woman I interviewed stated “I believe that Muslims want 
and need faith based arbitration, so they can live according to the sharia. I worry that 
some imams are prejudiced against women, and don’t give them their full rights. 
However, I believe the imperfections lie not in shariah, but in the wrong application of it.  
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There are many imams who try their best to be just to women” (Email Interview April 3, 
2008). Another Muslim woman who had had both a civil and religious divorce was more 
positive, but still added a note of caution stating “yes, they are very fair because they 
follow what the Qur’an says. And they are good about those things, the rights of the 
woman. Of course you have to use your common sense, but mainly they are very fair. 
And I think they take care of women and kids” (Telephone Interview May 3, 2008). 
 The women I interviewed stated that they would consult any number of trusted 
Islamic authorities including imams, or other trusted people knowledgeable in Islam 
generally, as well as reputable websites such as Islamonline.net. However, most women I 
interviewed also had questions about the training and judgments of particular imams. 
They felt that “shopping around,” seeking out trustworthy leaders and sources, and even 
going to more than one source for diverse opinions was a good way to ensure they 
received the justice and equity they believe Islam accords to women. The women who 
participated in the web-survey seem to be divided about whether they feel Muslim faith 
based mediators are adequately aware of women’s rights in Canadian law. No one said 
“all or most are,” four said “many are,” three said “50/50,” eight said “few are,” no one 
said “none are,” four said they did not know, and one skipped the question. However, I 
was surprised to find that the women who participated in this survey also seem to be 
divided about whether they feel Muslim faith based mediators are adequately aware of 
women’s rights in Islamic law. No one said “all or most are,” six said “many are,” and 
four said “50/50.” Four said few are, no one said “none are,” and six said they did not 
know.   
 224
 The women who participated in the web-survey are generally positive about the 
possibility of interpreting Islamic law or sharia and applying it in civil disputes in a way 
that is generally in keeping with Canadian law. One woman I interviewed stated “I would 
want my civil dispute to be decided according to shariah. This is my obligation as a 
Muslim. However, I also know that according to the shariah we must obey the laws of the 
land in which we live, so recourse to the Canadian courts can also be a form of abiding 
by the shariah, so I do not think the dichotomy of shariah vs. Canadian courts is a simple 
as people make it out to be. The Canadian court system could integrate shariah rulings for 
Muslims. Both systems aim for justice” (Email Interview April 3, 2008). When 
responding to the survey itself, seventeen women said either “yes certainly” (5) or “yes 
possibly” (12). Only two women said “no” and one skipped the question.  
 The women who participated in the web-survey seem to be somewhat divided 
regarding how often they would feel comfortable going to secular lawyers and courts to 
resolve civil disputes such as divorce, custody, or inheritance disputes. One Muslim 
woman I interviewed who had a religious and civil divorce stated of her experience in the 
secular court system “oh very happy. They were very good to me. I mean, I got all that I 
wanted… I was very happy, but people have different experiences.” Another Muslim 
woman I interviewed who attended the divorce court proceedings of a woman family 
member stated,  
Honestly, I went with my [family member] to the court when she was doing the 
family law with her divorce for custody. The husband was filing for full custody. 
And honestly, the experience I got from the judges, I was sitting there for two 
cases before her right, and I found the way the judge was dealing with the 
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situation was very good. I found the interests of the child were paramount over 
everything else. And he didn’t demonize the husband. He showed his [the 
husband’s] stupidity and said, you know, you’re being bone headed, and he was 
tough when he needed to be, but at the same time didn’t make him feel 
alienated… I found after that experience with my [family member] I actually had 
a good faith in the family law system. (Personal Interivew March 5, 2008) 
However, one woman said, “ask any white Canadian feminist if she thinks the Canadian 
justice system enshrines full equality for women” (Email Interview April 3, 2008). When 
answering this question in the survey, 10 said either “yes always” (4) or “yes often” (6). 
However three said “yes sometimes,” one said “yes rarely,” four said “no,” and two said 
they did not know.  
Some of my interview respondents illustrated the social pressures on women not to take 
their husbands to court for child or spousal support. One Muslim woman stated  
I know this woman. She’s a friend of mine. She works as a counsellor, like she 
knows the system. But she doesn’t want to be stigmatized. And she’s [not] going 
to the family courts asking for child support. So she’s at the mercy of her ex-
husband. They have been divorced for four years. She doesn’t want to be seen in 
the community that she took the father to court… He might take the kids out to 
buy them stuff, but it is not regular. It is at his own discretion. So every time I tell 
her, why don’t you do this [take the husband to court]? She says no, no, no, you 
know our community, culture. If I do this they are going to say she is 
Canadianized. Sometimes people don’t want to take that route, but if you educate 
the public and say this is okay… Removing that stigma, because look at her. 
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She’s educated. She graduated from university… She knows that she is working 
and she knows that she [still] needs that support from her ex-husband, but she 
doesn’t want to take that extra step when she has every right to go to the family 
court and say, you know, I want child support. Because I can’t keep taking care of 
the kids and she’s paying daycare, and she’s paying child care. So cases like that 
also exist. And I tell her, you know you advocate for women all the time, and you 
advise them regularly, and you’re not doing it! (Personal Interview March 5, 
2008) 
However, under certain circumstances Muslim women can be encouraged to take their 
husbands to court for child or spousal support. One Muslim woman social worker stated  
“There is this one woman I know who went to the family court. I think they met 
in high school. Then they went to university together. He found a great job, and 
then met another woman. Of course she was upset. So she went to the court, and 
he didn’t think he had any responsibility toward her. So she went to family 
court… [With] that, they (family and Muslim community members) really 
supported her. Yeah they took her part, and they said, good for her! I think that it 
was not only that he cheated on her, I think it’s the other woman thing, because 
especially the women in the community, they took her side. Because I hear this all 
the time, ‘she showed him.’… ‘How could he do this to the mother of his 
children?’ Of course the other woman is evil as well.” (Personal Interview March 
5, 2008) 
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However, this social worker concludes, “a lot of the times it feels like there are all these 
people that are a part of your business (laughing). And then some of the women are 
sympathetic and some of them are gossiping behind you.”  
 One Muslim woman social worker illustrates the challenges Muslim women may 
face even with religious community leaders who are supportive of women’s rights to 
child and spousal support stating “yes, the way it goes now it is all verbal and no 
contracts are signed. And then the woman has to keep going back to the elders when he 
defaults and she gets tired of going and gives up.” This further illustrates the problems of 
going to a religious authority when a husband defaults on payments because they have no 
power to enforce payment; instead they try to pressure the husband socially. For this 
reason this social worker encourages divorcing women to go through the secular courts. 
Another Muslim woman who had both a civil and religious divorce stated, “family 
services got involved to help support me and get support from the father, but religious 
communities don’t have that power. They can try to encourage the man, but they cannot 
enforce it.”  
 Some Muslim women who would like to seek outside help for their marriage 
before marital breakdown experience resistance from their husbands. One Muslim 
woman who ultimately had a religious and civil divorce stated  
We never really got to the point of asking for help with our problems. He would 
always say that he was not interested in somebody getting in the middle of the 
situation, because he thought he knows it best. He said you know I’m living in the 
situation and nobody can bring anything from outside to that situation. Nobody 
can add anything to it. I (on the other hand) was very interested in mediation. And 
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I even mentioned to him several times. And I wanted to get somebody from the 
community. And in our religion it explains that if two people cannot come to an 
agreement on a situation then they should bring family from both sides to sit 
down and talk about the situation. So I brought that up with him, and he said no, 
no. I know what’s happening and nobody can add anything to that. And I said 
what about a social worker, or a counsellor, or an imam from the masjid? And he 
said no. I think he didn’t want to because of privacy issues. I don’t know why 
really. He just didn’t think anyone could add anything. That went on for maybe a 
year. (Personal Interview May 3, 2008) 
6.4.1 Pressure on Women to Stay Married  
 My interview participants illustrate well the importance of granting the religious 
divorce in Muslim communities by showing how difficult it can be for some women to 
acquire it. One Muslim woman social work stated, “if I want a divorce from my husband, 
do you know what the elders will ask me? How come… was he beating you? Because 
there are things that are unacceptable to them right? Does he not give you any money? 
Does he control you? Does he insult you or insult your family? And if all these questions 
are a no, they will say then why do you need a divorce?” Later in the interview the same 
woman states, “but especially if you are the one who asks for the divorce, and if he (the 
husband) says I want her. I want my family. I didn’t want to break my family apart. She 
did that. And people look at the outside picture where it is a good looking family and 
nobody knows anything. And she’s not saying you beat me up or things like this. See 
what I mean? She loses the public relations. And then she will be the one.”  
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 Sometimes the religious divorce will not be granted even if there is domestic 
abuse involved. In an interview with two social workers who work mainly with members 
of Muslim communities one woman stated, “sometimes imams will not give the divorce 
because of domestic violence. But I do have an Arabic gentleman… who gives the 
Islamic divorce, and we collaborate. We don’t want any women going back to an abusive 
situation. We don’t tell them to go to the mosque when things are going on. We wait until 
they have the Canadian divorce and then tell them to go, because then there is nothing 
they can do. We don’t refer them to the mosque because they will turn them down.”  
A Muslim woman social worker describes the plight of many of the women she has 
worked with in Muslim communities stating,  
They also put the pressure on to the man supposedly because they’re interested to 
keep the Muslim home right? But often that pressure goes to the woman and the 
guilt… They start guilt-tripping her. And they will say things like, you know, we 
are here in this culture, your children, and use all kinds of things to [get her to] 
accept the situation if the man does not want a divorce… You know, basically 
oppress this woman. You are oppressing her if you are keeping insisting that she 
be your wife when she doesn’t want to be. But they don’t. As long as he’s not 
beating her, he’s not cheating on her, he’s not, you know? Like, does the person 
have to go to extremes to get divorces, you know what I mean? And they would 
pressure the woman. They use all kinds of tactics and say like, you know, it’s our 
duty to keep Islam because Islam is home. And we are responsible for our 
children, and this and that and blah, blah, blah. If you are strong and you don’t 
have any other pressures to worry about you might say screw you I want my 
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divorce. Talk to this asshole and get me my divorce or I’m going to go to the 
Canadian government… But you’re not going to say that, you’re going to say oh, 
okay, because you don’t want to be the one who is going to break the bond.” 
Other patriarchal aspects of the process of pursuing a religious divorce are 
illustrated by another Muslim woman social worker where she states, “it is easier 
for your brother or your father to convince the imam that he should grant the 
divorce than it is for a wife to convince an imam. (Personal Interview April 12, 
2008)  
One Muslim woman who had both a religious and civil divorce, and then had to take her 
husband to court in order to enforce support payments answered my question regarding 
how accepting her community was of going to the secular courts stating,  
Not really. Some people felt that it was unfair to the husband, like I ruined him 
and it was shameful to have to be taken to court, but what about me? I’m an 
educated woman. I had no support, no family here, and it is hard to get a full-time 
job and take care of the children. In order to get full-time child care I had to 
already have a full-time job or be going to full-time school. But how can I do that 
without child care? I have nobody here even for one day. It has been very hard for 
me. I nearly had a nervous breakdown… So what about me? He is free to go see 
movies and friends, so he can give some financial support. [However,] a lot of 
people (in the Muslim community) supported my decision to take him to court to 
enforce the payments. (Personal Interview May 3, 2008) 
In conclusion, a Muslim woman social worker employed by ISSRA illustrates the 
attempts of several Muslim organizations which I have documented in this chapter when 
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she stated, “we want women to know that they can end their marriage even if they have 
been abandoned… Women need to be reminded, if one imam says no, don’t stop, try 
another one.”  
6.4.2 Domestic Violence 
 Muslim women regularly come to mosques looking for help with situations of 
domestic abuse. Many religious leaders will deal with this situation appropriately and 
immediately call the police. However, not all imams address domestic abuse 
appropriately. One imam I spoke to stated “I’ve had women come to me who said another 
imam said: just don’t upset your husband, stay quiet, have patience and hopefully things 
will get better.” Another imam stated, “the first thing we do is tell the guy. Legally we 
should notify the police, but this is where faith based [intervention] comes in. We make 
him aware that he is breaking the law--from a civil and religious point of view. And we 
give him a certain warning. She has more empowerment to pick up the phone to call us. 
And if she has to call us once, then after that, [we say,] just pick up the phone and call the 
police; he only gets one chance for her to call us. And if it’s a case of extreme abuse we 
will call the police right away. But if it’s just someone throwing something.... It depends 
on the severity of the abuse.”  
One Muslim woman social worker has not had a positive experience with efforts to 
spread education among Muslim communities regarding domestic abuse. She said,   
We have tried to offer training to the imams on contentious issues like women 
abuse. Who will actually do that? They won’t do that. If you ask them about 
abuse cases they pretend they’ve never heard the word before. If you ask them 
about what resources, education, understanding they have of it they don’t even 
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know what you’re talking about. And that’s just been my experience so maybe 
others have better experiences. And I’m looking for them, because I’m always 
open for allies. I’m always looking for partners.” (Personal Interview April 12, 
2008).  
I have addressed the issue of domestic violence in the context of faith based arbitration 
and mediation in chapters four and five, and I will suggest policy recommendations 
relevant to domestic violence in the concluding chapter.  
6.4.3 Canadian Council of Muslim Women      
 Overall, my research on Muslim women’s approach to faith based arbitration 
contrasts somewhat with the CCMW’s own survey across Canada of approximately 200 
Muslim women. This survey was created and administered by the CCMW at regional 
chapter meetings across Canada held by the CCMW to CCMW members and 
participants. The majority of their respondents did not think that Islamic arbitration was a 
good idea. However a minority of their respondents, approximately 25% to 34%, would 
seek out faith based mediation or arbitration in the event of a civil dispute. The CCMW’s 
survey has drawn a larger sample than mine. However, leaders of the CCMW also felt 
that their workshop surveys did not reach many more conservative leaning Muslim 
women who did not attend, and therefore they recognize that their survey was not 
statistically random, and does not represent a wide diversity of Muslim women in 
Canada. However it is still a valuable non-random survey of several CCMW members 
and participants. My survey results to date are useful simply to provide a sense of the 
reasoning and reservations of some Muslim women who would seek out faith based 
mediation or arbitration. It is very likely the case that only a minority of Muslim women 
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would seek out faith based arbitration. However, this is potentially a significant number 
of women to consider as in the Greater Toronto Area alone there are more than 250, 000 
Muslims and Ontario is home to more than 350, 000 Muslims according to the 2001 
Canadian Census.  
 My research demonstrates that of those who actually do seek out mediation and 
arbitration services, the overwhelming majority are women. As Saba Mahmood’s work 
attests, there are numerous Muslim women who are not easily described as either 
oppressed by, or resisting the oppression of, their religion.148 A significant minority of 
Muslim women in Toronto would choose, and have chosen, to embrace religious 
practices in the realm of addressing civil disputes by seeking out faith based mediation 
and arbitration.149  However, these women also actively question the degree to which 
particular religious leaders are practicing genuine Sharia or not and choose the sources 
they go to for advice carefully. This is certainly not to be characterized as helpless 
oppression nor is it accurately described as resistance to Islam as a whole.150 These 
women seek to resist oppressive interpretations of Islam, but not to escape Islam 
altogether. Rather, a number of Muslim women interpret the proper and just practice of 
Islam in the resolution of civil disputes to be a process that can greatly protect their rights 
and freedoms.  
                                                 
148 Saba Mahmood. 2005. The Politics of Piety: the Islamic revival and the feminist subject. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton UP. 
149 See Mahmood 2005. 
150 Mahmood notes that in feminist discourse concerning Muslim women there appears to be only two 
possible subject positions that are recognizable. Either there is the oppressed Muslim woman, or there is the 
woman who is resisting her religion. Mahmood argues against this dichotomy based on her research with 
Muslim women in Egypt, arguing that there are instead many Muslim women who are not resisting their 
tradition per se, but are not uncritically oppressed either. There are many Muslim women that embrace 
Muslim subjectivity at the same time they participate in its gradual change and transformation.  
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 The activities of the Canadian Council of Muslim Women highlight the 
shortcomings of the amendments to the Arbitration Act and the concerns of Muslim 
women on the ground. The Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW) is perhaps the 
largest national Canadian organization of Muslim women today. The CCMW was 
founded in 1982 in Winnipeg Manitoba. It serves a diverse community of Muslims, 
especially women, across Canada. From the beginning of this organization it has been 
“firmly committed to the overarching vision of improving the status of women and 
empowering Muslim Women to remain true to their Islamic heritage and Canadian 
identity” (ccmw.com). It boasts local chapters in virtually every province, and they were 
very active in the Ontario debate on faith based arbitration. The CCMW opposed faith 
based arbitration as it was proposed and argued that Marion Boyd’s protections did not 
go far enough. It is therefore very pleased with McGuinty’s decision, but it is still very 
active as it believes that this is in no way a dead issue. Part of McGuinty’s decision 
included a commitment to fund further research and education around the issue of 
arbitration generally and its impact on vulnerable people. In keeping with that 
commitment the government has funded a consortium of organizations to conduct further 
research and develop awareness-building materials.151 The CCMW, the only religious 
organization that has received funding for this purpose,152 commissioned three major 
research projects to this end.  
 The first CCMW project concerns the Muslim marriage contract or iddat 
domestic contract. The CCMW repeatedly informed me that although they believe that 
                                                 
151 Seven organizations were funded by the government to reach out to and education vulnerable women 
regarding civil dispute resolution and family law. The CCMW is the only religious and Muslim 
organization that was funded. (www.onefamilylaw.ca).  
152 www.onefamilylaw.ca 
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what McGuinty has done is excellent as far as it goes, it is concerned about a number of 
“loopholes” in the Family Law Act because people are still free to opt out of a number of 
important rights. For example, a woman may give up her right to spousal support or an 
equal claim to family assets (see Macklin 2012). The CCMW is lobbying the government 
to update Ontario’s Family Law Act claiming Ontario has changed dramatically since the 
FLA’s last draft approximately fifteen years ago. In the meantime the CCMW’s project 
on domestic contracts aims to create awareness of vulnerable people’s rights regarding 
domestic contracts. The CCMW fears that Muslim women might be signing their rights 
away without even realizing they have these rights. Furthermore, the CCMW is aware 
that many practicing Muslim women want their marriages to reflect their religion 
meaningfully, and to that end the CCMW is drawing up a sample Muslim marriage 
contract that clearly lays out women’s Muslim and Canadian rights.153  
The second project will develop educational materials concerning marriage and divorce 
more generally, especially issues related to foreign marriages and divorces. Finally, the 
third project aims to create better awareness about arbitration and mediation. The 
materials developed out of this project will clearly lay out the qualifications and 
requirements of arbitrators necessary for conducting legitimate arbitrations that can be 
enforced by the courts. It will lay out the right of appeal if the process proceeds unfairly, 
and it will inform vulnerable people of their rights so they do not unknowingly or lightly 
contract out of them. The CCMW is fully aware that Muslims may still elect to go to a 
                                                 
153 The CCMW has now published its “Marriage Contract Toolkit” online through their website. The page 
containing the link to the PDF marriage contract toolkit states “During the No Religious Arbitration debate, 
we came across some women wishing to deal with family matters in accordance with the traditions of their 
faith. Realizing the need, CCMW published this kit which allows women to develop a marriage contract in 
keeping with Muslim and Canadian family laws” (ccmw.com). 
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religious leader for mediation or arbitration, though of course arbitration will now have to 
be much more clearly practiced within the bounds of Canadian law. However, the 
CCMW ultimately wants potentially vulnerable people seeking faith based mediation or 
arbitration to be fully aware of their rights and protections under both Canadian and 
Islamic laws. 
 The CCMW is also lobbying the government to provide legal aid to people 
looking for faith based arbitration. Currently it is not the usual practice of the government 
to provide legal aid for those opting to use arbitration, faith based or otherwise. I argue 
that even though the Arbitration Act now requires independent legal advice for 
arbitrations, the people most likely to need this advice, people with few financial 
resources, are precisely those who would not be able to afford the lawyers in order to 
benefit from the protections the new regulations provide. Furthermore, the CCMW has 
lobbied the government to train “cultural interpreters” working for the courts that 
understand better the diverse cultures and religions of people accessing the justice system 
so that the court system may be more accommodating and understanding of differences, 
making the secular legal system potentially more accessible and welcoming to wary 
Muslims. These cultural interpreters would act as advocates explaining relevant cultural 
and religious matters to the courts as well as assisting Muslims through the court system 
by explaining the system and its procedures.  
Finally, the CCMW is very concerned about the belief among Muslims that they need a 
religious divorce in addition to a civil divorce. One member of the CCMW said  
The worry is that people are assuming that they cannot remarry without getting a 
religious divorce. But that is simply not true. But it gives religious leaders and 
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imams a lot of control and power. Nowhere in Islam does it say you have to get a 
religious divorce to remarry as it is in Judaism. Are religious women being given 
this message that they must get a religious divorce? Because religious divorces 
are not recognized in Canada. Is it to make the couple feel better? Is there any 
money transaction taking place? What does a woman do with a piece of paper that 
says she’s religiously divorced if it’s not recognized in Canadian court (Personal 
Interview September 2, 2008)  
The work of the CCMW indicates that it is fully aware the issue of faith based arbitration 
and mediation is far from concluded. Not only is it attempting to lobby the government to 
provide legal aid for arbitrations so that the protections now afforded by the Act may 
actually benefit those most in need of them, but also it is striving to provide educational 
and practical materials that will better inform Muslim women of their Islamic and 
Canadian rights while drawing up of private contracts. The limitation of faith based 
arbitration in Ontario has not affected the state enforcement of private contracts that are 
open to a wide diversity of private ordering arrangements, religious or otherwise. 
 
6.5 Web Survey  
 Out of 66 respondents, 90% (60 respondents) reported that it was “very 
important” for them to have an Islamic marriage or nikah (as opposed to only having a 
civil marriage). This question had the most responses for any question in the entire 
survey. Four respondents (6.1%) said it was “somewhat important,” and two respondents 
(3%) said it was “very unimportant.” One respondent felt that a marriage was not 
legitimate unless there was a nikah. Another participant emphasized the importance of 
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the nikah over the civil contract, “for me, doing/holding a nikkah rather than a civil 
ceremony… Knowing that my spouse and I committed to both the religion and each 
other, we solidified our foundation for the future.” Another participant insisted there is no 
real difference between civil marriages and the nikah, “a marriage in Islam is a Civil 
Contract and since EVERYTHING in Islam begins and ends with the name of The 
Almighty God, it becomes a religious ceremony by itself. There is NO such thing as 
Islamic marriage; please inform yourselves.” One participant noted concerns about the 
attitudes of the next generation, “even though I said that a Muslim wedding (nikkah) is 
very important to me, I know that our children (who are also Muslim) may not think so. 
That is possibly because they view it as a ‘tradition’ or ‘culture’ more than a religious 
requirement.”  
 Forty-four out of 56 who answered the question (78.6%) said it would be “very 
important” if they were divorcing their spouse to have an Islamic divorce. Six (10.7%) 
said it would be “somewhat important.” Five (8.9%) said it would be very unimportant, 
and one person said they did not know. However, slightly fewer said it would be 
important for them to have issues such as the division of family assets, amount and 
duration of maintenance of a dependent wife and children, and child custody decided 
according to Islamic principles154 in the even of a divorce. Thirty-seven of 56 who 
answered the question (66.1%) said it would be “very important.” Nine participants (or 
16.1%) said it would be “somewhat important.” Two people (3.6%) said it would be 
                                                 
154 Although this has become known as the “sharia debate” simply using the term sharia in this web-survey 
was problematic as was fiqh, Muslim personal law, Islamic law, etc. In the interests of maximum generality 
with the opportunity for participants to clarify matters further I elected to use the term “Islamic principles” 
and included the following caveat in relevant web-survey questions: “I realize the term “Islamic Principles” 
is very general, and that there is a lot of complexity and diversity that could be included under this term. 
Please feel free to make any comments on this term you would like to in the comment box below.” 
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“somewhat unimportant.” Seven people (12.5%) said it would be “very unimportant,” 
and one person again said they did not know. Some respondents who left written 
comments strongly affirmed the importance of deferring to Islam in the event of marital 
breakdown. “Islamic divorce is mandatory for all married Muslims.”155 “The only way is 
the Islamic way.” Another person stated the matter with more complexity, “there are no 
universally accepted "Islamic Principles". There are minimum requirements. However, 
justice and equity are the overriding requirements and take precedence.”  
 Other respondents expressed a desire to adhere to Islamic principles in the event 
of marital breakdown but were concerned about gender equality. One participant could 
see the logic in it, but was not necessarily enthusiastic about the proposal: “as I have 
lived in this society my entire life, I am not passionate about having Islamic law with 
Canadian divorce law. However, I do see value in having integrated... if a nikkah is 
important, wouldn’t it make sense to have an Islamic divorce?” One participant expressed 
the opinion that one does not need an Islamic divorce in addition to a civil divorce. 
“‘Islamic divorces’ seems to me to be a misnomer. Islamic marriages are contractual - not 
sacramental. In Canada, divorce should be in accordance with Canadian law.” One 
participant expressed clearly the complexity of the issues for some Muslims, “it’s a 
complex issue and it generates myriads of mixed emotions and loyalty for many 
Muslims. It’s more complex than the way it’s discussed. Many Muslims like me use parts 
of it and are happy to use those parts. For example I cannot see myself not having an 
Islamic marriage or nikah but I don’t think I would be comfortable going through 
arbitration if I was dealing with custody and child support issues.” One participant held 
                                                 
155 I of course interpret this to mean that all married Muslims seeking a divorce must have an Islamic 
divorce, not that it is the duty of all married Muslims to get a divorce.  
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Islamic divorce in very low esteem, “since the ‘Islamic’ MEN have made a MESS of 
Islamic laws and twisted them according to their likes and dislikes, I am sorry to inform 
you that EVEN an Islamic divorce will be a FARCE.” 
 For many participants in this survey, the concern with having civil contracts 
drawn up according to Islamic principles extended to wills as well. Thirty-nine of 56 who 
answered the question (69.6%) said it would be “very important” to draw up a will 
according to Islamic principles. Nine (16.1%) said it would be “somewhat important.” 
Three (5.4%) said it would be “somewhat unimportant.” Four (7.1%) said it would be 
“very unimportant,” and one person said they did not know. For some people, because of 
their circumstances, this is not an important issue. One wrote, “since I only have 
daughters, it is more important for me that they both equally share in my assets.” One 
participant preferred to take the matter into her or his own hands, “the inheritance 
divisions by percent are probably something I would want to figure out on my own.” 
Another respondent suggested a way around the issue of inheritance, suggesting also the 
historic context and reason for sons inheriting more than daughters, “for my wife I can 
give as much as I want in my life time, so she does not become destitute.”156 One 
respondent clearly outlines the struggle of adhering to Islamic tradition in the modern 
Canadian context, “I struggle with this one. I understand that my daughters should get 
half of the share than my son. However, as I understand it is because men are financially 
responsible for women (including sisters) in the family. However, in the cultural milieu 
that we are living in now, I do not see this happening at all. And so I find myself 
                                                 
156 Historically sons were expected to take care of a surviving mother as well as unwed sisters. This is often 
cited as the historic context and justification for giving sons twice the inheritance of daughters. However, 
daughters were in fact technically allowed to inherit and women could own their own assets.  
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struggling with the idea of a half share for my daughters. Not sure at this time how I am 
going to resolve this issue.” 
 The responses remained relatively consistent when also asked how important it 
would be to resolve a family dispute over an inheritance according to Islamic principles. 
Thirty-seven people of 56 (66.1%) said it would be “very important.” Eleven (19.6%) 
said it would be “somewhat important.” Two (3.6%) said it would be “somewhat 
unimportant,” and six people (10.7%) said it would be “very unimportant.” Wishing to 
avoid conflict, one respondent stated “the wishes of the deceased, if there is a will, should 
take priority.” Another participant stated “if it is my right, I am willing to give it up.”  
Participants in the survey felt generally more positive about faith based mediation than 
faith based arbitration. Forty-nine out of 53 who answered the question (92.5%) generally 
felt “positive” or “very positive” about faith based mediation. In fact, 64.2% felt “very 
positive.” Three people felt “negative” and only one person felt “very negative.” 
However, the responses are much more mixed regarding general feelings about faith 
based arbitration. Only 34.6% of respondents (18 of 52) said they felt generally “very 
positive” about faith based arbitration. Seventeen people 32.7% felt “positive.” Whereas 
32.6% either felt “negative,” “very negative,” or did not know how they felt about faith 
based arbitration. Five (9.6%) felt “negative.” Six people felt “very negative,” and six 
people said they did not know. Although a majority of participants still generally felt 
positive toward faith based arbitration, 92.5% of respondents generally felt “positive” or 
“very positive” towards faith based mediation, while only 67.3% felt “positive” or “very 
positive” about faith based arbitration. These numbers remained fairly consistent when 
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asked if hypothetically they would recommend faith based mediation and faith based 
arbitration respectively to a friend or family member.  
 Many of the written comments offered by participants illustrate their concerns 
about faith based arbitration and mediation well. Another respondent stated “I feel that 
people running these arbitrations are mostly culture based and do not apply Islamic 
principles but their own cultural bias which often undermines women’s rights. That’s 
why I hesitate to endorse this process. I’ve read that Jewish women’s rights are also 
compromised in these kinds of arbitrations so this does not only apply to Islamic based 
arbitrations.” Many were concerned about the qualifications of mediators and arbitrators, 
“the people involved would have to be VERY professional in their approach and there 
need to be guarantees that there would be no culturally-based decisions made.” One 
wrote simply: “must be done by qualified persons.” Another said, “If I am sure about the 
process and if the people conducting it have a good track record. I would also make sure 
all decisions are in compliance with Canadian laws.” One respondent illustrated the 
potential need for arbitration if mediation fails, “it really depends on the situation and the 
person(s) involved. If the parties were mature and had the capability to make sound 
decisions based upon facts, I wouldn’t recommend Arbitration. However, if the parties 
were immature, unreasonable, difficult, etc then I would recommend Arbitration.” 
In the comments there was a general preference for mediation rather than arbitration. One 
respondent wrote, “in Islam, mediation is at the heart of resolving disputes. Each party 
should be left with dignity and a sense that it is their solution. Arbitration is still an 
adversarial process, that, in order to convince the arbitrator, hurtful things may be said.” 
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Another stated, “I don’t mind seeking religious advice, but I would rather have the power 
and control over my affairs, rather than giving the decision making to someone.”  
I included questions that I hoped would give some wider indication of how frequently 
faith based arbitration or mediation is used. Fourteen of 52 respondents (about one 
quarter) said they know someone who has used faith based arbitration. Twenty-two 
respondents (42.3%) said they knew someone who had used faith based mediation. Only 
18 people (34.6%) said they knew of no one who had used faith based mediation or 
arbitration. Eleven respondents (21.6%) said they had used faith based mediation in the 
past. While only 3 people (5.9%) said they had used faith based arbitration in the past. 
One participant stated “I am a Mediator/Arbitrator. I have done number of them.” Others 
were glad they had not previously needed faith based arbitration or mediation, “I never 
got any chance so far. Thanks Lord.” One person claimed to have participated in faith 
based mediation or arbitration, and clearly did not have a positive experience, “it did not 
work.” One person stated “I heard (single sided opinions) from friends about arbitration 
that was not fair.”  
 When asked to check all that apply, 27 of 51 (52.9%) said they “would use faith 
based mediation” hypothetically in future for advice or help with resolving an issue or 
dispute. Twenty-five (49%) said they “might use faith based mediation” in future. While 
only three people said they would not use faith based mediation in future, and two people 
said they did not know. More people said they would not use faith based arbitration in 
future than faith based mediation if faith based arbitration had remained an option. 
Twelve of 53 (22.6%) said they would not use faith based arbitration even if it were still 
available, and five (9.4%) said they did not know. However, still a clear majority (67.9%) 
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said either they would or might have used faith based arbitration in future if it were still 
available. One participant was open to faith based mediation in future “if it worked.” But 
clearly she had not had a good experience with a previous divorce, “I won’t get married 
again because nikah is nothing more than a licence for fornication.” Another was open to 
faith based mediation “if necessary.” Some participants took the opportunity to recall the 
issue of the qualifications of mediators, “it all depends on the credibility of the 
individuals running the mediation.” One participant interestingly proposed that mediators 
could be trained to address issues of faith without actually belonging to the faith 
community of the disputants, “there are professional mediators who do NOT need faith to 
mediate, believe me, I know of mediators who STUDY your faith before they mediate so 
that they can give the CORRECT mediation and arbitrate with JUSTICE. Sorry to again 
inform you that “Islamically” based mediation is MALE biased.” Another respondent 
insisted trust in the arbitrator was more important than whether the arbitration was faith 
based or not: “arbitration is done with someone you can TRUST and that does NOT have 
to be faith based.” 
 Only 21% of 52 people “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the Dalton McGuinty 
government’s decision to change the Ontario Arbitration Act so that the state will no 
longer enforce arbitrations decided according to religious laws. The majority (53.8%) 
disagreed with the McGuinty government’s decision. One quarter of respondents said 
they simply did not know either way. One respondent stated,  
I did not like the way it was done. I personally think that people will choose faith 
based mediation/arbitration anyway. It would have been much better to be able to 
regulate it. I sometimes compare it with the abortion issue. Making abortion 
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illegal does not solve the problem because people would do it anyway if they need 
to, but in this case there is more potential for harm. If it is legal, then at least it can 
be regulated as well as it will minimize the health and life risks associated with 
illegal abortions.  
One respondent noted the importance of understanding that faith based arbitration has a 
longer and more complex history than some were aware of: “you would need to mention 
the year that this happened so people know that it started in the 1990’s with Lynn 
MacLeod (?) [Marion Boyd] and then it came up again in the early 2000’s. Also, Jewish 
faith and I believe one other already had it.” One respondent expressed why some felt the 
McGuinty government’s decision was the right one, at least for the time being, “I think 
our society may not be ready. More time is needed to adjust, prepare and implement this 
solution, in my opinion.” Some participants in the survey felt they were not well 
informed about this issue, “I have not heard this news before!” “I was not following the 
subject closely to make an informed decision.” One participant expressed an 
understanding of de facto legal pluralism in Canada as discussed in chapter 4, stating “I 
just want to add that mediation can still be done according to sharia here as the law 
allows for any mutual settlement among parties. Of course things like multiple marriage 
are not allowed and I think as Muslims are required to obey the law of the land they 
should not indulge in multiple marriage or any thing else which breaks the law.” 
Whether participants agreed with the McGuinty government’s decision or not, several 
expressed regret that the decision had been made in the context of debating Muslim 
communities specifically rather than religious communities more generally, “…also, the 
abrupt decision to cancel the whole thing because Muslims were asking for it was very 
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demeaning. If a Muslim woman chooses to use faith-based mediation/arbitration, she 
should have the right to do so.” Another wrote: “…but not surprisingly, when the public 
became aware of the so called ‘Sharia Law’ coming to Ontario, there was alarm bells set 
off (similarly to how the John Tory lost the election because of his proposal to fund 
religious based schools in Ontario).” Another participant stated “what bothered me about 
the decision was that it specifically targeted Muslims and made it seem they were more 
prone to oppress and abuse women’s rights when it’s clear that’s not the case. The 
decision was based in xenophobic hysteria and it was disheartening.” 
 As expected, respondents generally felt that Muslim faith based mediators are 
more adequately aware of women’s rights in Islamic law than women’s rights in 
Canadian law. However given the strong support for faith based mediation and 
arbitration, the overall level of confidence in Muslim faith based mediator’s awareness of 
women’s rights in both Islamic law and Canadian law is surprisingly low. Only 21.6% of 
51 respondents felt that “all or most” or “many” Muslim faith based mediators were 
adequately aware of women’s rights in Canadian law. Thirteen point seven percent felt 
that half were adequately aware. Twenty-five point five percent said they did not know, 
and a full 39.2% said few Muslim faith based mediators are adequately aware of 
women’s rights in Canadian law. However, even overall confidence in Muslim faith 
based mediator’s awareness of women’s rights in Islamic law is not as high as I would 
have expected. Of 52 responses, 42.3% felt that “all or most” or “many” were adequately 
aware of women’s rights in Islamic law. Eleven point 5 percent felt that half were 
adequately aware. Twenty-five percent did not know, and 21.2% felt that few Muslim 
faith based mediators possessed adequate awareness of women’s rights in Islamic law.  
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 One participant noted the issue of mediators trained in the diversity of Muslim 
traditions, “I am not sure if ‘qualified’ mediators or arbitrators exist in the variety of 
Muslim beliefs (example the sub-sects of Sunni Muslims). This point may be a reason for 
the people not accept the process.” Some were unclear on how adequately aware Muslim 
faith based mediators are of women’s rights in Islamic law, but felt this was an important 
issue. One wrote, “not sure what to answer as I haven’t dealt directly with these matters. 
But it is a huge concern.” Another participant responded,  
From my interactions with many of them, it does not seem like that. There are 
various interpretations to start with. Most of them are grown up in another culture 
with culture-based understanding of ‘women’s rights in Islamic law’. It may 
sound ridiculous but it happens. So for example, most scholars from South Asia 
would not like to see women praying at the mosques at all, whereas Arab and 
North African culture is fine with it. Then there are issues such as interpretation 
of some verses for example ‘men are in-charge, or protectors or maintainers of 
women?’ I personally think there is definitely a gender gap here. Muslim men in 
general would lean more to the in-charge than maintainers whereas women would 
long for more equality. I see many Muslim women around me making more 
money than their husbands and what happens in their case is that they become 
‘maintainers.’ So what happens in such cases? If there are those who are willing 
to apply Islam’s strong stance on equality in gendered situations, I would be 
happy to have them as mediators.  
Another participant noted the importance of proper training, “if we have faith based 
arbitration, then should we not also have licensed mediators? And if so, mediators need to 
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follow a standard application of Religious law. (Law applications can not have grey 
areas).” Another raised an important issue of awareness and training stating, “I do not 
know their qualifications (are they Lawyers?)” Other participants were more negative 
regarding how adequately aware Muslim faith based mediators are of women’s rights in 
Islamic law, “they follow the books that were altered after the time of the Prophet (sm) 
and have changed the law according to the THEN misogynistic rules (that were passed 
down from other faiths). Islam is not misogynistic but people have made it that way.” 
Another wrote: “they do not care enough. The REALLY GOOD people who KNOW and 
follow Islamic law would be fair to women.” 
 However, in contrast there is great confidence that Islamic law or sharia can be 
interpreted and applied today in civil disputes in a way that is generally in keeping with 
Canadian law. Several respondents expressed this generally positive response in writing, 
“there is nothing non-Islamic in the Canadian law. It coincides quite well.” Another 
wrote: “a middle path could be achieved.” Other respondents emphasized the flexibility 
of Islamic tradition and the importance of choice, “critically analyzing various fiqh 
positions based on our times and context is required. Choose the ones that applies best to 
our context. Even better to find new interpretations. For example, the inheritance law, 
divorce laws, child custody should be debated and discussed openly in the community of 
scholars.” “The law was created to make it equal and fair for everyone. I think if people 
had a choice that would be good. If I were a Muslim that chose NOT to go via Sharia 
law, then I should be allowed to.” Another wrote: “after all, Sharia is itself the 
interpretation of Quran and Hadith. When I say ‘interpretation,’ it is on the basis of 
today’s scientific knowledge and broad and unbiased judgement. I think there is room in 
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Sharia to take opinions from another scholar who might have more experience in the 
subject of discussion. For example, forensic scientific knowledge could be used to solve 
[crimes] in advanced cities whereas the same cannot be solved in undeveloped 
countries.” One respondent wrote: “if women are given the two choices (Islamic and 
Canadian law) and voluntarily chose Islamic. Or if the other party forgave the women 
when they selected the Canadian law).” I take this to mean that this person thinks that 
Islamic law or sharia can be interpreted and applied today in civil disputes in a way that 
is generally in keeping with Canadian law as long as women have a choice, or if the 
person she is in a dispute with agrees to the use of Canadian law. This suggests that the 
respondent thinks Canadian law is not contrary to Islamic law. One respondent expressed 
a more negative position regarding mediators, but a positive position regarding the 
compatibility of Canadian family law and Islamic principles, “my experience is that those 
who wish to use this approach want the minimum of what is required, not justice and 
equity. Most mediators are men who are burdened with a foreign cultural overlay, which 
they interpret as being Islamic. I have yet to hear a criticism of Canadian family law, 
describing in what way it offends Islamic principles.” Of 50 responses, 84% felt that this 
was “certainly” true or “possibly” true (responses were equally divided between these 
two options). Only 14% felt that this was not true, and only one person said they did not 
know.  
 That being said, overall confidence in the secular court system is not very high 
either. One participant expressed concern that “civil courts are very difficult for low 
income women. They are complex and very hard to deal with, so sometimes people 
choose the simplicity of what they know and can understand.” Some participants noted 
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occasions when they would prefer deferring to Islamic tradition, and other occasions 
when they would be required to use the secular courts and lawyers, “I would advise them 
of our law, and if the conflict is with a person of my faith to try mediation according to it; 
however if it is with a person of another faith or a secular person then the arbitration or 
mediation will have to be according to the secular law.” Another wrote: “there are 
enough laws in Islam to solve any problem. In case there is challenger who does not want 
to agree with the Islamic law, I would have no chance but to go to the Secular Law.” One 
participant said they would use secular courts and lawyers “if other efforts failed.” One 
participant suggested those practicing Canadian law could be better educated about 
diverse legal traditions, “do you have to be Muslim to understand Islamic law and 
appreciate the religious and cultural sensitivities of Muslims? Maybe the effort should be 
made in training lawyers, mediators, social workers to address this population – and 
others. The collaborative approach to family law, which is now a specialization in 
Canada, is in tune with how Muslims should style family disputes.” On the other hand, 
one participant expressed a feeling of exclusion to even be asked about faith based 
arbitration or mediation,  
I wish you luck in your Project for your Dissertation but I do not understand the 
purpose of this Survey. We live in Canada, and Canadian Law is for ALL of us 
(and it is a VERY FAIR Law without contradicting anything that Islam teaches 
us), why would you Isolate a Community by having a separate Law system for 
them? I find it degrading actually that I would be on a different level than all 
Canadians. Why are the Courts of Canada allowing a different system? Why even 
ask. Are the Courts not wanting to do their JOB? We Muslims came to 
 251
CANADA, if we wanted to live in a "Sharia" based country, why did we leave? 
OR, if you ask me "What about the children who were born here in Canada, grew 
up here and WANT Mediation or Arbitration in an Islamic way"? Sir, they have a 
CHOICE to go and live in a country that Arbitrates or Mediates Islamically. I 
would NOT change this FAIR Canadian System for anything.157 
When asked if they would feel comfortable going to secular lawyers and courts to resolve 
civil disputes such as divorce, custody, or inheritance disputes, of 52 respondents only 
30.8% said “yes always” or “yes often.” Thirteen point five percent said “sometimes.” 
However, 36.5% said “no,” and 13.5% said “rarely,” while 5.8% did not know. In sum, 
overall confidence in faith based mediation or arbitration is higher than confidence in 
Canada’s secular courts for resolving civil disputes related to family law and inheritance 
law among the participants in the survey.  
 Of 51 participants in the survey 96.1% considered themselves practicing Muslims 
or practicing to some degree. When asked if they considered themselves practicing 
Muslims 66.7% said “yes” and 29.4% said “yes to some degree.” Only one person said 
“no,” and one person said they did not know. One participant stated, “I pray five times a 
day, wear a hijab and fulfil my other religious obligations. I have read Qur’an with 
translation and tafseer.” Another stated, “I am a practicing Muslim, but I don’t wear a 
Hijab 24/7 (only to Mosque and when I pray). But I do my prayers 5 times a day, believe 
in God, fast during Ramadan and have made the Hajj.” One respondent simply stated “try 
to.”  
                                                 
157 However, interpreting what survey participants mean by faith based arbitration must take into account 
the qualitative work by myself and Julie McFarlane. Most so-called faith based arbitrations are in fact 
religious divorces that have little or nothing to do with making decisions about financial decisions 
regarding the dissolution of marital relationships. 
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 The numbers overall were only slightly lower when asked how important it is to 
live according to the sharia generally (not necessarily according to Islamic family law in 
particular). Of 50 people who answered this question 62% said it was “very important,” 
24% said it was “somewhat important,” while only 6% said it was “somewhat 
unimportant,” 6% said it was “very unimportant,” and one person said they did not know. 
However, participants had much more to say about the meanings and nuances of this 
question. Several participants in my fieldwork overall had substantial concerns about 
what is meant by “sharia,” its importance, who gets to decide what is and is not “sharia,” 
and whether even to use the term at all in the context of debating faith based arbitration 
or mediation. Therefore, it is important to quote several participants directly on this issue. 
One participant stated, “living according to Islam is very important to me. Whether that 
comes under the heading of ‘sharia’ when living in a majority non-Muslim country is 
open to debate and probably has been for centuries! Being able to deal with the kind of 
family matters mentioned in this survey in accordance with sharia is very important to 
me.” Another respondent opined, “important in the sense that shari’a covers prayers, 
fasting, charity, interactions with others, etc. Of course, this does not mean that Shari’a 
would have to take place of Canadian criminal code as many in the media would suggest. 
Only about 5% of the Shari’a deals with criminal law, the rest has to do with religious 
conduct, daily affairs, settling of debts, prayers, all of which point to the end goal which 
is worshiping and loving God. Shari’a is not the end, but the means through which one 
can attain the goals of Islam, which as mentioned are worshiping and loving God.” One 
participant was very concerned about who get the power to decide what counts as 
“sharia,” “I KNOW my Sharia through the Quran and I know it is VERY important for 
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me and I follow it. I just do NOT want anyone else to dictate that to me. There is a LOT 
of danger is someone else dictating THEIR Sharia over me. I am a free person to 
understand and live by God Almighty’s prescribed Shari’a and I shall be answerable for 
my deeds, I just do NOT like the idea of someone else prescribing Sharia to me.” Another 
stated, “if I am in a practicing Islamic country, but I realize that there is no practicing 
Islamic country these days I totally understand that there is no sharia in secular countries 
but I do not mind living in a country where there is fairness and respect and at liberty to 
practice our own faith. I actually prefer to live in our country where I can try to practice 
my faith correctly so that I can help remove many misconceptions which arise due to 
wrong practices by Muslims who do not understand their faith.” One participant stated “I 
really struggle with the wide spread acceptance of fiqh as unchallengeable part of sharia.” 
One respondent expressed flexibility stating, “some areas I adhere to sharia but in others I 
do not.” Another participant questioned the importance of the issue, “I live in a diverse 
culture, and have lived without religious laws thus far.” One participant was more 
concerned to preserve the integrity of “sharia,” “the Sharia is God’s Law. Muslims have 
no right to tamper with it or to tone it down just for the sake of pleasing the non-Muslims 
around them, just as it was not for the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) to do the 
same (as is clear in the Quranic verses, 69:44-47). Unfortunately though, a lot of the 
Muslims who have been influenced by the false ‘liberties’ and ‘freedoms’ of the West 
don’t understand the meaning of Sharia, let alone the gravity of living by it.”  
 Of 51 people who disclosed their gender, 60.8% were male and 39.2% were 
female. The demographic of people who completed the survey is relatively young. 59.6% 
of 52 who disclosed their age range were 40 years of age or below. Twenty-one point two 
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percent were 41-50 years of age. Only 19.2% were above the age of 50.158 The majority 
of participants were married (65.4% of 52), and one person had a partner. Twenty-six 
point nine percent were single. One person was separated and two people were divorced. 
Most participants had children (51.9% of 52 people). Of 50 participants who revealed 
their ethnicity, the majority were South Asian (62%). Twenty percent claimed East and 
Southeast Asian origins. Eighteen percent claimed Arab origins, and generally small 
numbers (normally between one and three people each) claimed other ethnic origins such 
as British Isles, Caribbean, Eastern European, or West Asian origins. Ten percent total 
claimed “western origins” of some type including North American, European, Western 
European, or Northern European origins.  
 In conclusion, the practice of religious marriage and divorce is widespread in the 
Muslim community. However, it is less important to have civil disputes arbitrated or 
mediated by community leaders. This makes sense in light of the responses of many web-
survey participants who not only had reservations about Muslim mediators and 
arbitrator’s familiarity with Muslim women’s rights under Canadian law, but also Muslim 
women’s rights under Islamic law. The Muslims who participated in the survey generally 
feel more positively about mediation than arbitration, not wanting to give decision 
making power away to an arbitrator. However, many were still ambivalent about the 
McGuinty government’s decision to prohibit faith based arbitration. There is pressure on 
women to stay married if the husband wants to stay married and if religious leadership 
does not recognize the wife’s reasons for wanting a religious divorce as legitimate. This 
                                                 
158 Although this survey is not representative, the average age of respondents is roughly similar to the 
average age of Canada’s Muslim population, which is quite young. The 2001 Canadian Census reports that 
80% of Muslims were below the age of 45, making the average age of Canadian Muslims slightly younger 
than those that participated in my survey. Statistics Canada, 2001 Census of Population, Statistics Canada 
catalogue no. 95F0450XCB2001004 (Canada, Code01).  
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reality illustrates the need for granting the religious divorce among Muslim communities. 
These responses reveal that Muslim Canadians have adopted an individualistic and 
subjectivated form of the religion in which they do not automatically cede authority over 
their lives to religious leaders. They wish to live by and learn from the Islamic tradition, 
but this does not mean that they blindly follow Islamic leadership. 
 
6.6 Jewish Orthodox Communities 
 There are important similarities between the issues that Muslim organizations 
contend with and those the Jewish Orthodox Beth Din faces with regard to family 
disputes and especially with regard to religious divorces. The Beth Din has at the time of 
my research received approximately twenty-five inquiries per year. However, only about 
eight or nine of these cases will end up going to the Jewish court for formal judgment. 
The vast majority of cases deal with business disputes or wrongful dismissal. The 
administration of the Beth Din estimates of the twenty-five inquiries the organization 
initially receives each year approximately fifteen concern business disputes, five concern 
wrongful dismissal, and another five concern family law disputes. The Beth Din 
estimates that the Orthodox Jewish community numbers approximately 15 000 in the 
Greater Toronto Area. There are over 164 000 Jews in Toronto, over 190 000 in Ontario, 
and nearly 330 000 in Canada (Beyer 2005).   
 The Beth Din has a long history of drawing up formal arbitration agreements that 
disputants sign before going to judgment by the Jewish court. One rabbi who formerly 
worked for the Beth Din of Toronto stated “people are required by Jewish law to resolve 
civil disputes according to Jewish law” (Personal interview May 16, 2008). A rabbi who 
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was then current director of the Beth Din of Toronto stated “People seek us out because 
they know they should go to a Beth Din rather than a secular court… We receive many 
referrals from rabbis” (Beth Din Director Interview Aug. 20, 2008). Those who approach 
the Beth Din of Toronto are encouraged to resolve their dispute on their own as far as 
possible, and if that does not work, “I usually suggest they send one last demand letter 
giving a time limit of a week or 10 days saying that if the issue is not resolved in that 
period then they will commence an action with the Beth Din. And often that is enough to 
get disputants to settle” (Beth Din Director Interview Aug. 20, 2008). A regular judge for 
the Toronto Beth Din stated,  
A religious Jew by Jewish law has to come first to the Rabbinic court, the beth din 
for these kind of cases. Then if it doesn’t work out, and if it can’t work… or the 
other side refuses to come, then that person who did initially want to come has 
permission from us and the Rabbis. You’ve done what you’re supposed to do. The 
other person is not cooperating, so you now have official permission to go to the 
civil courts. And then the other person is sent a letter by us telling them they have 
violated Jewish law. And you’re Rabbi, your synagogue, will be notified. They 
won’t be too happy about it. (Interview with Beth Din Judge November 30, 2011) 
The advantages of faith based arbitration are clear to many Jews as well,  
Even those who are not observant Jews will come to us because they know it’s 
quicker. It’s cleaner. Our decisions are very just and honourable and within the 
context of Ontario law and so on. And they don’t have to worry about lawyers and 
this and that, and it’s a lot smoother a lot cleaner and far less expensive. There is 
just a fee that they pay in, you know, to cover the paper work and stuff like that. 
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And [the director of the Toronto Beth Din] spends the time he’s got to get a few 
dollars pay. It’s all basically volunteer work. People don’t realize we spend a lot 
of time volunteering. Sometimes you wonder do they appreciate it. That’s another 
issue. (Interview with Beth Din Judge November 30, 2011)  
The Toronto Beth Din also initiates reintegration of the disputants into peaceful relations 
among community members as part of the process of arbitration, “when we finish a case 
we get both sides to shake hands. It’s over with. Finished. Now, shake hands. Be friends 
and go on with your life. So there’s no need to want to do that (take it to civil court 
afterwards)” (Interview with Beth Din Judge November 30, 2011). Indeed, very few 
Jewish arbitrations are taken to the courts to be enforced or overturned.  
Most Canadian Jews live in the Toronto or Montreal area, so that is where the two 
dedicated Beth Din in Canada can be found. The Beth Din of Toronto draws,  
on a pool of seven or eight judges. For each case there are three judges, although 
sometimes the parties will agree to one judge. The Canadian system is adversarial. 
Lawyers ask the questions. The Beth Din is more like the European system. It is 
inquisitorial; the judges ask the questions of the parties. The disputing parties are 
given a choice: either the Beth Din chooses the judges or one person chooses one 
judge, the other chooses another judge, and the two judges appoint a third. (Beth 
Din Director Interview Aug. 20, 2008) 
Normally lawyers are not a part of the process. The Director for the Toronto Beth Din 
stated “usually we do not allow advocates/lawyers, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances like they are recent immigrants and not familiar with the process. But 
generally speaking we don’t, and some beth din’s don’t allow any advocates at all. That 
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being said sometimes they will allow someone in the room to advise them but not to 
address the beth din directly” (Beth Din Director Interview Aug. 20, 2008). The Director 
for the Toronto Beth Din states that Jews in Canada are not concerned with establishing, 
for example, the conditions to be put in place in the event of a marriage breakdown, in 
the context of the marriage contract or prenuptial agreement because, “Canada has a good 
justice system so we don’t worry about that here. But in the past or in other countries that 
did not have this kind of justice system it would become much more important, especially 
regarding support for the wife in the event of divorce” (Beth Din Director Interview Aug. 
20, 2008). Only approximately a half dozen arbitrations have ever been brought to the 
civil courts for enforcement or appeal. However, the most striking finding from my 
research is that despite the amendments to the Arbitration Act, which state that no law 
other than Canadian law can be used in an enforceable Arbitration agreement, according 
to the Beth Din “nothing has changed” with regard to their everyday practice (Interview 
with anonymous rabbi December 12, 2011; Interview with Beth Din Judge November 29, 
2011). This is precisely because of the de facto legal pluralism that Canadian Family law 
allows.159 A regular judge for the Toronto Beth Din stated, 
 “you have to understand it is all voluntary anyway to begin with. And those 
people who… you know religious Jews, who want to use the services of the 
Rabbinate and so on, and so they come to us and we do it. So I don’t see where it 
has affected it… The only way it technically affect is… if a person is unsatisfied 
with our decision, then they might try to go to civil court. But what we make them 
do is to sign in advance an arbitration agreement and we become legal arbitration, 
                                                 
159 See Chapter 1.  
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not a Rabbinic court… even though the rulings might be in accordance with 
Jewish laws. (Interview with Beth Din Judge November 30, 2011) 
When asked about the new provision in the Arbitration Act regarding only using 
Canadian law, the same rabbi stated, “Yeah, that’s why we’re very, very carful. 
Everything we do we make sure is in sync with Canadian law, Ontario law. We do 
nothing… you know, we’re very, very careful about that… If you studied intimately 
Jewish law you would see that most of common law, civil law, western law is taken from 
that” (Interview with Beth Din Judge November 30, 2011). The rabbi explains further,  
Judaism itself is bound by the laws of the land. There is a concept in Jewish law 
of, you know, if the laws of the land do not to some great extent contradict Jewish 
Laws and so on and we will follow, you know, in any case, when they come to us 
for these kinds of things we look at the Ontario laws, provision of properties and 
so on, but no, its very rare, that aspect is very rare, its just the gett. (Interview with 
Beth Din Judge November 30, 2011) .  
The judge states in conclusion,  
It goes on as before because the people come voluntarily. That’s why they are 
there, and they sign an agreement that they will abide by the decision of the 
rabbis, the beth din. And we proceed. Its usually not very complex cases. It is 
usually very simple, to some degree.. you know, those who come to us are 
religious Jews who want to use the rabbinical authorities. And they come for 
arbitration. So we haven’t [seen] much of an impact I don’t think. I haven’t 
noticed much difference. (Interview with Beth Din Judge November 30, 2011) 
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On the whole however, much like the Muslim communities of Ontario, the Toronto Beth 
Din has tried to stay away from deciding issues of divorce such as child or spousal 
support, division of family assets, and the like. A judge for the Toronto Beth Din states, 
“over the years we have tried to keep away from the disposition of property and things 
like that… we let them go to the courts and let the lawyers work that out” (Interview with 
Beth Din Judge November 30, 2011). The Toronto Beth Din does not deal with very 
many divorces in any case; one judge said,  
Maybe one every couple years. And even then we try, we do this, we meet with 
them and try to work things out properly. Inevitably both sides have lawyers and 
they will get them to go to court anyway, that’s how they do these things. So we 
figured it out pretty quickly, we’re wasting our time because lawyers themselves 
are going to take it to the courts and do their thing. (Interview with Beth Din 
Judge November 30, 2011)   
The fact members of the Beth Din feel that in practice nothing has changed despite the 
amendments to the Arbitration Act again raises the question of what the amendments to 
the Arbitration Act actually mean. Much of the media coverage of McGuinty’s decision 
has given the impression that faith based arbitration is now forbidden in Ontario. 
However, this is clearly not the case. First, anyone can mediate a civil dispute. Second, 
anyone, including religious leaders, can arbitrate a civil dispute as long as the decision 
adheres exclusively to Canadian law and arbitrators sign a declaration that the arbitration 
has been done exclusively according to Canadian law. This is the caveat that is meant to 
exclude the use of religious laws in civil arbitrations. Furthermore, arbitrators must meet 
a minimum standard of training, keep written records, screen for abuse, provide bi-annual 
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reports of their activities to the Ministry of the Attorney General, and ensure that 
disputants receive independent legal advice.160   
 Most commentators in the press assumed Jewish law to be relatively similar to 
Canadian law. In fact it shares more in common with Islamic than Canadian law, and 
Jewish custody traditions are somewhat similar to some Islamic traditions. For example, 
traditionally, girls are often sent to live with their mothers and boys with their fathers. 
This is not the practice as much in Canada. In contrast, the Beth Din does recommend 
that boys go to live with their fathers after the age of thirteen if their father is able to give 
them religious instruction.161 One rabbi who formerly worked for the Beth Din of 
Toronto stated “male children who have a father in a position to teach the boy about 
Jewish tradition may be encouraged by Jewish law to go with the father after the age of 
13 (Personal interview, May 16, 2008). However, in practice the Beth Din tends to favour 
the mother in custody disputes. 
 Like the nikah (marriage contract which may include stipulations commonly 
entered into prenuptial agreements) in Islam, there is a Jewish marriage contract or 
prenuptial agreement called the ketubah in which, much like the Islamic mahr (dowry), 
there is an amount called the mohar (Jewish dowry) that remains an established part of 
the ketubah in Ontario Jewish communities today. The mohar is an amount that is paid in 
the event of divorce and was traditionally intended as a deterrent against hasty divorce 
and financial support for the wife in the event of divorce or widowhood. The rights of 
Jewish women in marriage are similar to those of Muslims. For example, husbands are 
                                                 
160 The Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/ 
arbitration/ . 
161 A number of Muslim leaders I spoke to maintained that the tradition is for both male and female 
children to go with the mother until somewhere between the ages of 7 and 13 at which point they should 
live with the father if he is in a position to teach the children the religious tradition.  
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required to support their wives, while wives are not required to support the household 
financially. Other stipulations of the relationship are laid out in the marriage contract, and 
the contract may be changed to suit the desires of the couple before signing, as in the 
nikah. In Jewish law, husbands are required to support children upon divorce as in 
Islamic law; however there was traditionally no support accorded to the wife, unlike 
Islamic law which traditionally supported the wife for the period of the Iddat (traditional 
three-month waiting period to ensure the wife is not pregnant, or establish paternity if she 
is, before she potentially remarries). Also, the assets of the husband and wife were 
traditionally separate: she kept her assets upon divorce and he his, as in many Islamic 
traditions. Traditional inheritance norms are similar to Muslim norms as well, with males 
inheriting more than women and the firstborn inheriting more than those born later. One 
Jewish woman lay-leader stated of Jewish faith based arbitration,  
Were there instances where in the Jewish community somebody who was more 
vulnerable wasn’t adequately represented or didn’t, you know, in the end attain 
what could have been attained in faith based arbitration? Of course, I’m sure that 
happened, as I’m sure it happens in every legal system and every arbitration 
situation… But there is always room for improvement. Obviously there are parts 
of the community that weren’t being accessed as well educationally, or weren’t as 
aware of the infrastructure that is open and available, those kinds of things. So 
things can always improve (Personal interview April 2, 2008).  
With regard to arbitrating family disputes, such as separation and divorce, in most cases 
today the Beth Din of Toronto simply adheres to the law of the land as there is always 
room in Jewish law to go by the law of the land as long as important religious practices 
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are not broken. One rabbi who formerly worked for the Beth Din of Toronto stated that 
the “tendency in Jewish law is to go with the law of the land you find yourself in… There 
is no tradition in Jewish law for support of women after marriage. This is a North 
American tradition” (Personal interview, May 16, 2008). Therefore, division of family 
assets is fifty/fifty, and spousal support and child support are worked out in similar 
fashion to Canadian methods. This is interpreted as in keeping with Jewish law. 
A fascinating comparison to the Muslim communities of Ontario concerns religious 
divorce. Orthodox Judaism shares with many Muslims a belief that religious divorce is 
necessary in addition to civil divorce, and may only be granted by the husband. One rabbi 
attempted to distinguish Muslim and Jewish law on divorce stating, “the husband is the 
only one that can grant the get, yes, but she can also refuse it. So he cannot divorce her 
without her permission. It’s not like in Islam where, you know, ‘I divorce you, I divorce 
you, I divorce you’ like that three times, and you’re gone… she needs to be present, she 
needs your consent. If she doesn’t give her consent then there’s no get”162 (Interview 
with Beth Din Judge November 30, 2011). However, Orthodox Judaism appears to be 
more restricted in that there is no room for a Jewish judge to pronounce a religious 
divorce on behalf of an absent or recalcitrant husband. Jewish courts can order a husband
to grant a religious divorce but have no further religious legal powers to pronounce 
divorce on his behalf. The Beth Din does not, according to them, deal with very many 
cases of limping marriages. In the vast majority of cases mediation is successful, the 
husband grants the divorce, and the two go their separate ways. However, there have 
 
                                                 
162 As stated above, the majority of Muslim leaders in Ontario do not believe that the husband has the right 
to divorce his wife as simply as this. Even though husbands have a unilateral right to religious divorce in 
Islam (as in Judaism) the process for them is more complex than this, takes more time, and must involve a 
religious authority that recognizes the religious divorce as such. Judaism and Islam are very similar in this 
regard.  
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been a few cases where an ex-husband has kept his ex-wife tied to a limping marriage, 
refusing to grant the get, or religious divorce. In this case the Jewish community resorts 
to social pressure on the husband to grant the get, “what happens is community pressur
Community pressure. You know, the Amish got it right. I wouldn’t call it shunning 
(laughing), but you know its that kind of thing. In other words we let the community
know that this person’s recalcitrant. There’s no possibility of reconciliation. If there’s a 
possibility we try to help them” (Interview with Beth Din Jud
e. 
 
ge November 30, 2011). 
                                                
For the apparent few who suffer from limping marriages, the suffering had been so acute 
for the women that a group of Jewish women organized to lobby the Canadian 
government for a number of years to include a legal provision in Canadian law that 
required a Jewish husband to grant the get upon receiving a civil divorce.163 One Toronto 
Beth Din judge stated,  
But when it comes to the Jewish divorce… The courts here in Ontario, and in 
Canada have sort of cooperated with us. In other words if they see, because once a 
person gets a divorce they should have a right to remarry right? If a person 
doesn’t have his Jewish divorce, Jewishly they can’t remarry in spite of the fact 
they got a civil divorce. So then the courts are saying you’re hindering civil 
divorce procedure. So therefore they say you cannot do anything to prevent 
anyone from remarrying once they get a civil divorce. So they will kind of push 
the issue with the husband if he is the recalcitrant one. And it is [often that] he’s 
going to punish her. He wants certain things out of her. So there is what we call in 
Canada the get law. There is a legislation. (Interview with Beth Din Judge 
November 30, 2011) 
 
163 See Norma Baumel Joseph 1994. 
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This is a fascinating case where at the bequest of religiously vulnerable people the state 
has agreed to attempt to intervene in religious matters where unjust oppression occurs. I 
know of no cases where this was effective. However, there was a recent highly publicized 
case in which a woman sued her husband for not granting her a Jewish divorce after he 
signed a civil divorce document promising to do so.164 The case went all the way to the 
Supreme Court of Canada where the husband was ordered to pay nearly $50 000 in 
damages to the woman for the fifteen years he kept her in agunot or chained, which put 
her past child rearing age before she could remarry within her community. However, this 
was apparently not enforced because of the amendments to Canadian law. Rather it was 
enforced as a contract that the husband signed and then defaulted on. Therefore, the new 
legislation requiring a civilly divorced husband to grant the get has, to my knowledge, not 
been tested. In summary, one Jewish Rabbi stated,  
In my opinion, the real effect of the McGuinty decision did not prevent religious 
courts from continuing, but prevented the recommended safeguards from taking 
effect. McGuinty rejected the suggestions of his commission after what I think 
was a misguided hue and cry from feminists alarmed by sharia law. I believe it 
was a grievous error. What did they think Marion Boyd was proposing? They 
could have had safeguards established in law. Instead, they got the worst possible 
results. People continue to use sharia courts, but without any of the safeguards 
Boyd had proposed for the women who can be easily taken advantage of. 
(Personal interview April 18, 2008) 
When asked whether faith based arbitration in the Jewish community was ongoing, one 
Jewish woman lay-leader stated,  
                                                 
164 See Wendy Leung 2008. 
 266
Oh absolutely! The only thing that’s been removed is the government support. 
What’s really ironic is that it seems that the reasoning of the government was that 
they wanted to make sure to secure the rights of the vulnerable. But really what 
they’ve done is they’ve removed any kind of accountability that would have 
secured the rights of the vulnerable. Communities are going to continue to do this 
anyway. Without question. I mean, faith based arbitration panels are empowered 
by their community. So with the government pulling supports it doesn’t take away 
the community empowerment, you know, it just removes a layer of security. 
That’s the irony of what happened. They actually accomplished the opposite of 
what they were hoping to accomplish. The matching of the two is really what will 
secure vulnerable people, because you could always have reviews and you could 
always appeal something as not being in line or supportive with Canadian values 
and Canadian law, and its much harder now. (Personal Interview April 2, 2008) 
 A number of observations may be made about the experiences of the Beth Din 
and practices of Jewish law in Canada. First, it is clear that all forms of faith based 
arbitration have not been forbidden. There are new protections, and the arbitrator must in 
good conscience formally declare that the arbitration has been decided according to 
Canadian law. However that is not an issue as in most matters the Beth Din adopts 
judgments very close to Canadian legal norms, but it claims to be able to do so fully in 
keeping with Jewish law. Therefore, the Beth Din claims that its practice of Jewish law 
and Canadian law is integrated. Secondly, the Beth Din and many other religious 
organizations are not in a position to afford the protections the amendments to the 
Arbitration Act. This could potentially disadvantage vulnerable people, for while the 
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amendments included new protections in the Act, simultaneously the new protections 
were made inaccessible to the people who might benefit from them most. Third, 
assumptions voiced in the media that Islamic law is hopelessly patriarchal and backward 
while Jewish law is presumably much more acceptable to Canadian standards overlook 
the fact that Jewish legal tradition is much closer to Islamic legal traditions than Canadian 
legal norms. Many would be surprised to find that Islamic law grants far more powers for 
women to receive a religious divorce denied by their husbands than the Jewish legal 
tradition. Furthermore, as documented in this chapter, the practice of Jewish and Islamic 
faith based mediation and arbitration is also very similar. Jewish and Islamic faith based 
mediation and arbitration is carried out in close proximity to Canadian legal norms, and 
Canadian law is practiced as consistent and integrated with Jewish and Islamic law, as 
both legal systems allow for abiding by the laws of the land. Given the fact that Jewish 
communities had been practicing faith based mediation and arbitration for many years, 
and the similarity between Jewish and Islamic family law, the reaction against Muslims 
practicing faith based mediation and arbitration suggests that Jewish communities are 
regarded as an accepted community in Canada (and anti-Semitism is socially 
unacceptable) while Muslims are still regarded as foreign and dangerous (and 
Islamophobia is not widely regarded as socially unacceptable). Finally, the Jewish case 
suggests a caveat to the separation of religion and state approach advocated by the 
McGuinty Government. It appears from the issue of the get, and granting religious 
divorces generally, that there may be room for state coercion of religious practice. There 
are precedents in Canadian legal practice of coercing Jewish men to grant the get, which 
under Jewish religious legal practice is the husband’s exclusive religious right. This is 
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justified because it is in the state’s interest to protect citizens who may be unfairly 
disadvantaged by the religious practices of others. Whether or not state coercion of 
religious matters in the realm of granting Muslim divorces for the sake of protecting 
vulnerable people is a viable option remains to be seen. 
 
6.7 Mediation and Religious Divorce: Discussion and Conclusion  
 One of the main points I have sought to emphasize in this chapter is the contrast 
between the issues that were thought to be important in the public “Sharia debate” 
regarding faith-based arbitration and the issues that are actually important to Ontario 
Muslims. Because of the media coverage, the public debate imagined that the most 
important issue had to do with formal arbitration.165 This assumption meant that much of 
the debate focused on issues that could be legally decided by a third party in the context 
of arbitration, such as amounts of spousal support and child support, and division of 
resources upon marital breakdown. However, arbitration proper occurs only when two 
parties in dispute choose a third party to make a binding decision on behalf of both 
parties. Very few in the Muslim community, leaders or adherents, were or are interested 
in formal faith-based arbitration as such. The majority of clients seeking Muslim civil 
dispute resolution services are women in need of a religious divorce. Furthermore, the 
majority of Muslims who are seeking advice from religious leaders on how to divide 
resources, establish amounts for child and spousal support, or informally decide custody 
according to Islamic tradition Islamically in the event of divorce are not interested in 
subjecting these decisions to formal arbitration, and I found no Muslim leaders or 
                                                 
165 “Formal” arbitration is redundant, but I include it to emphasize the difference between that and 
“informal” mediation. 
 269
organizations that were anxious to encourage couples to have these issues formally 
arbitrated, religiously or otherwise. This is not the case because Muslims now imagine 
faith based arbitration to be legally forbidden. The demand or desire is simply not there. 
The most dramatic case in point is that of the IICJ. Aforementioned, the IICJ is the only 
organization I found that fully understood the nature and requirements of the Arbitration 
Act. Further, its members understand that limited forms of “faith-based arbitration” are 
still allowable and legally enforceable even under the new amendments to the Act as long 
as certain requirements and guidelines are followed. However, the IICJ has never 
performed a formal arbitration process, nor have their clients requested or inquired about 
it.  Moreover, the IICJ has not attempted to use its knowledge of the Arbitration Act to 
either market or pressure formal arbitration onto their clients. Rather, the majority of the 
small number of clients of the IICJ, as is the experience of all other Muslim organizations 
and leaders I have interviewed, are looking for assistance with some form of religious 




Chapter 7:  
Conclusion 
 
 During my fieldwork for this dissertation I found that it is mainly women who 
seek out the services of Muslim leaders and institutions on matters related to family law. 
Most commonly, Muslim women are looking for a religious divorce in addition to the 
civil divorce so that they can move on with their lives and perhaps remarry within their 
religious community with a free conscience that they are not committing adultery by 
doing so. I also found that, if Muslim women are experiencing oppression in the realm of 
family law matters, most commonly it is oppression relating to the granting of the 
religious divorce. A number of social workers in Muslim communities spoke of women 
who were not granted a religious divorce, especially if the husband did not want to 
divorce her. Some recalcitrant Muslim men would like to keep their ex-wives “chained” 
to them by religious marriage, even if they have had a civil divorce, and even if he has 
moved on and married someone else. These men often do so out of bitterness because 
they did not initiate the divorce, or because they want to punish their ex-wives. 
Sometimes they will use religious divorce as a bargaining chip in separation negotiations 
to lower spousal support. Sometimes men will simply disappear or move back to their 
homelands because they cannot provide adequately for their families. Whatever the 
reasons, my fieldwork suggests that not being able to obtain a religious divorce is by far 
the largest potential source of religious oppression related to family law matters that 
Muslim women may face in Ontario.  
However, I also found in my fieldwork several Muslim leaders and institutions 
that are attempting to grant religious divorces as freely as possible. I found Muslim 
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leaders and institutions going out of their way to seek out schools of Islamic law that they 
may not normally use in order to grant religious divorces to Muslim women with limping 
marriages as frequently as allowable. I found Muslim social workers that would 
encourage women not to give up the first time they were denied a religious divorce and 
who may even recommend a specific religious leader or institution that they know would 
grant the religious divorce readily. Therefore, based on my fieldwork I found that faith 
based mediation of matters such as child support, spousal support, division of marital 
assets, custody, etc. was not the most important issue to Muslim communities. In fact I 
found relatively few Muslims looking for or providing these services. Rather, my 
fieldwork suggests that the issue of granting or withholding the religious divorce is much 
more important. The changes made by the McGuinty government to the Arbitration Act 
are excellent as far as they go. However, they do not touch the most important issue 
affected by religion in the area of the private resolution of family law matters for 
Muslims in Ontario, the religious divorce.  
 In the sections that follow, I attempt to first expand my consideration of how a 
secular Canada in the context of the policy goals of its laws on multiculturalism, 
accommodates the Canadian Charter guarantee of religious freedom of people who wish 
to practice faith based arbitration in Ontario, as well as what the limits of this 
accommodation are by revisiting the theoretical contributions of this dissertation in light 
of my fieldwork findings. The second section attempts to further answer my thesis 
question through an evaluation of previous scholars who argue for transformative 
accommodation in legal matters in light of my fieldwork findings. I argue that 
transformative accommodation is an example of anti-imperial and feminist forms of 
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secularism that would serve as a framework for policy-making in the area of faith-based 
arbitration in family law. The third section makes several suggestions for policy 
development based on my findings in the spirit of anti-imperial secularism and post-
secular feminism. Finally I make suggestions for future research.  
 
7.1 Is Secularism Bad for Women? 
 In this section I revisit the theory discussed in chapter two in light of my 
fieldwork findings. A common assumption expressed by many during the Sharia debate 
was that secularism is almost always good for women (Razack 2008). Those who hold 
this position appear to assume both that secularism is nearly monolithic, and also that it 
has not been used in the service of imperial and dominant (including gendered) interests. 
If “dangerous Muslim men” and “uncivilized sharia” were the main “problems” 
identified with faith based arbitration in the so-called sharia debate, then secularism was 
most often represented as the solution to these problems. We need to challenge these 
comfortable assumptions because secularism has historically not only been diverse, but 
also frequently conducive to dominant sexist and colonial interests. However, it would be 
unwarranted to argue that secularism will always be harmful for women.  
 Imperial secularism and colonial feminism in the case of the “sharia debate” 
placed the overwhelming responsibility for the potential disadvantage of Muslim women 
almost exclusively on “dangerous Muslim men” and “uncivilized sharia” (see chapters 
four and five). The problem with these approaches is that they hide several other reasons 
– cultural, social and structural – that work in concert to disadvantage Muslim women on 
this issue. Moreover, as a direct result of these approaches, numerous methods and 
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resources that could have facilitated much better protection of Muslim women were 
ignored or not well developed. I have argued in this dissertation that imperial formations 
of secularism share responsibility in creating the conditions for the potentially unfair 
treatment of vulnerable people generally and Muslim women in particular. Yes, Muslim 
women may be harmed by patriarchy among some Muslim men and by particular 
interpretations of sharia. However, orientalism, racism, western forms of patriarchy, the 
culturalization of inequities and deviance in Othered minoritized communities, hierarchy, 
colonial feminism, imperial secularism, and generally the pursuit of western imperial 
interests abroad and domestically contribute greatly to creating the conditions for the 
marginalization of and inequity experienced by Muslim women globally and in Ontario 
specifically.166   
 One unseen and direct result of imperial secularism in the sharia debate and 
resulting policy has been the obfuscation of several methods and resources for facilitating 
Muslim women’s rights and agency. In chapter five I argued that the discourse used in 
much of the media and public discourse on the so-called sharia debate paternalistically 
infantilized Muslim women by imagining them generally to be largely devoid of human 
agency. The Othering accomplished by the public discourse on the sharia debate 
generally shows the secularizing function of media institutions, as I have defined imperial 
secularism as in part a hierarchy producing and maintaining program.167 Given this 
dominant discourse on the “imperiled Muslim woman,” as I argued in chapter four, 
                                                 
166 Razack has suggested that while patriarchy and inequity are significant threats to vulnerable people in a 
number of Muslim homelands, the discourse and state policies on Muslims in the West are the greater 
threats to Muslims living in the West generally, and Muslim Canadians specifically at present (Razack 
2009, 163). 
167 And as discussed in chapter two, my concept of religionization not only allows me to provisionally 
define the object of my study as “religious,” it enables me to see that religionization is an important tool of 
imperial secularism for its effective hierarchy producing capability.  
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imagining Muslim women to be largely devoid of agency in the face of the “dangerous 
Muslim man” and “uncivilized sharia” has led to policy developments largely designed to 
aid persons imagined to be in need of rescue and to be without agency instead of policies 
designed to facilitate the agency of vulnerable people. This has been a major oversight 
because the realities of de facto legal pluralism mean that the “one law for all” approach 
is not a real possibility currently in Canada (Bunting 2008; Bakht 2008). Even though 
technically an agreement can no longer be enforced if religious laws were used as the 
basis of deciding a dispute in a formal arbitration, there are several ways that religious 
laws can be made a part of legal contracts that are legally enforceable. In other words, the 
legal system remains overwhelmingly dependant on agents exercising their agency in 
order to bring to bear the protections the legal system offers. This means that policy 
designed to protect non-agents could very likely be largely ineffective. Policy designed to 
better facilitate the agency of vulnerable people is what is needed. I make several 
recommendations in this regard in section three of this chapter.  
 Exploring what Muslim communities are doing on the ground has also revealed 
several realities that media pundits, public spokespersons, and policy makers did not 
expect. There are few Muslim service providers that are attempting to pursue the offering 
of faith based arbitration per se. The vast majority are offering religious divorces in 
addition to legal divorces and this by far, as I have argued in chapter six, is the major 
issue of inequity facing Muslim women in Canada. This issue has not been touched by 
the amendments to the Arbitration Act. Furthermore, those Muslim family service 
providers that are offering legal advice regarding how to dissolve a marriage according to 
Islamic tradition, for example, are doing so in the context of mediation, the results of 
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which can be entered into a separation agreement and are therefore also legally 
enforceable. Such contracts again are not touched by the recent changes to the Arbitration 
Act. Furthermore, the attempt to protect vulnerable women through the revisions of the 
Arbitration Act seems disingenuous given that legal aid is still not provided to those 
choosing to resolve their civil disputes through arbitration. This means that although what 
has been changed in the Arbitration Act is quite good as far as it goes, it does little to 
touch most of the issues that concern vulnerable people on the ground.  
 Furthermore, we do not find the majority of Muslim service providers 
shamelessly attempting to take advantage of Muslim women. Although certainly 
patriarchy is a major concern among Muslim communities as it is among all Canadian 
communities, we see numerous examples of Muslim civil dispute resolution service 
providers working to benefit women as best they are able in their particular positions. For 
example, several Muslim organizations go out of their way to liberate women from 
religious marriages against the will of recalcitrant husbands in order that women might 
better perceive themselves to be fully divorced from these men, as well as to free them to 
remarry within the community if they wish. The research results presented here challenge 
the tone of the “sharia debate,” while still being realistic about the need for policy 
developments that genuinely protect and facilitate the agency of vulnerable peoples 
generally, and Muslim women in particular.  
 I use the new concepts and revised theories presented in this dissertation to 
express my general theory that the “sharia debate” was an example of how Canadian 
secularism distorted public policy debates by positing abstract caricatures of a Muslim 
“other”, specifically, the vulnerable, uneducated, Muslim woman and the predatory, 
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dominating, irrational pre-modern Muslim man. Sherene Razack refers to these 
stereotypical figures as the “imperiled Muslim woman” and the “dangerous Muslim 
man”. What I have termed imperial secularism served several functions including racism, 
sexism, anti-immigrant sentiment, Orientalism and Islamophobia. This form of 
secularism was deployed by several figures and organizations in the name of colonial 
feminism over against Islam and Muslims in Canada generally. This form of secularism 
operated through a discourse that did not refer to real women. Therefore I introduce 
original empirical evidence to show that these media and public discourses have nothing 
to do with the real lives of Muslim Canadians and therefore are an abstract fabrication of 
an Orientalist imagination. 
  Building on Asad’s insights regarding France, Razack examines how the 
public discourse operated in Ontario’s “Sharia debate.” Razack argues that the 
secular/religious divide was made to stand in for a racialized colour line separating white 
modern civilized subjects over against premodern racialized and even barbaric Others in 
need of being brought (by force if necessary) into modernity (Razack 2008, 146). It is not 
always clear whether Razack sees religion as simply coming to stand in for racism, or 
whether she sees Islamophobia for example as separable, even theoretically, from racism 
though intersecting intimately with it here. I would argue that the latter is the better way 
to understand the situation, lest religious discrimination be ignored because completely 
reducible to racial discrimination. Razack argues that this kind of project is also intended 
to create neo-liberal citizens unconnected to community so that they may be better 
integrated into the needs and wants of modern capitalist economies (Razack 2008, 169). 
Furthermore, the discourse of the so-called “Sharia debate” further illustrated Canada’s 
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commitment to the “war on terror” in the context of a larger effort, Razack argues, in 
which Canada is anxious to solidify its membership in the family of privileged and 
dominant white nations (Razack 2008, 160). 
 Scholars such as Sherene Razack (2008) have convincingly argued that although 
patriarchy is certainly a major concern of several Muslim women living in Muslim 
countries often the greater threat to Muslim women in the West is the racist and imperial 
discourses and projects that seek to benefit dominant populations and marginalize 
minoritized women. However, because of the lack of research into what is happening in 
Muslim communities on the ground, Razack and others critical of racist and imperialist 
projects and discourses have nonetheless concluded that the McGuinty government’s 
decision was the right one, at least for now. She states, “[w]here I run aground, however 
is in the perception of risk. Many of my good friends breathed a sigh of relief when 
Premier McGuinty announced the end of faith-based arbitration. These are friends who 
know the power of fundamentalism and how much it oppresses women. They are women 
who insist that Sharia always works in favour of men and that for it to work otherwise 
requires considerable resources that Canadian Muslim women do not have. Making 
equality arguments within Islam certainly requires a long-term strategy” (Razack 2008, 
171). I hope that my work has clarified several of the concrete issues surrounding the 
debate and actual practice of private ordering in minoritized communities, as well as the 
substantial complexity of the issue of allowing or denying faith based arbitration counter 
to the simple yes/no manner in which the debate was characterized.  
 I have argued that imperial formations of secularism have been deeply detrimental 
to minoritized and religionized women. However, there are other types of secularism that 
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might better facilitate the promotion of equity and agency of women generally, and 
Othered women specifically. I have argued in this dissertation that anti-imperialist 
secularism and post-secular feminism must be developed to better protect and facilitate 
Muslim women’s agency, opening up a third option for Muslim women between 
potentially patriarchal communities and potentially racist and imperialist western nation 
states (Khan 1998; Khan 2000). Anti-imperial forms of secularism aid in the struggle 
against Orientalism, racism, the culturalization of deviance or inequity in minoritized 
communities, and hierarchies. In the context of Canadian multiculturalism, Canadians 
must uncover and counter those assumptions rooted in what I have called imperial 
secularism. Post-secular feminism is at once anti-imperial in thrust, but also by its name 
suggests a criticism of colonial feminism for assuming that secularism is always the best 
way to protect the rights of, especially religiously minoritized, women. Colonial 
feminism, as stated above, blames any patriarchal inequity experienced by Muslim 
women almost exclusively on Muslim men and Islam, suggesting that Muslim women are 
primarily the victims of their culture. Post-secular feminism rather recognizes several 
global, imperial, and economic contexts that create the conditions for global patriarchy, 
and challenges these other sources of patriarchal oppression as well. Building on 
Habermas’ notion of the post-secular, post-secular feminism further takes religious 
subjectivity seriously, and attempts to achieve feminist goals without marginalizing 
religious subjectivity or assuming the superiority of imperial forms of secularism.. 
Imperial secularism must be countered with anti-imperial secularism; colonial feminism 
must be countered with post-secular feminism, and these will help achieve the policy 
goals of Canadian multiculturalism in the arena of combating religious discrimination, 
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accommodating religious diversity, and protecting religious freedom without 
compromising individual rights. Rather than attempting to outline what each of these 
might look like in a general and theoretical way, I have made specific policy 
recommendations below in section three that I think work towards these ends in concrete 
ways through this particular case study of faith based arbitration generally and the “sharia 
debate” specifically.  
 
7.2 Return to Theory: Transformative Accommodation 
 Now that I have offered my analysis of what I deem to be imperial secularism and 
colonial feminism in the sharia debate and resulting policy, I attempt here to return to our 
earlier theoretical discussion in chapter 2 in order to propose forms of anti-imperial and 
feminist secularism to address the broader concerns of inequity raised in the so-called 
sharia debate in the Canadian context. In order to right the damage of the discourse on the 
“Sharia debate” as well as the oversights of the resulting policy practice of the 
government, Canada must better embrace critical multiculturalism generally as well as 
anti-imperial secularism and post-secular feminism specifically. I argue that 
transformative accommodation as proposed by Ayelet Shachar and Anver Emon is in part 
an attempt to craft just such a post-secular feminist and anti-imperial secular 
accommodation of religious legal diversity. Transformational accommodation asks how, 
and to what extent legal codes can themselves be diversified in order to build legal 
diversity that accommodates the legal traditions and norms of diverse cultures without 
compromising individual rights or overloading the state. How much legal pluralism can 
Canada incorporate, if any, without disadvantaging women for example?  
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 7.2.1 Ayelet Shachar: Legal Pluralism 
 Ayelet Shachar’s Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s 
Rights offers a robust development of a program for legal pluralism specifically that 
attempts to address the question of legal transformation, pluralism and individual, 
especially women’s, rights (2001). In place of earlier forms of accommodating cultural 
diversity through the law, Shachar proposes what she calls “transformative 
accommodation” of cultural diversity in state legal matters in her well-known work 
Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights (2001). Here I 
evaluate this program in light of faith based arbitration generally and the Sharia debate 
specifically. Transformative accommodation is constituted by four basic principles. First 
is “allocating jurisdiction along “sub-matter” lines (Shachar 2001, 119-120). This means 
that diverse areas of contestation between cultural groups and the state can be further 
divided into sub-matters. For example, family law in the area of marriage can be divided 
further into the sub-matters of status and property relations. Shachar argues that 
transformative accommodation allows competing entities to have a share in or joint 
jurisdiction of matters and sub-matters rather than falling back into the either/or position 
of either the state or cultural/religious communities having exclusive reign over a given 
jurisdiction. For example, perhaps the state will want to maintain exclusive power over 
the ability to assign the status of divorce, but it may share jurisdiction with religious 
communities regarding the status of marriage. Authorized religious leaders may act as 
representatives of the state in marrying couples. Furthermore, both the state and religious 
communities might claim a role in governing property relations between married couples. 
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Shachar’s point is that if larger jurisdictions are divided into sub-matters, it is easier to 
see how jurisdiction might be shared rather than exclusively assigned to the state or 
cultural communities. 
 Second, is the “no monopoly” rule (Shachar 2001, 120). This simply means that 
as often as is reasonably possible, individuals should be able to choose between either the 
state or cultural communities for governance on certain legal issues. Together with this 
goes the third requirement of transformative accommodation, “the establishment of 
clearly delineated choice options” (Shachar 2001, 122). These conditions aim to ensure 
that citizens may always choose their authority, rather than only one authority 
legitimately holding sway over a specific jurisdictional matter or sub-matter. 
Furthermore, built into the clearly delineated choice options are openly laid out “reversal 
conditions.” This means that the parameters are clearly laid out to help clients identify 
when the relevant jurisdiction is not meeting the needs of individuals so that they might 
partially opt for the other jurisdiction. This aims to make opting out more feasible in that 
the conditions for opting out are agreed to in advance by both the state and cultural 
communities, and they are explicit and therefore individuals are made aware of these 
reversal conditions in advance. Moreover, opting out does not have to mean, for example, 
that a religious community member must completely opt-out of his or her community, but 
only on very specific and clearly delineated sub-matters. If religious communities have 
agreed to these conditions in advance, it is less likely that individuals will be 
excommunicated or shunned for opting out of one aspect of a sub-matter of jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, religious communities may thus be pressured to make changes gradually to 
accommodate especially their most marginalized members (Shachar 2001, 144). 
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Conceivably, state jurisdictions could be encouraged to better accommodate 
cultural/religious difference as well if clients continue to opt for community-provided 
services rather than state institutions. Finally,  a “single cohesive system of checks and 
balances guarantees that neither the state nor the group is enabled to govern alone” 
(Shachar 2001, 143). 
 Shachar argues that although some minority groups will resent not possessing the 
sole power to authoritatively govern a particular jurisdiction, this system potentially 
offers the best of both worlds. Importantly, Shachar maintains that the “last word on the 
‘reversal’ of jurisdiction belongs to those group members who are at most risk from 
oppressive group practices” (Shachar 2001, 144). This approach, Shachar argues, is 
superior to those that oppose all state interference in private affairs, given that states 
inevitably interfere in private matters in any case, even when they simply turn a blind eye 
to internal community norms that may disadvantage vulnerable people. The question for 
Shachar then becomes how the state is to interfere in private lives, not if. 
 Shachar introduces the term privatized diversity into the sharia debate that assists 
in conceptualizing a component of the proposal of the Islamic Institute for Civil Justice to 
offer faith based arbitration (2008, 575). If “multicultural accommodation” means 
making accommodations to diverse cultural practices within the context of the existing 
state, then “privatized diversity” refers to the option of minority cultural groups to opt out 
of state requirements and institutions altogether. In these instances, diversity is 
“privatized,” that is, relegated to the “private” sphere that includes personal life, family 
relations, and ethno-religious communities and associations. In this case, although the 
Islamic Institute of Civil Justice was attempting to join in with Orthodox Jews for 
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example who were operating within already existing Arbitration law, Shachar argues that 
the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice also voiced its desire to at least partially “opt out” of 
the family law system through the Arbitration Act. Even though part of the point of 
binding arbitration is to make such decisions enforceable by the state, and the Arbitration 
Act is itself state legislation, Shachar makes the point that the Islamic Institute of Civil 
Justice still apparently wanted as far as possible to apply Islamic legal codes in family 
matters rather than the Family Law Act. Thus it sought privatized diversity to a 
significant extent. Shachar opposes both the privatized diversity proposed by the Islamic 
Institute of Civil Justice and the much more exclusionary form ultimately carried out by 
the McGuinty government which did not eliminate faith based arbitration but rather 
moved it completely into the private realm, i.e., the realm of underground arbitrations and 
mediations. Instead, she offers a variety of proposals designed to work toward the 
transformative accommodation program she recommends in Multicultural Jurisdictions. 
As Shachar argues “individuals and families should not be forced to choose between the 
rights of citizenship and group membership: instead they should be afforded the 
opportunity to express their commitment to both” (2008, 574). To this end she proposes a 
“non-dichotomous” route (592).  
 Shachar’s suggestion is to allow faith based arbitration again but with clearly 
outlined protections in the form of explicit choice options and reversal conditions. The 
area of family law is already divided along submatter lines, which better allows 
community members choices on specific matters rather than suggesting that a community 
member must opt out entirely of one’s community to afford the alternative legal options 
the state might offer. For example, the matters of spousal support and division of family 
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assets are already subdivided in family law, meaning that one could choose to accept the 
right to fifty percent of the family assets (according the Family Law Act), but at the same 
time one could choose to follow religious legal traditions regarding spousal support. The 
benefit here according to Shachar is that the legal situation does not have to be all or 
nothing regarding secular or religious law. If one wants to adjudicate a certain matter 
under religious tradition, and another matter under the Family Law Act, one has that 
choice. A litigant does not have to choose only religious law or secular law for all family 
law matters. Moreover, offering people this choice would ensure that no one community 
has a monopoly on offering this type of service, thus fulfilling the first two requirements 
of transformative accommodation (allocating jurisdiction along “sub-matter” lines and no 
monopoly). Furthermore, if faith based arbitrators wanted to offer their services such that 
the results of their decisions would be enforceable by the state, Shachar suggests the state 
draft legislation that faith based arbitrators must first and foremost employ Canadian 
legal default norms of the Family Law Act. Several other protections could also be built 
into the process such as mandatory independent legal advice, training of arbitrators, 
record keeping and the like. In this case faith communities voluntarily agree to statutory 
default norms established in the Family Law Act in order to afford the enforceability of 
their arbitral outcomes by the state. Such a system, Shachar argues, could promote the 
development of moderate interpretations of religious traditions in the area of family law 
practices, at the same time it promotes the diversification of existing state institutions as 
well. Shachar notes that the Jewish community claims to have elected to adhere to the 
default norms of the Family Law act on its own initiative previously, even though before 
the recent changes to the Arbitration Act any form of law in fact was allowable in 
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enforceable arbitration (Shachar 2008, 603).  Shachar’s program may raise the question of 
whether it only protects diversity that is not substantially outside Canadian law. I believe 
her aim is to include more diversity than, for example, the McGuinty government has 
chosen to in prohibiting faith based arbitration altogether, while at the same time 
imposing acceptable limits, and she attempts to accomplish this in a more liberal, 
rational, and less arbitrary way than the McGuinty government has done, or some 
religious communities have proposed.  
 I argue in response to Shachar’s proposal simply that essentially what she 
recommends has in fact now all but been put into place. Several clearly outlined reversal 
conditions are now enshrined in the revised Arbitration Act. However, two major changes 
need yet to be made to achieve Shachar’s vision. First, the province needs to provide 
legal aid to those electing arbitration but unable to shoulder the costs. Without this, those 
most in need of the legal protection (despite the requirement for independent legal advice 
in the revised Arbitration Act) will be precisely the ones who cannot afford the 
protections the revised Act now affords. Second, religious arbitration must be allowed 
again in order for Shachar’s vision to fully materialize. This would fulfill the only 
remaining of the four parts of transformative accommodation that is not fulfilled, 
addressing the current monopoly of the state and religious community over the services 
they provide. For example, if faith based arbitration were allowed under the Arbitration 
Act, then religious communities would not have complete monopoly on providing 
religious dispute resolution services, nor would the state have a complete monopoly on 
legally enforceable dispute resolution services that encompass the rights afforded by the 
Family Law Act. Again, the potential benefit of this arrangement is that if a client was 
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not receiving satisfactory dispute resolution services in her religious community, she 
could turn to the Arbitration Act without completely rejecting her religious tradition. 
Furthermore, if a client felt that she did not prefer the secularism or dominant culture as 
manifested through the court system, she could turn to faith based arbitration under the 
Arbitration Act and therefore not be required to completely give up all of her rights under 
the Family Law Act in order to observe her religious tradition in the processes of family 
dispute resolution.  
 In sum we have come very close to realizing Shachar’s vision in one sense, and at 
the same time exponentially more distant from it. Excellent new reversal conditions in the 
form of several protections have now been included in the revised Arbitration Act, at the 
same time the monopoly of the state over family law matters was apparently reaffirmed 
to the exclusion of choice options related to faith based arbitration. Moreover, the trust 
necessary between majority and minoritized communities for transformative 
accommodation to work has been even more battered and bruised. As Shachar has 
argued, the tone of the “sharia debate” has likely promoted “reactive culturalism,” that is, 
the retreat away from the secular state back into one’s culture as a response to the 
perceived rejection by mainstream society of the culture in question. If the issue of faith 
based arbitration were raised again in the press, the old stereotypical discourse is now 
ready to rematerialize against it, making the potential to allow religious arbitration again 
virtually impossible.  
7.2.2 Anver Emon: Multicultural Jurisprudence  
 Anver Emon suggests that “the government and private sector can facilitate the 
development of a Muslim family-service civil society,” (Emon 2006, 353) but recognizes 
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that civil society alone may not always produce just ends in this realm. Thus, he 
recommends government regulated oversight of processes related to family services. 
Emon here is advocating not just the open competition between public state and private 
religious entities on this matter but also the public funding of religious family service 
organizations in order in part to ensure greater oversight and regulation of religious 
providers of family services (Emon 2006, 354). For example, Emon suggests that the 
government might build tax auditing procedures to “ensure that the financial support for 
each centre represents a community of interests, rather than a single donor trying to 
unduly influence the debate unilaterally” (354). I would add to that the general 
requirement that religious organizations receiving tax breaks (and in this case potentially 
tax dollars) would be required to be run by an elected board of governors. Interestingly, 
this too has already been practiced by the McGuinty government in some small measure. 
As mentioned in chapter 6, the McGuinty government has already used public tax dollars 
to pay for the contractual arrangement for services delivered by a Muslim religious 
organization, the Canadian Council of Muslim Women, to research this issue further, and 
has also paid them to create an Islamic marriage contract template that clearly outlines 
Muslim women’s rights according to specific Muslim traditions. Beyond this, Emon 
suggests all the checks and balances that the revised Arbitration Act now includes, such 
as requirements regarding training of arbitrators, record keeping, adherence to the default 
norms of Canadian jurisprudence, and independent legal advice, although again, 
ironically these have also now been excluded from being applied to faith based 
arbitration in the revised Act.  
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 What I think Emon offers here is a proposal for an open market system of 
religious family service provision that complements the transformative justice system that 
Shachar suggests. Muslims will not simply have the option to choose between secular 
state forms of legal resolution of family law disputes and religious forms as Shachar 
suggests, but they will also for example have a great variety of Muslim family service 
institutions to choose from as well. This adds a further level of choice and therefore a 
further element of “market” regulation into family law service provision.168 The other 
suggestion that Emon makes that Shachar does not is the public funding of religious 
organizations that provide these services. Shachar suggests clear choice options and 
reversal points, but not necessarily the funding of religious organizations in order to 
better develop as well as better oversee these institutions. Shachar’s program offers rather 
the benefit of state enforcement at the cost of state oversight, but this is state oversight at 
a distance in the sense that organizations are free to operate by the Family Law Act and 
observe its statutory norms in exchange for the potential enforceability of its arbitral 
awards, or not.  
 Facilitating Muslim family-service civil society through direct government 
funding of Muslim institutions presents a number of benefits as well as disadvantages. 
The obvious advantage is greater likelihood and assurance that the rights of vulnerable 
people will be protected by the legal norms of the state. However, a potential 
disadvantage is that Emon’s proposal might place a heavier hand of oversight on 
                                                 
168 I include here a qualification that Emon included in his own article in full, “To use ‘market’ and ‘Islam’ 
in the same sentence might strike some as odd, if not inappropriate. The idea here, though, is not to reduce 
religious practice and belief to some vulgar capitalist free market system. Rather, the ‘market’ is a 
metaphor used to understand how institutional development of a civil society sector can avoid current 
pitfalls, by ensuring a regulatory design meant to foster an open Muslim society, through various incentive 
structures that also protect against monopolistic control. For a study on the ‘religious marketplace’, see Rex 
Ahdar, “The idea of ‘religious markets’,” International Journal of Law in Context 2, no. 1 (2006): 49-65.” 
(Emon 2006, 26 footnote 105).  
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minoritized and marginalized communities, suggesting a paternalistic and imperialistic 
approach. Perhaps Shachar’s vision is preferable in this regard, as it maintains an arms-
length distance between the state and service providers. However, the other major 
advantage of Emon’s suggestion is that even though faith based arbitration is not 
officially allowed at the moment, the government could still proceed with facilitating the 
development of more general family service provision organizations in religious 
communities. This could have the double result that religious communities would be 
better equipped to protect vulnerable people over time, and in the long run this might 
increase the likelihood that faith based arbitration would again be allowed in future, 
under much more favourable circumstances. Once again, at that point the process of faith 
based arbitration would finally benefit from the excellent new protections and reversal 
conditions now afforded by the revised Arbitration Act.  
Both Shachar’s and Emon’s proposals are examples of transformative 
accommodation because they propose forms of accommodating diversity, which while 
attempting to protect the rights of vulnerable people and avoid imperial forms of 
secularism, also attempt to ultimately open Canadian legal traditions and institutions to 
genuine change rather than forcing minoritized people to assimilate to existing dominant 
norms.  
7.2.3 Veit Bader: Associational Democracy 
Veit Bader attempts to answer the question of legal and institutional pluralism in 
western democracies in a theoretical fashion.  In doing so, he suggests a model of 
associational democracy as a political philosophical justification for transformational 
accommodation (2009). Bader’s revolutionary suggestion is essentially to drop 
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secularism altogether. There are secular ideologies such as fascism, communism, and 
scientism that pose threats to the moral values of secular democracies, therefore targeting 
religious groups for special exclusions is unwarranted. Rather, Bader recommends 
refocusing on applying the minimal moral values of liberal democracy in the governance 
of all societal groups, religious or secular, though this still includes mutual autonomy for 
religious groups and governmental institutions. Bader suggests a middle way between, on 
the one hand, comprehensive liberalism or liberal perfectionism, which strongly favors 
individual liberties at the expense of associational interests, such as religious groups, and 
on the other hand, absolute accommodation, which favors the accommodation of 
associations such as religious groups at the expense of individual rights, especially those 
of minorities within minorities such as Muslim women and children. He proposes rather a 
decent society that upholds minimum standards of equality and human rights without 
enforcing absolute equality. Bader conceives state neutrality as ‘fairness as even 
handedness’ rather than ‘strict neutrality’ or ‘neutrality as hands off.’  
 However, Bader is not simply reinstalling the individualism of liberal democracy 
here. Associational democracy, as the phrase suggests, engages citizens as members of 
groups as well as individuals with certain rights. In terms of governance, associational 
democracy in Bader’s view favours manifold levels of government, and although he 
recommends a strong central state, it must also be minimal. Power sharing must also be 
as wide and diverse as possible without threatening the stability and minimal unity of the 
society. In this context, Bader recommends 1. maximum accommodation of religious 
groups, for example, recognition of religious holidays and dietary requirements, 2. 
political representation of religious groups through, for example, advisory councils, and 
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3. public funding of faith based institutions, for example faith based educational 
institutions and social service providers. He shows concretely that associational 
democracy can justify and produce policies that are maximally accommodating of 
religious diversity at the same time it justifies maximal protection of vulnerable people 
through his recommendations regarding faith based arbitration. The more religious 
groups want recognition and enforcement by the state of legal diversity, the more they 
must apply liberal democratic moral norms. If religious communities would like to use 
faith based arbitration, and ultimately rely on the state to enforce arbitral awards, then 
Bader suggests a number of recommendations for changing the Arbitration Act to better 
protect vulnerable people, rather than prohibiting faith based arbitration altogether. Bader 
recommends mandatory independent legal advice for both parties, carefully documenting 
the arbitration process in writing, freedom to turn to civil courts at any time, and several 
other procedural measures mentioned by other authors discussed in this dissertation and 
largely already enacted in the revised Arbitration Act of Ontario. He does not necessarily 
recommend heavy judicial review that would apply default amounts stipulated in the 
Family Law Act for example, though I think he would agree with the current revisions of 
the Arbitration Act which as discussed previously subsumes the Arbitration Act under the 
Family Law Act in matters of family law, with the proviso of defacto legal pluralism. In 
sum, Bader’s recommendations have essentially been implemented by the revisions to the 
Arbitration Act, minus the prohibition of faith based arbitration. For Bader, associational 
democracy would rather have allowed faith based arbitration to continue, but only in the 
context of the type of protections now offered in the revised Arbitration Act.  
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Bader’s contribution is to offer a larger political philosophy justification for 
transformative accommodation. My position is that both Shachar’s and Emon’s positions 
are laudable, but if Shachar’s is not fully realizable at the moment, Emon’s could be 
pursued in the meantime, preparing religious communities with better resources to 
provide alternative dispute resolution services if and when faith based arbitration is again 
allowed in the context of the Arbitration Act. 
7.2.4 Lori Beaman: Deep Equality 
 Veit Bader’s associational democracy, I would argue, is founded on the principle 
that Lori Beaman identifies as “deep equality.” Beaman argues that the dominant 
discourse of “reasonable accommodation” needs to be replaced because, like the term 
“tolerance,” reasonable accommodation suggests an us/them binary that must be 
challenged. In this binary, one group is imagined as a dominant majority that is offering 
accommodation to another group imagined as an exceptional, “not-normal” minority 
(Beaman 2012, 208). She states, “when we ‘accommodate’ someone we, grant an 
exception to the rule, rather than questioning the inclusiveness of the rule itself” (Beaman 
2012, 208). Beaman notes that in some recent court decisions concerning minoritized 
religious communities the courts have regressed to formal equality, that is a form of 
equality that treats everyone the same regardless of minoritized status and structural 
inequality in society. This is a step backwards from the achievement of a more 
substantive form of equality, which takes into account structural inequity in society and 
minoritized status, in other recent court decisions. Reasonable accommodation would 
presumably at least attempt to achieve more substantive modes of equality over formal 
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modes, but Beaman maintains that this still does not go far enough because of the 
us/them binary it continues to support.  
Therefore, Beaman promotes a commitment to “deep equality” instead of 
“reasonable accommodation.” She states, “As an emergent concept, deep equality might 
include a number of elements, including a substantive notion of equality, institutional 
flexibility, an emphasis on shared ground rather than otherness, a simultaneous 
recognition of difference that respects the richness of social texture, a complex 
understanding of identity, and agonistic respect169” (Beaman 2012, 213). Deep equality 
strives to be flexible as it attempts to achieve strong substantive forms of equality over 
weak forms of substantive equality or formal equality. Deep equality means 
acknowledging one’s privileged position that comes with beloning to the majority rather 
than assuming hierarchies of accommodation and tolerance to be normative. Deep 
equality is “needs-based and “practice-oriented,” innovative and creative” (Beaman 2012, 
213). In short, deep equality assumes the real equality of all people, to the extent that the 
justness of laws and social norms are questioned rather than the noncomformity of 
minoritized groups assumed and their relative accommodation negotiated.  
 Beaman makes an important observation about the “reasonable accommodation 
approach of great relevance to this dissertation. She states,  
Questions about agency, particularly that of women, are often used as a beginning 
point for discussion about what is reasonable accommodation or an appropriate 
level of tolerance. These discussions can lead to a situation in which women and 
children are “protected,” as was the frequent refrain during the hottest moments of 
                                                 
169 By “agonistic respect” Beaman means, building on the work of William Connolly a “willingness to 
suspend one’s own position to open space for conversation that involves shared exploration of possibilities” 
(Beaman 2012b) 
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public discussions about polygamy. Policies or approaches are therefore 
developed “for their own good,” with little or no consideration of the ways in 
which women themselves have and exercise agency. In the context of reasonable 
accommodation, practices that implicate women, such as the wearing of the niqab 
and hijab or polygamy, are then unable to be accommodated with little unpacking 
of the ways in which the practices manifest or implicate women. (Beaman 2012, 
213)  
This dissertation attempts to move toward deep equality by taking into account the lived 
experience of Muslims and Jews on the ground, and how they affect vulnerable people. I 
have argued that policies arising from a discourse of “rescue” have in fact left vulnerable 
people wanting. I suggest rather policies that recognize and facilitate agency, rather than 
assuming that vulnerable people must be rescued despite their putative lack of agency.  
 Notwithstanding a number of legitimate criticisms of multiculturalism, it can also 
positively enhance “not only the recognition of difference but also a simultaneous 
questioning of the very social construction of difference” (Beaman 2012, 215). This facet 
of multiculturalism facilitates deep equality. There are of course limits to freedom, 
religious or otherwise, that must be protected in the interests of justice. Yet Beaman 
argues, “Limits, though, and discussions of harm must be carefully worked through with 
a full exploration of the practice in question and an assessment of its social and cultural 
context” (Beaman 2012, 220). Deep equality attempts to establish justice on the basis of 
the substantive equality of all people, regardless of hierarchy and differentiation of power 
in society. In order to achieve that kind of equality, continuing inequity and hierarchy in 
society must be acknowledged, and policies and forms of justice developed to right these 
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inequities. A commitment to deep equality could, for example, lead to the adoption of the 
institutional and legal pluralism that Shachar, Emon and Bader encourage.  
 
7.3 Policy Recommendations 
 Having discussed the potential for developing transformative accommodation in 
the context of the faith based arbitration debate, I turn now to more specific and concrete 
policy recommendations meant to further develop an anti-colonial feminist and anti-
imperial secularist approach to the issues of inequity raised by the so called sharia debate. 
One of the main points I have sought to emphasize in this dissertation is the contrast 
between the issues that were thought to be important in the public “Sharia debate” 
regarding faith-based arbitration and the issues that are actually important to Ontario 
Muslims. Not unreasonably, the public debate imagined that the most important issue had 
to do with formal arbitration.170 This assumption meant that much of the debate focused 
on issues that could be legally decided by a third party in the context of arbitration, such 
as amounts of spousal support and child support, and division of resources upon marital 
breakdown. However, arbitration proper occurs only when two parties in dispute choose a 
third party to make a binding decision on behalf of both parties. Very few in the Muslim 
community, leaders or adherents, were or are interested in formal faith-based arbitration 
as such. According to my interviewees, the majority of clients seeking Muslim civil 
dispute resolution services are women in need of a religious divorce. Furthermore, the 
majority of Muslims who seek advice from religious leaders on how to divide resources, 
establish amounts for child and spousal support, or informally decide custody in 
                                                 
170 “Formal” arbitration is redundant, but I include it to emphasize the difference between that and 
“informal” mediation. 
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accordance with Islamic tradition are not interested in subjecting these decisions to 
formal arbitration. I found no Muslim leaders or organizations that were anxious to 
encourage couples to have these issues formally arbitrated, religiously or otherwise. This 
was not because Muslims now imagine faith based arbitration to be legally forbidden. 
The demand or desire was simply not there. The most dramatic case in point is that of the 
Islamic Institute of Civil Justice. The Islamic Institute of Civil Justice is the only 
organization I found that fully understood the nature and requirements of the Arbitration 
Act. Further, its members understand that limited forms of “faith-based arbitration” are 
still allowable and legally enforceable even under the new amendments to the Act as 
long as certain requirements and guidelines are followed. However, my research found 
that the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice has never performed a formal arbitration process, 
nor have their clients requested it – or even inquired about it. Moreover, the Institute has 
not attempted to use its knowledge of the Arbitration Act to either market or pressure 
their clients into entering into formal arbitration. Rather, the majority of its small number 
of clients, as was the case of all other Muslim organizations and leaders I have 
interviewed, were looking for assistance with some form of religious divorce whether it 
be talaq, khula, faskh, or marriage annulment.  
 I do not want to suggest here that the amendments to the Arbitration Act were not 
necessary. Clearly there are many positive benefits from the amendments. For example, 
because the previous version of the Arbitration Act was intended more for resolving 
business disputes, the relationship between the Arbitration Act and the Family Law Act 
had never been clearly established. The amendments define this relationship much more 
carefully and explicitly. Also, the unamended Arbitration Act had far too few protections 
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for vulnerable people built into the arbitration process. The amendments now include 
several of the recommendations made by the Boyd commission, as well as others, such as 
requiring independent legal advice.171 The only arguably contentious issue regarding the 
amendments was the decision to ban the use of any legal system other than Canadian law 
in arbitrations.172 If a law other than Canadian law is used in formal arbitration it will not 
be enforceable under the Arbitration Act. This amendment has effectively ended the use 
of “religious laws” in formal arbitration. Although, as the website for the Attorney 
General’s Office points out, religious figures can still act as arbitrators and may still give 
mediatory advice based on religious laws that may then be entered into enforceable civil 
contracts (attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/arbitration/faith-based.asp). 
Importantly, arbitrators cannot “force” a decision based on religious law as an arbitrator 
in the context of a “formal” arbitration, though they may perform “advisory” arbitrations 
that are not binding. In my view the amendments that have been made to the Arbitration 
Act are valuable and important, and I do not want to detract from this reality. My point 
here is that, although this policy change has made potential uses of the Arbitration Act 
much more just for possible future use, in practice, the vast majority of private ordering 
of civil matters in Muslim communities remains untouched.  
7.3.1 Real Issues and Imagined Crises 
 Having established the importance of the issue of religious divorce over the issue 
of formal faith-based arbitration for Ontario Muslims, I turn to the possible importance 
and impact of these findings. First, the empirical inaccuracies of much of the negative 
                                                 
171 For a more detailed account of the amendments to the Arbitration Act please see the introduction to this 
dissertation.  
172 Natasha Bakht, for example, argues that banning religious arbitration was a mistake (Bakht 2005, 67-
82). 
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media discourse and portrayals of Muslim civil dispute resolution are noteworthy. 
Contrary to these representations, I found several Muslim organizations and leaders 
attempting to accomplish Muslim divorce in a way that was intended, and perceived by 
clients, to be highly supportive of Muslim women’s rights and interests. The vast 
majority of clients approaching Muslim leaders and organizations regarding civil matters 
were Muslim women looking for assistance relating to some aspect of Islamic divorce. In 
the majority of cases I found leaders and organizations undertaking efforts to free women 
from their religious marriages. That is not to say that there are not issues of inequity and 
patriarchy to be addressed. Unequal access to religious divorce is the practice of a 
patriarchal system of law. Therefore, I do not mean to paint an overly positive picture 
that suggests there are no problems with private ordering of civil disputes in Ontario’s 
Muslim communities. Rather, I seek to challenge and complicate the much starker and 
overwhelmingly negative portrayals of Muslim dispute resolution that proliferated in the 
media during the “Sharia debate.”  
 This leads me to my second point. I am persuaded by my findings that policy-
wise the Ontario provincial government has missed the boat for a number of reasons. The 
positive elements of the amendments to the Arbitration Act notwithstanding, little policy 
has arisen as a result of the Sharia debate that has helped the vast majority of Muslims 
currently seeking private dispute resolution in civil matters. There are also issues of 
inequity and patriarchy that the amendments to the Arbitration Act do not touch. First, 
one of the main sources of oppression from which Muslim women suffer is being stuck in 
a “limping marriage.” This situation arises because men have a unilateral right to divorce 
independent of any religious authority, while women do not. Many imams and Muslim 
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organizations are attempting to remedy this by freeing Muslim women from limping 
marriages. Second, completely outside of “formal arbitration” some imams may not be 
equitable in a number of areas having to do with informal civil dispute resolution. I will 
give three types of examples. Some imams are not willing to grant a religious divorce 
where clearly the state would grant a legal divorce.173 In addition, though my findings 
suggest that this may be rare, some imams may give informal religious advice to 
divorcing couples regarding support payments, division of resources, and custody which 
may not be acceptable with regards to the default norms of Ontario’s Family Law Act. 
Such decisions are not being made in the context of the Arbitration Act, but they are fully 
enforceable by the state if they are entered into a civil contract such as a separation 
agreement. Finally, some imams clearly do not recognize or know how to address 
domestic abuse. I interviewed several who did take it seriously and immediately advised 
Muslim women to call the police, but Julie Macfarlane (2012) and I both found some 
Muslim leaders who did not act effectively or appropriately on this issue. Once again, the 
amendments to the Arbitration Act make virtually no difference on any of these issues. I 
do not want to mention these issues in a way that simply confirms the stereotypes 
proliferated in the press during the Sharia debate. Just like non-Muslim communities in 
Ontario, there are several people living and acting justly, and there are a number of 
people and institutions that continue to struggle with patriarchy and other forms of 
inequity. 
7.3.2 What Is To Be Done? 
                                                 
173 For example, more than one of my interview respondents informed me that a woman approached them 
for a religious divorce after she had been refused a religious divorce from another imam. 
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 What, if anything, can be done in terms of policy that might help Muslim women 
and men seeking assistance from their community regarding religious divorce and other 
civil disputes? I suggest three proposals. First, I turn to the issue of the granting of the 
religious divorce. Is there anything the state can do to improve this process? To consider 
this query I turn to communities of Canadian Jewish women who recently lobbied the 
government to change state legislation to require Jewish men to grant a religious divorce 
once a legal divorce has been granted (Joseph 1994; Kayfetz 1986; Leung 2008). 
Something similar might be considered for Muslim communities where husbands refuse 
to give the talaq, and imams refuse to grant a religious divorce on behalf of the husband. 
Also, a formal or informal commission might be set up that could consult with Muslim 
communities regarding a larger Ontario Muslim consensus on the status of the legal 
divorce as equivalent to a religious divorce. A number of imams and organizations in 
Ontario already state that legal divorce in the Canadian context is equivalent to an Islamic 
divorce religiously. There are international examples for this as well. An umbrella 
organization of Muslim leaders in New York has declared that legal divorces are valid as 
Islamic divorces (personal communication with Laury Silvers, November 8, 2009). If this 
kind of endeavor were successful in Canada, it could resolve the majority of the issues 
that arise in the context of religious divorce. Finally, the government could assist Muslim 
communities to educate their adherents about their rights under Islamic law, including 
specifically the possibility of recognizing a Canadian civil divorce as equivalent to a 
religious divorce, which several imams in Ontario do already.174  
                                                 
174 Although this recommendation might raise concerns regarding assumptions about secularism being a 
clear separation between church (religious institutions) and the state, my recommendations build on several 
already existing connections between religious institutions and the state in Canada, in a country that has 
never in fact fully embraced the American model of a “wall of separation” (Biles and Humera 2005).  
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 Second is the issue of potentially inequitable recommendations made by Muslim 
leaders and organizations for resolving civil disputes. The matter of potentially 
inequitable advice based on particular Muslim interpretations of Islamic law regarding 
the terms of divorce remains an issue for some Muslim women who might approach 
Muslim leaders who hold to patriarchal interpretations of Islamic law. Once again, with 
the assistance of community members willing to participate, the government could 
facilitate community education regarding the rights of Muslim men and women, and the 
options for divorce.  
Although some may think the state should not involve itself in such things, there 
is precedent. The Liberal McGuinty government has already quietly funded a number of 
such projects in the Muslim community. As mentioned before, the McGuinty government 
has given funds to the Canadian Council of Muslim Women to enable the Canadian 
Council of Muslim Women to commission three such projects (see Chapter 6). The 
Canadian Council of Muslim Women is also lobbying the government to provide legal 
aid to people looking for faith-based arbitration. Currently it is not the usual practice of 
the government to provide legal aid in this context. This amendment appears to be a 
major shortcoming, for even though the Arbitration Act now requires independent legal 
advice for arbitrations, the people who will likely need it most – vulnerable people with 
few financial resources – are precisely those who would not be able to afford the lawyers 
in order to benefit from the protections the new regulations provide. Furthermore, the 
Canadian Council of Muslim Women has lobbied the government to train “cultural 
interpreters” that understand better the diverse cultures and religions of people accessing 
the justice system so that it may be more accommodating and understanding of 
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differences, making the secular legal system potentially more accessible and welcoming 
to wary Muslims. These kinds of projects are excellent precedents, and changes in public 
policy could distribute them more widely and market them more effectively in Muslim 
communities. 
 Third is the issue of domestic abuse. It is encouraging to find that a modest 
number of mosques and Muslim organizations are holding their own community 
education workshops on domestic violence.175 These gatherings are certainly uncommon, 
but no more so than in any other religious community.  Government along with Muslim 
and non-Muslim community organizations and NGOs might be able to assist in 
organizing and carrying out educational workshops designed to educate imams and other 
religious leaders in particular regarding how to deal appropriately with domestic violence 
in Ontario.  
 Fourth and finally, the public discourse on faith based arbitration, with all its 
attendant misunderstandings and stereotypical figures, which the McGuinty government 
did very little to clarify or counter, has perhaps done far more damage to vulnerable 
Muslims than faith based arbitration has or could. I strongly recommend a much more 
ambitious government policy of anti-Islamophobia to parallel anti-racism campaigns of 
the 1980s to the present. The discourse employed by McGuinty in his announcement 
quoted above that there would be “no sharia in Ontario” only confirmed and heightened 
Islamophobic sentiments rather than challenging them as he should have done. 
 
7.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
                                                 
175 I found three institutions that undertook such workshops recently between 2006 and 2009. 
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 The strength of this study is in the original fieldwork investigating what Muslims 
and Jews actually practice on the ground with regard to faith based arbitration 
specifically and the resolution of civil disputes in the context of family law generally. As 
documented in the introductory chapter, there are several publications on the debate over 
faith based arbitration in Ontario that evaluate the media discourse or are theoretical in 
nature. My study helps to fill a gap in the research. However, in future one would like to 
see more studies completed that test the representativeness of these research findings. 
Julie Macfarlane has completed the only other substantial fieldwork project on this 
subject that I am aware of in Canada, and she agrees that more study needs to be done in 
order to confirm our preliminary results (personal communication with Julie Macfarlane, 
February 11, 2008). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, there are several other Canadian 
provinces that have arbitration acts that could be used in the realm of family law. I would 
like to see research done in other provinces than Ontario on faith based arbitration, 
mediation, and religious divorce. Eventually, it would also be important to do cross-
cultural comparison with similar laws in other jurisdictions around the world. This would 
help us to understand our findings in the larger national and global context, and would 
help us understand whether our findings in Ontario are unique or are represented 
elsewhere. This would allow us to understand regional differences in the governance of 
religious diversity in Canada and to compare and contrast the relationship between 
religion, multiculturalism, politics and law in various jurisdictions. 
 Beyond more representative studies I envision several possible new directions for 
future projects based on the findings of this study. First, I would like to explore the 
influence and effectiveness of the Marriage Contract Toolkit created by the Canadian 
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Council of Muslim Women (ccmw.com). This toolkit attempts to make Muslim women 
better aware of their rights in marriage, and to have them negotiate and protect those 
rights through the marriage contract or nikah at the beginning of the marital relationship. 
However, it is not clear how widely used this toolkit will be. Related to this, future 
research projects could explore how well Muslims are aware of their religious rights in 
the context of marriage, how many go to the trouble of enshrining these rights in their 
nikahs, and to what extent. This research would tell us whether the Canadian Council of 
Muslim Women Marriage Contract Toolkit has been effective or not, and it would tell us 
how well Muslim women are aware of their Islamic and Canadian marital rights, and to 
what extent they act on those rights to protect their rights through the formation of their 
nikah’s. Together, this will allow us to understand how the state and groups in civil 
society operate to integrate immigrants and minority religious traditions into Canadian 
society. 
 Second, I would like to document more representatively how many Muslims seek 
out the religious divorce in addition to a civil divorce compared to how many only seek 
out the civil divorce, and I would like to compare these findings over time. It is clear 
from McFarlane’s research and my own that the religious divorce is widely sought 
among Muslims in Ontario. However, it is not clear how many Muslims do not care to 
seek out the religious divorce, whether this correlates with religious adherence or 
ethnicity, or whether the numbers of Muslims seeking the religious divorce will go down 
over time as Muslim immigrants increasingly integrate into Canadian society and the 
numbers of Canadian born Muslims increase. It is likely that one may be more or less 
likely to desire a religious divorce based on his or her country of origin, or whether they 
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are Canadian born. This will allow us to understand changing patterns of religious 
divorce over time and to better understand the extent of the practice of religious divorce 
among Muslims in Canada.  
 Third, I would be interested in seeing a future study of faith based mediation more 
generally. The Ontario family courts have lists of Muslim lawyers and mediators that 
they refer Muslim clients to in the event of civil disputes. I should like to see this 
relationship between the secular state and faith based, or at least faith-sensitive, mediators 
better explored and theorized. I would also like to explore how the faith based or faith-
sensitive and even culturally-sensitive nature of the mediator affects the process of 
mediation in diverse family-related disputes. This would fill in a large gap in the 
research. Our fieldwork to date has focused on religious divorce and faith based 
mediation and arbitration largely in the context of religious communities. However, this 
research would enable us to understand better what is happening with regard to religious 
accommodation or sensitivity in the context of court mandated mediation.  
 Fourth, it might be useful to investigate and compare specific ethnic groups. 
Many of the Muslims that participated in the study are of South Asian origin or serve 
South Asian communities. However, I learned in my research that Somali communities 
for example are somewhat different in that tribal elders, in addition to imams, still play an 
important role in mediating disputes. This research would allow us to better understand 
ethnic and cultural diversity within Muslim communities as it relates to faith based 
resolution of family law matters.  
 I would like to see the theoretical work referenced and developed in this 
dissertation to be further developed in the post-colonial discourse. The notions I suggest 
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in anti-imperial secularism and post-secular feminism should be better represented and 
developed in the post-colonial academic literature. This work would enable us to better 
understand multiple secularisms and feminisms, which ultimately will assist in 
dismantling colonial and patriarchal powers in the interests of building more fair and just 
societies.  
 Finally, as a part-research/part-community-building project, a Muslim researcher 
might explore the possibility of cooperating with Muslim women’s agencies and Muslim 
social work agencies regarding the production of a pamphlet that explains their position 
on the granting of the religious divorce designed to let women know their religious 
options. Some Muslim women’s organizations, such as the Canadian Council of Muslim 
Women, believe that the civil divorce counts as a religious divorce, and find it difficult to 
understand why women feel they must also have a religious divorce granted by a 
religious leader or institution. To my knowledge the Canadian Council of Muslim 
Women is not addressing the issue of the religious divorce at all. However, based on my 
research it is clear that several Muslims in Ontario do feel this need, and that having 
limited access to religious divorce is a substantial issue of unequal access and oppression 
among Muslim women with limping marriages. Several Muslim organizations might then 
be interested in producing a pamphlet that explains various positions on whether or not 
one needs a religious divorce and generate awareness of options for Muslim women 
decide to pursue a religious divorce. One Muslim social worker I interviewed for this 
project reminds us of the need for such public education: “We want women to know that 
they can end their marriage even if they have been abandoned… Women need to be 
reminded, if one imam says no, don’t stop, try another one.” This pamphlet could be 
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published in several languages and distributed to social service and immigrant settlement 
agencies and programs in addition to as many masjids as will accept them. The goal here 
is to generate engaged academic scholarship in cooperation with community stake 
holders to achieve their goals.  
 Several voices raised legitimate concerns about the potential for state enforcement 
of inequitable religious arbitrations in the so-called Sharia debate. The McGuinty 
government’s decision takes important steps in protecting vulnerable people in the 
context of formal arbitration.  However, these reforms have not gone far enough in 
protecting the rights of vulnerable people, especially women seeking religious divorce. 
The vast majority of instant advocates for Muslim women who spoke out during the 
dramatic media debate have all but forgotten the issue. My research shows that 
understanding and developing the ongoing linkages between the modern Canadian state 
and the private practice of religion through transformative accommodation is central to 
ensuring the protection of the rights of vulnerable people. My study of faith-based 
religious groups in southern Ontario highlights how what is at stake for such people – 
religious divorce – has been largely ignored by government and public policy. The 
Islamophobic discourse of the public debate inspired by imperial secularism has led to a 
wrong-headed and paternalistic public policy. A commitment to post-secular feminism 
and anti-imperial secularism would lead to policies that affirm the agency and dignity of 






Appendix A – Fieldwork Research Information and Consent Form 
 
Dear (Focus Group Participant’s Name): 
 
This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study I am conducting as part of 
my Doctoral degree in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Waterloo 
under the supervision of Professor Dr. David Seljak and Dr. Jasmin Zine. I would like to 
provide you with more information about this project and what your involvement would 
entail if you decide to take part. 
 
The issue of faith based arbitration has been an important public issue since at least 2003 
when the media brought it to the public’s attention. And although it appears that this is a 
dead issue after the McGuinty government’s decision to exclude the practice of faith 
based arbitration from Ontario’s Arbitration Act, the issue remains of great importance to 
religious adherents who may mediate or informally arbitrate civil disputes within their 
religious community. Moreover, the public debate on the issue focused very little on the 
experiences and perceptions of actual or potential users of faith based arbitration or the 
perceptions of diverse Muslims who would not use faith based arbitration and why. The 
purpose of this study, therefore, is to document the experiences and perceptions of faith 
based arbitration of both arbitrators and members of religious communities who have 
used faith based arbitration or mediation services or may use them in the future. It is also 
to document diverse Muslim perceptions of faith based arbitration including those who 
would not use these services and why. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately one 
to two hours in length to take place in a mutually agreed upon location. You may choose 
to be interviewed in person or over the telephone. You may choose to consent to this 
interview in writing or by verbal consent in which case I will record that you consented 
verbally. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so wish. 
Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative 
consequences by advising the researcher.  With your permission, the interview will be 
audio recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis. 
Shortly after the interview has been completed, I will send you a copy of the transcript to 
give you an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of our conversation and to add or clarify 
any points that you wish. All information you provide is considered completely 
confidential. Your name will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study, 
however, with your permission anonymous quotations may be used in the thesis and in 
academic publications. Data collected during this study will be retained in a secure 
private location indefinitely. Electronic data will be stored on compact disks kept in a 
secure and private location. Only researchers associated with this project will have 
access. Some participants in this study may become upset due to their or others 
experiences with religious arbitration. Contact information for a counseling referral will 
be provided with the assistance of the ISSRA (Islamic Social Services and Resources 
Association) in response to such a situation. 
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If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to 
assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me by email at 
ccutting@artsmail.uwaterloo.ca. You can also contact my supervisor, Professor David 
Seljak at 519-884-8111 ext. 28232 or email dseljak@watarts.uwaterloo.ca. You may also 
contact Dr. Jasmin Zine at 519.884.0710 ext.3267, or by email jzine@wlu.ca. 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance 
through the Office of Research Ethics. However, the final decision about participation is 
yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this 
study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes of this office at 519-888-4567 Ext. 36005. 
I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those religious communities and 
organizations directly involved in the study, as well as to the broader research 
community. 
 
I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your 
assistance in this project. 
Yours Sincerely, 





 CONSENT FORM 
 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being 
conducted by Christopher Cutting of the Department of Religious Studies at the 
University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this 
study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any additional details I 
wanted. 
I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be audio recorded to 
ensure an accurate recording of my responses.   
I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the thesis and/or 
publications to come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will 
be anonymous.  
I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising 
the researcher.   
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of 
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.  I was informed that if I have any 
comments or concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact the 
Director, Office of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567 ext. 36005.  
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this 
study. 
YES     NO     
I agree to have my interview audio recorded. 
YES    NO     
I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of 
this research. 
YES   NO 
Participant Name: ____________________________ (Please print)   
 








• What is the History of service and activities at the specific religious institution?  
• Does this institution have any relation to other known providers of FBA such 
as the Darul Iftaa or the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice?  
• Where are you from originally?  
• What is your training? (Islam, Canadian law, mediation, counseling, addressing 
abuse, etc.)? 
• Approximately how large is the religious community you serve. 
• How many people from your community have used your services as an arbitrator 
or mediator and how often?  
• What is the ethnic makeup of this religious community? 
 
Introduce the main topic: 
 
• What are your impressions of the public debate regarding faith based arbitration?  
• How do you feel about how Muslims were represented in the press? 
• Were you involved at all in this debate? 
 
• What in your opinion are the pros and cons of faith based arbitration (as it was 
before McGuinty’s decision)? 
 
• Did you know about the arbitration act before the press event? 
 
• What did you think of Boyd’s recommendations? (Have you read them?) 
• Do you think the arbitration act could have been better amended? 
 
• In your perception: What was faith based arbitration before McGuinty’s 
decision. (I.e. in place since 1991). 
 
• What is your perception of the state of FBA now after McGuinty’s 
announcement and the amendments?  
 
• What is your impression of what has been lost with these changes to FBA?  
 
• Do you think the McGuinty government’s decision to disallow FBA has 
effectively protected “vulnerable peoples”? Why or why not?  
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• What do you make of media representations of Muslim men wanting to use 
FBA inequitably? To what degree does your experience confirm or contrast with 
these representations? 
 
• Can imams do something about potentially inequitable uses of FBA? 
 
• What now? 
 
Details of the practice of faith based arbitration and mediation: 
 
• Why is it important to get an Islamic marriage/divorce/arbitration/mediation?  
• Are or should Muslims be Obligated to use FBA? Would Muslim be more 
obligated to use FBA if it were still allowed?  
 
• Who comes looking for these services (FBA or mediation)? 
 
• Can you describe to me the way a typical mediation might proceed? 
 
• What is the specific legal tradition on which you base your arbitration and 
mediation services? Do you give advice based on more than one legal tradition? 
  
• Are records kept of the proceedings? (Both arbitration & informal mediation?) 
 
• Are disputants informed of their rights under religious and Canadian law?  
 
• Are there efforts and procedures employed to encourage transparency and 
accountability? 
 
• Is independent legal advice encouraged? Required? 
 
• Are any attempts made to protect the rights and meet the needs of vulnerable 
persons? What specific provisions have been made?  
 
• Has the provision of these services and their results been received well by those 
using faith-based arbitration services? I.e. have the disputants generally reported 
positive evaluations of the result, and have both parties honoured the decisions? 
 
• How successful has the community been in enforcing an arbitrator’s decision? 
 
• Can you provide any anonymous Stories/examples of mediations/arbitrations 
you’ve been involved in good/bad? 
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What are your interpretations of Islamic law regarding the details of divorce: 
 
• Nikkah (Marriage contract). Do you inform women of their rights at this 
point and attempt to encourage marriage contracts that provide for equitable 
support and division of resources in the event of relationship breakdown? 
• What is your understanding of the rights of women under Islamic law with 
regard to marriage and divorce?  
 
• Iddat (Support Three month waiting period?) amount that would last longer? 
Specific examples? One year of support?  
 
• Spousal support?  
 
• Child support?  
 
• Mahr (Dowry). Recommended amounts? 
 
• Khula? (Wife initiated divorce) Mahr forfeited?  
 
• Must women get men’s permission to divorce? 
 
• Have you known women who have experienced abandonment or 
retribution because of initiating divorce? 
 
• Custody? Specific examples? 
 
• What is your procedure for screening for and addressing domestic violence or 
abuse? 
 
• Inheritance (disputes)? 
 
• Might a civil divorce count as an Islamic divorce?  
 
• Are there any challenges that have arisen in the offering of these mediative or 






• Could Sharia be interpreted (authentically for you) in a way that is more 
conducive to women’s and children’s rights and protections in terms of Canadian 
legal norms?  
 
• Can there be to some degree a Canadian Islamic law tradition? 
 
• Do you think Canadian family law could and should be made to be better 
sensitive to the needs of Muslim communities?  
 
The issue of training: 
 
• Could/should the quality of training faith based arbitrators or mediators receive 
be improved? (Religious, Canadian law, mediation, counseling, addressing 
domestic abuse). 
 
• Do you think that some trained mediators/arbitrators could make better decisions 
than some informal mediators/arbitrators? 
 
• Have some community leaders and mediators had a positive impact on 
spreading women’s rights according to Islamic and/or Canadian tradition? 
 
Community building potential: 
 
• Do you feel there is Community building potential with regard to providing 
faith based arbitration or mediation? (Re: education, rights, accountability, service 
provision, working together with other organizations? More?) 
• Is there anything being done here regarding community building already? 
 
Can you suggest other people I might interview?    
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• What is the History of service and activities at the specific religious 
institution?  
• Does this institution have any relation to other known providers of FBA 
such as the Beth Din?  
• Where are you from originally?  
• What is your training? (Judaism/Jewish law, Canadian law, mediation, 
counseling, addressing abuse, etc.)? 
• Approximately how large is the religious community you serve. 
• How many people from your community have used your services as an 
arbitrator or mediator and how often?  
• What is the ethnic makeup of this religious community? 
 
 
Introduce the main topic: 
 
• What are your impressions of the public debate regarding faith based 
arbitration?  
• How do you feel about how Jews were represented in the press? 
• Were you involved at all in this debate? 
 
• What in your opinion are the pros and cons of faith based arbitration (as it 
was before McGuinty’s decision)? 
 
• Did you know about the arbitration act before the press event? 
 
• What did you think of Boyd’s recommendations? (Have you read them?) 
• Do you think the arbitration act could have been better amended? 
 
• In your perception: What was faith based arbitration before McGuinty’s 
decision. (I.e. in place since 1991). 
 
• What is your perception of the state of FBA now after McGuinty’s 
announcement and the amendments?  
 
• What is your impression of what has been lost with these changes to FBA?  
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• Do you think the McGuinty government’s decision to disallow FBA has 
effectively protected “vulnerable peoples”? Why or why not?  
 
• What now? 
 
 
Details of the practice of faith based arbitration and mediation: 
 
• Why is it important to get an Jewish marriage/divorce/arbitration/mediation?  
• Are or should Jews be Obligated to use FBA? Would Jews be more obligated 
to use FBA if it were still allowed?  
 
• Who comes looking for these services (FBA or mediation)? 
 
• Can you describe to me the way a typical mediation might proceed? 
 
• What is the specific legal tradition on which you base your arbitration and 
mediation services? Do you give advice based on more than one legal tradition? 
  
• Are records kept of the proceedings? (Both arbitration & informal 
mediation?) 
 
• Are disputants informed of their rights under religious and Canadian law?  
 
• Are there efforts and procedures employed to encourage transparency and 
accountability? 
 
• Is independent legal advice encouraged? Required? 
 
• Are any attempts made to protect the rights and meet the needs of vulnerable 
persons? What specific provisions have been made?  
 
• Has the provision of these services and their results been received well by 
those using faith-based arbitration services? I.e. have the disputants generally 
reported positive evaluations of the result, and have both parties honoured the 
decisions? 
 
• How successful has the community been in enforcing an arbitrator’s 
decision? 
 
• Can you provide any anonymous Stories/examples of mediations/arbitrations 
you’ve been involved in good/bad? 
 
 
What are your interpretations of Jewish law re: the details of divorce: 
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• What can be negotiated in a marriage contract? 
 
• Do you inform women of their rights and attempt to encourage marriage 
contracts that provide for equitable support and division of resources in the 
event of relationship breakdown? 
• What are the rights of women under Jewish law in Marriage? (I.e. Men to 
take care of financial responsibilities? Compensation for women’s domestic labor 
(compensation upon divorce)? Keep her own assets. Keep her maiden name? Etc.) 
 
• Is there a specifically Jewish Waiting period of separation before divorce? 
 
• Are there unique Jewish ways to calculate Spousal support? Specific examples? 
 
• Are there unique Jewish ways to calculate the Division of Property and Family 
Assets upon divorce? 
 
• Are there unique Jewish ways to calculate Child support? Specific examples? 
 
• What kind of Mohar (Dowry) is normally included in Jewish marriage 
contracts? Specific examples? Recommended amounts?  
 
• Have you had to address issues in your community surrounding the granting 
of the Ghet? Are there very many agunot women in your community? How 
do you or the community deal with this issue? 
 
• Are there unique Jewish ways to decide child Custody? Specific examples? 
 
• Violence or abuse procedure (children, women)? Screening? Specific examples? 
 
• Are there unique Jewish methods for designing a will according to Jewish law 
or tradition, or settling a dispute over Inheritance? Specific examples? 
 
• How much accommodation to Canadian legal norms has been made here? 
 
• Are there any problems or challenges that have arisen in the offering of these 





• Could Jewish law be interpreted (authentically for you) in a way that is more 
conducive to women’s and children’s rights and protections in terms of Canadian 
legal norms?  
 
• Can there be to some degree a Canadian Jewish law tradition? 
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• Do you think Canadian family law could and should be made to be better 
sensitive to the needs of Jewish communities?  
 
The issue of training: 
 
• Could/should the quality of training faith based arbitrators or mediators receive 
be improved? (Religious, Canadian law, mediation, counseling, addressing 
domestic abuse). 
 
• Do you think that some trained mediators/arbitrators could make better decisions 
than some informal mediators/arbitrators? 
 
• Have some community leaders and mediators had a positive impact on 
spreading women’s rights according to Jewish and/or Canadian tradition? 
 
Community building potential: 
 
• Do you feel there is Community building potential with regard to providing 
faith based arbitration or mediation? (Re: education, rights, accountability, service 
provision, working together with other organizations? More?) 
• Is there anything being done here regarding community building already? 
 
Can you suggest other people I might interview?    
 
Conclusion of Interview.  
 
 
Addendum: Questions for participants involved in the Beth Din: 
 
• How long have you been a judge with the Beth Din? 
 
• How long have you been working in Ontario? (Your background?) 
 
• How does the Beth Din work? 
 
• How many “judges” are there that make judgments at the Beth din? 
 
• What kind of training does a judge require? 
 
• Does a Jewish judge also require training outside Jewish law in mediation 
techniques, counseling, and screening for abuse? 
 
• How often are arbitrations done? Mediations? 
 
• Are mediations always done before arbitration? 
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• Do Mostly men or women or both look for this service? 
 
• What issues do you arbitrate/mediate? 
 
• Which issues to you arbitrate/mediate most often (and how often for each 
general type)? (I.e. Family law issues: Divorce, support, custody, inheritance? 
Business disputes? Can you give me specific (anonymous) examples to illustrate? 
 
• Are disputants informed of their Jewish and Canadian legal rights as part of 
the process of arbitration or mediation? 
 
• Are there efforts made and procedures employed to encourage transparency and 
accountability? Examples? 
 
• Is Independent legal advice encouraged or required? 
 
• Are any attempts made to protect the rights and meet the needs of vulnerable 
persons? Examples? 
 
• Has the provision of these services and their results been received well by those 
using faith-based arbitration services? I.e. have the disputants generally reported 
positive evaluations of the result, and have both parties honoured the decisions? 
 
• How successful has the community been in enforcing an arbitrator’s decision? (Is 
community pressure a factor for informal enforcement? Have arbitrations needed 


























1. I would like to read more information about this project before I complete this survey
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1. How important is it to you to have an Islamic marriage or Nikah (as opposed to only 
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1. If you and your partner were divorcing, how important to you would it be to have an 
Islamic divorce?
2. If you were involved in a divorce, how important for you would it be to have issues such 
as the division of family assets, amount and duration of maintenance of a dependent wife 
and children, and child custody decided according to Islamic principles? (I realize the term 
"Islamic Principles" is very general, and that there is a lot of complexity and diversity that 
could be included under this term. Please feel free to make any comments on this term you 
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1. If you were drawing up your will, how important would it be for you to will your assets to 
your family according to Islamic principles? (Once again, please feel free to comment on 
the term "Islamic principles" if you wish. Or simply refer back to what you have written 
previously on this if applicable).
2. If you were involved in a dispute with your family over an inheritance that was willed to 
you, how important would it be to you to have that dispute resolved according to Islamic 
principles? (Once again, please feel free to comment on the term "Islamic principles" if you 















































1. How do you feel about faith based MEDIATION generally?
2. How do you feel about faith based ARBITRATION generally?
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1. Hypothetically, would you recommend a friend or family member use faith based 
MEDIATION?
2. Hypothetically, if faith based ARBITRATION was still allowed, would you recommend a 
friend or family member use faith based ARBITRATION?
 



































Appendix D – Web Survey
327
1. Have you known anyone who has used faith based mediation or arbitration in the past? 
(Check all that apply).
2. Have you used faith based mediation or arbitration in the past? (Check all that apply).
3. Hypothetically, might you use faith based MEDIATION in the future for advice or to help 
resolve an issue or dispute? (Check all that apply).
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4. Hypothetically, if faith based ARBITRATION were still allowed, might you have used faith 
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1. How do you feel your religious community was represented in the media and public 
debate generally? 
2. Do you agree or disagree with the Dalton McGuinty government's decision to change 
the Ontario Arbitration Act so that the state will no longer enforce arbitrations decided 
according to religious laws?
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1. Do you feel generally that Muslim faith based mediators are adequately aware of 
women’s rights in Islamic law?
2. Do you feel generally that Muslim faith based mediators are adequately aware of 
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3. Do you feel that Islamic law or Sharia can be interpreted and applied today in civil 
disputes in a way that is generally in keeping with Canadian law? (I realize the terms 
“Sharia” and “Islamic law” are very general, and that there is a lot of complexity and 
diversity that could be included under these terms. Please feel free to make any comments 

















Appendix D – Web Survey
332
1. Would you feel comfortable going to secular lawyers and courts to resolve civil disputes 
such as divorce, custody, or inheritance disputes?
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1. Do you consider yourself to be a practicing Muslim?
2. How important is it to you to live according to the Sharia generally? (Not necessarily 
according to Islamic family law in particular). I realize the term "Sharia" is very general, and 
that there is a lot of complexity and diversity that could be included under this term. Please 











































2. What is your age range?
3. What is your relationship status?
4. Do you have any children?
5. What do you consider to be your nationality(s)?
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1. If you would like to make any comments regarding the issues this survey raises, or the 





















Appendix E – Email Interview Questions 
 
FBA = Faith Based Arbitration. 
 
 
1. How important is it to you to live according to the Sharia generally? How does it 
affect your everyday life? To whom do you go if you have a question about Sharia? 
 
 
2. What are your perceptions of faith-based arbitration and/or mediation? Do you have 
any stories to tell relevant to this? In your perception, how sensitive to women’s 
rights in Islamic and/or Canadian legal traditions are faith based arbitrators presently? 
 
 
3. If you were involved in a civil dispute, would you want (or feel obligated) to have 
that dispute decided according to Sharia? Why? If so, who would you go to for help 
in doing this (if anyone)? How do you feel about the Canadian court system as a way 
to settle civil disputes? Could it be improved to better meet the needs of Muslims? 
 
 
4. If you have reservations about FBA, would your opinions change if the quality of 
FBA that was being offered were more to your liking? I.e. More sensitive to Muslim 
women’s Islamic and/or Canadian rights? Do you think this is possible in future? 
 
 
5. How do you feel your religious community was represented in the media and public 
debate on FBA generally?  
 
 
6. What do you think of McGuinty’s decision to disallow FBA and has this affected 
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